Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 3/6/20 Zak Goldstein 3/6/20

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Court May Consider Total Weight of Drugs Handled on Different Occasions at Sentencing

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the case of United States v. Diaz. The Court held that a trial court may consider the cumulative weight of drugs possessed by a defendant for purposes of his sentencing guidelines. This decision is important because it allows a trial court to aggregate all of the drugs that a defendant possessed on different occasions when calculating the guideline sentencing range, which can make the recommended sentence much higher. Even minor differences in the weight of drugs involved can have a dramatic effect on a criminal defendant’s sentencing guidelines.

United States v. Diaz

The defendant was charged along with five co-defendants with conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute heroin. One of the co-defendants, Guzman, allegedly orchestrated the conspiracy. He distributed drugs to his co-defendants, including his mother and the defendant. All of the defendant’s co-defendants pleaded guilty. The defendant, however, pleaded not guilty and went to trial.

After being indicted, the defendant represented that he could not afford counsel and he was appointed a Criminal Justice Act (CJA) counsel to represent him. Shortly after his CJA counsel was retained, she accepted a position as an assistant district attorney with an unknown prosecutor’s office. As such, she withdrew from the defendant’s case and he was appointed a new attorney on July 13, 2016. The defendant was not satisfied with his new attorney’s representation. According to the defendant, his new attorney pressured him to plead guilty, did not accept his advice on submitting pre-trial motions, and failed to turn over discovery to him. Consequently, the defendant filed a pro se motion to remove his new attorney from the case. The court held a hearing, and the trial court attempted to resolves their issues. Despite the trial court’s best efforts, it was not able to assuage the defendant’s concerns. The court therefore gave the defendant a new court-appointed attorney.

Unfortunately for the defendant, his relationship with his new attorney was not great, either. On December 5, 2016, the defendant wrote the trial court a letter stating that he had not received requested documents from his new attorney. The trial court then issued an order acknowledging receipt of the defendant’s letter and then forwarded a copy of said order to his attorney. It is unknown if the attorney responded to the defendant.

A few months later, on February 7, 2017, the defendant wrote to the trial court again stating that he still did not have his requested discovery. The trial court then ordered the attorney to file a response to the defendant, however he did not. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed another motion requesting a new attorney. The trial court did not seek any additional information from the attorney or the defendant. The trial court also did not schedule a hearing to address the defendant’s request or replace the attorney. About a month after the latest request from the defendant seeking new counsel, the attorney wrote to the trial court requesting a continuance. He also stated that he and the defendant had resolved all of their issues and that the defendant wished to continue having the attorney represent him. At the April 7, 2017 pre-trial conference, the defendant did not raise any issues between him and his attorney.

This harmony was short lived. Ten days after the pre-trial conference, the defendant again wrote to the trial court stating that the attorney failed to adequately represent him and to provide him his requested discovery. It is unclear if the trial court made a formal acknowledgment of this letter. Approximately two months later, the defendant wrote to the trial court again complaining of his attorney’s supposed shortcomings. However, the defendant did not specifically request a new attorney. On August 16, 2017 the defendant’s case proceeded to trial with the defendant being represented by his current attorney.

At his trial, multiple witnesses were called to testify against the defendant. These witnesses included his co-defendants (who had already pleaded guilty) and various DEA agents. Additionally, the Government introduced intercepted communications between the defendant and his co-defendants. The testimony showed that although the defendant was not the leader of the organization, he was involved in the drug trafficking. Specifically, the calls showed that he would primarily “bag” up the drugs and that he would also engage in selling on his own behalf. The testimony showed that on multiple occasions the defendant would bag 500 bags of heroin, which amounted to approximately 15 grams. At the conclusion of his trial, the defendant was found guilty of conspiring to distribute and possession with the intent to distribute.

At his sentencing hearing, there was some debate about the weight of drugs that were involved in this case. The defendant argued that only 15 grams of heroin should be attributed to him instead of the 30 grams that the Government alleged. This is significant because U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(12) governs the guidelines for 20-30 grams of heroin and, it may go without saying, but the guidelines are harsher for 20 grams in comparison to 15 grams. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to 33 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. After his sentencing, the defendant filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised three issues: the trial court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s motion for appointment of new counsel, the improper admission of one of the DEA agent’s testimony, and finally the trial court’s attribution of more than 20 grams of heroin to the defendant at sentencing. For purposes of this blog, only the defendant’s issue of whether the trial court improperly attributed more than 20 grams of heroin to the defendant at sentencing will be discussed.

Does the Weight/Type of Drugs Matter for Determining a Defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines?

