Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 6/17/25 Zak Goldstein 6/17/25

PA Supreme Court Finds Statute Allowing Police to Tell Hospital Staff to Draw Blood Without Warrant in Potential DUI Cases Unconstitutional

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strikes Down Section 3755 as Facially Unconstitutional in DUI Blood Draw Case

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In Commonwealth v. Hunte, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a trial court ruling finding that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755, the “emergency room blood draw” statute, violates both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court found the statute facially unconstitutional because it authorizes warrantless blood draws from DUI suspects in the absence of a valid exception to the warrant requirement.

The Facts of Hunte

Police officers responded to a single-vehicle crash in Cumberland County in which the defendant and a passenger were ejected from the vehicle. The passenger died, and the defendant was unconscious when the police arrived. The scene contained alcohol containers and fentanyl patches, and first responders reported that the defendant admitted to drinking. At the hospital, without obtaining a warrant or consent, a Pennsylvania State Trooper invoked Section 3755 and directed medical personnel to draw the defendant’s blood.

Although a separate blood sample had already been taken for medical purposes, the blood tested by the Commonwealth was drawn specifically at the trooper’s request under Section 3755. The hospital even used a special form tailored to that statute. Of course, the police had not obtained a warrant authorizing them to order that blood draw. Accordingly, the defendant later moved to suppress the blood results, challenging the constitutionality of the statute.

Section 3755

The statute allows the police to direct medical personnel to conduct a warrantless blood draw in certain circumstances. It provides:

§ 3755.  Reports by emergency room personnel.
(a)  General rule.--If, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the person who drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the movement of any involved motor vehicle requires medical treatment in an emergency room of a hospital and if probable cause exists to believe a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) was involved, the emergency room physician or his designee shall promptly take blood samples from those persons and transmit them within 24 hours for testing to the Department of Health or a clinical laboratory licensed and approved by the Department of Health and specifically designated for this purpose. This section shall be applicable to all injured occupants who were capable of motor vehicle operation if the operator or person in actual physical control of the movement of the motor vehicle cannot be determined. Test results shall be released upon request of the person tested, his attorney, his physician or governmental officials or agencies.
(b)  Immunity from civil or criminal liability.--No physician, nurse or technician or hospital employing such physician, nurse or technician and no other employer of such physician, nurse or technician shall be civilly or criminally liable for withdrawing blood or obtaining a urine sample and reporting test results to the police pursuant to this section or for performing any other duty imposed by this section. No physician, nurse or technician or hospital employing such physician, nurse or technician may administratively refuse to perform such tests and provide the results to the police officer except as may be reasonably expected from unusual circumstances that pertain at the time of admission.

The Statute Is Unconstitutional

Writing for the majority, Justice Wecht held that Section 3755 violates the Fourth Amendment and Pennsylvania’s analogous constitutional provision because it authorizes warrantless blood draws without fitting into any recognized exception to the warrant requirement such as consent or exigency.

The Court reasoned that:

Implied consent statutes cannot serve as an independent exception to the warrant requirement. The Court rejected the notion that drivers implicitly consent to blood draws simply by operating a vehicle in Pennsylvania.
Blood draws are searches under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8. Because they are invasive and reveal sensitive personal information, they require a warrant or a valid exception.
No categorical exigency exists in DUI cases. The Court followed United States Supreme Court precedent (Missouri v. McNeely) in which the US Supreme Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not create per se exigency.
Section 3755 is unconstitutional on its face because it authorizes searches in situations where the Constitution requires individualized inquiry and a warrant, and probable cause alone is not enough.

The Commonwealth’s Arguments

The Commonwealth argued that exigent circumstances justified the blood draw and that a subsequent search warrant for testing the blood cured any defect. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed these arguments, emphasizing that the initial draw—i.e., the search—occurred without a warrant or recognized exception.

The Court also rejected the Commonwealth's attempt to salvage the statute by arguing that it merely facilitates lawful conduct or does not prohibit obtaining a warrant. The Court noted that Section 3755 affirmatively requires blood draws without a warrant or consent.

