Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 11/8/25 Zak Goldstein 11/8/25

PA Supreme Court: Prosecution May Not Remove Defendant from ARD for Truthful Answers

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jenkins, ruling that a judge cannot revoke a defendant’s Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) status simply for failing to mention an uncharged arrest on their ARD application where the prosecution never asked about uncharged arrests on the application itself. The decision limits the idea of “deception by omission” and makes clear that ARD participants can only be removed for violating actual, written conditions of the program, not for conduct that merely offends the “spirit” of rehabilitation.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was arrested for DUI in May 2021 and later applied for ARD in Adams County. Before charges were filed for a second DUI arrest that summer, the defendant truthfully completed his ARD application, which required him to disclose any pending criminal charges but said nothing about uncharged arrests.

He was accepted into ARD, but when prosecutors later learned of the earlier uncharged arrest, they moved to revoke his participation, arguing that he violated ARD “Rule #1” prohibiting violations of the law and that omitting the arrest “defeated the spirit of ARD.” Both the trial court and the Superior Court agreed with the District Attorney. The defendant appealed the order kicking him out of ARD to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court Reverses

Chief Justice Debra Todd, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected that reasoning. The justices held that the defendant had not violated any ARD condition. He didn’t commit a new crime after admission, and his application contained no misrepresentation because he simply was not asked about uncharged arrests.

The Court emphasized that ARD revocation must rest on a violation of specific conditions found in statute or rule, not on implied ones. Citing Commonwealth v. Foster and Commonwealth v. Rosario, the Court refused to invent an “implied condition” that defendants must self-report uncharged arrests. The ARD statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3807, and Rule 318 allow removal only if a participant commits a new offense or violates an enumerated condition, and neither applied here. In other words, a defendant must answer the questions asked truthfully, but they do not have to answer questions that are not asked.

Rejecting the Commonwealth’s “Spirit of ARD” Argument

The Commonwealth urged the Court to follow older cases like Boos and Jones, which allowed revocation when applicants concealed disqualifying convictions or lied on their forms. The Court distinguished those cases: the defendant’s application was truthful, and the ARD paperwork never asked about uncharged arrests. That was the Commonwealth’s problem, not his.

Justice Todd wrote that if prosecutors want such information, they must ask for it explicitly, not rely on defendants to guess what’s relevant. In her words, “We find no basis on which to expect an applicant to guess at what information he is expected to disclose.”

Takeaway

This decision restores clear limits on when ARD can be revoked. Courts cannot terminate a defendant’s participation based on uncharged conduct that occurred before admission or on vague notions of “deception by omission.”

If an ARD application doesn’t ask about arrests, an applicant has no duty to volunteer them. The opinion also suggests that counties should update their ARD forms if they want that information in the future. The ruling is an important reminder that the ARD process is governed by written rules, not by unchecked prosecutorial discretion or moral intuitions about candor.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania or New Jersey?

Zak Goldstein 11/7/25 Zak Goldstein 11/7/25

Attorney Goldstein Wins Federal Suppression Motion in Electronic Contraband Case

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, of Goldstein Mehta LLC recently secured a major victory in federal court when a judge granted his motion to suppress all evidence in a serious federal criminal case. The ruling, issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, resulted in the exclusion of every item seized by investigators and effectively ended the government’s case.

The client had been charged in federal court with offenses involving the alleged possession and production of unlawful digital material. The prosecution’s entire case depended on evidence taken from a series of search warrants that allowed agents to seize and examine the client’s computers, phones, and other electronic devices.

Attorney Goldstein challenged the legality of those searches in a “four corners” motion, arguing that the warrants were unconstitutional because they were not supported by probable cause. In particular, he demonstrated that the affidavits failed to draw any meaningful connection between the conduct being investigated and the belief that illegal material would be found on the client’s electronic devices. Instead, the government relied on a boilerplate assumption that people accused of sexual misconduct are likely to possess such material on their electronics. Attorney Goldstein argued that this “profile-based” reasoning violated long-standing Third Circuit precedent, which requires a clear factual nexus between the alleged crime and the evidence sought.

The federal judge agreed, ruling that the affidavits were too speculative to support probable cause and that the warrants were so deficient that the “good faith” exception did not apply. The court found that no reasonable officer could have believed that the affidavits established a sufficient basis to search the client’s home and devices. Because the subsequent search warrants were based on evidence obtained from the initial unconstitutional searches, all of the evidence in the case was suppressed.

This outcome is a tremendous win and a relatively rare event in federal criminal litigation. Federal suppression motions are extremely difficult to win. Courts often defer to the government’s investigative process, and they routinely apply a good faith exception where, as here, investigators obtain a search warrant even if the warrant itself turns out to be lacking. Attorney Goldstein’s success demonstrates the value of a deep understanding of constitutional law and the willingness to challenge law enforcement overreach through careful, methodical, and aggressive litigation.

Facing federal criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client, and we frequently spot issues and defenses that other lawyers miss. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 11/6/25 Zak Goldstein 11/6/25

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rejects Public Record Presumption and Orders Hearing on Juror Bias Claim in Commonwealth v. Blakeney

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Laweyr Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has issued an important decision in Commonwealth v. Blakeney, vacating the dismissal of a third Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the PCRA court improperly relied on the discredited “public records presumption” and applied an unreasonably high diligence standard when it dismissed the petitioner’s serial petition as untimely. The decision continues the Supreme Court’s recent trend of reinforcing the fact that petitioners must be given a fair opportunity to prove newly discovered facts under the PCRA.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses for the 2000 killing of his girlfriend’s two-year-old child in Dauphin County. During jury selection, one juror, identified as Juror #7, initially marked “yes” on her juror questionnaire in response to the question of whether she or a close family member had been charged with a crime, then crossed out “yes” and marked “no.” More than twenty years later, new post-conviction counsel investigating potential juror bias discovered an obituary listing Juror #7’s family members. Counsel determined that the juror’s nephew had been charged with attempted murder and related offenses involving his own infant child. The juror’s nephew’s own preliminary hearing occurred on the very day that the juror was being questioned during voir dire in the defendant’s trial.