Yes. A defendant’s sentencing guidelines can be dramatically affected by the weight and type of drug that was involved. This is true in Pennsylvania too. In Pennsylvania, a defendant’s guidelines can be substantially different depending on how much heroin he possessed. For example, let’s assume that a defendant is convicted with Possession with Intent to Deliver with 50 grams of heroin and that he has no prior record. His guidelines on the case would be 22-36 months +/- 12. However, if this same defendant was convicted with 49 grams of heroin, his guidelines would be 9-16 months +/- 9 months. As one can see, the weight of the drugs is significant and one gram can make a huge difference in determining one’s sentencing guidelines.

The federal guidelines are no different. In the instant case, the defendant was arguing that the evidence only showed that he possessed 15 grams of heroin. This is significant because per the federal sentencing guidelines, that would make his offense graded as a level 14. However, if the drugs had a weight of 30 grams (as alleged by the Government), then the offense is graded as a 16. Assuming the defendant was a zero (which is unclear from the Third Circuit’s opinion), his guidelines would have been 15-21 months if it was just 15 grams. However, if it was actually 30 grams, then his guidelines would be 21-27 months. Therefore, the weight of drugs can have a significant impact on the guidelines regardless of whether your case is in federal or state court.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction and sentence. Regarding the weight of the drugs, the Third Circuit found that there was an “ample basis for determining that the defendant was responsible for at least 20 grams of heroin.” The defendant would frequently bag 500 bags of heroin which amounted to 15 grams of heroin. Additionally, the defendant did this more than once. As such, the trial court found that the trial court did not err in attributing at least 20 grams of heroin to the defendant for purposes of sentencing. Therefore, his sentence will stand and he will not get a new trial.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 2/27/20 Zak Goldstein 2/27/20

Can a judge give a worse sentence if you file a motion to reconsider the sentence?

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Coleman, holding that a trial court may not sua sponte increase a defendant’s sentence after he or she files a post-sentence motion. This decision is significant because there is an all-too-common misconception among defense attorneys that if they file a post-sentence motion for a new trial or a reduced sentence, there is the possibility that the judge could retaliate by increasing the defendant’s sentence. As such, some attorneys are hesitant to file these motions for that incorrect reason. Hopefully, as a result of Coleman, this misconception will be put to rest.

Commonwealth v. Coleman

On August 7, 2017, the complainant was granted a temporary protection from abuse (“PFA”) order against her boyfriend, the defendant. When the PFA was issued, the defendant and the complainant were living together. Notably, the defendant was not on the lease of their shared residence nor did he ever possess a key.

Despite the PFA being issued, the defendant evaded attempts at being officially served with the PFA. Additionally, the defendant continued to go to their shared residence which resulted in the complainant staying at her grandmother’s home until the defendant could be officially served. On August 21, 2017, the defendant was finally served with the PFA order and an eviction notice. When he was served, he was hiding in the complainant’s daughter’s bedroom closet. The complainant was present when an officer offered to have him remove all of his property from the residence which the defendant declined. Because of the defendant’s actions, the complainant made a point to keep all of her windows and doors locked.

On August 25, 2017 at around 9:30 AM, the complainant was returning home when she noticed the defendant coming out of her house holding a bag. She would later testify that she did not observe any exterior sign of forced entry. However, she did testify that a few months prior to this she observed the defendant attempting to climb through her window. The complainant assumed that this is how the defendant entered her residence. She also would testify that she observed the internet box, which was in the defendant’s name, was missing from the house. At the time of this incident, the PFA was still active and thus the defendant did not have permission to be inside the home. The defendant would later testify that he and the complainant had a conversation where she gave him permission to enter the residence.

On August 30, 2017, the complainant went to the defendant’s new residence at his request. When she arrived, she noticed that the defendant’s new girlfriend was living at this residence. The complainant was not let in, but for unknown reasons the police were subsequently called. As a result, the defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary, criminal trespass, criminal mischief, and contempt for violating the PFA order for his actions on August 25, 2017. The defendant elected to have a bench trial where the above testimony was presented and he was found guilty of burglary, criminal trespass, and contempt.

The trial court then conducted a subsequent sentencing hearing on August 23, 2018. At that hearing, it was determined that the defendant had a prior record score of zero and an offense gravity score of seven, which set the sentencing guidelines to 6 to 14 months’ incarceration, plus or minus 6 months. The trial court stated that it had reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report and the text messages that were provided to the court. The defendant’s attorney informed the trial court that the defendant was employed and no longer involved with the complainant. The defendant’s new girlfriend also testified on the defendant’s behalf.