Accordingly, the statute is unconstitutional. Police must obtain a search warrant prior to directing a blood draw or be able to establish exigent circumstances which make getting a warrant impractical. They may not convert medical personnel into state actors in order to get around the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

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Zak Goldstein 6/7/25 Zak Goldstein 6/7/25

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Prior ARD Cannot Be Used to Enhance DUI Sentences

Commonwealth v. Shifflett

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Attorney

In a significant decision for Pennsylvania DUI law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled on May 30, 2025, that using a defendant's prior acceptance of the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program to enhance sentences for subsequent DUI offenses violates constitutional protections under United States Supreme Court precedent such as Alleyne v. United States.

The Facts of Shifflet

The defendant was charged with DUI in 2022. The Commonwealth sought to treat this as a second offense based on his 2012 participation in the ARD for a prior DUI charge. Under Pennsylvania law, a second DUI offense carries mandatory minimum penalties including at least five days imprisonment, compared to six months probation for a first offense. The penalty is often more severe than that depending on the defendant’s BAC or whether the defendant had drugs in their system.

The defendant challenged the use of his prior ARD as a sentencing enhancement, arguing it violated his constitutional rights because it was not an actual conviction. The trial court agreed and sentenced him as a first time offender. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court reversed. The Superior Court ordered that the defendant be resentenced as a second time offender. The defendant sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted allocatur.

The Issue on Appeal

The case centered on the application of Alleyne v. United States. In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact which increases or triggers a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The only exception is for prior convictions, which the Supreme Court has recognized need not be re-proven to a jury.

The critical question was therefore whether ARD acceptance falls within this "prior conviction exception."

The Court's Analysis

Chief Justice Todd, writing for the majority, held that ARD does not qualify as a prior conviction for several reasons:

ARD is Not a Conviction: The Court emphasized that ARD is explicitly a pre-trial diversion program where formal criminal proceedings are suspended. No conviction results from ARD acceptance.
No Constitutional Safeguards: Unlike criminal convictions, ARD proceedings lack fundamental protections:
- No requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
- No admission of guilt required from the defendant at all
- No jury trial
- No formal evidentiary proceedings
- Limited confrontation rights
Not Equivalent to a Guilty Plea: The Court rejected arguments that ARD acceptance is similar to pleading guilty. Key differences include:
- No guilty plea colloquy ensuring knowing and voluntary waiver of rights
- No admission to the facts of the offense
- No requirement that defendants be informed their ARD could enhance future sentences
- Successful completion results in dismissal and expungement, not conviction

The Court's Holding

The Supreme Court therefore held that:

Using prior ARD acceptance to enhance DUI sentences without jury determination violates Alleyne
Section 3806 of the Motor Vehicle Code is facially unconstitutional insofar as it includes ARD in the definition of "prior offense"
The unconstitutional ARD provision is severable from the rest of Section 3806
The defendant was properly sentenced as a first offender

Implications for Pennsylvania DUI Defense

This decision has significant implications for DUI cases in Pennsylvania:

For Current Cases:

Defendants facing DUI charges who have prior ARD resolutions cannot be sentenced as repeat offenders, so they will typically be facing lower mandatory minimums and maximum sentences.
The Commonwealth must now prove any prior DUI convictions (not ARD) to enhance sentences
Defense attorneys should challenge any attempt to use ARD as a sentencing enhancement both for future DUI cases and for any other types of cases

For Past Cases:

Defendants sentenced as repeat offenders based solely on prior ARD may have grounds for an appeal or post-conviction relief if the case was recent
Those currently serving enhanced sentences should consult counsel about potential remedies

For Future ARD Decisions:

The decision removes a significant consequence of accepting ARD
Defendants can accept ARD without fear it will automatically enhance future sentences
This may make ARD a more attractive option for first-time offenders

What This Means for You

If you're facing DUI charges and have a prior ARD, this decision provides crucial protection against mandatory minimum sentences. The Commonwealth can no longer use your ARD acceptance as an easy path to enhanced penalties.

However, the Court left open the possibility that if the Commonwealth can prove the underlying facts of your prior DUI offense to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, enhancement might still be possible. This would require a much more complex and difficult process for prosecutors.

The Dissenting View

Three justices dissented, arguing that ARD acceptance involves a knowing waiver of rights and that the statute could be applied constitutionally in some circumstances. However, the majority's view prevails, providing strong protection for DUI defendants.

