Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/3/24 Zak Goldstein 10/3/24

PA Supreme Court: Sentencing Court May Not Consider Arrests That Did Not Result in Conviction

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Berry, overturning a long line of Superior Court precedent and holding that a sentencing court may not consider a defendant’s bare record of arrests at sentencing without any evidence of the underlying criminal conduct. Previously, a sentencing court could consider the defendant’s arrest record even where the arrests did not result in convictions so long as the sentencing court recognized the difference between an arrest and a conviction. The Supreme Court has now rejected that proposition and conclusively ruled that mere arrests are meaningless without a conviction or real proof of the underlying criminal conduct behind the arrest.

The Facts of Berry

In Berry, the defendant was convicted of the sexual abuse of two young family members. Specifically, he was found guilty of sexually assaulting his intellectually disabled younger brother, J.B., on two occasions, coercing him into non-consensual sexual acts, and coercing his seven-year-old great-nephew, J.J., into sexual contact. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate term of seven-and-a-half to fifteen years, which represented an upward departure from the range recommended by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines.

The Issue on Appeal

The key issue at sentencing was the trial court's consideration of the defendant’s prior arrest record. He had no prior convictions or juvenile adjudications, but he had been arrested several times. The trial judge explicitly considered these arrests, referring to them as “previous other contacts” and suggesting that they negated the defendant’s prior record score of zero. This led at least in part to a significant increase in the length of the defendant’s sentence above the guideline range.

The defendant challenged this above-guideline sentence, arguing that the sentencing court improperly relied on unproven arrests as an aggravating factor. He asserted the consideration of these arrests violated both Pennsylvania law and his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that considering a defendant’s arrest record violates Pennsylvania law because arrests, without proof of a conviction or that the defendant committed underlying criminal conduct, are completely irrelevant and do not give the sentencing judge any reliable information as to whether the defendant actually committed a crime.

The Supreme Court recognized a number of key points:

First, the Court reiterated that an arrest, without a resulting conviction, does not equate to a finding of guilt. Arrests occur under circumstances that do not necessarily reflect criminal conduct, and they can happen to both the innocent and the guilty. Consequently, they are not a reliable indicator of a defendant's character or propensity for future crimes.

Second, under Pennsylvania law, the Sentencing Guidelines do not permit the use of arrest records in calculating a defendant's prior record score or as an independent factor in determining an appropriate sentence. Prior record scores must be based on actual convictions or adjudications, not on mere arrests.

Third, the Court noted that prior decisions from both Pennsylvania and federal appellate courts such as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have consistently held that arrest records are not admissible as evidence in various phases of criminal proceedings because they are not probative. The Court explicitly overruled a series of Pennsylvania Superior Court cases that had allowed the use of prior arrests in sentencing even where the judge did not equate them with convictions.

Finally, the Court highlighted concerns about the potential racial and socioeconomic biases inherent in arrest records. Studies show that arrests may often reflect disparities in police practices rather than actual criminal behavior, which further undercuts their reliability as a sentencing factor.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court therefore held that the sentencing court committed an error of law in considering the defendant’s arrest record as an aggravating factor. This reliance on irrelevant and unreliable information improperly influenced the sentence; the sentencing judge specifically said so. Therefore, the Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing. It ordered that the sentencing judge not consider arrests at the re-sentencing without real proof of the underlying conduct.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/3/24 Zak Goldstein 7/3/24

PA Superior Court: Institutional Sexual Assault Statute Does Not Apply to Colleges

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yanovitsky, reversing the defendant’s conviction for institutional sexual assault after concluding that that statute does not apply to colleges and universities.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was a professor at a large state university in Philadelphia. The complainant testified that after class, he dismissed all of the other students, leaving her alone with him in the classroom. He then touched her hair, kissed her forehead, and pressed his penis against her thigh. He also touched her feet and hands, and she said that she did not consent. Her roommate testified that the complainant immediately reported the incident to her and had expressed her concerns about some prior behavior by the same professor. DNA testing revealed the presence of the defendant’s DNA on the complainant’s clothing, but character witnesses testified to the defendant’s good reputation in the community.

The police arrested the defendant, and Philadelphia prosecutors charged him with institutional sexual assault and indecent assault. The jury convicted, and the defendant appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court reversed the institutional sexual assault conviction and affirmed the indecent assault conviction. The Court therefore remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.

On appeal, the defendant argued that institutional sexual assault, which is a new offense in Pennsylvania, does not apply to colleges and universities despite the extremely broad language of the statute.

The Superior Court agreed. The Court reversed the institutional sexual assault conviction of primarily because it found that the statute under which he was convicted did not apply to college or university settings.

First, the Court interpreted the statutory language of the institutional sexual assault statute (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.2) and concluded that it was intended to protect students in elementary and secondary schools, not those in higher education institutions.

The statute defines “school” to include public or private schools, intermediate units, or area vocational-technical schools. The Court noted that these definitions typically refer to institutions providing education for children and adolescents, not adults in colleges or universities.

The Court looked at dictionary definitions and legal interpretations of the word “school.” Although Merriam-Webster’s definition included colleges and universities, Black’s Law Dictionary and other legal sources suggested that the term “school” in a statute usually refers to institutions for children unless the statute explicitly includes higher education institutions.

