Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 6/9/26 Zak Goldstein 6/9/26

PCRA Court Grants New Trial for Attorney Goldstein’s Client in Cumberland County Sexual Assault Case Due to Trial Counsel’s Failure to Call Character Witnesses

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, of Goldstein Mehta LLC recently won a new trial for a client in the case of Commonwealth v. J.R. In an opinion and order issued on June 9, 2026, the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas granted J.R.’s Post-Conviction Relief Act petition, finding that trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call character witnesses at J.R.’s trial on sexual assault charges. The court ordered a new trial and set unsecured bail, clearing the way for J.R.’s release after he had served nearly two years in state prison.

Commonwealth v. J.R.: The Allegations and the Trial

The case arose from a night out in March 2023. J.R. and three co-workers went out drinking after their shifts ended at the restaurant where they worked. At the end of the night, one co-worker drove the group home in his small two-door car. A second co-worker rode in the front passenger seat, while J.R. and the complainant sat in the back seat. The complainant became heavily intoxicated over the course of the evening and later alleged that J.R. forced the complainant to engage in sexual contact, including oral sex, during the drive. The front seat passenger testified that she heard the complainant say “help me” and turned to see J.R. holding the complainant’s hand against him. The driver testified that he did not observe any sexual contact. After J.R. was dropped off, the complainant disclosed the alleged assault to the two other co-workers, and they went to the police the following morning.

J.R. was arrested and proceeded to a jury trial in May 2024. He took the stand in his own defense and admitted that sexual contact occurred, but he testified that it was entirely consensual. The jury found him guilty of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, and related offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to four and a half to nine years’ incarceration. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal in December 2025.

The PCRA Petition

J.R. retained Attorney Goldstein, who filed a timely Post-Conviction Relief Act petition on his behalf. The petition raised two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: first, that trial counsel failed to impeach the driver, a Commonwealth witness, with his extensive history of crimen falsi convictions, and second, that trial counsel failed to call character witnesses on J.R.’s behalf even though several witnesses were available and willing to testify to his reputation for peacefulness and non-violence. The court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2026 at which trial counsel testified.

To win a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must prove that the underlying claim has arguable merit, that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for the act or omission, and that counsel’s error prejudiced the petitioner, meaning there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Sneed, where the claim involves the failure to call a witness, the petitioner must also show that the witness existed, that the witness was available and willing to testify for the defense, and that counsel knew of or should have known of the witness.

The Court’s Ruling: Character Witnesses Were Critical in a He Said/She Said Case

At the hearing, it was uncontested that character witnesses existed, that they were available and willing to testify for the defense, and that trial counsel knew about them. Trial counsel testified that he chose not to call them because he did not want to distract the jury from his trial strategy, which was to argue that it would have been impossible for J.R. to sexually assault the complainant in the back seat of a small, moving car. He also acknowledged that he never consulted with J.R. about the decision.

The PCRA court rejected that explanation. As the court observed, the defense actually presented at trial was not impossibility. J.R. testified that the sexual contact was consensual, which made the trial a classic he said/she said credibility contest between J.R. and the complainant. Trial counsel himself recognized that the verdict would turn on the jury’s assessment of those two witnesses, yet he neither consulted his client about ways to bolster his credibility nor called any of the available character witnesses who could have done so. Calling character witnesses could not have undermined the defense theory because the defense theory hinged entirely on J.R.’s credibility.

Pennsylvania law treats character evidence as substantive evidence, not a mere formality. Evidence of a defendant’s good reputation may, by itself, create a reasonable doubt and require a verdict of not guilty. The principle carries particular weight in sexual assault cases. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Weiss, in a case “where there are only two direct witnesses involved, credibility of the witnesses is of paramount importance, and character evidence is critical to the jury’s determination of credibility.” Relying on Weiss and the Superior Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Alceus, the court concluded that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to call character witnesses and that J.R. suffered prejudice as a result.

