Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 3/23/26 Zak Goldstein 3/23/26

PA Superior Court: Trial Court Cannot Stack Three Maximum Sentences for Technical Probation Violations at a Single Hearing Under Act 44

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 2026 PA Super 54 (Pa. Super. March 19, 2026), holding that a trial court erred in imposing a one-to-two-year term of imprisonment for three technical probation violations that were all presented at the same hearing. Although the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant had committed flagrant technical violations, it vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with the graduated sentencing scheme in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c)(2). This case is one of the first to address the sentencing limits imposed by Act 44, Pennsylvania’s 2024 probation reform law, in the context of multiple technical violations addressed at a single hearing.

The Facts of Goodwin

In August 2022, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, and receiving stolen property in Monroe County, PA. The charges arose from a series of burglaries at auto shops. At the time of his arrest, he was already on bail for crimes committed in 2021. He was sentenced in the earlier case to one month to one year of incarceration followed by two years of probation. He was paroled in October 2022.

In August 2023, the defendant pleaded guilty in the Monroe County case to burglary, theft by unlawful taking, and criminal mischief. In November 2023, he was sentenced to five years of restrictive probation, a consecutive two-year period of probation, and a fine. The restrictive condition of his five-year probation was the successful completion of the two-week Outmate Program at the Monroe County Correctional Facility when directed by the Monroe County Probation Office.

After sentencing, the defendant met with his probation officer and was provided with the rules of probation. His probation was subsequently transferred to Allegheny County. However, the defendant then left Allegheny County and traveled to North Carolina without seeking or receiving permission from the Commonwealth and without advising his probation officer of the move. His probation officer did not learn of this until three weeks later, when the defendant’s mother revealed his location.

Rather than immediately filing a violation petition, the probation officer attempted to transfer the defendant’s case to North Carolina. North Carolina declined to accept the transfer because the defendant’s mother, whose residence was the proposed home plan, said the defendant could not reside with her. The probation officer then directed the defendant to return to Pennsylvania to work out a solution, but the defendant did not return voluntarily.

In April 2024, the Commonwealth filed a violation of probation petition alleging four violations: failure to report to the Probation Department, failure to comply with criminal laws (based on a simple assault charge in Allegheny County), leaving the Commonwealth without permission and failing to return, and failure to complete the Outmate Program.

The defendant failed to appear for his violation hearing, and the court issued a bench warrant. He was eventually arrested in North Carolina, initially declined extradition, but then reversed course and waived extradition on June 11, 2024, the same day the Act 44 probation reform amendments became effective. At the violation hearing, the Commonwealth withdrew the violation based on the new arrest, and the defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and counseled admission to the three remaining technical violations. The court revoked probation and sentenced the defendant to one to two years of incarceration in a state correctional facility.

The Superior Court's Analysis

The Superior Court addressed three issues on appeal. First, it considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support the revocation of probation. Second and third, it addressed whether the trial court had the statutory authority to impose total confinement and whether the sentence was illegal under the graduated sentencing provisions of Act 44.

Revocation Was Supported by the Evidence

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the defendant committed flagrant technical violations. The VOP court specifically found the defendant did not establish that he was homeless to the extent that he could not comply with the terms of his probation. The court noted the defendant’s inconsistent statements about his living situation, his deliberate choice not to return to Pennsylvania to participate in the Outmate Program despite his probation officer’s fair offer to not violate him if he returned, and his initial refusal to waive extradition. The Superior Court concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding the violations and determining that the defendant’s conduct was not merely a consequence of homelessness.

Total Confinement Was Authorized

The Superior Court also upheld the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence of total confinement. Applying the newly effective Section 9771(c), the court found the defendant had absconded and could not be safely diverted from total confinement through less restrictive means. The record supported this finding. The defendant left the Commonwealth without permission, failed to contact his probation officer, refused to return when directed, and initially refused extradition.

The Sentence Was Illegal Under Act 44’s Graduated Scheme

However, the Superior Court concluded that the trial court erred as a matter of law in imposing a one-to-two-year prison sentence. This is the critical holding of the case.

Under the amended Section 9771(c)(2), when a court imposes total confinement for technical probation violations, it must follow a graduated sentencing scheme: a maximum of 14 days for a first technical violation, a maximum of 30 days for a second, and for a third or subsequent violation, the court may impose any sentencing alternative available at initial sentencing. The purpose of this scheme is to embody a recidivist philosophy: to give a probationer the opportunity to reform his or her conduct before receiving a more severe sentence for repeated violations.

