Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/1/26 Zak Goldstein 10/1/26

PA Superior Court: Service of a Temporary PFA Order Does Not Prove the Defendant Knew About the Final Order

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Miller, 2026 PA Super 219, reversing a conviction for indirect criminal contempt of a Protection From Abuse order because the Commonwealth never proved that the defendant knew a final PFA order existed. The defendant had been served with the temporary order and the notice of the final hearing, but he did not attend the hearing, and the Commonwealth put on no evidence that anyone ever told him the court had entered a final order. The Court held that is not enough. It also refused to let the Commonwealth save the conviction with a portion of a video that was never played in court and never admitted into evidence.

The Facts of Miller

The complainant obtained a temporary PFA order against the defendant, with whom she lived, in March 2023. He was served with the temporary order on March 17, 2023. The court held the final hearing on April 19, 2023. The complainant appeared, the defendant did not, and the court entered a final PFA order by default barring him from contacting her or being at her residence for three years. On the day of the hearing, the defendant was in Philadelphia County custody.

On May 29, 2023, the complainant called the police at 2:19 a.m. and reported a verbal dispute with the defendant. The officer’s report stated that she did not report any assault, injury, or weapon, although she later testified that she had told him the defendant strangled her and threatened to kill her. Police arrested the defendant for violating the final PFA order and charged him with strangulation, terroristic threats, unlawful restraint, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, and false imprisonment.

The Procedural History

The case went to a bench trial in December 2023. During cross-examination, defense counsel played a short portion from the beginning of the complainant’s recorded police interview to show that her speech was slurred. Both sides marked the video, but neither side moved it into evidence, and nothing in the record shows that any other part of it was played. The parties stipulated to the procedural history of the temporary and final orders. They did not stipulate that the defendant had notice of the final order, and the Commonwealth presented no evidence that he did.

The trial judge found the complainant’s testimony about the alleged assault not credible and acquitted the defendant of every charge except contempt. The judge found that he had been at her residence in violation of the final order and sentenced him to six months of reporting probation. The contempt conviction also triggered a probation violation on an older case, for which the defendant received five to ten years in prison. He appealed the contempt conviction, arguing that the Commonwealth never proved he knew about the final order.

The Superior Court’s Decision

To convict someone of indirect criminal contempt of a PFA order, the Commonwealth must prove that the order was clear, that the defendant had notice of it, that he did something the order prohibited, and that he acted with wrongful intent. On notice, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 283 A.3d 196 (Pa. 2022), that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual knowledge of the PFA order at the time of the violation. The defendant can get that knowledge any way at all, including from someone telling him. But the Supreme Court made clear it was not holding that knowledge of a temporary order equals knowledge of a final order.

The trial court’s opinion reasoned that the defendant knew about the final order because he had been served with the petition, the temporary order, and the notice of the April 19 hearing date. The Superior Court rejected that reasoning as contrary to Stevenson. Notice of the temporary order and of the hearing is not notice that the court actually entered a final order. The Commonwealth had to prove that the defendant knew the final order existed, and it offered nothing on that point.

The Commonwealth tried to fill the gap on appeal with the police interview video. It claimed that at roughly the eight-minute mark the complainant said the defendant took her copy of the final PFA order when he left, which would support an inference that he knew about it. The Court would not consider it. The video was marked for identification but never moved into evidence. The record showed that the judge saw only the opening minutes, played by the defense for a different purpose, and the trial court’s opinion never mentioned the statement the Commonwealth was relying on. The Commonwealth cited Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452 (Pa. Super. 2021), where the Court treated a video as part of the record even though no one formally moved it in, but in Jones the defense had stipulated to its admissibility and the video had been played for the judge. The Court applied the general rule from Jones instead: an exhibit that is only marked for identification is not evidence a fact-finder can rely on. The Court vacated the sentence, reversed the conviction, and discharged the defendant.

The Takeaway

PFA contempt cases move fast, and defendants often plead or go to a short bench trial without anyone asking whether the Commonwealth can prove notice of the final order. Miller shows why that question matters. A defendant who was served with a temporary order and then missed the final hearing, as this defendant did because he was in custody, has not necessarily learned that a final order was entered. The Commonwealth has to prove he knew, and if its only evidence is service of the temporary order, the conviction cannot stand.