The court denied the separate claim concerning the impeachment of the driver. Although it agreed that the claim had arguable merit because trial counsel knew about the crimen falsi convictions and chose not to use them, the court found that counsel had a reasonable strategic basis for that decision and that no prejudice resulted. The driver did not witness the alleged assault, and his testimony was cumulative of the testimony of the other Commonwealth witnesses. The new trial was therefore granted on the character witness claim.

The Result

The court granted the PCRA petition and ordered a new trial. Because J.R. had previously posted $250,000 bail and had already served approximately twenty-two months of his fifty-four month minimum sentence, the court set bail at $250,000 unsecured pending the retrial, with the condition that he have no contact with the complainant. That ruling allows J.R. to be released from state prison while the case is pending.

This decision highlights the critical role that character evidence plays in Pennsylvania criminal trials. In a sexual assault case that comes down to the word of the complainant against the word of the defendant, evidence of the defendant’s reputation for peacefulness and non-violence may be the only corroboration the defense can offer, and the law recognizes that it may by itself create a reasonable doubt. Trial counsel must investigate potential character witnesses, consult with the client about whether to call them, and have a real strategic reason before leaving that evidence on the table. When counsel fails to do so, the PCRA may provide a path to a new trial.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/6/26 Zak Goldstein 6/6/26

Jury Acquits Attorney Goldstein’s Client of Third-Degree Murder in One-Punch Homicide Case

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently obtained a not guilty verdict on the charge of third-degree murder in Commonwealth v. K.F., a homicide trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The case arose from a widely publicized 2022 incident in which a single punch thrown outside a Center City bar caused the death of a patron who had earlier been removed from the bar. The jury found K.F. not guilty of third-degree murder, a felony of the first degree that carries a maximum sentence of 40 years’ incarceration. The jury instead convicted K.F. only of involuntary manslaughter, a misdemeanor of the first degree with a maximum sentence of five years.

This case was a tragedy for everyone involved. A 41-year-old man lost his life, and K.F. has expressed nothing but remorse for the punch that caused his death. No verdict could change that loss. But the legal question for the jury was narrow: had the Commonwealth proven beyond a reasonable doubt that K.F. acted with malice, the element that separates murder from manslaughter under Pennsylvania law? After four years of litigation, including the pre-trial dismissal of the murder charge and a Commonwealth appeal that reinstated it, the jury concluded that the answer was no.

Background

The evidence showed that in the early morning hours of April 16, 2022, K.F. was working as a security guard at a bar in Center City Philadelphia. He was not employed by the bar itself; he worked for a private security company that the bar had retained to provide security staff. That night, bar staff decided to remove a patron who had become severely intoxicated. Security guards escorted the patron outside, and he remained in the area, eventually dancing in the street in front of the bar. Another guard tried to move him out of the roadway. K.F. then walked up to the patron and punched him once in the face. The man fell, struck his head on the street, and lost consciousness. He was taken to a nearby hospital, where he died days later. The medical examiner attributed the death to complications of blunt impact injuries to the head and ruled the death a homicide.

K.F. remained at the scene. He was charged with homicide later that month and turned himself in to the police. Following a preliminary hearing in July 2022, the Philadelphia Municipal Court held him for court on a charge of third-degree murder.

The Motion to Quash

The defense moved to quash the return of transcript. A motion to quash, which is the Philadelphia term for a pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asks the Court of Common Pleas to dismiss a charge on the ground that the Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing. The motion argued that the evidence could not support a charge of third-degree murder because the Commonwealth could not establish malice.

Malice requires more than carelessness or even ordinary recklessness. It exists only where the defendant acted with the intent to cause serious bodily injury or with “a conscious disregard for an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily harm.” Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (Pa. 2017). Involuntary manslaughter, by contrast, requires only that the defendant caused a death as the direct result of doing an act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner.

Pennsylvania courts have long recognized that a death caused by bare fists usually does not amount to murder. In Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 74 A.2d 125, 129 (Pa. 1950), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “[o]rdinarily where an assault is made with bare fists only, without a deadly weapon, and death results there would only be manslaughter.” Whether a bare-fisted assault establishes malice depends on the circumstances, including the size of the assailant, the manner in which the fists are used, the ferocity and duration of the attack, and the provocation. Id. at 130. In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 594 A.2d 300 (Pa. 1991), a single unexpected punch that knocked the decedent down and caused him to strike his head on the pavement was held insufficient to establish malice where the two men were roughly equal in size and had been drinking together.