The trial court treated the defendant’s three technical violations as three separate violations and imposed a sentence for a “third or subsequent” violation. The Superior Court, agreeing with both the defendant and the Commonwealth, held that this was error. Because all three violations were presented to the court at the same first hearing, the recidivist philosophy required that they be treated as a first technical violation. To allow the court to stack three maximum sentences at a single hearing would be absurd and contrary to the legislature's intent in passing Act 44.

The Superior Court noted that the en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Seals, 2026 PA Super 29, had held that a claim that a court failed to follow the limitations in Section 9771(c) raises a challenge to the legality of the sentence. Accordingly, it vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with Section 9771(c)(2), which limits a first technical violation to a maximum of 14 days.

Interestingly, the court observed in a footnote that this new statutory framework may not achieve its intended goal of reducing incarceration for technical violations. The court suggested the graduated scheme may actually create a disincentive for probation officers to exercise discretion and handle minor violations informally, instead pressuring them to initiate court proceedings for every technical violation in order to build a record for enhanced sentencing later.

The Takeaway

Goodwin is an important decision for anyone on probation in Pennsylvania. The case makes clear that under Act 44, a trial court cannot circumvent the graduated sentencing limits by treating multiple technical violations from a single hearing as separate violations for sentencing purposes. If this is a defendant’s first violation hearing, the maximum sentence for technical violations is 14 days, regardless of how many individual technical violations are found at that hearing.

This case also reinforces that Act 44 challenges are legality-of-sentence claims that cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. If you or someone you know has received a sentence for technical probation violations that exceeds the Act 44 limits, the sentence may be illegal and subject to challenge on appeal.

Facing Criminal Charges or a Wrongful Conviction?

If you or a loved one has been wrongfully convicted or believes that the prosecution withheld evidence in your case, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our experienced criminal defense lawyers are typically available for same-day phone consultations and in-person meetings so that we can begin investigating your case, obtaining exculpatory evidence, and planning your defense. Call 267-225-2545 for a free criminal defense strategy session.

Zak Goldstein 3/17/26 Zak Goldstein 3/17/26

PA Superior Court Vacates Life Sentence and Orders New Trial in Franklin County Murder Case After Attorney Goldstein Wins PCRA Appeal

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Attorney Goldstein recently won a major victory in the Pennsylvania Superior Court as the Court reversed the denial of his client’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, vacated the judgment of sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Attorney Goldstein’s client had been convicted following a ten-day jury trial in Franklin County of second-degree murder, burglary, robbery, and three counts of conspiracy. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and a consecutive aggregate sentence of 28 to 56 years’ imprisonment on the remaining charges. Attorney Goldstein entered his appearance as PCRA counsel, filed an amended PCRA petition, and represented the client through the PCRA evidentiary hearing and subsequent appeal to the Superior Court.

The central issue on appeal involved trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence obtained from a cell phone that police had searched without a warrant. After the client’s arrest, law enforcement directed Maryland State Police to power on the client’s iPhone and call a suspected phone number to confirm the phone’s connection to that number — all before obtaining a search warrant. The evidence obtained from the phone, including text messages, photographs, rap lyrics, and data linking the client to a co-defendant, formed the backbone of the Commonwealth’s case.

Attorney Goldstein argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the cell phone evidence under Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), which categorically requires police to obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone. The Superior Court agreed on all three prongs of the ineffectiveness test. First, the Court found the underlying suppression claim had arguable merit, holding that the police’s actions of powering on the iPhone and calling the suspected number constituted a warrantless search under the law as it existed at the time of trial without relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s later decision in Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2018). The Court further found that the warrant subsequently obtained for the phone was tainted because probable cause to search the phone depended entirely on the information unlawfully obtained through the initial warrantless search.

Second, the Court found trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to file the suppression motion. At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified he had no recollection of even considering the suppression issue and was unaware of Riley or any other relevant caselaw.

Third, the Court found prejudice, concluding the cell phone evidence was a critical factor in the Commonwealth’s case. The Court noted that of the six testifying eyewitnesses, only one cooperator unequivocally identified the client at trial, the lead investigator acknowledged that no forensic evidence linked the client to the crime scene, and the investigator described the iPhone as the only physical evidence connecting the client to the robbery and murder. Without the cell phone evidence, the Commonwealth’s case was, in the Court’s words, only weakly supported by the record.

