Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 6/19/26 Zak Goldstein 6/19/26

PA Superior Court: The Commonwealth Cannot Appeal a Pretrial Ruling That Lets the Defense Present Evidence

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Broomes, 2026 PA Super 103, ruling that prosecutors could not appeal a trial judge’s decision to let the defense cross-examine the complaining witness in a domestic violence case. The trial court had allowed the defendant to question the alleged victim about her own dropped charges for stealing from him. The prosecution tried to appeal that decision before the trial even started. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that prosecutors do not get to appeal a pretrial ruling simply because the judge decided the defense could present its evidence.

The decision matters because it limits how much prosecutors can delay a trial. They are allowed to appeal before trial when a judge throws out their evidence. They are not allowed to appeal just because a judge lets the defense ask its questions or present its case. When that happens, the prosecution has to go to trial and raise its objections in front of the jury instead of putting the case on hold with an appeal.

The Facts

The defendant was charged in Monroe County with attempted homicide, aggravated assault, and related offenses. Prosecutors alleged that he struck the complainant in the head with a large rock and then drove his car, with her inside, over an embankment, causing a crash.

Before the case reached trial, the complainant had herself been arrested for theft and identity theft. The allegation was that she had taken money from the defendant’s bank and credit accounts while he was in jail. A prosecutor who handled the case decided to drop those charges, later explaining that the police investigation was weak and that no deal had been made with her in exchange. The charges were dropped before any hearing, so no judge ever found there was enough evidence to support them.

The defense wanted the jury to hear about this. Its theory was that the complainant had made up part of her story in order to take the defendant’s money, which gave her a reason to lie. To build that argument, the defense planned to cross-examine her about the dropped theft charges.

What Happened in Court

On the morning of trial, prosecutors asked the judge to block that line of questioning, arguing that a person’s arrest is not a fair basis for attacking her credibility. The judge disagreed and ruled that the defense could ask about it. Rather than go forward, the prosecution announced that it would appeal, and the trial was called off before the jury was even sworn.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court declined to hear the appeal. Pennsylvania gives prosecutors a limited right to appeal certain rulings before trial, but that right is meant for situations where a judge keeps out the prosecution’s own evidence. This was the opposite situation. The judge had not kept out any of the prosecution’s evidence. He had only allowed the defense to present its case. Because the ruling was about the defense’s evidence, the court held that the prosecution had no right to appeal it and dismissed the appeal.

Why It Matters

Broomes is a good result for the defense. It confirms that prosecutors cannot stop a trial and run to the appeals court every time a judge lets the defense ask a question or present evidence. That keeps cases moving, which is especially important for a defendant who is in custody. Here, the attempt to appeal pushed the trial back by roughly a year all over a ruling the prosecution could have challenged with an objection at trial.

It is worth being clear about what the decision did not do. The court decided only that the prosecution could not appeal yet. It did not decide whether the defense’s questions about the dropped charges are ultimately proper. That issue still has to be worked out when the case returns for trial. For now, the trial judge’s ruling stands and the case can move forward.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, serving a state or federal sentence, or considering a direct appeal, post-conviction petition, or federal habeas petition, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and we have won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/17/26 Zak Goldstein 6/17/26

PA Superior Court: A Brief Public Restraint Supports Felony False Imprisonment of a Minor, and a Holdout Juror Can Be Removed for “Refusing to Deliberate”

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Evans, 2026 PA Super 96, affirming a conviction for false imprisonment of a minor despite alarmingly little evidence. A jury in Montgomery County found that a 45-year-old man approached a 14-year-old girl at the Willow Grove Mall, took hold of her arm, and walked her against her will for about 36 seconds before she pulled free and ran. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient even though the restraint was short, happened in a crowded mall, and did not involve the girl screaming or struggling. The Court also upheld the trial court’s decision, after the jury deadlocked, to remove a juror who said she would no longer discuss the case and to replace her with an alternate. The new jury convicted. Judge Kunselman dissented.