The trial court agreed with the defense and dismissed the third-degree murder charge in December 2022, concluding that a single punch, thrown without a weapon and without more, did not establish the malice required for murder.

The Commonwealth’s Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed, and in July 2024, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed in a published opinion and reinstated the murder charge. The Superior Court held that there is no per se rule that a single punch can never establish malice. The question instead depends on the particular circumstances of each case. Viewing the preliminary hearing evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as courts must at that stage, the Superior Court concluded that the Commonwealth had presented a prima facie case of malice based on the size disparity between K.F. and the decedent, the lack of provocation, and K.F.’s awareness of the decedent’s intoxication.

That ruling resolved only the question of whether the Commonwealth could take the murder charge to a jury. The prima facie standard is a low one. The Commonwealth need only produce some evidence of each element of the offense, and at that stage, the court may not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Proving malice to a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt is a far more demanding task.

The Trial

The case went to trial before a jury in June 2026, more than four years after the incident. The defense did not dispute the basic facts. The punch was captured on surveillance video, and there was no question that it led to the decedent’s death. The dispute was over the degree of the homicide: whether a single punch thrown by a security guard who was dealing with an intoxicated patron reflected the conscious disregard of an extremely high risk of death or serious bodily injury that the law requires for murder, or instead the recklessness or gross negligence that makes an unintentional killing involuntary manslaughter.

The jury deliberated for a morning before returning its verdict. It found K.F. not guilty of third-degree murder and guilty only of involuntary manslaughter. Instead of a first-degree felony conviction carrying up to 40 years in prison, K.F. now awaits sentencing on a first-degree misdemeanor carrying no more than five years. Sentencing is scheduled for July 31, 2026.

Why This Result Matters

One-punch homicide cases are difficult. The harm is catastrophic and irreversible, but the conduct often involves a momentary decision rather than the cruelty, hardness of heart, or conscious disregard for human life that the law requires for a murder conviction. Pennsylvania law accounts for that difference through the degrees of criminal homicide, and the jury’s verdict in this case reflected those distinctions.

The case also illustrates how much the standard of proof matters. The Superior Court’s decision reinstating the charge meant only that the Commonwealth had produced enough evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to it, to put the question of malice to a jury. At trial, where the Commonwealth had to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury rejected the murder charge. A defendant who loses a pre-trial motion or an appeal under the prima facie standard still has the right to hold the Commonwealth to its full burden at trial.

Finally, the result reflects the value of litigating a serious case at every stage. The motion to quash, the appeal, and the trial all turned on the same question: whether one punch, under these circumstances, amounted to malice. The defense pressed that question for four years, and the jury ultimately answered it in the negative, acquitting Attorney Goldstein’s client of murder.

Facing Criminal Charges in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you or a loved one is facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent more than a decade in prison for a crime he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/29/26 Zak Goldstein 5/29/26

Third Circuit: COVID-Era Courtroom Closure and Marshals Blocking the Defendants’ Mothers’ Entry Violated the Sixth Amendment, but Convictions Affirmed Anyway

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has decided United States v. Girard and United States v. Harry, Nos. 24-2097 & 24-2148 (3d Cir. May 26, 2026), holding that the District Court violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a public trial twice during a federal racketeering trial in the U.S. Virgin Islands. On the first day of trial, the court required every spectator to watch from an overflow room rather than in the courtroom. On several later days, federal marshals stationed at the courtroom door kept the defendants’ mothers from coming in, even though there were seats available.

Despite finding two constitutional violations, the Court affirmed the convictions. The defendants had not thoroughly objected at the time (although their lawyers repeatedly expressed concerns), so the Court reviewed the issue for plain error. Under that more demanding standard, the Court concluded that a retrial was not warranted because the trial as a whole still had what it called the “publicity, neutrality, and professionalism” the Sixth Amendment is meant to protect.