This is an important decision addressing warrantless cell phone searches under Riley and the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in PCRA proceedings, and the Court issued a published opinion in this case.

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Zak Goldstein 2/28/26 Zak Goldstein 2/28/26

PA Supreme Court: Resentencing Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Object to Prejudicial “Serial Killer” Evidence in Death Penalty Case

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 815 CAP (Pa. Feb. 26, 2026), holding that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately object to the Commonwealth’s evidence and argument portraying the defendant as an aspiring serial killer during a capital resentencing hearing. The Court reversed the PCRA court’s order and remanded the matter for a new penalty-phase hearing. The unanimous decision was authored by Justice Brobson.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Smith

In November 1994, Eileen Jones and the appellant, Wayne Smith, left together in a car borrowed from Smith’s nephew. Smith returned the car later that evening, and the next day, he told his brother that he had murdered Jones by choking her in a nearby park. Jones’s body was discovered on November 22, 1994, and the county medical examiner concluded the cause of death was strangulation. Police also recovered newspaper articles about the recovery of Jones’s body from Smith’s home.

A jury found Smith guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Smith’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Smith, 694 A.2d 1086 (Pa. 1997). Smith then filed a PCRA petition, and the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing after finding that counsel had provided ineffective assistance. Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2010).

At the 2012 resentencing hearing, the jury again sentenced Smith to death after finding the aggravating circumstance of a prior voluntary manslaughter conviction outweighed the mitigating circumstances of emotional distress and an abusive childhood. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on direct appeal in Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467 (Pa. 2015), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.Smith v. Pennsylvania, 580 U.S. 830 (2016).

The “Serial Killer” Evidence at the Resentencing Hearing

At the center of this appeal was highly inflammatory evidence the Commonwealth introduced at the 2012 resentencing hearing. Prior to the original trial, Smith had actually filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to his alleged interest in being a serial killer, and the defense had successfully precluded the Commonwealth from pursuing that theory at the original trial and sentencing in 1995.

However, at the 2012 resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth sought to introduce testimony from Sonya Rollins, Smith’s ex-girlfriend, about Smith’s reading habits. The prosecution also asked the resentencing court to allow Rollins to testify that Smith read books about murder and crime, including titles such as “The Perfect Crime” and “How to Get Away with the Perfect Crime.” The Commonwealth argued this evidence was relevant to show intent and to rebut Smith’s anticipated mitigation evidence regarding mental illness and an abusive childhood.

Resentencing counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, arguing that evidence about reading habits was inadmissible character evidence that amounted to nothing more than smearing his client. However, the resentencing court permitted the testimony. Critically, resentencing counsel did not renew his objection when Rollins actually took the stand and testified, did not object to testimony from Smith’s brother Jeffrey about Smith’s alleged interest in serial killers, did not object to a police detective reading from Smith’s statement about fantasizing about being a serial killer, and did not object to the prosecutor’s repeated references to the serial-killer theme in both opening and closing arguments.

The prosecutor made this evidence the centerpiece of her case for death, arguing in her opening that Smith had been planning the murder for 14 years and comparing him to Ted Bundy. In closing, the prosecutor urged the jury to give Smith “his recognition” and “his attention” — referring to his alleged desire for the notoriety of a serial killer.

The PCRA Proceedings

Smith timely filed a PCRA petition in 2017 arguing that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the serial-killer evidence. The PCRA court ultimately dismissed the petition after a hearing, finding that counsel’s decision not to continue objecting after the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine was a reasonable tactical decision. The PCRA court also concluded that Smith had not established prejudice because the serial-killer evidence was only a small part of the Commonwealth’s overall case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, finding that Smith had satisfied all three prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard under Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2007).

Arguable Merit: The Court agreed with Smith that the reading-material and serial-killer evidence were irrelevant to the resentencing proceedings. The Court noted that the sole issue for the jury was whether to sentence Smith to death or life imprisonment, and that Smith’s intent to kill Jones, which the Commonwealth claimed the reading evidence proved, had already been established by his first-degree murder conviction. As to the Commonwealth’s second justification, that the evidence rebutted Smith’s mitigation evidence regarding mental illness and an abusive childhood, the Court found it unclear how reading books about murder would undermine evidence that Smith was abused as a child, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, or was substantially impaired. Whatever minimal probative value the evidence may have had was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Pa.R.E. 403.