The case establishes that a short detention of just a few seconds can potentially support a felony false imprisonment conviction (and Megan’s Law registration requirement) even when the complainant does resist in any way, and it gives a trial court room to remove a deadlocked juror who refuses to keep deliberating. Because the panel divided, this is the kind of published decision that will hopefully draw a successful request for reargument or a petition for allowance of appeal.

The Facts of the Case

On the evening of July 12, 2023, the 14-year-old complainant was shopping with three friends at the Willow Grove Mall in Montgomery County. She got upset with one of her friends, left the group, and rode a down escalator toward a first-floor jewelry store, listening to music and looking at her phone. At the bottom of the escalator, a 45-year-old man who had ridden down ahead of her waited for her, offered his arm, and told her to walk with him.

She testified that she did not go with him willingly. She said he grabbed her wrist, tucked it inside his arm, and “pressed down” so she could not pull away, and that he walked her away from the jewelry store she had wanted to visit. Asked why she did not just turn toward the store, she answered, “because I couldn’t get away from him, and that’s where he was walking.” He told her his name was Alex and that he was 25. She told him she was 13, a year younger than her real age, to make clear she was a child. She was frightened, and she started secretly recording him on her phone through Snapchat.

She testified that his grip was tight enough that she could not free herself, and that each time she pulled away he took hold again. After he loosened his grip, she pulled free and told him she was 13. She said he then asked “if he was too old for [her]” and kept trying to get her to take his arm again. She stepped back, yelled, and walked away, then ran, as a passing woman asked whether she needed help. The whole thing lasted about 36 seconds and moved her toward a corner of the mall near an exit that, the Court noted, led to the man’s parked car. She reported the encounter to mall security and then to the Abington Police, who arrested the man and charged him with false imprisonment of a minor and two counts of harassment.

The Ex Parte Questioning and Removal of a Juror

The case was tried in April 2024. The jury deliberated, came back to rewatch the videos and photographs to fix when the man took the girl’s arm, and later asked the court to explain what it means to “interfere substantially” with someone’s liberty. Early in the afternoon, the jury reported that it could not reach a unanimous verdict.

The court gave a Spencer charge, also called a dynamite charge, which tells a deadlocked jury to keep trying to reach a verdict with an open mind but without surrendering firmly held convictions. The jury went back to deliberate and then sent a note: “We are unable to reach a verdict. One juror respectfully but forcefully no longer wishes to discuss the aspects of this case.”

The court’s first reaction was understandably to declare a mistrial. The prosecutor disagreed, arguing that a juror who was refusing to deliberate should be struck for cause and replaced, because “[i]f they’re not deliberating, they’re not doing their job.” Defense counsel asked for a mistrial, arguing that the juror’s refusal to keep talking reflected her conscientious view of the evidence.

The judge then interviewed the juror, Juror No. 8, in the robing room, on the record but without counsel or the defendant present. The exchange was brief. After the juror said she felt like she was “in the principal’s office,” the court confirmed that she was the juror described in the note and that she no longer wished to discuss the case. The court discharged her and replaced her with an alternate, explaining that she was not a juror who simply would not change her mind: “She’s not sticking to her position. She’s refusing to deliberate anymore.” The new jury watched the video again and returned a guilty verdict the same day. The court later sentenced the man to three and one-half to ten years in prison and ordered him to register as a Tier I sex offender for fifteen years.

Removing a Juror Who Refuses to Deliberate

On appeal, the defense argued that the trial court should not have removed Juror No. 8 because the short colloquy never established whether she was refusing to deliberate or had deliberated and reached a firm conclusion she would not give up. The Superior Court rejected the argument and affirmed.

The Court applied the rule that the decision to discharge a juror rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, who may substitute an alternate when the facts show that a juror can no longer perform the role. The trial judge, the Court observed, was in a unique position to evaluate Juror No. 8 in person. The jury had the case for about four hours, the court had instructed the jurors more than once to keep an open mind and consult with one another, and on that record the Court concluded that the judge could treat the juror’s refusal to discuss the case as a refusal to deliberate rather than a genuine deadlock requiring a mistrial.