The Court also looked at the legislative history and context of the statute. It found that the statute was aimed at protecting younger students from employees and adults in schools. The Governor’s message accompanying amendments to the statute highlighted its focus on protecting children from sexual predators. Additionally, the absence of terms specifically referring to higher education (such as “professor,” “college,” or “university”) in the statute further supported the interpretation that the statute was not meant to cover colleges and universities.

The Court also found that applying the statute to colleges would lead to an absurd result. The Court considered the potential consequences of interpreting the statute to include higher education. It pointed out that if “school” included colleges and universities, any consensual sexual relationship between a college professor and an adult student would be criminalized, which the legislature likely did not intend, especially in cases where the adult student was not even a student of the professor.

Finally, the Superior Court noted that the Commonwealth agreed with the defendant’s argument that the statute did not apply to college or university settings and conceded that his conviction for institutional sexual assault should be vacated.

Therefore, the Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. This case illustrates the fact that although the statute is broad, it does not apply to absolutely everyone in any kind of school setting. Instead, the statute only applies to certain types of schools and to certain employees and other adults in those settings who have “direct contact” as defined by the statute. It does not apply to all employees and all possible types of schools.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein 6/25/24 Zak Goldstein 6/25/24

Speedy Trial Motion Granted in Sexual Assault Case

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire recently won a speedy trial motion to dismiss all charges in a sexual assault case. In Commonwealth v. VK, the client was charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and related charges after the complainant reported that the client had assaulted her years earlier. The complainant did not disclose the alleged abuse for about a decade.

The complainant made a police report, and a detective then obtained an arrest warrant and put the arrest warrant in the system. The detective then did essentially nothing to arrest the client. By then, he had moved to another state. The client was eventually arrested by police in the other state during a random encounter more than two years later and extradited to Philadelphia. Upon his arrival in Philadelphia, he retained Attorney Goldstein. Attorney Goldstein successfully argued for a reasonable bail at preliminary arraignment.

The charges were held for court at the preliminary hearing. Once the case reached the Court of Common Pleas and motions could be filed, Attorney Goldstein immediately filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600(a) of the rules of criminal procedure. In the motion, Attorney Goldstein argued that the charges should be dismissed because the Commonwealth failed to bring the client to trial within 365 days as required by the rule.

Under the rules, the one year deadline for bringing a defendant to trial begins to run on the date on which the complaint is filed. Accordingly, the time during which a defendant has charges filed against them and a complaint pending counts for purposes of the rule unless the Commonwealth exercises due diligence in attempting to locate the defendant but is unable to do so. For example, if a defendant is being held in custody in another state and the other state refuses to extradite the defendant despite the Commonwealth’s attempts to obtain extradition, then the time might not count. Or, if the police conduct records checks and attempt to locate the defendant but are unable to do so despite giving it a good effort, then the time may not count.

Here, the detective who filed the charges testified at a hearing on the motion that he made a couple of phone calls to phone numbers he could not remember when he first filed the charges. He did not call authorities in the other state, he did not have anyone check the addresses in those states, he did not check social media, and he did not ask federal marshals to look for the defendant. Accordingly, Attorney Goldstein argued that the police and prosecutors had failed to exercise due diligence for more than a year from the filing of the complaint.

Ultimately, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas judge agreed. The trial judge dismissed all of the charges, and the record can now be expunged. The appellate courts have increasingly enforced the speedy trial rules in Pennsylvania over the last few years. Filing criminal charges against someone is a serious thing, and the Commonwealth is not allowed to just leave cases sitting for years without taking real steps to move the cases forward. Here, the police did nothing to locate and extradite the client despite knowing where he was. This led to pending charges sitting against the client for years. That is exactly what Rule 600 prohibits. Accordingly, the judge dismissed the case.

What is Rule 600?

Rule 600 is Pennsylvania’s speedy trial rule. It applies to felony cases in Philadelphia. Municipal Court misdemeanor cases have a different rule (Rule 1013). Under Rule 600(a), the Commonwealth generally must bring the defendant to trial within 365 days of the filing of the complaint. There are lots of exceptions - defense continuances, continuances due to the court’s schedule, and continuances where the Commonwealth acted with due diligence but could not move forward due to circumstances outside of their control all may not count words the 365 days. But in general, if the case is delayed because the Commonwealth is not ready to proceed without a very good excuse, the time counts against the Commonwealth. Obtaining dismissal under the rule requires filing a written motion in the Court of Common Pleas.