The defendant, whose prior appeals and PCRAs has been denied, filed a third PCRA petition arguing that this information constituted newly discovered facts that could not have been found earlier through reasonable diligence. He contended that Juror #7 provided a misleading answer during voir dire and that he was therefore denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.

The PCRA Court’s Ruling

The PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss under Rule 907 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and ultimately denied the petition without a hearing. The PCRA court held that the claim was untimely because the nephew’s criminal case had been reported in a 2002 newspaper article, meaning that the information was publicly available and could have been discovered earlier. The court concluded that the defendant had not exercised due diligence and that his claim therefore failed to satisfy the PCRA’s timeliness exception for newly discovered facts under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The defendant appealed, and because he had received the death penalty at sentencing, the appeal went directly to the state Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The Court emphasized that the PCRA court erred by invoking the “public record presumption,” a doctrine that previously held defendants responsible for facts contained in public sources such as newspapers or court filings. The Supreme Court has repeatedly disapproved of that presumption in recent years, explaining that it is inconsistent with the plain language of the PCRA. The PCRA requires only reasonable diligence, not omniscience. It also recognizes that many petitioners are in custody and do not have normal access to public records.

In the defendant’s case, the Court found that the 2002 newspaper article did not specifically identify Juror #7 or establish any connection between her and her nephew’s case. The article merely reported the nephew’s charges and provided no reason for defense counsel in 2002 to link that case to a juror from the defendant’s trial. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the lower court erred in holding the information was discoverable simply because it existed in the public domain. The proper inquiry, the Supreme Court reiterated, is whether the petitioner could have discovered the fact earlier through reasonable diligence, not just whether the fact appeared somewhere in public records.

Because the defendant’s petition presented specific, potentially verifiable claims about juror bias and newly discovered evidence, the Supreme Court ordered a remand for further factual development. The PCRA court must now conduct a hearing to determine whether the information indeed qualifies as newly discovered and whether it entitles the defendant to relief.

The Takeaway

Commonwealth v. Blakeney reaffirms that Pennsylvania courts may not deny PCRA petitions by assuming defendants should have discovered facts merely because they were once published or theoretically accessible. The Supreme Court continues to reject the public record presumption and to clarify that reasonable diligence is a practical, case-specific standard. Petitioners are not required to scour every public source in existence, and when a claim of newly discovered evidence is plausible, a hearing is often necessary before dismissal.

Facing criminal charges or under investigation?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers in Philadelphia, PA

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/16/25 Zak Goldstein 10/16/25

PA Superior Court: Jurisdiction Exists for Out-of-State Access Device Fraud When Complainant Lives in Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Washington, holding that the Commonwealth could prosecute the defendant for allegedly committing fraud out of state when the complainant and the complainant’s financial accounts were based in Pennsylvania.

The Facts of the Case

In Commonwealth v. Washington, 2025 PA Super 183, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that Pennsylvania courts have jurisdiction to prosecute access device fraud committed outside the Commonwealth when the complainant resides here and the affected financial account is maintained in Pennsylvania. The Court rejected the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge.

The defendant was charged in Montgomery County, PA with one count of Access Device Fraud under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4106(a)(1)(ii). While physically in New York, the defendant used an altered check and fake identification belonging to a Pennsylvania resident. Using the forged documents, he cashed a counterfeit $3,500 check and withdrew $5,000 from the complainant’s KeyBank account.

The complainant lived in Lower Salford Township in Montgomery County, and KeyBank operated branches there. After the transactions, a New York branch manager contacted the complainant, who confirmed that he had not authorized the withdrawals. Surveillance footage identified the defendant, who was arrested and extradited to Pennsylvania. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nine to twenty-three months in jail. On appeal, the defendant argued that Pennsylvania lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and venue because the fraudulent conduct occurred entirely in New York State.

The Superior Court’s Analysis

The Superior Court rejected that argument and affirmed the conviction. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 102, Pennsylvania courts may exercise jurisdiction if either the conduct constituting an element of the offense or the result of that conduct takes place within the Commonwealth. Access Device Fraud under § 4106(a)(1)(ii) criminalizes using another person’s access device without authorization. The Court held that an essential element of the offense—the failure to obtain the owner’s consent—occurs where the victim resides. Because the complainant lived in Montgomery County, the defendant’s unauthorized use of the complainant’s financial information constituted conduct occurring within Pennsylvania even though the defendant was in New York.

The Court also concluded that venue was proper in Montgomery County under § 4106(e), which provides that such offenses may be deemed committed “at the place where the property or services were received or provided, or at the place where the lawful charges for said property or services are billed.” Because the complainant’s account and the relevant KeyBank branch were located in Montgomery County, that county was the proper venue.

Citing similar reasoning from courts in Massachusetts and Florida, the Superior Court confirmed that Pennsylvania may exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state access device or identity-theft offenses when the complainant resides in Pennsylvania and the loss is tied to a Pennsylvania account.

The Takeaway

Commonwealth v. Washington establishes that Pennsylvania courts can prosecute financial crimes committed elsewhere if the victim lives in Pennsylvania and the affected funds are drawn from a Pennsylvania account. Even remote, out-of-state conduct can support Pennsylvania charges when the harm and loss occur within the Commonwealth.

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