
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
PA Superior Court: Jurisdiction Exists for Out-of-State Access Device Fraud When Complainant Lives in Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Washington, holding that the Commonwealth could prosecute the defendant for allegedly committing fraud out of state when the complainant and the complainant’s financial accounts were based in Pennsylvania.
The Facts of the Case
In Commonwealth v. Washington, 2025 PA Super 183, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that Pennsylvania courts have jurisdiction to prosecute access device fraud committed outside the Commonwealth when the complainant resides here and the affected financial account is maintained in Pennsylvania. The Court rejected the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge.
The defendant was charged in Montgomery County, PA with one count of Access Device Fraud under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4106(a)(1)(ii). While physically in New York, the defendant used an altered check and fake identification belonging to a Pennsylvania resident. Using the forged documents, he cashed a counterfeit $3,500 check and withdrew $5,000 from the complainant’s KeyBank account.
The complainant lived in Lower Salford Township in Montgomery County, and KeyBank operated branches there. After the transactions, a New York branch manager contacted the complainant, who confirmed that he had not authorized the withdrawals. Surveillance footage identified the defendant, who was arrested and extradited to Pennsylvania. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nine to twenty-three months in jail. On appeal, the defendant argued that Pennsylvania lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and venue because the fraudulent conduct occurred entirely in New York State.
The Superior Court’s Analysis
The Superior Court rejected that argument and affirmed the conviction. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 102, Pennsylvania courts may exercise jurisdiction if either the conduct constituting an element of the offense or the result of that conduct takes place within the Commonwealth. Access Device Fraud under § 4106(a)(1)(ii) criminalizes using another person’s access device without authorization. The Court held that an essential element of the offense—the failure to obtain the owner’s consent—occurs where the victim resides. Because the complainant lived in Montgomery County, the defendant’s unauthorized use of the complainant’s financial information constituted conduct occurring within Pennsylvania even though the defendant was in New York.
The Court also concluded that venue was proper in Montgomery County under § 4106(e), which provides that such offenses may be deemed committed “at the place where the property or services were received or provided, or at the place where the lawful charges for said property or services are billed.” Because the complainant’s account and the relevant KeyBank branch were located in Montgomery County, that county was the proper venue.
Citing similar reasoning from courts in Massachusetts and Florida, the Superior Court confirmed that Pennsylvania may exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state access device or identity-theft offenses when the complainant resides in Pennsylvania and the loss is tied to a Pennsylvania account.
The Takeaway
Commonwealth v. Washington establishes that Pennsylvania courts can prosecute financial crimes committed elsewhere if the victim lives in Pennsylvania and the affected funds are drawn from a Pennsylvania account. Even remote, out-of-state conduct can support Pennsylvania charges when the harm and loss occur within the Commonwealth.
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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court holds both that “hey fellas” is not a stop and that probation officers may assist police with catching fleeing suspect.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Stoney, holding that the police did not illegally stop the defendant by saying “hey fellas” as they pulled up to him and that there was nothing illegal about a probation officer helping the police capture the defendant once he fled from them.
The Facts of the Case
The incident began when a Harrisburg police officer and several county probation officers were patrolling a high-crime area near North 6th and Seneca Streets. The police officer observed two men, later identified as the defendant and another individual, standing on a corner. The officer testified that the second man appeared to be concealing a firearm with a drum magazine and that the defendant made a “security tap” on his waistband consistent with carrying a gun.
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
When the officers circled the block and approached on foot, the officer called out, “Hey fellas.” Both men looked back and immediately fled in opposite directions. A probation officer pursued the defendant and saw him remove a gun from his waistband and throw it onto a roof. The officers recovered the firearm and arrested him.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was unlawfully seized when the officer said “hey fellas,” that his flight was provoked by a show of authority, and that the probation officers exceeded their statutory authority because the defendant was not under county supervision. He was, however, on federal supervised release. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion and that the probation officers acted lawfully in assisting the police. The defendant appealed, arguing both that the police stopped him without reasonable suspicion and that the probation officers did not have the authority to stop him at the direction of the police.