Reasonable Basis: The Court rejected the argument that resentencing counsel acted reasonably by not continuing to object after the motion in limine was granted. The Court highlighted two important factors: first, the Supreme Court itself had previously determined in Smith III that resentencing counsel failed to properly object to the reading-material evidence and had therefore waived the issue on direct appeal. Second, the Commonwealth’s motion in limine did not address Smith’s alleged desire to be a serial killer. The resentencing court never actually ruled on that evidence, and yet counsel failed to object to any of the serial-killer testimony or the prosecutor’s inflammatory use of it in opening and closing arguments.

Prejudice: The Court found that the PCRA court had improperly applied a “harmless error” standard rather than the correct prejudice standard for ineffective assistance claims. Under the proper standard, Smith needed to show a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have concluded that the aggravating circumstance did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The Court concluded that this standard was met, noting that the Commonwealth had made the serial-killer evidence the central theme of its case for death, repeatedly referring to it throughout the proceedings. The Court also noted that the resentencing jury had initially reported that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict before ultimately sentencing Smith to death, which further bolstered the finding of prejudice. The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that because the original jury (which did not hear the serial-killer evidence) also sentenced Smith to death, the evidence could not have been prejudicial, explaining that the two sentencing hearings were not comparable; the first lasted one day with a 39-page transcript, while the resentencing hearing spanned four days with hundreds of pages of testimony.

The Takeaway

This decision is significant for several reasons. First, it reinforces the principle that evidence admitted at a penalty-phase hearing must actually be relevant to the issues the jury is deciding, namely, whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. Evidence that serves primarily to paint a defendant in a negative light without bearing on the actual sentencing determination is inadmissible, particularly where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs any probative value under Pa.R.E. 403.

Second, the decision clarifies the obligations of counsel at a resentencing hearing. The Court made clear that an attorney cannot simply stop objecting to inadmissible evidence after an initial objection is overruled. Counsel must preserve objections when evidence is actually introduced and must object to improper arguments by the prosecution.

Third, the Court’s analysis of the prejudice prong is noteworthy. The Court distinguished between the “harmless error” standard applicable on direct appeal and the “prejudice” standard applicable to ineffective assistance claims under the PCRA, noting that the PCRA court had improperly conflated the two. In a capital case, the proper question is whether there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have reached a different conclusion on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Conviction? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won on appeal. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 2/19/26 Zak Goldstein 2/19/26

PA Supreme Court: Majority of Justices Agree Police Opinions on Guilt and Accusations of Lying Must Be Excluded from Interrogation Videos Played at Trial

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Malcolm, No. 46 EAP 2024 (Pa. 2026), addressing whether accusatory statements and opinions of guilt made by police detectives during a videotaped interrogation must be excluded when the video is played for the jury at trial. Although the Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, the decision actually reinforces the principle that these types of statements should not come in. The case resulted in a split decision and no opinion commanded a majority, but five of the seven justices agreed that the trial court erred in admitting the detectives’ statements. The two concurring justices found the error to be harmless, resulting in a 4-3 vote to affirm the conviction, but the key takeaway is that a strong majority of the Court has concluded that police opinions about a defendant’s guilt and accusations of lying should be redacted from interrogation videos before they are played for a jury. Defense attorneys should continue to file motions in limine to exclude such statements, and this case shows why doing so is critical.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Malcolm

On December 22, 2018, the victim was fatally shot outside of Kif's Bar on Market Street in Philadelphia after a birthday party. He was shot once in the head and once in the chest. Another individual was also shot but survived. Police recovered eleven fired cartridge casings from two different firearms and obtained surveillance footage from nearby cameras. The footage depicted an individual in a gray zipper hoodie, black boots, black pants, and white earbuds circling the block before approaching the victim from behind and shooting him twice at close range.

Detective James Burns of the Philadelphia Police Homicide Unit was assigned to the case. Unable to identify the shooter, he sent out a patrol alert with a screenshot from the surveillance footage. The defendant was brought in for questioning. During the interrogation, the defendant consented to a search of his bedroom, where officers recovered a gray hoodie, black boots, and white corded headphones consistent with what the shooter was wearing in the surveillance video. The gray hoodie tested positive for gunshot residue on the right sleeve. DNA testing on the hoodie and other items was inconclusive.

About a month after the defendant’s interview, Officer Robert Lamanna identified the defendant as the suspect in the patrol alert. Officer Lamanna was familiar with the defendant because the defendant frequented his assigned police district and the officer had also viewed the defendant on social media. Officer Lamanna was the only witness who would identify the defendant from the surveillance footage at trial.