The Court drew a line between two situations. A juror who deliberates and then holds to a minority view cannot be removed for that. A juror who will not keep deliberating can be. The two can look the same from the outside, and the short interview here did not explore why Juror No. 8 would not continue, which is the question that separates them. The court had also been ready to declare a mistrial before it placed her on the removable side of the line. Judge Kunselman dissented.

The Ex Parte Interview Issue Was Not Preserved

The defense also argued that questioning Juror No. 8 without counsel present violated the right to have counsel at a critical stage of trial. The Court did not reach the merits. It held the claim waived because counsel had not objected on that ground in the trial court and had instead pressed for a mistrial. The point for trial lawyers is important. An objection has to be specific and on the record when the issue comes up no matter how significant the issue.

“Substantial” Interference With Liberty

On sufficiency, the defense argued that the evidence did not show a substantial interference with the girl’s liberty, pointing to video that, in its view, showed her walking calmly at the man’s side rather than a child in distress. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the Superior Court disagreed.

Drawing on earlier decisions, the Court explained that false imprisonment of a minor reaches restraints less serious than those required for kidnapping or unlawful restraint, and that the word “substantially” has its ordinary meaning, covering interference with liberty in an ample or considerable manner. The Court held that the girl’s passive reaction did not defeat the charge. It relied on her testimony that she was in “shock,” wrote that the jury could read her demeanor on the video as bewilderment rather than calm, and found nothing in the statute that excludes victims who “silently retreat inward in response to adults’ commandeering and restraints instead of lashing out in defiance.” The Court also held that the short length of the restraint did not take it out of the reach of the statute, citing decisions that found a substantial interference in a one-minute confinement of a child and in a brief grab of a 13-year-old, and distinguishing the kind of short, good-faith detention, such as a store owner questioning a suspected shoplifter, that may belong in civil court.

The Court rejected a related challenge to the jury instruction that defined “substantially.” It held that the charge tracked an earlier Superior Court decision and that, read as a whole, it created no real risk of confusion or prejudice even though it referred in passing to kidnapping and unlawful restraint without defining those crimes.

The Takeaway

The practical point is a serious one for anyone charged with this offense. A restraint that lasts only seconds, in a public place, can possibly support a felony conviction when the complainant is a child, and the complainant’s own account of her state of mind can carry the “substantial interference” element even where the video looks ambiguous. A conviction also requires fifteen years of sex-offender registration even though false imprisonment is not itself a sex crime and the Commonwealth does not have to prove a sexual motive. Reading “substantially” this broadly makes the line between the crime and a brief, lawful encounter harder to draw, and the registration consequence is severe.

The juror ruling may be an even bigger problem. After Evans, a trial court faced with a deadlock can potentially question a reported holdout and, if it finds she has stopped deliberating, replace her with an alternate instead of declaring a mistrial. That is a significant power, and the panel did not agree on it. Trial counsel unquestionably should have objected to the court doing that without counsel there. Until the Supreme Court takes up the question, counsel should make a complete record any time a court considers removing a juror during deliberations and should be ready to ask for a mistrial on the record rather than a substitution.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/10/26 Zak Goldstein 6/10/26

PA Superior Court: No Discovery Violation Where Police Failed to Turn Over Videos to Prosecutors Until Days Before Trial

Zak Goldstein Criminal Lawyer — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 2026 PA Super 115 (June 8, 2026), holding that the Commonwealth did not commit a discovery violation where the arresting officer failed to provide forty videos to the prosecution until days before trial and the prosecution promptly notified the defense once it received them. The Court also approved the trial court’s decision to respond to the late disclosure by granting a continuance rather than excluding the videos. The precedential opinion confirms that Rule 573 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure reaches only evidence within the possession and control of the prosecution. Evidence sitting in a police file may not trigger the rule’s remedies, no matter how long the police have had it or how early the defense asked for it.