The Facts

The defendant was the head of a violent drug-trafficking enterprise in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The co-defendant served as the enterprise’s armorer. A jury convicted the defendant of 22 counts of drug, firearm, racketeering, and other charges, and convicted the co-defendant of seven counts of racketeering and firearms charges.

The trial took place in March 2022, the day after the Chief Judge of the District Court of the Virgin Islands issued an order incrementally reinstating in-person proceedings that had been suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic. Because of ongoing concerns about the virus, the District Court restricted who could be inside the courtroom. The jury sat in the jury box, and the court set up an overflow room with an audiovisual feed for anyone who could not watch from inside the courtroom.

After the jury was selected, but before opening arguments, the defendant’s lawyer asked what arrangements had been made for the public, and asked that at least the defendant’s family be allowed in “to comply with the Constitution.” The trial judge initially refused, then agreed to allow some spectators in beginning the next day. For all of day one, however, every spectator, including the defendants’ mothers, was directed to the overflow room.

Things did not improve on the days that followed. The co-defendant’s lawyer reported the next morning that the co-defendant’s mother was still not in the courtroom. Several days later, defense counsel pointed to a newspaper article reporting that the overflow room had not opened until around 10:00 a.m. on one of the trial days. The judge called that an “inadvertent error.” A day after that, the co-defendant’s lawyer told the judge that federal marshals had again prevented the co-defendant’s mother from entering the courtroom that morning, and the judge said he would “deal with that.”

After the verdicts, both defendants moved for a new trial. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and credited the testimony of the defendant’s mother, who said that for most of the trial, federal marshals had told her and the co-defendant’s mother to watch from the overflow room without ever explaining why. The District Court nevertheless denied the motions, finding that seats had been available in the courtroom on a first-come basis and that any technical problems with the audiovisual feed had been brief.

The Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a public trial. The Supreme Court has long recognized that this right is rooted in centuries of Anglo-American practice and that trials are presumptively “open to all who care to observe.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980) (plurality opinion). The right is not absolute, but courts can only close the courtroom in rare circumstances. Under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), a trial court has to identify an overriding interest that justifies closure, consider less restrictive alternatives, and make a record explaining its decision.

Excluding specific spectators, rather than closing the courtroom entirely, requires a less demanding showing, what the Third Circuit described as a “substantial reason.” But the trial court still has to consider alternatives and put its reasoning on the record. That requirement traces back to two older Third Circuit cases, U.S. ex rel. Laws v. Yeager, 448 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1971), and United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949).

The Court Finds Two Sixth Amendment Violations

Applying that framework, the Third Circuit identified two violations.

The first was the day-one closure of the courtroom. By directing every interested spectator to the overflow room, the District Court had effectively closed the courtroom, and it never explained why a less restrictive option, such as letting in a smaller, socially distanced audience, would not work. The Government argued that the closure was “trivial” because spectators could still watch through the audiovisual feed. The Third Circuit disagreed. One of the purposes of the public trial right is to keep judges, jurors, and lawyers conscious of the seriousness of what they are doing, and the physical presence of spectators serves that purpose more meaningfully than remote viewing. The closure also covered opening arguments and the start of evidence, which the Court considered substantial.

The Court did agree that protecting trial participants from COVID-19 can qualify as an overriding interest that justifies some courtroom restrictions, joining the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits on that point. But because the trial court allowed in-person spectators with social distancing on every later day, the record gave no reason why day one had to be different.

The second violation came after the District Court reopened the courtroom. The Third Circuit found that, despite the formal reopening, federal marshals continued to turn away the defendants’ mothers for several days, even when seats were available. The Court rejected the District Court’s finding that seats had been available on a first-come basis as inconsistent with its own credibility determination favoring the defendant’s mother. And it held that the trial judge’s lack of personal awareness of the marshals’ exclusions did not cure the problem. Joining the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits, the Third Circuit held that exclusions by courtroom staff can violate the public trial right even when the judge does not know about them.