The Interrogation Video

At trial, the Commonwealth played portions of the defendant’s videotaped police interrogation for the jury. Throughout the interrogation, Detectives Burns and Harkins made numerous accusatory statements, including telling the defendant “I don't believe that we have the wrong guy,” “I'm telling you that I know that this is you,” “We're quite confident we have the right person here,” and “Do you know how absurd that sounds.” The defendant challenged thirteen specific statements on appeal. Throughout the interrogation, the defendant repeatedly and steadfastly maintained his innocence.

Defense counsel made only two to three broad objections during the video. The trial court paused the video at one point to instruct the jury that only one witness, Officer Lamanna, had identified the defendant, and that the jury should disregard the detective’s references to multiple people having identified him. The trial court also reminded the jury that it was the ultimate finder of fact.

The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and possessing an instrument of crime. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Superior Court affirmed, concluding that the statements were distinguishable from those in Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 730 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 1999), because none of them “directly” accused the defendant of lying.

The Supreme Court's Decision

The Supreme Court granted review and issued a fractured decision. The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, authored by Justice Mundy and joined only by Justice Brobson, declined to adopt Kitchen’s categorical rule treating these types of police statements as inadmissible. Instead, the OAJC held that the admissibility of accusatory police statements in interrogation videos should be assessed on a case-by-case basis under Rules 401 and 403. The OAJC found no abuse of discretion in this case, emphasizing that the jury heard the defendant’s repeated denials, the trial court gave curative instructions, and defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the detectives. Only two justices joined this analysis, meaning that is not presidential.

Justice McCaffery, joined by Justice Dougherty, concurred in the result only. This means they agreed to affirm the conviction, but for completely different reasons. The concurrence concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the detectives’ statements. Justice McCaffery found that the statements had at best de minimis relevance, explaining that there is no legal basis under Pennsylvania precedent for the relevance of one witness’s opinion about the credibility of another. He cited the longstanding rule from Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753 (Pa. 2014), that credibility determinations are exclusively for the jury, and noted that Pennsylvania courts have consistently prohibited such opinion testimony even from qualified experts. The concurrence stated that he could see “no circumstances under which such testimony should be considered” and that the statements “should have been excluded.” However, Justice McCaffery found the error to be harmless because the crux of the case was the surveillance video and Officer Lamanna's identification, and the verdict would not have been different without the detectives’ opinions.

Justice Wecht, joined by Chief Justice Todd and Justice Donohue, dissented. The dissent agreed with the concurrence that the statements were erroneously admitted but went further, arguing the error was not harmless. Justice Wecht emphasized that the detectives’ repeated assertions of Malcolm's guilt carried a significant danger of unfair prejudice because of their appearance of authority and their suggestion to the jury that additional inculpatory evidence existed beyond what was presented at trial. The dissent described the detectives’ opinions as coming in through the “Trojan Horse” of the interrogation video, meaning the same opinions that would clearly be inadmissible if offered from the witness stand were allowed in simply because they were on a video. The dissent also found the trial court’s curative instructions insufficient, noting they were directed only at Detective Burns’s false claim that multiple “people” had identified the defendant and did not address the broader pattern of accusatory statements. Where identification was the central issue and the surveillance footage was unclear, the dissent concluded the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Takeaway

Despite the affirmance of the conviction, this is actually a favorable development for defendants even though it does not help the defendant in this case. Five of seven justices agreed that the detectives’ accusatory statements and opinions of guilt were improperly admitted. The existing law has not changed. Trial courts should continue to exclude police opinions about a defendant’s guilt or credibility from interrogation videos played for a jury, and defense attorneys must continue to file motions in limine to make sure that happens. The Kitchen opinion, while not formally adopted by a majority, reflects what five justices on the current Court believe the Rules of Evidence already require.

The practical lesson from this case is the critical importance of filing a detailed pretrial motion challenging specific portions of an interrogation video. In Malcolm, defense counsel did not file a motion in limine directed at the accusatory statements and made only broad, nonspecific objections at trial. That clearly influenced the outcome. Had counsel preserved the issue more carefully, the result may well have been different given that five justices found error. For defendants facing serious charges where the Commonwealth intends to play an interrogation video at trial, this case shows why it is essential to have an experienced defense attorney who will review the video in advance, file the appropriate motions, and make specific objections on the record.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case? We Can Help.

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Fraud, and Murder. We have also successfully challenged convictions for murder, firearms charges, rape, and other serious convictions on direct appeal in state and federal court as well as through post-conviction relief act litigation. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.