The Superior Court’s Decision
The Superior Court affirmed on appeal. The Court held that a police officer saying “hey fellas” did not amount to a seizure under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Because the phrase was casual and non-coercive, it would not communicate to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave. At that point, the encounter was merely a consensual interaction, not an investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion.
The Court held that the seizure occurred only once the officers began to pursue the defendant and his companion after they fled. By that time, the officers already had reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances: a high-crime location, the officer’s observation of what appeared to be a firearm, the defendant’s “security check,” and unprovoked flight, which the Court has long held can justify a Terry stop.
The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that county probation officers acted outside their statutory authority. Relying on Commonwealth v. Gibson (2025) and Commonwealth v. Mathis (2017), the panel held that probation officers may assist police in the field as part of their public-safety duties. The “stalking horse” doctrine did not apply because the police already had reasonable suspicion before the probation officers helped with the physical apprehension. The probation officers did not initiate the investigation or stop. Instead, they merely helped the police officers.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the firearm was not discarded as part of a “forced abandonment,” that the detention was lawful, and that the trial court properly denied the motion.
The Takeaway
The decision reinforces that a brief, informal greeting such as “hey fellas” or “what’s up” does not constitute a seizure under Pennsylvania law. A stop begins only when police restrain a person’s movement or communicate that they are not free to walk away. “Stop” is a stop, but other, more casual greetings may not be. And once someone flees for no real reason, police often have at least reasonable suspicion to chase them. Further, although Pennsylvania recognizes forced abandonment and still allows for the suppression of a gun that someone discards while fleeing if the flight was triggered by an illegal stop, federal law does not. Thus, even if the state courts had suppressed the gun, the defendant could have been prosecuted in federal court.
This case also illustrates that courts continue to treat unprovoked flight in a high-crime area as a major factor supporting reasonable suspicion even when the behavior itself is ambiguous. It further confirms that probation officers working with police may lawfully assist in arrests when officers already have reasonable suspicion. The defense was unable to cite any cases which held that the probation officers could not assist the police once the police themselves had reasonable suspicion. The probation officers may not have been able to conduct the investigation alone, but because they were acting at the direction of the police, the Superior Court affirmed.
Facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police?
Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit.
Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court Rejects Request for Hearing on Juror Misconduct Allegations in Commonwealth v. Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
In Commonwealth v. Wakeem Hall, No. 1399 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 15, 2025), the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered whether a defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on allegations that the jury foreperson, who was an attorney, may have told other jurors that the defendant’s failure to call character witnesses at trial must have meant he had a prior criminal record. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief and decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s claim, holding that the defendant’s proffer was speculative and insufficient to overcome the rule prohibiting inquiry into jury deliberations.
The Facts of the Case
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) with a child, endangering the welfare of a child, corruption of a minor, and unlawful contact with a minor. The criminal charges stemmed from allegations that he repeatedly abused his biological daughter in 2015 when she was nine and ten years old. He was found guilty and sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years in prison followed by 10 years of probation.
After trial, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing. He argued that the jury foreperson, who was a lawyer, may have told the rest of the jury that the defendant’s failure to call character witnesses indicated he had a prior record. This allegation arose from questions jurors asked defense counsel after the verdict had already been returned and the jurors discharged. The trial court denied the motion, finding the allegations supporting it to be speculative. Because of a court system error that prevented him from filing a timely appeal, the defendant’s appellate rights were later reinstated nunc pro tunc through PCRA proceedings, and he appealed to the Superior Court.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Ruling
On appeal, the defendant argued that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing to question jurors about whether they considered improper information during deliberations. The Superior Court rejected the claim and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. The Court explained that trial courts should only grant such hearings when there is actual evidence that jurors received information from outside the trial — for example, when someone testifies that jurors asked friends or relatives for advice or looked up information on their own. Here, however, there was no solid evidence of that. At most, defense counsel speculated that the foreperson might have suggested something about character witnesses, and even that was not clearly established.
The Court emphasized that jurors are allowed to bring their own life experiences and common sense into deliberations. This is true even if the juror is a lawyer, and the defense or prosecution could have struck that juror using a peremptory strike or for cause if there was evidence that the juror could not be fair. It is not unusual for jurors to wonder why a defendant did not call certain witnesses, and the law does not permit attorneys to question jurors after the fact about such speculation. Because the defendant’s claim relied only on assumptions and not on actual evidence of outside influence, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying his request.