Commonwealth v. Lloyd

In November 2023, police charged the defendant with arson and related offenses for allegedly setting fire to the porch of her relatives’ home in Armstrong County. After the case was held over for trial at the preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a discovery request seeking, among other things, any videos in the possession of law enforcement.

The case moved slowly. In January 2024, the trial court granted a defense motion for a competency examination, and the court later ordered treatment to restore the defendant’s competency to stand trial. The court found her competent in October 2024, granted her request for a non-jury trial in November 2024, and scheduled trial for January 29, 2025.

On January 24, 2025, five days before trial, the parties filed dueling motions. The Commonwealth moved for a continuance, alleging that although it had previously requested discovery materials from the arresting officer, it did not receive a disc of videos from him until that same week. The prosecution first told defense counsel about the disc on January 22, 2025, and advised the next day that it contained forty videos, each running about half an hour. The defendant responded with a motion in limine under Rule 573 asking the court to exclude the videos. Her counsel filed the motion before even obtaining the disc and without any opportunity to review roughly twenty hours of footage or to consult with the defendant about it.

The defendant also opposed any continuance. She noted that the Commonwealth had listed the case for trial four times in 2024 without ever mentioning outstanding discovery, and she attributed the late production to the “bad conduct of the arresting officer.” She argued that a continuance was “not feasible” because she remained in custody and her competency might deteriorate while she waited still longer for trial. In her view, the Commonwealth had more than a year to obtain and review the videos, and its continuance request was a last-minute reaction to her motion to exclude them.

The trial court summarily denied the motion in limine, granted the continuance, and rescheduled the non-jury trial for April 1, 2025. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the videos without further objection from the defense. The footage included gas station security video of the defendant pumping gasoline into a container and carrying it away on foot, along with residential videos showing her walking toward the fire scene with the container and later walking away and discarding the container in a dumpster. The trial court found the defendant guilty and later sentenced her to three to seven years of incarceration. After the court denied her post-sentence motion, she appealed, arguing that the videos should have been excluded and the continuance denied.

Rule 573 and the Remedies for Late Disclosure

Rule 573(B)(1)(f) requires the Commonwealth, on request, to disclose tangible objects, including documents and photographs, that are material to the case. The Commonwealth also has a continuing duty under Rule 573(D) to disclose additional evidence and to promptly notify the defendant when new material surfaces. If a court finds a discovery violation, Rule 573(E) gives it broad discretion to choose a remedy, which can include excluding the evidence.

The case law places an important limit on the rule, however. The Commonwealth need not turn over evidence that is not within its possession or control. As the Superior Court explained in Commonwealth v. Long, 753 A.2d 272, 278 (Pa. Super. 2000), “[o]ur cases uniformly hold that the prosecution does not violate discovery rules when it fails to provide the defense with evidence that it does not possess and of which it is unaware during pre-trial discovery, as when the evidence is in police custody.”

Even when a violation occurs, exclusion is the exception. The Superior Court has suggested that in most cases, “[a] continuance is appropriate where the undisclosed statement or other evidence is admissible and the defendant’s only prejudice is surprise.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 955 A.2d 391, 395 (Pa. Super. 2008). Absent any violation, Rule 106(A) permits the trial court to grant a continuance “in the interests of justice.”

One caveat is worth noting. Rule 573 does not alter the Commonwealth’s obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which extend to favorable evidence in the possession of the police even when the prosecutor is unaware of it. Lloyd did not argue that Brady was at issue in her appeal.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court affirmed. Reviewing the evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, the Court concluded that Lloyd never established a discovery violation in the first place. The disclosure duty imposed by Rule 573 extends to evidence in the Commonwealth’s possession and control, not evidence that sits solely in police custody. Lloyd did not dispute that the videos remained with the police until the prosecution received them shortly before the scheduled trial date, or that the prosecution promptly notified her counsel once it had them. She also pointed to no facts suggesting the prosecution knew of or had access to the videos any earlier.