The stakes here were not small. The contempt conviction itself carried six months of probation, but it also served as the basis for a five-to-ten-year sentence on a probation violation. The defendant separately appealed the revocation, and with the contempt conviction reversed, the conviction that supported it is gone. Defense lawyers handling probation violation cases should look hard at the underlying conviction, because a weak contempt case can be the only thing holding up a long state sentence.

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Zak Goldstein 9/30/26 Zak Goldstein 9/30/26

PA Superior Court: Google and Facebook Are Not Government Agents When They Scan User Accounts and Report Internet Contraband to NCMEC

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Thomas, 2026 PA Super 209, holding that Google and Facebook do not act as agents of the government when they scan their users’ accounts for child sexual abuse material and report what they find to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). The defendant argued that federal law, which requires the companies to report this material and fines them if they do not, makes them instruments of law enforcement, so their warrantless searches of his accounts violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court rejected the argument in a published opinion. But the holding rests on a thin record, and the Court left the harder questions open.

The Facts of Thomas

In May 2023, Facebook and Google sent three CyberTipline reports to NCMEC stating that files had been uploaded through Facebook Messenger and to Google Photos. NCMEC forwarded the reports to the Pennsylvania State Police. A State Police corporal viewed the images, subpoenaed Verizon and Google for the subscriber behind the IP address, and obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s home in Fayette County. Police found child sexual abuse material on two of his phones. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that Google, Facebook, and NCMEC were all acting as agents of law enforcement when they searched his accounts. The trial court denied the motion, a jury convicted him of twenty counts of possession, one count of dissemination, and one count of criminal use of a communication facility, and the court sentenced him to six to twelve years in prison.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 restrain the government, not private parties. Under United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), and Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 209 A.3d 957 (Pa. 2019), the police may use what a private party finds and turns over so long as they do not exceed the scope of the private search. The doctrine does not apply if the private party was really acting as an agent or instrument of the government, and the answer to that question depends on the degree of the government’s participation in the private party’s activities.

The defendant’s argument rested on 18 U.S.C. § 2258A, which requires providers to report apparent child sexual abuse material to NCMEC and fines them up to $1,000,000 for knowingly failing to do so. The Court held that the statute does not make Google and Facebook government agents because subsection (f) of the same statute says that nothing in it requires a provider to monitor its users or affirmatively search, screen, or scan for the material. Congress required the companies to report what they know and left the decision whether to look entirely to them. The Court then made a critical point: nothing in the record showed that Google and Facebook searched the defendant’s accounts at the government’s urging or through any manipulation or coercion. The Court cited decisions from five federal circuits reaching the same result and followed them.

The Court treated NCMEC differently. It acknowledged that Congress funds NCMEC, requires providers to report to NCMEC rather than to the police, requires NCMEC to forward every report to law enforcement, authorizes NCMEC to receive and distribute material that would be a crime for anyone else to possess, and immunizes NCMEC for doing so. It noted that the Second Circuit in United States v. Guard, 152 F.4th 375 (2d Cir. 2025), and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016), have held that NCMEC is a government agent. The Court did not decide the question because the defendant never argued that NCMEC or the police looked at anything Google and Facebook had not already looked at. Without a scope argument, NCMEC’s status did not matter.

The defendant did win a new trial on the dissemination count, because the Commonwealth proved that charge entirely through the CyberTipline report, which it introduced as a business record through the corporal, and the Court held that an investigating officer who merely receives and relies on NCMEC reports is not a qualified witness who can authenticate them.

The Takeaway

The state actor argument is still open. The Court did not hold that Google and Facebook can never be government agents. It held that this defendant did not prove they were on a record that failed to provide any evidence as to why the companies scan their users’ accounts, how those systems came to exist, or what role law enforcement and NCMEC play in them. The Court said in so many words that the record did not support a finding that the government urged, manipulated, or coerced the searches. That may be an opportunity to build a better record in a future case. A defendant could subpoena the providers and develop testimony about the government’s participation in the design and operation of these scanning programs, where the hash databases the providers match against come from, and what the providers get in return presents a different case. The agency test turns on the degree of government participation, and no one in Thomas presented any evidence of participation to the trial court, so there was nothing to support the appeal.