The Commonwealth requested that the defendant receive a sentence of 6 ½ to 23 months’ incarceration for his actions. After arguments, the trial court elected to sentence the defendant to 12 to 24 months of incarceration which was to be followed by two years of probation. In its rationale, the trial court stated that the defendant “tortured” the complainant based on its review of the text messages.

The defendant then filed a post-sentence motion arguing that the court should not have sentenced him to a sentence greater than what was requested by the Commonwealth. In his motion, the defendant specifically referenced the trial court’s comment that the defendant “tortured” the complainant. A hearing was held on August 30, 2018. At that hearing, the defendant rested on his motion and requested that the trial court impose a county sentence.

The trial court then stated that it had reviewed the defendant’s motion and that even though it mentioned the word “torture” during the defendant’s sentencing, it was not a factor in the defendant’s sentence. Also during this hearing, it became known that the defendant had re-violated the PFA. In response to questioning by the trial court, the defendant stated that “[he] didn’t mean to violate the PFA.” It is worth noting that at this hearing, the Commonwealth did not request a modification of the defendant’s sentence nor did it file its own post-sentence motion. Nonetheless, the trial court re-sentenced the defendant to an increased sentence of 14 to 18 months of incarceration, followed by four years of probation. The defendant then filed another post-sentence motion which was denied and then he subsequently filed a timely appeal.

What is a Post-Sentence Motion?

Post-Sentence motions are an incredibly important, and often forgotten, part of criminal defense practice. A post-sentence motion is a request to do any of the following: modify one’s sentence, request a new trial (for a variety of reasons including: the acquisition of newly discovered evidence, prosecutor’s comments during closing argument, challenging the weight of the evidence, etc.), request a motion for judgment of acquittal, and challenge one’s guilty plea. As one can see, post-sentence motions gives the trial court an opportunity to correct a past wrong by either the jury or the trial court itself.

It is worth noting that these motions are frequently denied. However, that does not take away from their importance. They are incredibly important because if you do not file them on time, you can inadvertently waive certain issues for appeal. For example, if you do not file a post-sentence motion, you are not able to challenge the weight of the evidence or the discretionary aspects of an appeal. Therefore, it is imperative that your attorney files a post-sentence motion after your sentencing if you believe that you received an unduly harsh sentence or if you believe that there were serious issues with the evidence that was presented at your trial.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court granted the defendant’s appeal. In its decision, the Superior Court relied on prior case law that stated that in order for a defendant’s sentence to be increased after a post-sentence motion is filed, the Commonwealth must also have filed a post-sentence motion. In other words, a trial court is not permitted to increase a defendant’s sentence unless the Commonwealth has filed a post-sentence motion specifically requesting a harsher sentence. Therefore, a defendant cannot be punished simply because he files a post-sentence motion requesting a more lenient sentence. Because the Commonwealth did not file a post-sentence motion in this case, the defendant’s current sentence will be vacated and he will receive his original sentence.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Criminal Defense Lawyers Demetra Mehta and Zak Goldstein

Zak Goldstein 2/21/20 Zak Goldstein 2/21/20

PA Superior Court: No Search Warrant Required to Access Data on Public WiFi Network

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Dunkins, holding that the police do not need a search warrant to obtain data that is transmitted over a public WiFi network. This decision is significant because people access public WiFi networks on a daily basis and now may have a reduced privacy interest in that activity. If you are a suspect in a crime, the police then can use this information as substantive evidence to arrest you. Despite this information being very personal, Dunkins holds that the police do not need to obtain a search warrant to obtain this information.

Commonwealth v. Dunkins

The incident in question took place on February 2, 2017 at approximately 2:00 AM at Moravian College in Bethlehem, PA. Two men wearing ski masks pretended to be campus police officers and gained access to the dorm room shared by the complainants. The complainants were apparently known drug dealers at Moravian College. When one of the complainants opened the dorm door, one of the masked men punched him and caused him to fall. The masked men then held the students at gunpoint and demanded marijuana and the key to one of the complainant’s footlockers. The masked men accessed the footlocker and stole approximately $1,000 in cash as well as a jar of marijuana.

Several hours later, around 11:00 AM, one of the complainants reported the robbery to the campus officials. A Moravian Campus Police Officer requested that Moravian’s Director of Systems Engineering analyze its wireless network data to compile a list of the students who logged onto the network near the wireless access point in the dormitory where the complainants resided. The campus officials discovered, at the time of the robbery, that there were only three individuals logged onto the campus WiFi at that location who did not reside in that building. Two of the three WiFi users were female. The male user was the defendant, who was also a Moravian student.

