Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/14/26 Zak Goldstein 10/14/26

PA Supreme Court Rejects Joint Acquisition and Use Defense to Drug Delivery Resulting in Death

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided Commonwealth v. Cassell and Commonwealth v. Scott, Nos. 22 and 23 MAP 2025 (Pa. Oct. 13, 2026), holding that two people who buy drugs together and use them together have no defense to the delivery element of possession with intent to deliver or drug delivery resulting in death. The Commonwealth does not have to disprove joint acquisition and use, and the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on it. Under the Court’s reading of the Drug Act, a drug user who chips in money or drives a friend to the dealer has delivered the drugs. If the friend dies, the drug user faces up to 40 years in prison.

The Facts of Cassell and Scott

A. Smith left a drug rehabilitation facility in Lancaster with no money and no phone. She texted Cassell, her boyfriend, and asked for a ride to York. Cassell paid for an Uber to bring her to York, texted a dealer that he had $40, and drove to the dealer’s house. He and Smith used together twice, and Cassell told police that he let her take as much as she wanted. Smith overdosed, and Cassell did not call 911 until about an hour after she stopped breathing. A York County jury convicted him of third-degree murder, drug delivery resulting in death, PWID, and related charges, and the court sentenced him to 23.5 to 47 years in prison.

In the second case, M. Wandell and her friend Z. Savage planned to buy heroin from Wandell’s dealer, and Savage put up the money. When Wandell could not reach the dealer, the dealer’s son, defendant Scott, answered and said he could help if they picked him up. Savage drove the three of them to Harrisburg, where Scott took the money from Wandell, handed it to a dealer, and came back with fentanyl. The three went to a park and used. Savage passed out and died the next morning in the back seat of his car. The jury acquitted Scott of third-degree murder but convicted him of drug delivery resulting in death and PWID. He received 9 to 18 years.

Both defendants asked for a jury instruction that people who jointly acquire drugs for their shared personal use do not deliver drugs to each other, relying on United States v. Semler, 858 F. App’x 533 (3d Cir. 2021), and United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1977). Both trial judges refused, and the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court granted allocatur and accepted the case for review.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the proposed defenses that they could not be guilty of drug delivery resulting in death (homicide) because they had purchased and consumed drugs together. The Drug Act defines delivery as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance … whether or not there is an agency relationship.” 35 P.S. § 780-102. Because the definition covers constructive transfers, the Court read it to reach anyone who helps the deal happen:

However, the Court also suggested in a broad opinion that individual also may constructively deliver drugs to another when they intentionally facilitate the sale — in other words, as the Swiderski Court stated, they serve “as a link in the chain of distribution.” This “link” may be providing the funds for the drugs, or the transportation to the dealer. Without these actions, the transaction cannot occur. That language is largely dicta, however, and may not be binding on future cases. There could also be causation issues with that type of analysis which were not addressed in this opinion.

The Court also relied on Section 780-113(a)(31), which makes the distribution of a small amount of marijuana not for sale a misdemeanor with a 30-day maximum. In the Court’s view, the General Assembly knew how to protect co-users and chose to protect only marijuana users:

The fact the General Assembly limited this exception to possession of a small amount of marijuana speaks volumes. It could have crafted a lesser penalty for those who share (or co-use) other controlled substances, such as heroin or fentanyl, but it did not.

The Court admitted that the defense “makes sense” and that some believe dealers deserve harsher punishment than users. It then held that “this type of policy determination is for the General Assembly, not the courts.”

The Court found the evidence sufficient in both cases. Cassell paid for Smith’s ride, contacted the dealer, paid for the drugs, and controlled how much she took. Scott was never part of the plan between Wandell and Savage; he was a go-between who got the drugs from his dealer and handed them to Wandell, who was acting as Savage’s agent.

The Takeaway

This is a terrible decision for anyone charged after a friend’s overdose. Prosecutors rarely find the dealer in these cases. They charge the person who was in the room, usually another addict who drove, made the call, or put in a few dollars. The Court has now held that each of those acts is a delivery. The Second and Third Circuits drew a line between traffickers and users under a federal definition of delivery nearly identical to Pennsylvania’s. The Superior Court had leaned towards accepting that potential defense, as well, in a prior unpublished case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to draw it and told defendants to ask the legislature, which is unlikely to make any changes.

The facts still matter. The Court rested its sufficiency analysis on Cassell’s control of the drugs and Scott’s role as the go-between, and it quoted the California rule that the partner who takes the more active role in financing and arranging the buy may be guilty of furnishing to the less active one. A case where two people put in the same money and bought the drugs together remains open as a sufficiency argument, even without a jury instruction, and defense counsel should build that record. Cassell’s murder conviction also carries a lesson. The trial court told the jury it could infer malice from his failure to seek medical care, not from the delivery itself. Calling 911 is the one choice that can still change the outcome, both in terms of avoiding a murder charge and getting crushed at sentencing should a defendant be convicted.