Pa.R.E. 606 governs a juror’s competency as a witness (or their availability to be called as a witness), and it generally holds that they cannot testify. There are limited exceptions, but the Court did not find that exceptions applied here. The rule provides:
Rule 606. Juror’s Competency as a Witness.
(a) At the Trial. A juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial. If a juror is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the jury’s presence.
(b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
(A) prejudicial information not of record and beyond common knowledge and experience was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; or
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.
Here, the Court found that none of the exceptions applied due to the speculative nature of the defendant’s allegations.
The Takeaway
This case shows how difficult it is to challenge a jury verdict based on what may have been said in the jury room. Pennsylvania law strictly limits any inquiry into jury deliberations, and courts require solid proof of outside influence or improper information before allowing a hearing. Mere speculation about what jurors may have thought or said is not enough to overturn a conviction or obtain a new trial or even an evidentiary hearing.
Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
Facing criminal charges? We can help.
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
PA Supreme Court: Time Spent in Custody on Probation Detainer Should Apply to New Case Even if Bail Paid
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Phillips, holding that the defendant should have received credit for time served on a new case where he was held in custody only on a probation detainer on a prior case because he had paid bail on the new case. Therefore, he would have been released but for the detainer. Generally, defendants are only entitled to time credit on the cases that are actually holding them in custody, so under prior statutory interpretations, he would not have been entitled to time credit on the new case because that case was not holding him in custody once he paid bail. The time credit statute, however, deals with conduct rather than cases, and the conduct that led to the new case also triggered the probation detainer. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that he was entitled to time credit on the new case even though he had posted bail.
The Facts of Phillips
The defendant was serving a probationary sentence from a 2015 case involving DUI and resisting arrest when he was arrested in 2018 for aggravated assault. Although his mother posted his bail for the 2018 case, he remained incarcerated because a probation detainer was lodged against him in connection with the earlier case. He was still on probation at the time of his arrest for the assault, leading to the detainer.
The defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in the 2018 case and received a sentence of 27 to 72 months’ incarceration in state prison. At the same time, the sentencing court revoked his probation in the 2015 DUI case and imposed a consecutive two-year probationary sentence, meaning that he did not need any time credit from the time spent in prison to go to that case because he received a non-incarceration sentence. Nonetheless, because he had posted bail on the case, the trial court did not award him credit for the nearly eight months he spent incarcerated on the probation detainer between May 2018 and January 2019 before his sentencing on the assault.
The defendant ultimately sought relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), arguing that under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1), he was entitled to credit for all of that time spent in custody. The PCRA court gave him partial credit of 237 days, but it refused to credit the time he spent incarcerated solely on the probation detainer. The Superior Court affirmed on appeal, reasoning that because he was held only on the detainer during that period, the credit could not be applied to the assault case. The defendant sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
The Supreme Court’s Ruling
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. Justice Mundy, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that Section 9760(1) requires credit for “all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.”
The Court found that the defendant’s detention on the probation detainer was directly triggered by the same conduct, the assault, that led to the aggravated assault conviction. Because the detainer would not have been lodged but for the new charges, the time he spent incarcerated from May 2018 to January 2019 was “a result of the conduct” underlying the assault.
The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that credit should not apply because the detainer related to his earlier resisting arrest conviction. It emphasized that the statute does not require the conduct to be the sole cause of confinement. Reading the statute narrowly, as the Commonwealth urged, would improperly insert limitations not found in the statutory text.
Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to have all of his pre-sentence confinement credited toward his 2018 assault sentence. Although it appeared he had already completed that sentence, the Court remanded for a determination of whether relief could still be awarded.
The Takeaway
This decision clarifies that defendants are entitled to credit for all pre-sentence confinement when that custody results from the same conduct that led to the new charges, even if they were technically held on a probation detainer rather than bail. The ruling ensures that defendants are not punished twice by losing credit simply because a probation violation and new charges arise from the same incident. In general, it is best to avoid situations like this by not posting bail when a probation detainer is in place, but now this is one less trap for defense attorneys to have to worry about.
Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case?
Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelph1ia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorn2ey today.