Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/4/25 Zak Goldstein 10/4/25

PA Superior Court Rejects Request for Hearing on Juror Misconduct Allegations in Commonwealth v. Hall

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In Commonwealth v. Wakeem Hall, No. 1399 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 15, 2025), the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered whether a defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on allegations that the jury foreperson, who was an attorney, may have told other jurors that the defendant’s failure to call character witnesses at trial must have meant he had a prior criminal record. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief and decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s claim, holding that the defendant’s proffer was speculative and insufficient to overcome the rule prohibiting inquiry into jury deliberations.

The Facts of the Case

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) with a child, endangering the welfare of a child, corruption of a minor, and unlawful contact with a minor. The criminal charges stemmed from allegations that he repeatedly abused his biological daughter in 2015 when she was nine and ten years old. He was found guilty and sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years in prison followed by 10 years of probation.

After trial, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing. He argued that the jury foreperson, who was a lawyer, may have told the rest of the jury that the defendant’s failure to call character witnesses indicated he had a prior record. This allegation arose from questions jurors asked defense counsel after the verdict had already been returned and the jurors discharged. The trial court denied the motion, finding the allegations supporting it to be speculative. Because of a court system error that prevented him from filing a timely appeal, the defendant’s appellate rights were later reinstated nunc pro tunc through PCRA proceedings, and he appealed to the Superior Court.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Ruling

On appeal, the defendant argued that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing to question jurors about whether they considered improper information during deliberations. The Superior Court rejected the claim and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. The Court explained that trial courts should only grant such hearings when there is actual evidence that jurors received information from outside the trial — for example, when someone testifies that jurors asked friends or relatives for advice or looked up information on their own. Here, however, there was no solid evidence of that. At most, defense counsel speculated that the foreperson might have suggested something about character witnesses, and even that was not clearly established.

The Court emphasized that jurors are allowed to bring their own life experiences and common sense into deliberations. This is true even if the juror is a lawyer, and the defense or prosecution could have struck that juror using a peremptory strike or for cause if there was evidence that the juror could not be fair. It is not unusual for jurors to wonder why a defendant did not call certain witnesses, and the law does not permit attorneys to question jurors after the fact about such speculation. Because the defendant’s claim relied only on assumptions and not on actual evidence of outside influence, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying his request.

Pa.R.E. 606 governs a juror’s competency as a witness (or their availability to be called as a witness), and it generally holds that they cannot testify. There are limited exceptions, but the Court did not find that exceptions applied here. The rule provides:

Rule 606. Juror’s Competency as a Witness.
(a)  At the Trial. A juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial. If a juror is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the jury’s presence.
(b)  During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict
   (1)  Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.
   (2)  Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
       (A)   prejudicial information not of record and beyond common knowledge and experience was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; or
       (B)   an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.

Here, the Court found that none of the exceptions applied due to the speculative nature of the defendant’s allegations.

The Takeaway

This case shows how difficult it is to challenge a jury verdict based on what may have been said in the jury room. Pennsylvania law strictly limits any inquiry into jury deliberations, and courts require solid proof of outside influence or improper information before allowing a hearing. Mere speculation about what jurors may have thought or said is not enough to overturn a conviction or obtain a new trial or even an evidentiary hearing.

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/2/25 Zak Goldstein 10/2/25

PA Supreme Court: Time Spent in Custody on Probation Detainer Should Apply to New Case Even if Bail Paid

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Phillips, holding that the defendant should have received credit for time served on a new case where he was held in custody only on a probation detainer on a prior case because he had paid bail on the new case. Therefore, he would have been released but for the detainer. Generally, defendants are only entitled to time credit on the cases that are actually holding them in custody, so under prior statutory interpretations, he would not have been entitled to time credit on the new case because that case was not holding him in custody once he paid bail. The time credit statute, however, deals with conduct rather than cases, and the conduct that led to the new case also triggered the probation detainer. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that he was entitled to time credit on the new case even though he had posted bail.

The Facts of Phillips

The defendant was serving a probationary sentence from a 2015 case involving DUI and resisting arrest when he was arrested in 2018 for aggravated assault. Although his mother posted his bail for the 2018 case, he remained incarcerated because a probation detainer was lodged against him in connection with the earlier case. He was still on probation at the time of his arrest for the assault, leading to the detainer.

The defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in the 2018 case and received a sentence of 27 to 72 months’ incarceration in state prison. At the same time, the sentencing court revoked his probation in the 2015 DUI case and imposed a consecutive two-year probationary sentence, meaning that he did not need any time credit from the time spent in prison to go to that case because he received a non-incarceration sentence. Nonetheless, because he had posted bail on the case, the trial court did not award him credit for the nearly eight months he spent incarcerated on the probation detainer between May 2018 and January 2019 before his sentencing on the assault.

The defendant ultimately sought relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), arguing that under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1), he was entitled to credit for all of that time spent in custody. The PCRA court gave him partial credit of 237 days, but it refused to credit the time he spent incarcerated solely on the probation detainer. The Superior Court affirmed on appeal, reasoning that because he was held only on the detainer during that period, the credit could not be applied to the assault case. The defendant sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. Justice Mundy, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that Section 9760(1) requires credit for “all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.”

The Court found that the defendant’s detention on the probation detainer was directly triggered by the same conduct, the assault, that led to the aggravated assault conviction. Because the detainer would not have been lodged but for the new charges, the time he spent incarcerated from May 2018 to January 2019 was “a result of the conduct” underlying the assault.

The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that credit should not apply because the detainer related to his earlier resisting arrest conviction. It emphasized that the statute does not require the conduct to be the sole cause of confinement. Reading the statute narrowly, as the Commonwealth urged, would improperly insert limitations not found in the statutory text.

Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to have all of his pre-sentence confinement credited toward his 2018 assault sentence. Although it appeared he had already completed that sentence, the Court remanded for a determination of whether relief could still be awarded.

The Takeaway

This decision clarifies that defendants are entitled to credit for all pre-sentence confinement when that custody results from the same conduct that led to the new charges, even if they were technically held on a probation detainer rather than bail. The ruling ensures that defendants are not punished twice by losing credit simply because a probation violation and new charges arise from the same incident. In general, it is best to avoid situations like this by not posting bail when a probation detainer is in place, but now this is one less trap for defense attorneys to have to worry about.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelph1ia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorn2ey today.

Zak Goldstein 9/30/25 Zak Goldstein 9/30/25

PA Supreme Court: Defendant Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence to Require Voir Dire Question on Whether Jurors Will Always Believe Alleged Child Abuse Victims

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Smith, affirming a trial court's broad discretion in refusing a specific jury selection question about a juror’s potential for bias in favor of the truthfulness of alleged child sexual assault victims. The Court concluded that based on the record presented to the trial judge, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the proposed inquiry because the defendant failed to show that jurors tend to believe child abuse complainants more than other potential witnesses. Had the defense presented more evidence to the trial court, however, the question may well have been required.

The Issue in Smith

The defendant, who had been convicted of child sexual assault charges, challenged the trial court's refusal to ask prospective jurors the following specific question during voir dire (jury selection):

Are you more likely to believe the testimony of a child alleging sexual abuse because you do not believe a child could lie about sexual abuse?

The defendant argued that in a case where the uncorroborated testimony of the child complainants was central to the Commonwealth’s case, his right to an impartial jury required a specific inquiry into a potential "fixed bias" that children do not lie about sexual abuse.

The Court's Ruling: Insufficient Evidence to Support the Question

The Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s ruling and rejected the defendant’s challenge as follows:

No Foundation at Trial: The Court noted that the defendant’s argument for the existence of this fixed bias was a "bald assumption" before the trial court as he "offered no support for the proposition that the inquiry addressed a fixed bias or prejudice.” Because the Court must review the trial court's decision based on the information it had at the time, the defense's later, more detailed arguments on appeal were not helpful in terms of retroactively showing that the trial court erred.

Adequate General Inquiry: The trial court had conducted extensive general and individual voir dire. This included informing the panel of the nature of the charges and asking if anything would prevent them from being

fair and impartial, as well as inquiring if they or anyone close to them had been victims of sexual assault or child abuse. The trial court also excused multiple jurors for cause who claimed an inability to be fair.

Fixed Bias vs. Credibility: The Court clarified that inquiries designed to uncover a fixed bias, such as one related to a certain category of witnesses, are not the same as instructions on general witness credibility. A fixed bias precludes an impartial determination of credibility. However, based on the lack of a foundation supporting the existence of this particular bias due to the defendant’s failure to develop the record at the trial level, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The Court's decision essentially provides a roadmap for future cases: a trial court is only free to refuse this line of inquiry if the party requesting it fails to present a developed, evidence-based argument for the existence of a fixed bias. Here, the defendant presented strong evidence of the bias to the Supreme Court such that the Court may well have reversed had the evidence been presented to the trial court, but because the trial court could only make a ruling based on the evidence presented at the time, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s challenge.