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Zak Goldstein 10/11/26 Zak Goldstein 10/11/26

PA Superior Court: Trial Court Cannot Revoke Bail Based Only on the Prosecutor’s Proffer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Moore, 2026 PA Super 228 (Pa. Super. Oct. 9, 2026), holding that a trial court abused its discretion when it revoked a defendant’s bail based only on the prosecutor’s unsworn description of what a witness had reported. The Commonwealth did not call a single witness or introduce a single exhibit. Applying Commonwealth v. Talley, 265 A.3d 485 (Pa. 2021), the Superior Court vacated the revocation order and directed the trial court to reinstate the defendant’s $500,000 bail.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Moore

The Commonwealth charged the defendant in Clearfield County with indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age, corruption of minors, and endangering the welfare of children. The complainant, a minor, lives in the home of the defendant’s brother. The trial court reduced bail from $1,000,000 to $500,000, and a professional surety posted bond in September 2025.

On the morning the jury trial began in August 2026, the prosecutor made an oral motion to revoke bail. The court declared a mistrial during the Commonwealth’s case and then heard the motion immediately. The prosecutor said the Commonwealth would call a woman who lives in the home with the complainant, but the Commonwealth never put her on the stand. Instead, the prosecutor described what she had reported: several toys had appeared on her porch the previous morning, including a duck, a squishy toy, an eraser-type toy, and a toy parrot with a commercially printed message. According to the prosecutor, the message read:

I could talk to you today or quietly fly away. It is up to you to make me stay. It all depends on what you say.

The prosecutor argued that the defendant left the toys because he had been to the house before, knew where the security cameras were, and avoided them, and that the verse itself was witness intimidation. Defense counsel called the motion “way, way past the line of speculation.” The toys carried no signature or name, anyone could buy them in a retail store, and the Commonwealth had no receipts or witnesses tying them to the defendant.

The court did not swear in any witnesses, admit any exhibits, or take any testimony. It revoked bail after hearing argument. In a later statement of reasons, the court acknowledged that the case was circumstantial but said the wording on the toy led it to believe the defendant left the items, and that no one else would have had a reason to leave them the day before trial and outside the cameras’ view.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The defendant filed a petition for specialized review under Pa.R.A.P. 1610, which allows a party to seek review of an order granting or denying release or modifying the conditions of release before sentence. The Superior Court applied Talley, where the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth must present a substantial quantity of legally competent evidence, meaning evidence admissible under the rules of evidence or covered by the criminal rules on release criteria. Talley, 265 A.3d at 524. The Commonwealth cannot meet that burden by stacking inference upon inference, and the court must look beyond the affidavit of probable cause and the prosecutor’s proffer. Id. at 525, 528.

The Commonwealth offered nothing but the proffer. It did not call anyone to testify about finding the items, when they appeared, or who bought them, and the trial court admitted no evidence connecting the defendant to the delivery. Because the trial court relied exclusively on the prosecutor’s unsworn proffer, it abused its discretion. The Superior Court vacated the order and remanded for reinstatement of the $500,000 bail and the prior conditions of release, without prejudice to the Commonwealth filing a renewed motion to revoke. Having granted relief, the Court did not reach the defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to state its reasons as Pa.R.Crim.P. 536 and 529 require.

The Takeaway

Moore is a narrow win. The Superior Court did not decide whether the inferences tying the defendant to the toys could ever support revocation. It vacated the order because the Commonwealth presented no evidence at all, and the Commonwealth can try again with live testimony. If it does, the defense can still argue that unsigned toys available in any retail store require exactly the kind of stacked inferences that Talley forbids.

Still, defense lawyers now have a precedential opinion holding that a proffer alone cannot support revocation. Prosecutors sometimes move to revoke bail based on what a witness or detective told them, and judges sometimes grant those motions without hearing from anyone under oath. When that happens, object, ask the court to make the Commonwealth call the witness, and insist that any ruling rest on evidence the court actually admitted. If the court revokes bail anyway, Rule 1610 offers a fast route to the Superior Court. The defendant filed his petition on September 1, and the Superior Court decided it on October 9.