The second open question is what happens when the police look at files that no human at the company ever opened. In Thomas, the Facebook report itself said that NCMEC never viewed the files, and nothing in the opinion says anyone at Facebook viewed them either. A computer flagged them, and the first person to actually open them may have been the trooper. The private search doctrine lets the police look at what a private party already looked at. It does not necessarily let the police look at something a private party's software only flagged. The defendant never made that argument, so the Court did not address it. It has to be raised in the suppression motion and supported with evidence at the hearing because the Superior Court will not consider it for the first time on appeal.

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Zak Goldstein 9/21/26 Zak Goldstein 9/21/26

PA Superior Court: No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Bag Left in the Open Bed of a Pickup Truck Where Defendant Had No Connection to the Truck

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Attorney in Philadelphia

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Serrano, 2026 PA Super 205 (Pa. Super. Sept. 18, 2026), holding that the trial court erred in suppressing a gun that police found in a bag in the open bed of a parked pickup truck. The Commonwealth produced evidence that the defendant’s only connection to the truck was that he stood next to it, and he did not present any evidence to the contrary. The Court concluded that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck and that he abandoned the bag when he left it there and ran. It did not decide whether the open bed of a pickup truck should receive the same protection as the inside of a vehicle in a case where a defendant actually establishes a connection to the truck.

What happened in Commonwealth v. Serrano?

On August 26, 2024, two uniformed Philadelphia police officers received a call from another officer who had seen the defendant near Reese and Somerset Streets with a black fanny pack. The officers ran a warrant search and found an active arrest warrant. When they arrived, they saw the defendant crouching behind a parked pickup truck. One officer asked to speak with him, and he ran. Police arrested him after a brief chase. He did not have keys to the truck.

Meanwhile, the second officer looked around the truck and saw a black satchel on the floor of the open truck bed. He reached in, took the bag to the police car, searched it, and found a gun. The officer did not have a search warrant. The officers testified that the defendant was not holding the bag when they arrived.

The Commonwealth charged the defendant with three firearms/VUFA offenses, and he moved to suppress. The suppression court granted the motion under the Pennsylvania Constitution. It reasoned that society would treat the bed of a pickup truck as part of the vehicle, with the same expectation of privacy as the interior. It also found that the Commonwealth did not meet its initial burden of showing that the defendant lacked a privacy interest in the truck. In the court’s view, the only evidence on that point was the absence of keys, and the defendant could have been spending time outside his home in his neighborhood. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court reversed. Under Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695 (Pa. 2014), the Commonwealth bears the initial burden of producing evidence that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. The defendant then bears the burden of persuasion. The Court found that the suppression court did not consider the totality of the circumstances and wrongly treated the question as one of ownership. A person who does not own a vehicle may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it if he lawfully possesses or controls it. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 340 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2025).

Here, the Court found that the Commonwealth showed more than missing keys. The officers did not see anyone in the truck, no one claimed it, no one saw the defendant operate it, and his only apparent connection to it was that he stood near it. He did not introduce any evidence linking himself to the truck. The Court relied on Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680 (Pa. 2005), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant who stood beside a parked car and tossed items into it did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. In the cases the defense cited, the police saw the defendant inside the vehicle. The Court did criticize the Commonwealth, noting “with displeasure” that it never ran the truck’s registration and that running the registration could have made things a lot easier for everyone.

The Court then turned to the bag. A defendant cannot maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in property he has abandoned. Leaving property in a place open to the public is not enough. The evidence must also show that the person tried to dissociate himself from it. The Court found that showing here because the defendant walked away from the truck and the bag when the police approached, ran, and did nothing to suggest that he intended to come back for it.

Because the defendant did not have a privacy interest in the truck, the Court declined to decide whether an open truck bed is protected like the rest of the vehicle. In a footnote, it said that the defendant might have prevailed on that argument, but that the question requires analysis because the Fourth Amendment does not protect what a person knowingly exposes to the public.

The Takeaway

Serrano is a reminder that the defendant carries the ultimate burden on the expectation of privacy. When police find a gun or drugs in a car that is not registered to the client, and the client was not inside it, the defense should be prepared to present evidence connecting him to it. Without it, the Commonwealth can meet its burden by showing that the police did not find any link between the defendant and the place they searched. It is also a reminder that people who run and throw contraband are usually worse off for a motion to suppress than people who remain calm and do not run away.