Bottom Line

Commonwealth v. Shifflett represents a major victory for constitutional protections in DUI cases. It ensures that the severe consequences of repeat offender status cannot be imposed based solely on prior participation in a diversionary program designed to help first-time offenders avoid criminal convictions.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Goldstein Mehta LLC — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 4/26/25 Zak Goldstein 4/26/25

PA Superior Court: Trial Court May Deny Expungement Petition During Statute of Limitations

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 2025 PA Super 93, affirming the denial of the defendant’s petitions to expunge two sets of charges stemming from alleged domestic violence incidents against his former girlfriend. The defendant sought expungement after the cases were dismissed for lack of prosecution when the complainant failed to appear for multiple preliminary hearing listings.

Procedural History

The Commonwealth charged the defendant at two docket numbers with Aggravated Assault and related offenses. The charges were dismissed a few months later after the complainant failed to appear on three separate occasions. Although the court granted the defendant limited access relief under 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122.2 in November 2022, the defendant filed expungement petitions about six months after the dismissal of the charges. The Commonwealth objected to the expungement of the charges. The Commonwealth cited an alleged pattern of domestic violence-related charges even though all of the charges had been dismissed. After a hearing, the motions judge in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas denied the petitions, and the defendant appealed.

Legal Standard

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reviews the denial of an expungement petition for an abuse of discretion. Where charges are terminated without a conviction or acquittal, courts must balance the petitioner’s right to be free from the reputational harm of maintaining arrest records against the Commonwealth’s interest in retaining them. A court must apply the five-factor test outlined in Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1981). Those factors are:

Strength of the Commonwealth’s case;
Reasons for retaining the records;
The petitioner’s age, criminal record, and employment history;
Time elapsed since the arrest; and
Specific adverse consequences suffered.

The Commonwealth bears the burden of justifying the retention of the records when the prosecution admits it cannot meet its burden at trial. However, per Commonwealth v. Drummond, 694 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. 1997), records may still be maintained until the statute of limitations expires if the evidence is not wholly insufficient.

Arguments on Appeal

The defendant argued that:

The Commonwealth failed to meet its burden because it presented only affidavits of probable cause, which constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The Commonwealth’s reasons for opposing expungement (potential Rule 404(b) use and pending statute of limitations) were too general.
His criminal record was dated, and he faced adverse employment consequences.
The short time since dismissal (six months) should not weigh against expungement.

The Commonwealth and the trial judge countered that:

The affidavits, describing serious physical injuries and identifying defendant, showed a non-frivolous case even though the complainant refused to testify.
The charges were part of a pattern of domestic violence.
The statute of limitations had not expired, allowing potential refiling.
The defendant had not proven specific adverse consequences.

Superior Court Holding

The Superior Court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. In making its ruling, the Court emphasized the following:

Only six months had passed between dismissal and the expungement petitions.
The statute of limitations would not expire until 2027, supporting retention in case the complainant later cooperated. This is probably not true - it would be very difficult for the Commonwealth to reinstate charges given that the speedy trial rule likely continues to run even though the charges have been dismissed.
The defendant remained employed part-time and had not clearly demonstrated that the existence of the dismissed charges prevented full-time employment or caused other specific harm.

The Court concluded that the Commonwealth had provided sufficient justification to retain the arrest records and that the defendant had not shown a compelling right to expungement under the Wexler factors.

Practical Takeaway

Commonwealth v. Lloyd reinforces that even when charges are dismissed without a preliminary hearing, expungement is not automatic. Where the Commonwealth can show a plausible reason to retain records—such as the statute of limitations still running, evidence of serious injuries, and potential future cooperation by a complainant—courts may deny expungement even absent a conviction. Defense attorneys should develop a detailed record of specific adverse consequences when seeking expungement and be prepared to argue why retention of a dismissed case would be fundamentally unfair under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, the defense probably should have argued that even if the statute of limitations had not expired, the speedy trial rule (Rule 600) likely would prevent the Commonwealth from reinstating the charges even if the Commonwealth decided to try to pursue the case again.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 4/24/25 Zak Goldstein 4/24/25

PA Supreme Court: Police May Lie To You During Interrogation

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Foster, re-affirming the rule that the police generally may lie to you during an interrogation and still use any statement they have obtained in court against you.