Why the Convictions Were Affirmed

The convictions still stood. Neither defendant had made a clear, contemporaneous objection to the closures, which meant the Court could only reverse on plain error. Under United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993), a defendant who fails to object must show that there was an error, that the error was plain, that it affected substantial rights, and that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.

The Court held that the first three requirements were either satisfied or could be assumed, but it declined to find that the errors affected the integrity of the proceedings. Drawing on its 2020 decision in United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2020), the Court explained that the trial as a whole retained the “publicity, neutrality, and professionalism” the public trial right protects. The public could observe the trial at all times, either inside the courtroom or through the audiovisual feed. The day-one closure was a good faith COVID measure rather than an attempt at secrecy. The trial judge fixed the marshals’ misconduct as soon as he learned about it. And the trial itself had run for three weeks, involved nearly 50 witnesses, and concluded more than four years before the appeal was decided. A retrial under those circumstances, the Court said, would be a “windfall inimical to the interests of justice.”

The Court also rejected the co-defendant’s separate due process and compulsory process claims. There was no evidence in the record of any off-the-record meeting between the trial judge and Harry’s codefendant witnesses, who had invoked the Fifth Amendment through their own counsel. The Court declined to require question-by-question invocation of the privilege where Harry had never disputed the witnesses’ entitlement to invoke it.

The Takeaway

Although the convictions were affirmed, Girard is an important decision on the public trial right. It confirms that even in the middle of a public health emergency, a federal trial court cannot simply close the courtroom without first considering less drastic ways to protect everyone. A blanket order sending every spectator to an overflow room, with no explanation of why a socially distanced audience would not work, is not enough.

It also makes clear that the Sixth Amendment reaches into how courtrooms are actually staffed. When a marshal or other court officer turns a family member away at the door, that exclusion counts, even if the trial judge has no idea it is happening. The Third Circuit has now joined the majority of circuits that treat those exclusions as part of the public trial inquiry.

At the same time, Girard is another illustration of how difficult it is to win on appeal when an objection was not made at trial. Even where the Court of Appeals agrees that a constitutional violation occurred, plain error review allows it to leave the conviction in place if the trial as a whole appears fair. That is one of the reasons that having an experienced criminal trial lawyer in the courtroom matters so much. Issues that are not raised at the right moment can be very hard to fix later.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, serving a state or federal sentence, or considering a direct appeal, post-conviction petition, or federal habeas petition, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and we have won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/28/26 Zak Goldstein 5/28/26

PA Superior Court: Intent to Violate a PFA Order Can Support a Burglary Conviction

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Bryant, holding that a defendant who enters a residence in violation of a Protection from Abuse order may be convicted of burglary, even when the only criminal intent the Commonwealth proved was the intent to violate the PFA itself. The Superior Court affirmed an aggregate sentence of five and one-half to eleven years’ incarceration. The case is a good example of how a PFA violation, which people often think of as a civil or contempt issue, can quickly become a felony burglary case with significant state prison exposure.

Commonwealth v. Bryant

In the early hours of October 16, 2021, Philadelphia police responded to a 911 call about someone breaking into an upstairs apartment. The resident told the officer that her child’s father, the defendant, had an active PFA order against him and had somehow gotten into the apartment while she was sleeping. The PFA order excluded the defendant from her apartment and prohibited him from contacting her by phone or any other means. The officer could not find the defendant or any signs of forced entry, took her to the station to file a report, and brought her home.

About three hours later, officers received another call about a break-in at the same apartment. This time they caught the defendant coming down the steps from the apartment and arrested him. The next evening, officers responded to a third call. The complainant told them that the defendant was hiding in her daughter’s bedroom closet. The officers ordered him to come out, got no response, opened the closet, and found him there partially unclothed.

The contact did not stop after his arrest. From jail, the defendant continued to reach the complainant through harassing phone calls placed by other people, through letters, and through text messages, photos, and a video sent from a cell phone he managed to obtain while incarcerated. He offered her money to “get the charges dropped” and at other points threatened her. The Commonwealth filed an additional set of charges based on those contacts.