The decision also leaves room for future litigation. The Court left open whether the police need a warrant to take property from an open truck bed when the defendant has a connection to the truck. And abandonment only helps the Commonwealth when the police acted lawfully. Here, the police had an arrest warrant. Where the police unlawfully seize someone and he discards property in response, the forced abandonment doctrine requires suppression, as the Superior Court held two days earlier in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 2026 PA Super 202. This defendant may have lost either way. If the police found the warrant, they likely could have searched him incident to arrest, and if the gun was on him, they would have found it. But running away will usually not improve your case.

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Zak Goldstein 9/19/26 Zak Goldstein 9/19/26

PA Superior Court: No Mere Encounter Where Officer Pointed Gun At Suspect (Obviously)

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Thomas, 2026 PA Super 202 (Pa. Super. Sept. 16, 2026), holding that a Philadelphia police officer seized the defendant when he approached him with his gun drawn. The officer claimed that he only asked for identification, but he did not turn on his body camera until after the chase ended, and the suppression court did not believe him. Because a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away from an officer holding a gun, the Superior Court affirmed the order suppressing the firearm that the defendant discarded before he ran.

**What happened in Commonwealth v. Thomas?**

On May 16, 2024, an officer setting up narcotics surveillance saw the defendant walk by with a rectangular bulge near his hip that, according to the officer, moved like an unholstered gun. He put out a radio call that the man might have a gun. A second officer, who was alone, out of uniform, and driving an unmarked car, responded to the 3900 block of North Smedley Street. He testified that the defendant picked up the pace, so he got out to try to engage him in a mere encounter and ask for identification. According to the officer, the defendant bladed his body away, dipped down behind a parked car, and ran. Police caught him after a chase, and the officer recovered a gun from the wheel well of the parked car.

As is typical, the officer’s body camera video did not have any sound for the first minute. When the defendant began to stand back up from behind the parked car, the officer had his gun in his right hand, pointed chest-high across the car towards him. The officer testified that the gun was initially pointed up and that he lowered it when the defendant ran.

The suppression court first denied the motion, finding a mere encounter that turned into a stop supported by reasonable suspicion when the defendant dipped behind the car. The defense moved for reconsideration, and the court amended its findings. It found that the officer approached with his gun out and that, without audio, it could not know what he actually said. The court cited a Philadelphia police directive that requires officers to activate their cameras before conducting any pedestrian investigation, found that the officer deliberately failed to do so, and did not credit his testimony about what he said. It granted the motion, and the Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court first considered sua sponte whether the suppression court had jurisdiction to reverse itself more than 30 days after its original order. It did because a pre-trial suppression order is interlocutory and the 30-day limit in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 does not apply. Commonwealth v. James, 69 A.3d 180 (Pa. 2013). The Court did not endorse the procedure because Rule 581(J) makes the denial of a suppression motion final absent previously unavailable evidence, but the Commonwealth did not preserve that challenge.

On the merits, police may generally use abandoned property as evidence, but not where unlawful police action coerced the abandonment. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016 (Pa. 2025). On appeal, the Commonwealth argued only that the interaction was a mere encounter and did not claim that the officer had reasonable suspicion. The question therefore became whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have felt free to leave.

The Court held that he would not. An officer may approach someone in public and ask for identification without any suspicion, but the display of a weapon is one of the recognized factors that turns an encounter into a seizure. The video supported the finding that the officer activated his camera only after he had approached, chased, and apprehended the defendant, and the suppression court did not commit a clear and manifest error by discrediting him on that basis. The officer’s testimony that his gun was initially pointed up supported the conclusion that he pointed it towards the defendant before the defendant dipped down.

The Commonwealth argued that the defendant never saw the gun because he had turned away and was wearing a hood. The Court disagreed. The video does not show the defendant during the first six seconds after the officer got out of the car, and the Court found it reasonable to infer that he bladed away because he saw the gun. The Commonwealth also argued that the officer reasonably held his gun at his side for his safety. The Court responded that the question is whether a reasonable person would feel free to ignore the officer, not whether the officer acted reasonably for his safety. The Court affirmed. Judge Sullivan noted a dissent.

The Takeaway

Thomas is a helpful case for anyone charged with possessing a gun or drugs that the police recovered after a chase. Under Pennsylvania’s forced abandonment doctrine, if the police unlawfully seize someone and he throws something away in response, the Commonwealth cannot use it. Where an officer does not follow the body camera directive, defense counsel should ask the court to consider that failure in deciding whether to believe him.