The Moravian Campus Police provided this WiFi data to a detective with the Bethlehem Police Department which subsequently took over the investigation. One of the complainants told the detective that the defendant previously “robbed” him by taking marijuana from him without payment in return. The defendant was subsequently interviewed by the police. He denied the accusations and stated he has not been in the complainant’s dormitory since October 2016. This was obviously contradicted by the WiFi records.

Another student who lived in the dorm room next to the defendant told police that the defendant came to his room after midnight on February 3, 2017 and showed off a large display of cash and bragged that he obtained this money in a recent robbery. According to this student, the defendant boasted that he and another individual posed as campus police officers to gain access to the victim’s room and subsequently stole drugs and money from the complainant’s footlocker.

The Motion to Suppress

The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with robbery, conspiracy, receiving stolen property, and simple assault. The defendant then filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the campus police conducted an illegal search in obtaining the campus WiFi log-on data without first obtaining a warrant. At his suppression hearing, the Moravian Systems Engineering Director explained that in order to utilize Moravian’s WiFi each student must log on to the network with their individual username and password. However, at their initial log-on, students may choose to have their devices automatically long on to the campus WiFi without entering their credentials again. The parties also noted that the defendant had signed the Moravian Student Handbook which indicated that he accepted and understood Moravian’s policies, including its technology rules. These rules specifically state that “users cannot and should not have any expectation of privacy with regard to any data, documents…or other computer files created or stored on computers within or connected to the institution’s network.” After the evidence was presented, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.

The defendant then proceeded to a jury trial where he was found guilty of the aforementioned crimes. On January 4, 2019, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment. The defendant then filed a post-sentence motion which was denied. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised several issues. For purposes of this blog, only the issue as to whether the trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress will be addressed.

Does the Fourth Amendment Protect Data that is Generated from Electronic Devices?

Yes. Fourth Amendment protection is not constrained by the type of property in question, but instead whether the person who claims the protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property. Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Carpenter v. United States in which the Court held that law enforcement officials improperly acquired the defendant’s cell site location information (hereinafter “CSLI”) without a warrant. In that case, the law enforcement officers compelled the defendant’s wireless carriers to provide a record of his CSLI for a four-month period. This allowed the officers to track his movements during the time when robberies had occurred. In that case, the United States Supreme Court found that collecting this CLSI data without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.

However, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that this was a narrow opinion. Specifically, the Court said that its decision does not apply to “tower dumps” which is a download of information on all of the devices that were connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval. Additionally, other federal circuit courts have held that a person can lose their privacy interests in their data when they sign employer policies that state their electronic activity can and will be disclosed to third parties. As such, when an individual signs these “contracts,” they can lose their right to challenge the disclosure of their electronic data being transmitted to third parties.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. In its opinion, the Superior Court declined to overturn the trial court’s decision for several reasons. First, the Superior Court analogized the acquisition of the data from Moravian’s wireless campus to a “tower dump,” which as previously discussed, is permissible under Fourth Amendment law. Additionally, the Superior Court found that the defendant’s specific CSLI was not obtained in this case and therefore the police’s actions were not specifically intrusive to the defendant. Finally, the Superior Court found it persuasive that the defendant voluntarily consented to third parties accessing the data that was transmitted over Moravian’s WiFi systems. Therefore, the Superior Court found that the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress. Additionally, his other issues on appeal were denied, and therefore the defendant will not get a new trial and he will be forced to serve his sentence.

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Zak Goldstein 2/13/20 Zak Goldstein 2/13/20

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Suspect Who Refuses to Provide Password Can Only Be Held in Contempt For 18 Months

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the case of United States v. Apple Mac Pro Computer, holding that the suspect in a Philadelphia federal child pornography case could only be held for eighteen months for refusing to provide the password to his laptop in response to a court order.

In Pennsylvania and the federal system, prosecutors have increasingly sought court orders in an attempt to compel suspects to unlock their electronic devices in investigations involving internet crimes and illegal pornography. Pennsylvania state courts have found that these types of orders are likely to violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the foregone conclusion doctrine which holds that a suspect can be compelled to produce a password when the Government can prove that the suspect owns the device in question and knows the password. The penalty for refusing to comply can be civil contempt in which the person is jailed until they eventually give up the password. This decision holds that a suspect who refuses to comply with this type of order can only be incarcerated for at most eighteen months, meaning they can no longer be held indefinitely.