Unlawful Contact Remand: Reconsideration in Light of Strunk

The Court also addressed the defendant’s challenge to his convictions for unlawful contact with a minor (18 Pa.C.S. § 6318).

Commonwealth v. Strunk: Subsequent to the Superior Court's decision affirming in this case, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the unlawful contact statute in Commonwealth v. Strunk.

Strunk held that Section 6318 is an "anti-grooming statute" intended to criminalize and punish “communication designed to induce or otherwise further the sexual exploitation of children.”

The Outcome: Given the significant clarification in the law, specifically, the refinement of the sufficiency of the evidence required for convictions under Section 6318—the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment on this issue and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Strunk. The Superior Court will now have to apply the statute’s narrower focus on "communicative behavior” in this case on remand.

Ultimately, although the result is bad for this particular defendant, the case is good for defendants in general in that it shows that should a defendant make an adequate record, they might be entitled to ask potential jurors about whether they will always believe alleged child abuse victims. Similarly, the Court continues to hold that the unlawful contact statute is not nearly as broad as prosecutors typically claim.

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Zak Goldstein 9/19/25 Zak Goldstein 9/19/25

Pennsylvania Superior Court Approves Use of Google Geofence Warrants in Criminal Cases

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has issued an important decision on digital privacy and criminal investigations. In Commonwealth v. Choice, the Court considered, for the first time, whether police may use geofence warrants to obtain Google location history data even though the warrants, by definition, do not identify a particular suspect. These warrants require Google to search its database for any devices present in a particular area during a specific time period. The Superior Court ultimately upheld the use of the geofence warrant and the conviction, finding that the warrants were sufficiently narrow (particular) and supported by probable cause.

The Facts of the Case

In January 2019, a nurse was driving his Toyota Tundra northbound on Route 309 in Montgomery County when he was suddenly shot in the arm. The complainant immediately called 911 while following the suspect’s maroon vehicle. Although he was able to give a description and even followed the vehicle for over a mile, he could not identify the license plate before losing sight of the car, leaving the police with few suspects.

Trooper Eugene Tray of the Pennsylvania State Police was assigned to investigate. With little physical evidence tying a suspect to the shooting, Trooper Tray applied for a geofence warrant in December 2020. The warrant asked Google to provide anonymized location history data for any devices within a defined stretch of Route 309 and the Highland Avenue exit ramp between 9:20 and 9:27 p.m., which was the time when the shooting occurred.

In response, Google provided an anonymized list of device IDs. Trooper Tray determined that one of the mobile devices matched the movements of the suspect’s car. He then obtained a second warrant compelling Google to disclose the subscriber information for that device. Google linked the phone to the defendant, who was later charged with aggravated assault. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrants amounted to unconstitutional “general searches” of millions of Google accounts. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant was convicted in a stipulated bench trial. He appealed.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Ruling

On appeal, the defendant argued that the warrants failed both the probable cause requirement and the constitutional limits on overbroad searches. He claimed there was no individualized suspicion that the shooter had a cell phone, let alone one running Android software with Google location services enabled. He also argued that the process gave law enforcement unlimited discretion because it allowed them to sift through unrelated device data.

The Superior Court rejected these arguments. The Court emphasized that cell phone use is so pervasive that it is reasonable to assume most people, including criminal suspects, carry one. Combined with the precise details provided by the victim during his 911 call, the Court found there was a “fair probability” that Google’s location history data would produce relevant evidence.

The Court also concluded that the warrants were not overbroad. Unlike warrants that sweep up months of data or large geographic areas, this one was carefully limited to two short road segments and a seven-minute time window. Moreover, because Google anonymized the data before handing it over, police could not arbitrarily rummage through personal information. Officers were required to return to court for a second warrant to obtain the identity of the one device they believed was relevant.

Notably, this was a mater of first impression for a Pennsylvania appellate court. Other courts, such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have found that geofence warrants are unconstitutional. Accordingly, this issue may be reviewed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court.

The Takeaway

This case is a significant development in Pennsylvania law. It shows that courts are prepared to approve geofence warrants where police can identify the precise location and timeframe of a crime. Prosecutors will likely seek this type of data more frequently in serious cases ranging from shootings to robberies and other violent offenses.

At the same time, the decision highlights the tension between privacy rights and investigative technology. Defense attorneys should continue to challenge geofence warrants as unconstitutional general searches, and future cases, including those currently pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court such as Commonwealth v. Kurtz, may further refine the law. For now, however, defendants should expect prosecutors to use Google location data when it is available.