The Court acknowledged Lloyd’s frustration with the Commonwealth’s repeated trial listings that made no mention of outstanding discovery, but it held that this was not the type of delay Rule 573 was intended to address. The Court reiterated that “Rule 573 . . . does not, itself, impose a duty of due diligence on the part of the Commonwealth.” The rule requires prompt notification of additional evidence, and the prosecution provided it.

Because there was no violation, the remedies provision of Rule 573(E) never came into play, and the trial court properly denied the motion in limine. The Superior Court likewise found no abuse of discretion in the continuance, endorsing the trial court’s explanation:

The interests of justice required that both sides have a reasonable opportunity to review the new evidence, whether inculpatory, exculpatory, or neither. . . . [S]imply postponing the trial was the proper way to protect [Lloyd]’s right to a fair trial. Precluding evidence that had not been reviewed by either the Commonwealth or [Lloyd] was not the solution.

The panel added that even if the Commonwealth had violated Rule 573, the trial court still would not have abused its discretion by ordering a continuance as the remedy for the late disclosure.

The Takeaway

The decision draws a hard line between the police and the prosecution for discovery purposes, and that line seems inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s Brady obligations. A defendant can request videos at the outset of the case, the police can hold them for more than a year, and the defense still has no remedy under Rule 573 so long as the prosecutor discloses the evidence quickly once it finally arrives. For a defendant in custody, the consequences are real. The defendant waited in jail for an additional two months while the parties reviewed footage that, in her view, the Commonwealth should have obtained long before, and she did so while her competency remained a serious concern.

The opinion also shows where the fight has to happen in these cases. The outcome might be different if the defense can establish that the prosecution itself knew of or had access to the evidence earlier, so counsel should press for a record of when the district attorney’s office learned of the material rather than focusing only on when the police collected it. The defendant did not develop that record, and the Superior Court noted that she made no attempt to do so even at the post-sentence stage. Claims involving favorable evidence stand on different footing as well. Brady reaches favorable evidence in police hands regardless of what the prosecutor knows, so late-surfacing material that actually helps the defense presents a much stronger claim. The defendant may have also had a viable Rule 600 speedy trial motion due to the delays as the Commonwealth must exercise due diligence during the life of the case and may not juts seek continuances indefinitely.

Lloyd also confirms how difficult it may be to win exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction in Pennsylvania. But the analysis also took place based on what the trial court did, and appellate courts are often deferential to the trial courts on review in these types of cases. Courts typically treat a continuance as the standard cure when the only prejudice is surprise, even on the eve of trial and even when the defendant is in custody. A defendant seeking exclusion generally needs to show something more, such as evidence that the prosecution withheld material it actually possessed or prejudice that additional time cannot fix in order to win an appeal. In practice, however, many trial courts may exclude the evidence or dismiss a case, or the continuance may trigger a speedy trial problem for the Commonwealth.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein 6/9/26 Zak Goldstein 6/9/26

PCRA Court Grants New Trial for Attorney Goldstein’s Client in Cumberland County Sexual Assault Case Due to Trial Counsel’s Failure to Call Character Witnesses

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, of Goldstein Mehta LLC recently won a new trial for a client in the case of Commonwealth v. J.R. In an opinion and order issued on June 9, 2026, the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas granted J.R.’s Post-Conviction Relief Act petition, finding that trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call character witnesses at J.R.’s trial on sexual assault charges. The court ordered a new trial and set unsecured bail, clearing the way for J.R.’s release after he had served nearly two years in state prison.

Commonwealth v. J.R.: The Allegations and the Trial

The case arose from a night out in March 2023. J.R. and three co-workers went out drinking after their shifts ended at the restaurant where they worked. At the end of the night, one co-worker drove the group home in his small two-door car. A second co-worker rode in the front passenger seat, while J.R. and the complainant sat in the back seat. The complainant became heavily intoxicated over the course of the evening and later alleged that J.R. forced the complainant to engage in sexual contact, including oral sex, during the drive. The front seat passenger testified that she heard the complainant say “help me” and turned to see J.R. holding the complainant’s hand against him. The driver testified that he did not observe any sexual contact. After J.R. was dropped off, the complainant disclosed the alleged assault to the two other co-workers, and they went to the police the following morning.