In Foster, the Court considered whether a detective’s misrepresentation that the defendant was “not a suspect,” despite having already obtained a search warrant for his DNA, rendered the defendant’s subsequent statements involuntary and inadmissible. The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the Commonwealth, holding that such a lie does not automatically invalidate a suspect’s otherwise voluntary statement under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Facts of Foster

The case arose from a 2019 incident in Pittsburgh, where the complainant (K.C.) visited a bar, consumed alcohol, and later woke up with injuries and memory gaps. This prompted her to seek a sexual assault exam. The lab analysis revealed the presence of male DNA, and a Pittsburgh Police Detective began an investigation.

The defendant, who worked at the bar, was identified as someone who had contact with K.C. that night. After learning of this, the detective applied for and obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s DNA. Before executing the warrant, the police asked the defendant to come to the police station for an interview. The defendant voluntarily did so.

During the interview, the detective told the defendant twice that he was "not a suspect" and that he was just one of many people being interviewed. The detective did not advise the defendant of his Miranda rights because the defendant was not in custody. The interview remained cordial and non-confrontational. The defendant denied any sexual contact and voluntarily provided a DNA sample even after being told (late in the interview) that the detective had obtained a search warrant before he had arrived. Obviously, none of this was a great idea - the defendant did not have to give a false statement to the police or voluntarily surrender his DNA until the police obtained and executed a search warrant.

When the defendant’s DNA matched the DNA found in the rape kit, he was arrested and charged with rape of an unconscious person and sexual assault. He moved to suppress his statements, arguing they were involuntary because the detective lied about the nature of the encounter. He alleged that because the detective lied when telling him he was not a suspect, he was tricked into giving the statement and his DNA.

Suppression Court Grants Motion

The trial court granted the suppression motion, finding that the detective’s false statement deprived the defendant of the ability to make a “free and unconstrained choice” to speak. The court emphasized that the detective had already considered the defendant a suspect. This fact was reflected in the affidavit of probable cause used to obtain the DNA warrant. Although the court did not find that the detective acted in bad faith, it concluded that the false statement undermined the voluntariness of the statement.

Superior Court Reverses

The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed. Applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test, the panel noted that the defendant came to the police station voluntarily, was not restrained, used his cell phone freely, and was not subjected to coercive tactics. The interview was short and amicable. The court concluded that while the detective’s statement was misleading, it did not render Foster’s statement involuntary.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Affirms: Misleading a Suspect About Their Status Does Not Render a Statement Involuntary Per Se

In a majority opinion by Justice McCaffery, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. The Court reiterated that under both federal and state precedent, police deception does not automatically invalidate a suspect’s statement. The key inquiry remains whether the defendant’s will was overborne under the totality of the circumstances.

The Court rejected the idea that telling someone they are not a suspect, even when they are, automatically makes their statements inadmissible. The defendant was not in custody, the interview was non-coercive, and he voluntarily submitted to questioning and DNA testing. The Court also declined to adopt a per se rule automatically barring such misrepresentations. The police are allowed to lie to a suspect during an interrogation.

Importantly, while the Court acknowledged arguments from the defendant and amicus PACDL about the dangers of deceptive interrogation practices—including the risk of false confessions—it found that the defendant waived any broader claim under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to preserve the argument below.

What This Means for Criminal Defendants

This case underscores the fact that Pennsylvania courts continue to tolerate certain forms of police deception during voluntary interviews. Unless a suspect is formally in custody or subjected to inherently coercive tactics, courts are unlikely to suppress statements based solely on misleading remarks about their status.

However, the decision also offers a roadmap for defense attorneys challenging similar statements: had the defendant preserved his state constitutional claim under Article I, Section 9, the Court may have considered drawing a stricter line. Future cases may test whether Pennsylvania’s Constitution should provide broader protections than the Fifth Amendment.

Key Takeaway

If you are contacted by police and told you're “not a suspect,” that statement may not shield you from criminal charges. Anything you say can still be used against you. Always consult with an attorney before agreeing to any interview or providing evidence if there is any chance that you could be a suspect in the crime.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys