Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 1/9/25 Zak Goldstein 1/9/25

PA Superior Court: Police Need a Good Reason for a K9 Sniff, and the Commonwealth Must Actually Prove Inevitable Discovery with Evidence

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the cases of Commonwealth v. Brinson and Commonwealth v. Flamer, holding that nervousness alone does not justify prolonging a traffic stop to bring a drug dog to the scene to have the dog smell the car for drugs. The Court also held that the mere fact that the police could have towed the car did not establish that the police would have inevitably discovered the contraband as the Commonwealth introduced no evidence or testimony that the police in fact would have towed the car and conducted an inventory search.

The Facts of the Case

A Philadelphia police officer conducted a traffic stop of a car after seeing the car fail to stop at a stop sign. Flamer was driving, and Brinson was in the passenger seat. During the stop, the officer felt that both men seemed nervous. Therefore, he called for a K9 unit. The dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, leading to a search of the car. Officers searched the car and discovered a firearm with an altered serial number and oxycodone pills.

The Commonwealth charged Brinson and Flamer with various offenses, including illegal possession of a firearm (VUFA) and controlled substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was unlawfully prolonged without sufficient reasonable suspicion. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendants and extend the stop until a drug dog arrived. The court also found that the Commonwealth failed to show that the police would have inevitably discovered the contraband by towing the vehicle and conducting an inventory search. The prosecution appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court affirmed. It agreed with the trial court on both issues, finding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion and that the Commonwealth failed to prove inevitable discovery with actual testimony or evidence. The Court addressed both issues:

Prolonged Traffic Stop:
- The Court held that the stop, which extended 10–15 minutes before the K-9 unit was summoned, exceeded its permissible scope. The officer lacked specific and articulable facts (reasonable suspicion) to justify extending the stop beyond its original purpose of addressing a traffic violation.
- Nervous behavior alone was insufficient to establish the necessary reasonable suspicion for detaining the defendants, extending the stop, and bringing a dog to the scene to conduct the search. The officer claimed he smelled marijuana, as well, but he did not smell the marijuana until later in the stop. Therefore, the officer’s detection of the marijuana odor occurred after the stop should have reasonably concluded, further undermining the justification for the K-9 search.
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine:
- The Commonwealth argued that the evidence would have been discovered during an inventory search following impoundment due to lack of insurance. However, the court found this exception inapplicable. The Commonwealth failed to establish that the police unequivocally would have towed the car and found the contraband. Instead, the Commonwealth showed only that the police could have towed the car, which was not enough. The inevitable discovery doctrine is very limited under Pennsylvania law and rarely operates other excuse the failure to comply with the warrant requirement. The police testimony established that towing decisions were discretionary, and the officer failed to establish or present a clear policy regarding inventory searches. The absence of a concrete policy establishing that the car would have in fact been towed defeated the inevitable discovery claim.

The court reiterated that police must demonstrate reasonable suspicion based on a totality of circumstances and that any extension of a traffic stop must align with the mission of the stop. This is a great decision for privacy rights in terms of limiting the inevitable discovery doctrine. It is not enough to show that the police could have eventually conducted a legal search - the Commonwealth has to show that an eventual legal search was a true inevitability, not merely that it could have happened even had the police not violated the defendant’s rights by conducting an illegal search.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in state or federal court in Pennsylvania? We can help.

Zak-Goldstein-Defense-Attorney — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/6/25 Zak Goldstein 1/6/25

PA Superior Court: Forwarded Emails May Qualify as Duplicates for Best Evidence Rule

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Fischer, holding that the trial court properly admitted forwarded emails as duplicates under the best evidence rule even though forwarded emails can easily be tampered with or forged. The Court held that the best evidence rule did not prohibit the admission of the emails.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant and the complainant, his ex-fiancée, were involved in a ten-year relationship that ended prior to August 2020. They shared a child, who was two years old at the time of the events in question. Between August and September 2020, the defendant allegedly engaged in repeated communications directed toward the complainant. The communications involved making phone calls to the complainant, sending text messages and emails, and making social media posts tagging the complainant. On one occasion, the defendant made 100 calls to the complainant in a single day, which seems excessive.

The communications included threats and manipulative language. For example, one email stated: “If you don’t ensure our daughter is reunited with me this evening, your life will change forever tomorrow, as will your mother’s. Tread carefully. You’re being watched.”

At trial, the Commonwealth relied on forwarded emails from the complainant. The complainant had forwarded the emails from one account to another and then printed out the emails and given them to the police. The prosecution introduced them into evidence as evidence of the defendant’s harassing conduct.

The Commonwealth charged the defendant with three counts of harassment and one count of stalking. A jury convicted him of two harassment charges but acquitted him of stalking and one of the three harassments counts. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years of probation with restrictive conditions. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the forwarded emails because they should not have been admissible under the Best Evidence Rule.

The Superior Court Appeal

The defendant argued that the forwarded emails were not admissible for three reasons.

They were not “originals” or “duplicates” under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.
The forwarding process allowed for potential manipulation of the content.
Omitted portions of the email correspondence removed necessary context from the evidence.

The trial court overruled these objections, admitting the emails as “duplicates” under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 1001(e), which defines a duplicate as a copy produced through an electronic or other reliable process that accurately reproduces the original.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the forwarded emails were properly admitted as duplicates. The Court’s reasoning was based on the following:

Duplicate Status: The Court determined that the forwarded emails met the definition of duplicates because they were created through an electronic process that accurately reproduced the original content, including the sender’s and recipient’s email addresses, timestamps, and subject lines. The forwarded emails contained more detailed metadata than the screenshots at issue in Commonwealth v. Talley, a leading case on the Best Evidence Rule.
Authenticity: The defendant failed to raise specific challenges to the authenticity of the emails. The complainant authenticated the forwarded emails through her testimony, testifying that they were identical to the messages she received from the defendant. Thus, this claim was waived, and it would have been rejected anyway because the complainant could authenticate the emails as the emails that she received.
Fairness: The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the forwarded emails were unfairly admitted because other communications were omitted. The Court noted that the defense could have addressed these omissions through cross-examination or by introducing additional evidence.
Precedent: The Court relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Talley, which held that screenshots of text messages are admissible as duplicates under the Best Evidence Rule if created through a reliable process and authenticated at trial.

Ultimately, the Superior Court held that the forwarded-and-then-printed emails were duplicates of the originals and that forwarding an email and then printing it was basically the same thing as screenshooting it. In Talley, the Supreme Court ruled that screenshots of text messages were admissible as duplicates.

The problem is that screenshotting in fact creates a duplicate, whereas a forwarded email is not the exact same thing as the original email. It is easy for someone to change the text in the forwarded email, and one of the judges issued a concurrence suggesting that she would not have allowed for the admission of the emails because the risk of manipulation was too high.

In this case, however, the Court ruled that the emails were properly admitted and that any challenge to whether they were real should be decided by the fact-finder rather than as a challenge to their admissibility. The defense was free to cross-examine the complainant on the fact that she did not have the original emails available and then argue that they were fake. The problem with this analysis is that judges and juries are often too quick to rely on electronic evidence like text messages and emails that looks real even when it is not. It takes only a matter of seconds to edit or forge a text message or email, and unless someone is particularly savvy with technology, they may not realize just how easy it is to forge this type of evidence. Further, it is usually not particularly difficult to obtain actual records from the service provider to show that the screenshots or forwarded messages are real. Unfortunately, the courts have generally rejected the idea that the prosecution should have to obtain solid proof that the images are real, instead shifting the burden to the defense to prove that they are fake. Hopefully, the defendant will seek further review in this case. The appellate courts may also begin to reevaluate the low standard for the admissibility of electronic evidence as it becomes clearer that this type of evidence can be fabricated in a matter of seconds.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 12/26/24 Zak Goldstein 12/26/24

Third Circuit: Obstruction Enhancement Must Be Supported by Actual Evidence at Sentencing

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued a decision in United States v. Soto, vacating the sentence of a federal robbery defendant and remanding the case for resentencing due to an improperly applied obstruction of justice enhancement. The Court found that the government failed to introduce actual evidence at sentencing to support the enhancement and that the defendant’s alleged conduct, even if supported by the evidence, did not show an intent to obstruct the proceedings.

The Facts of Soto

The defendant was convicted of multiple charges stemming from two armed bank robberies in New Jersey. The charges included conspiracy to commit bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 371), bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)), and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG §3C1.1, citing three alleged incidents:

The defendant entered an elevator with jurors and asked one to press a button for him.
The defendant greeted victims on the steps of the courthouse before they testified.
The defendant allegedly interacted with a co-defendant's brother while attending a family event which the government had given him permission to attend.

At sentencing, the district court determined that the offense level was 29 and sentenced the defendant to 289 months in federal prison. The sentence included two mandatory and consecutive seven-year terms for the firearms charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court should not have applied the obstruction enhancement.

The Third Circuit's Decision

The Third Circuit agreed with the defendant, reversed the decision of the district court, and vacated his sentence. The Third Circuit concluded that the district court erred in applying the enhancement for several reasons:

1. Lack of Evidence Supporting the Alleged Obstruction

The Court emphasized that an obstruction of justice enhancement requires proof that the defendant acted “willfully” with the specific intent to obstruct or impede the administration of justice. In the defendant’s case:

Elevator Interaction: The court found no evidence of the defendant’s intent to influence or intimidate the jurors from the fact that he got on the elevator with jurors. While two jurors reported feeling uncomfortable, the majority were unfazed or did not even notice the interaction. The Court characterized the defendant’s actions—asking a juror to press a button—as an ordinary interaction which failed to show any obstructive intent.
Greeting Victims: The Court noted that the government’s claim that Soto greeted victims as they entered the courthouse was unsupported by testimony or reliable evidence. Defense counsel maintained that the defendant merely said “good morning” to people passing by on the courthouse steps one morning. He did not threaten anyone or say anything about the case.
Interaction with a Co-Defendant’s Brother: The government alleged that the defendant approached the brother on the street, but it did not introduce any actual evidence to support this claim. The defendant denied that this interaction occurred and objected, and the district court failed to hear any evidence on the allegation or make factual findings on this incident.

2. Due Process Violations

The Third Circuit also emphasized that the lower court violated the defendant’s due process rights because the court relied on unsubstantiated allegations without hearing any supporting evidence. Although the government referenced surveillance footage and FBI interviews, these materials were not part of the record from sentencing. Therefore, because the defense objected to the pre-sentence report, the district court could not rely on the allegations. Where the defense does not object to the PSR, then the district court may assume the statements in the PSR are true. But where the defense contests their validity, due process requires that the government prove factual allegations in the pre-sentence report.

3. Misapplication of the Guidelines

The obstruction of justice enhancement penalizes deliberate attempts to interfere with the judicial process. The Third Circuit criticized the district court for focusing on the consequences of the defendant’s actions (e.g., discomfort among jurors and the need for voir dire) rather than on whether the defendant acted with the intent to obstruct justice. Without evidence of willful obstruction, the enhancement was unwarranted and led the defendant to receive a worse sentence than he would have had it not been applied. Accordingly, the Court remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

This decision highlights several critical points for federal sentencing hearings.

Strict Evidentiary Standards at Sentencing: Prosecutors bear the burden of proving enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence, and sentencing courts may only apply enhancements where the evidence in the record supports the enhancement.
Intent Matters: The obstruction of justice enhancement under §3C1.1 applies only when the defendant acts with deliberate intent to obstruct justice. Mere inappropriate or inadvertent behavior does not suffice. Lawyers may know to stay far away from jurors, but a criminal defendant may not know that saying hi or getting on an elevator could be a problem.
Protecting Due Process: Defense counsel should object to unsupported allegations at sentencing in order to fight for a lower sentence and to preserve the record for appeal.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania? We can help.

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Lawyer — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 12/24/24 Zak Goldstein 12/24/24

PA Superior Court Upholds Criminalizing Firearm Possession for Felons on Parole for Robbery

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Farmer. In Farmer, the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s felon in possession of a firearm statute (VUFA § 6105) against an unconstitutional as-applied challenge where the defendant was prosecuted for being a felon in possession of a firearm while on parole for robbery. It ultimately remains to be seen whether all felons may be permanently prohibited from possessing firearms for life following recent United States Supreme Court decisions like New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen expanding Second Amendment protections, but this was not a particularly close case as the defendant in this case was on parole for robbery at the time of his arrest for possessing a firearm.

The Facts of Farmer

The defendant was on parole for a robbery conviction when police obtained information that he possessed a firearm. Acting on a search warrant, officers found a .40 caliber Beretta in his house. Prosecutors charged him with a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105, which prohibits firearm possession by individuals with certain criminal convictions, including robbery. A jury convicted him of illegal gun possession, and he was sentenced to five to ten years’ incarceration.

The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing on appeal that § 6105 violated his Second Amendment rights. Specifically, he claimed the law was unconstitutional as applied to him. He cited the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen. Bruen established a new framework for evaluating gun regulations but did not make it totally clear whether felon-in-possession statutes remain constitutional.

The Issues on Appeal

In Farmer, the Court addressed two issues as required by Bruen.

Does the Second Amendment apply to convicted felons like the defendant?
The Court found that the answer to this question is yes. The Court ruled that the defendant, as an American citizen, is included within "the people" protected by the Second Amendment. Drawing on District of Columbia v. Heller and Bruen, the Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that felons are categorically excluded from Second Amendment protections because they are not among “the people” to which the Second Amendment extends.
Could the government restrict the defendant’s gun rights based on his prior conviction?
Again, the Court found in the affirmative. While the Second Amendment protects the defendant in general, the Court held that the restriction on his firearm rights is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Court compared § 6105 to historical laws, such as “going armed” statutes, which disarmed individuals who were considered dangerous. The defendant’s conviction for robbery—in his case, a violent felony involving a gun—fit squarely within this historical framework. The Court relied heavily on United States v. Rahimi in its analysis as there, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of disarming protection from abuse order defendants based on a lower standard than a conviction obtained with proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

This decision highlights the limits of Second Amendment protections for individuals with criminal convictions. While courts recognize that the Second Amendment applies broadly, they continue to uphold restrictions when those laws have strong historical support, and the historical statutes need only be similar - they do not have to be identical. For individuals with felony convictions—particularly those involving violence or firearms—this case reaffirms that Pennsylvania’s prohibition on gun possession remains enforceable. The problem, however, is that no Pennsylvania state appellate court has yet addressed a challenge to a less serious, non-violent offense. The federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that an individual who had a thirty year old non-violent misdemeanor theft offense could possess a firearm even though Pennsylvania law prohibited it, but Pennsylvania courts have not yet determined what the limits are. It may be that some portions of the § 6105 statute are unconstitutional in that it may not be permissible under the Second Amendment to prohibit individuals from possessing firearms for life based on less serious or older convictions. But in this case, the defendant was actively on parole for a violent felony. Therefore, whether there are limits on disarming felons who have less serious or older criminal records will remain an open question. If you are charged with a violation of § 6105 based on a less serious criminal record, it may still be worth filing a motion to dismiss the charges on Second Amendment grounds.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania? We can help.

Gun Charges Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire Arguing before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court