J.R. was arrested and proceeded to a jury trial in May 2024. He took the stand in his own defense and admitted that sexual contact occurred, but he testified that it was entirely consensual. The jury found him guilty of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, and related offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to four and a half to nine years’ incarceration. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal in December 2025.

The PCRA Petition

J.R. retained Attorney Goldstein, who filed a timely Post-Conviction Relief Act petition on his behalf. The petition raised two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: first, that trial counsel failed to impeach the driver, a Commonwealth witness, with his extensive history of crimen falsi convictions, and second, that trial counsel failed to call character witnesses on J.R.’s behalf even though several witnesses were available and willing to testify to his reputation for peacefulness and non-violence. The court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2026 at which trial counsel testified.

To win a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must prove that the underlying claim has arguable merit, that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for the act or omission, and that counsel’s error prejudiced the petitioner, meaning there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Sneed, where the claim involves the failure to call a witness, the petitioner must also show that the witness existed, that the witness was available and willing to testify for the defense, and that counsel knew of or should have known of the witness.

The Court’s Ruling: Character Witnesses Were Critical in a He Said/She Said Case

At the hearing, it was uncontested that character witnesses existed, that they were available and willing to testify for the defense, and that trial counsel knew about them. Trial counsel testified that he chose not to call them because he did not want to distract the jury from his trial strategy, which was to argue that it would have been impossible for J.R. to sexually assault the complainant in the back seat of a small, moving car. He also acknowledged that he never consulted with J.R. about the decision.

The PCRA court rejected that explanation. As the court observed, the defense actually presented at trial was not impossibility. J.R. testified that the sexual contact was consensual, which made the trial a classic he said/she said credibility contest between J.R. and the complainant. Trial counsel himself recognized that the verdict would turn on the jury’s assessment of those two witnesses, yet he neither consulted his client about ways to bolster his credibility nor called any of the available character witnesses who could have done so. Calling character witnesses could not have undermined the defense theory because the defense theory hinged entirely on J.R.’s credibility.

Pennsylvania law treats character evidence as substantive evidence, not a mere formality. Evidence of a defendant’s good reputation may, by itself, create a reasonable doubt and require a verdict of not guilty. The principle carries particular weight in sexual assault cases. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Weiss, in a case “where there are only two direct witnesses involved, credibility of the witnesses is of paramount importance, and character evidence is critical to the jury’s determination of credibility.” Relying on Weiss and the Superior Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Alceus, the court concluded that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to call character witnesses and that J.R. suffered prejudice as a result.

The court denied the separate claim concerning the impeachment of the driver. Although it agreed that the claim had arguable merit because trial counsel knew about the crimen falsi convictions and chose not to use them, the court found that counsel had a reasonable strategic basis for that decision and that no prejudice resulted. The driver did not witness the alleged assault, and his testimony was cumulative of the testimony of the other Commonwealth witnesses. The new trial was therefore granted on the character witness claim.

The Result

The court granted the PCRA petition and ordered a new trial. Because J.R. had previously posted $250,000 bail and had already served approximately twenty-two months of his fifty-four month minimum sentence, the court set bail at $250,000 unsecured pending the retrial, with the condition that he have no contact with the complainant. That ruling allows J.R. to be released from state prison while the case is pending.

This decision highlights the critical role that character evidence plays in Pennsylvania criminal trials. In a sexual assault case that comes down to the word of the complainant against the word of the defendant, evidence of the defendant’s reputation for peacefulness and non-violence may be the only corroboration the defense can offer, and the law recognizes that it may by itself create a reasonable doubt. Trial counsel must investigate potential character witnesses, consult with the client about whether to call them, and have a real strategic reason before leaving that evidence on the table. When counsel fails to do so, the PCRA may provide a path to a new trial.