After a consolidated jury trial, the defendant was convicted of burglary and contempt of a PFA order at one docket, and stalking and contempt of a PFA order at the other. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five and one-half to eleven years in prison. The defendant filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied, and then appealed.

The Burglary Statute and the Intent Issue

A person commits burglary in Pennsylvania if, with the intent to commit a crime inside, he enters a building or occupied structure that is adapted for overnight accommodation at a time when someone is present. The intent element is what distinguishes burglary from criminal trespass.

On appeal, the defendant raised a single issue: he argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of burglary because the only intent the Commonwealth proved was the intent to violate the PFA order, and contempt of a PFA, in his view, is not a “crime” within the meaning of the Crimes Code. He pointed out that contempt under the PFA Act sits in Title 23 (Domestic Relations), does not carry a gradation like felony, misdemeanor, or summary offense, and is not even listed in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines. He also argued that the PFA Act is essentially civil in nature and that a violation of a civil order should not be enough to turn an unauthorized entry into a felony burglary.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court rejected the argument and affirmed. The Court applied the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Majeed, 694 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1997), which is the controlling case on this issue. In Majeed, the defendant broke into his own marital home in violation of a PFA order that excluded him, sexually assaulted his stepdaughter, and then engaged in an armed standoff with police. The Supreme Court held that he could be convicted of burglary even though he owned the home, and that the intent to violate a PFA order is enough to satisfy the intent element of the burglary statute.

The Majeed Court explained:

The purpose of the [PFA] Act is to prevent domestic violence and, concomitantly, to promote the security of the home. … If the only sanction for [a person’s] unlawful entry were an indirect criminal contempt [charge for violating the terms of a PFA], the purpose underlying the [PFA] Act would be frustrated. Instead, application of the law of burglary (and the consequential restraint of liberty), under these circumstances, advances the purpose of the [PFA] Act by discouraging domestic violence and unauthorized invasions of the home.

The Court added that a violation of a PFA “is a violation of the law, a public wrong, punishable by a fine, imprisonment, or both,” and that nothing prevents the Commonwealth from using that violation to satisfy the intent element of burglary. The Superior Court in Bryant treated that holding as binding and applied it directly. Because the defendant knew about the PFA, knew he was not allowed in the apartment or in contact with the complainant, and broke in anyway, the evidence was sufficient to support the burglary conviction.

The Court also pointed out that even if Majeed did not control, the Commonwealth is not required to prove the specific crime a defendant intended to commit once inside. A jury can infer criminal intent from the totality of the circumstances. Here, the defendant broke in repeatedly across two days, including in the middle of the night while the complainant was asleep, and was eventually found hiding in a child’s closet. The Court agreed with the trial court that this conduct supported an inference that he intended to harass and stalk the complainant, which is independently enough to support the burglary charge.

The Takeaway

This case does not change the law, but it is a useful reminder that a PFA case can turn into something much more serious very quickly. Many people view a PFA as just a piece of paper or a civil order. In reality, walking back into a home in violation of a PFA can support a felony burglary charge, and the resulting sentence can be measured in years rather than months. The defendant in this case is serving five and one-half to eleven years.

The case also illustrates how communications from jail can create entirely new and more serious problems. Letters, calls placed through other people, and messages sent from a contraband cell phone were all used here to support additional charges of stalking, contempt, and witness intimidation. Anyone with a no-contact order or an active PFA should assume that every form of contact, including indirect contact through friends or family, can and will be collected by the police and used by the prosecution.

Finally, the case is a reminder that sufficiency challenges in PFA-burglary cases are difficult to win on appeal. Because Majeed already allows the intent to violate a PFA to satisfy the burglary statute, and because a jury can also infer criminal intent from the surrounding circumstances, the real defense work in these cases generally has to happen earlier in the process. That can include challenging identification, contesting how the alleged entry occurred, litigating the validity and scope of the underlying PFA order, and moving to suppress statements or evidence where appropriate.