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Zak Goldstein 10/9/26 Zak Goldstein 10/9/26

PA Supreme Court: A Lie on a Benefits Application Is Not Theft Unless It Changed the Benefits

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided Commonwealth v. Gaspard, holding that the Commonwealth cannot convict a public benefits recipient of theft by deception just by proving that she left a source of income off her paperwork. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(b), a falsehood counts as deception only if it has pecuniary significance. In a benefits case, that means the Commonwealth must prove that the missing information would have made the defendant ineligible or reduced the amount she received. Because the prosecution never tried to prove that, the Court reversed the Superior Court and vacated the defendant’s judgment of sentence. The Court also overruled Commonwealth v. Volk, 444 A.2d 1182 (Pa. Super. 1982), a Superior Court decision that prosecutors had relied on for the opposite rule.

The Facts of Gaspard

The defendant received Section 8 housing benefits through the Monroe County Housing Authority from March 2017 until July 2021. In 2021, she asked to move to a new unit. When her caseworker called her, the call went to a voicemail greeting for the defendant’s soap-making business. The caseworker reviewed the file and found that the defendant had not listed the business as employment, income, or an asset on her 2016 application or on any of her annual recertifications. She had signed a form promising to report all changes in income and assets.

The Housing Authority terminated her benefits and referred the case to law enforcement, and the Commonwealth charged her with theft by deception and false swearing. At trial, the defendant testified that the business never made a profit because all of her sales went to expenses. The prosecution never tried to show what effect the business would have had on her eligibility. The caseworker agreed that a person who reported self-employment income might still be eligible for benefits, and she admitted that the Housing Authority never determined that the defendant was ineligible. In closing, the prosecutor told the jury that “[t]his case isn’t about income, it’s about disclosure.”

The jury convicted her of both counts, and the trial court imposed two years of probation and $10,000 in restitution by stipulation. The Superior Court affirmed, reasoning that her silence prevented the Housing Authority from acquiring information that might have affected her eligibility. Commonwealth v. Gaspard, 323 A.3d 1276 (Pa. Super. 2024).

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Commonwealth must prove that the benefits would have been different if the defendant had reported the income. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Donohue held that it must.

The theft by deception statute excludes from the definition of deception any “falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(b). The Court read that phrase to mean a falsehood with monetary consequences for the specific parties and transaction involved. It relied on Commonwealth v. Gallo, 373 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 1977), where the defendant falsely called himself an “account executive,” but the victim testified that he would have signed the contract anyway. Because the lie made no difference to the deal, it lacked pecuniary significance. As the Court put it, “proving a lie and receipt of property alone does not suffice to establish theft by deception.”

Applying that rule, the Court held that when the property is an income-based public benefit, the Commonwealth must show that the recipient’s failure to list a source of income “impacted her eligibility for public benefits such that it caused the payor to award money that the recipient was not entitled to receive.” The Commonwealth did not present any evidence that the defendant’s business income or assets would have made her ineligible or reduced her subsidy, and its caseworker admitted that the Housing Authority never made that determination. The Court pointed out that under the Commonwealth’s theory, the defendant would be guilty even if her business had no income or assets at all.

The Court also overruled Volk, where the Superior Court had upheld the convictions of public assistance recipients who failed to report newly acquired assets without asking whether those assets affected their eligibility. The Court explained that the reasoning in Volk might support a false swearing conviction, but not a theft conviction. Finally, the Court faulted the Superior Court for relying on the idea that the defendant prevented the Housing Authority from acquiring information. That theory belongs to subsection (a)(2) of the statute, and the Commonwealth charged her only under subsection (a)(1).

The Court vacated the theft conviction and remanded for resentencing on the false swearing conviction, which the defendant did not challenge.

Why Gaspard Matters

Prosecutors frequently charge benefits recipients with theft by deception on the theory that an unreported job, business, or bank account is enough. Gaspard rejects that theory. In an income-based benefits case, the Commonwealth now has to present evidence that the truth would have cost the defendant benefits, which usually means a witness who actually runs the eligibility numbers. Defense attorneys should hold the Commonwealth to that proof at the preliminary hearing and at trial and move for judgment of acquittal when the prosecution skips it. Outside the benefits context, the rule is the same: the lie must have mattered to the deal. A false statement that made no financial difference may support a false swearing charge, which is a misdemeanor, but it does not make the defendant a thief.

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Zak Goldstein 10/7/26 Zak Goldstein 10/7/26

PA Superior Court: Post-Sentence Motion Nunc Pro Tunc Must Be Filed Within 10 Days of the Order Granting Permission

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Wirfel, 2026 PA Super 224, holding that once a trial court grants a defendant permission to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc, the defendant has ten days from that order to file the motion. If the motion never gets filed, the order does nothing for the appeal deadline, and the notice of appeal is still due thirty days after sentencing. The Court also rejected a vindictiveness challenge to a sentence that the trial judge increased after the defendant sent a threatening letter to a prosecutor.