United States v. Apple Mac Pro Computer

The defendant was a former Philadelphia Police Sergeant who was under federal investigation for possessing child pornography. As part of that investigation, the Delaware County Criminal Investigations Unit executed a search warrant on the suspect’s residence. As a result of that search warrant, government agents obtained the suspect’s Apple iPhone 5S, an Apple iPhone 6 Plus, and an Apple Mac Pro Computer with two attached Western Digital External Hard Drives, all of which were protected with encryption software.

Agents from the Department of Homeland Security then obtained a federal search warrant to examine the seized devices. The suspect voluntarily provided the password for the Apple iPhone 5S, but he did not provide the passwords to decrypt the Mac Pro or the external hard drives. Ultimately, forensic analysts discovered the password to decrypt the Mac Pro, they but could not determine the passwords to decrypt the external hard drives. Forensic examination of the Mac Pro revealed (1) an image of a pubescent girl in a sexually provocative position, (2) logs showing that the Mac Pro had been used to visit websites with titles common in child exploitation, and 3) that the suspect had downloaded thousands of files known to be child pornography. Those files were not on the Mac Pro. Instead, they were stored on the encrypted external hard drives. In the course of their investigation, officers interviewed the man’s sister who stated that the suspect had shown her hundreds of images of child pornography on the encrypted external hard drives, which included videos of children who were nude and engaged in sex acts with other children. However, without a password to decrypt the hard drives, the agents could not access the files themselves, making a criminal prosecution difficult.

In August 2015, a Federal Magistrate Judge ordered the former Philadelphia Officer to produce all encrypted devices, including his external hard drives, in a fully unencrypted state. The suspect did not appeal the order, but instead filed a motion to quash the Government’s application to compel decryption, arguing that the act of decrypting the devices would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Eventually, his motion was denied, and he was directed to fully comply with the decryption order. The Magistrate Judge acknowledged the suspect’s Fifth Amendment objection but held that because the Government possessed his devices and knew that their contents included child pornography, the act of decrypting them would not be testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Approximately one week after the denial of the motion to quash, the suspect and his attorney appeared at the Delaware County Police Department for the forensic examination of his devices. He produced the Apple iPhone 6 Plus in a fully unencrypted state by entering three separate passwords on the device. The phone contained adult pornography, a video of the defendant’s niece in which she was wearing only her underwear, and approximately twenty photographs which focused on the genitals of his niece. The man stated that he could not remember the passwords necessary to decrypt the hard drives and entered several incorrect passwords during the forensic examination.

Following the forensic examination, the Government moved for an order to show cause why the suspect should not be held in contempt for his failure to abide by the decryption order. Following the hearings on this issue, the District Court found that the suspect remembered the passwords but chose not to provide them to the government agents. On September 30, 2015, the suspect was held in contempt. The court ordered that he would be held indefinitely until he agreed to comply with the order. He immediately appealed this decision, and the Third Circuit upheld his contempt order. The suspect eventually filed a motion to vacate the contempt order and order his release because, at the time of this subsequent appeal, he had been in custody for more than 18 months.

What is Civil Contempt in Federal Court?

28 U.S.C. § 1826 (a) governs civil contempt. The statute states:

Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information.

In other words, this statute gives judges authority to incarcerate or fine individuals who refuse to comply with an order to provide requested information. This order could involve testimony in a court proceeding (i.e. a grand jury proceeding), but it could also involve specific documents, passwords, emails or almost anything that could be of some evidentiary value.

What is the Difference Between Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt?

Civil contempt is frequently used in Federal litigation. The main difference between civil and criminal contempt is that civil contempt is designed to compel compliance with a particular order, whereas criminal contempt is designed to punish. Although in the instant case involves a potential criminal proceeding, civil contempt is very common in cases where a witness is compelled to testify in a grand jury hearing but refuses to do so even after being granted immunity.

It is also important to note that the burden of proof is different in each type of hearing. In a criminal contempt case, the Government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in a civil contempt hearing, the burden is clear and convincing evidence and thus not as difficult to prove as criminal contempt.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit ordered the suspect be released. In its ruling, the Third Circuit specifically stated that § 1826(a) specifically states that “no period of such confinement shall exceed the life of 1) the court proceeding, or 2) the term of the grand jury including extensions, before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement exceed eighteen months.” The Third Circuit specifically found that the suspect qualified as a witness for purposes of § 1826(a) and it was of no consequence that the suspect was also a suspect in connection with other offenses. Therefore, because his detention exceeded eighteen months, the Third Circuit ordered his immediate release from custody. This is an important decision because it imposes a finite limit on the ability of the Government to hold someone for failing to comply with an order to decrypt an electronic device. Given the possibility of decades in prison for federal child pornography offenses, it may make sense to risk civil contempt rather than unlock a device that could support a federal prosecution.

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