Under Rule 600(b), a defendant in custody because they cannot afford bail may only be held for 180 days before they should be released on nominal bail (usually with house arrest). Again, there are exceptions for defense continuances, but they are more limited. Additionally, the Commonwealth usually responds to a 600(b) speedy trial bail motion by moving to revoke the defendant’s bail. In that case, the trial judge will have to make a determination as to whether the defendant is such a flight risk or danger to the community that bail should be revoked. In less serious cases, the defendant will almost always be released. In more serious cases such as shootings and rapes, this becomes a bigger issue.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed the trial courts to follow the rule and enforce it more reliably over the last few years, and courts have begun to do so. Here, the trial court followed the rule and dismissed the charges.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 5/27/24 Zak Goldstein 5/27/24

PA Superior Court: Tender Years Exception Does Not Necessarily Apply to Hearsay-Within-Hearsay

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Copenahver, holding that the trial court improperly admitted video statements given by the complainants in this case because the video statements contained hearsay-within-hearsay. The court nonetheless affirmed the defendant’s conviction because the evidence was overwhelming, and the court believed he would have been convicted even in the absence of the inadmissible portions of the statements.

The Facts of Copenhaver

In Copenhaver, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his daughters, K.G. and C.C. The Commonwealth charged him with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, production of child pornography, and related charges. Copenhaver went to trial, and the prosecution introduced both the in-court testimony of the complainants as well as videotaped statements they had given at the York County Child Advocacy Center (CAC). The court admitted the CAC statements under the “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule. The Commonwealth also introduced evidence that the defendant had threatened to commit suicide as well as admitted to taking and deleting nude photos of the complainants. The jury convicted the defendant, and he received a lengthy state prison sentence. He appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

The defendant had court-appointed counsel, and in his initial appeal, his court-appointed attorney submitted an “Anders brief.” An Anders brief is a letter to the Superior Court informing the court that the attorney believes the defendant has no legitimate issues for appeal and the appeal should be dismissed. In order to comply with the rules, the attorney must identify any potential issues and explain why they would not result in a successful appeal. It is inconceivable that there could have been no legitimate issues for appeal following a jury trial involving two child sex assault complainants, and the Superior Court in fact reviewed the transcripts and found that the court-appointed attorney should have raised at least one claim relating to whether the videotaped statements were properly admitted at trial. Accordingly, the Superior Court rejected the Anders brief and directed the appellate attorney to file a real brief on the admissibility of the videotaped statements.

The lawyer filed a new brief challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the admissibility of K.G.’s videotaped statement under the tender years exception to the hearsay rule. The sufficiency challenge failed - the complainants both testified that the defendant raped them, and the jury was free to believe that evidence and find him guilty.

The video tape issue, however, required more extensive analysis as it had some merit. In most sexual assault prosecutions involving minor complainants, the prosecution team will have the complainant interviewed at some sort of quasi-independent children’s advocacy center. In Philadelphia, this organization is called Philadelphia Children’s Alliance. In many counties, it is called the Children’s Advocacy Center. In Montgomery County, it is called Mission Kids. Instead of having a detective interview the complainant, a social worker with some training in conducting “forensic interviews” will conduct a videotaped interview to try to determine what happened and evaluate the allegations. The questions are supposed to be neutral and non-leading in the hopes of avoiding planting ideas in the complainant’s head, but in practice, the questions are often leading, and the interviewers work very closely with the assigned detective. That detective will typically be standing outside the interview watching through a one-way mirror.

What is the tender years exception to the hearsay rule?

Pennsylvania and most other jurisdictions have a “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule. Section 5985.1 of the Judicial Code, referred to as the “tender years” exception to the hearsay rule, provides as follows:

§ 5985.1. Admissibility of certain statements
1. General rule.
(1) An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was 12 years of age or younger, describing any of the offenses enumerated in paragraph (2) [including, inter alia, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(b)], not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if:
(i) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(ii) the child either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1(a).

In 2021, the legislature raised the age from 12 to 16. The old rule with the younger age was still in effect at the time of this case.

Thus, the rule allows for hearsay statements to be admissible into evidence in cases involving rape charges and other similar offenses so long as the complainant either testifies or is unavailable as a witness. In a civil case, unavailability may include a finding that the child will have trouble testifying due to feeling emotional distress. In a criminal case, however, the complainant generally must testify because these statements have been deemed to be testimonial for confrontation clause purposes. There are three main ways for the defense to challenge the admissibility of the statements: First, the defense could argue that the statement is not relevance or reliable. Second, the defense can generally exclude the statement if the complainant does not testify. Third, the defense could argue that there is some other evidence in the statement which is not admissible such as hearsay-within-hearsay or a prior bad act under Rule 404(b).

In this case, one of the complainants gave a statement in which she said that the other complainant disclosed some of the abuse to her. Thus, the initial complainant’s statement was admissible under the tender years exception, but the statement inside that statement from the other complainant was hearsay. That portion of the statement should not have been admitted, but the trial court admitted all of it. The statement was not admissible because the trial court made no finding that the statement was actually reliable. Otherwise, it may have been admissible under the tender years exception, as well. Thus, the trial court erred in simply admitting the entirety of the statements without conducting a reliability assessment.

Nonetheless, the Superior Court affirmed. It found that the evidence was overwhelming and the defendant would have been convicted anyway. The statements were basically cumulative of what the complainants said in court and in their own videotaped statements. Accordingly, although the Superior Court made the court-appointed lawyer do a lot of extra result by rejecting the Anders brief and requiring briefing of the issue, the Superior Court ultimately ruled against the defendant, anyway. The case, however, highlights some of the ways that the defense may challenge the admission of these videotaped PCA or CAC statements.