The Facts

In Wirfel, a York County jury convicted the defendant of possession with intent to deliver cocaine and simple possession. On July 21, 2025, the trial judge sentenced him to two to four years in state prison on the PWID and no further penalty on the possession. The judge did not tell him anything about his right to file a post-sentence motion or an appeal, or how long he had to do either.

Shortly after sentencing, the chief deputy prosecutor in the York County District Attorney’s Office received a letter from the defendant. According to the trial court’s description, he called her “a miserable pig of a woman” and “Ms. Piggy,” told her he had a private investigator watching her, and made a point of saying he knew she had a daughter and what kind of car she drove. He also wrote, “I will go to war with each and every one of you.”

Procedural History

The Commonwealth moved to modify the sentence under Rule 721, which gives the prosecution ten days after sentencing to ask the judge to reconsider. At a hearing on August 19, 2025, the defendant admitted writing the letter and told the judge, “I was just frustrated, honestly.” The judge called the letter “a veiled threat,” granted the motion, and resentenced him to three to six years. For the second time, the judge did not advise him of his post-sentence and appeal rights.

After the court appointed counsel, the defendant asked for permission to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc because the judge had never advised him of his rights. On September 16, 2025, still within thirty days of the amended sentence, the trial court granted that request under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. The order did not say when the motion had to be filed. Counsel then decided not to file a post-sentence motion. Instead, she filed a notice of appeal on October 16, 2025, which was thirty days after the order granting permission but fifty-eight days after the resentencing.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Court took up jurisdiction first. Nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure says how long a defendant has to file a post-sentence motion once a trial court grants leave to file one nunc pro tunc. The Court answered that question with two of its earlier cases. Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc), treats a post-sentence motion filed with the trial court’s express permission under Section 5505 as if it had been filed within the original ten days. Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. 2004), gives a defendant whose appeal rights are restored nunc pro tunc the same thirty days he would have had at the start. Putting the two together, the Court held that an order granting nunc pro tunc relief “winds back” the clock to the day of sentencing, and the Rule 720 deadlines then run from the order. That means ten days to file the post-sentence motion and thirty days from the ruling on that motion to appeal.

The problem for Wirfel was that he never filed the motion. Quoting Dreves, the Court explained that “the time for filing an appeal can be extended beyond 30 days after the imposition of sentence only if the defendant files a timely post-sentence motion.” With no motion on file, his appeal deadline stayed at thirty days from August 19, and the October 16 notice of appeal missed it by about a month.

The Court heard the appeal anyway. Under Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. 2007), when a sentencing judge fails to advise the defendant of his post-sentence and appeal rights, that is a breakdown in the court system, and an appellate court can excuse a late appeal because of it. This judge skipped the colloquy at both sentencings. The Court said it was “troubled” by that and treated the appeal as timely.

On the merits, the Court affirmed. In Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554 (Pa. 2022), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained how the presumption of vindictiveness from North Carolina v. Pearce works. When a judge imposes a harsher sentence the second time around and does not say on the record that the increase rests on objective information about something the defendant did after the first sentencing, the increase is presumed vindictive. But if there is objective evidence of a post-sentencing event that likely gave the judge new information about the defendant’s character and prospects for rehabilitation, the presumption does not apply, and the defendant has to prove that the judge actually acted out of vindictiveness. The Superior Court found that the letter was that kind of event. It came after the July sentencing, the defendant admitted writing it, and the trial court reasonably read it as a threat. His explanation that he was frustrated did not meet his burden.

The Court also vacated the no further penalty sentence on the simple possession count on its own. That count merged into the PWID because both rested on the same cocaine, and under Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d 399 (Pa. 2020), a sentence of no further penalty on a merged count is an illegal sentence.

The Takeaway

The ten-day holding is the part of Wirfel that will likely come up again. Until now, there was no clear answer on when a post-sentence motion had to be filed after a trial court grants nunc pro tunc relief under Section 5505. The answer is ten days from the order. Previously, that was just an assumption. If the plan is to skip the motion and appeal directly, the thirty days still run from the sentence. Wirfel was still able to appeal only because the trial judge twice failed to give him the required colloquy. Most defendants will not have that excuse.

The vindictiveness ruling is a warning for anyone who has just been sentenced. The Commonwealth has ten days to ask the judge for more time, and the Pearce presumption will not help a defendant who hands the judge a new reason during that window. Wirfel’s letter cost him a year on the minimum and two years on the maximum. If you are angry about your sentence, it is better to tell your lawyer than write to the prosecutor.