PA Supreme Court: Unlawful Contact Conviction Requires Prior Communication, Not Just the Assault or Touching Itself

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Strunk, holding that unlawful contact cannot be proven solely through evidence that the defendant had some sort of illegal physical sexual contact with the alleged victim. Instead, the statute requires some kind of prior communication to facilitate a sex crime. This narrows the reach of the statute to more closely match the legislative intent behind it as the point of the statute is to prevent communications designed to facilitate illegal sex acts rather than to criminalize the actual assault itself given that other existing statutes criminalize the assault.

Recent cases from the Superior Court, however, had found that a violation of the statute could be proven without any evidence of any prior communication. That is no longer the case, but the actual illegal contact or sex act can still be prosecuted under the statute that covers the substantive contact. This reading of the statute by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court returns the statute to its original purpose and makes sure that people will not be prosecuted twice for the exact same conduct.

The Facts of Strunk

The defendant was convicted in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas following testimony from the complainant which detailed repeated sexual assaults occurring over a period when she lived in the same household. The complainant’s testimony described incidents where the defendant allegedly initiated physical contact while she pretended to be asleep. Despite the obviously illegality of the sexual acts themselves, the crux of the appeal centered on whether the defendant’s conduct met the statutory requirements for "unlawful contact with a minor" because there was no real evidence that the defendant said or did anything in advance to facilitate to assaults.

The complainant specifically testified to three instances of alleged sexual assault:

  • The defendant fondled the complainant while she slept on a couch and proceeded to sexually assault her. Afterward, he whispered something unintelligible to her, but there was no evidence of prior communication to facilitate the assault.

  • The defendant assaulted the complainant again while she was recuperating on the couch after dental surgery. She testified that she was heavily sedated and unable to respond. He digitally penetrated her during this assault, but the complainant testified that there was no verbal or nonverbal communication beforehand.

  • The defendant assaulted the complainant in her bedroom while she pretended to be asleep. This assault was interrupted by the victim’s mother, but again, the complainant testified that there was no communication between her and Strunk before or during the assault.

The complainant’s testimony was consistent in that she denied any verbal or nonverbal communication between her and the defendant that facilitated the actual assaults.

The Supreme Court Appeal

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review on two issues:

  1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for Unlawful Contact with a Minor under § 6318, given the lack of communication.

  2. Whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court erred in interpreting § 6318 to allow physical contact beyond the sexual acts themselves to satisfy the statute's communication requirement.

The statute provides:

§ 6318.  Unlawful contact with minor.

(a)  Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if the person is intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of duties who has assumed the identity of a minor or of another individual having direct contact with children, as defined under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a) (relating to definitions), for the purpose of engaging in an activity prohibited under any of the following, and either the person initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this Commonwealth:

(1)  Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses).

(2)  Open lewdness as defined in section 5901 (relating to open lewdness).

(3)  Prostitution as defined in section 5902 (relating to prostitution and related offenses).

(4)  Obscene and other sexual materials and performances as defined in section 5903 (relating to obscene and other sexual materials and performances).

(5)  Sexual abuse of children as defined in section 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children).

(6)  Sexual exploitation of children as defined in section 6320 (relating to sexual exploitation of children).

(b)  Grading.--A violation of subsection (a) is:

(1)  an offense of the same grade and degree as the most serious underlying offense in subsection (a) for which the defendant contacted the minor; or

(2)  a felony of the third degree; whichever is greater.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 criminalizes being “in contact with” a minor for purposes such as engaging in a prohibited sexual act. Historically, courts, including the Pennsylvania Superior Court, have interpreted this statute as focused on communication — either verbal, written, or non-verbal cues that facilitate the illegal conduct. The Superior Court, however, upheld the defendant’s conviction in this case even though he did not say anything, reasoning that non-communicative physical acts, such as manipulating clothing before the assault, were sufficient to fulfill the statute's requirements.

However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed. The Court found that the statute was ambiguous, and therefore an analysis of what exactly it covers required looking at the legislative intent behind it. Further, the Court found that the legislative intent behind § 6318 focused on criminalizing communication aimed at facilitating sexual exploitation, rather than physical actions alone. The analysis delved into both statutory language and legislative history, concluding that while "contact" can imply physical touch in other contexts, its interpretation within § 6318 should remain tied to prior communication.

The Legislative and Judicial Context

The majority opinion highlighted that § 6318, as conceived, aimed to address the risks posed by communication—whether through digital means or in-person interactions—that predators might use to groom or manipulate minors. Legislative debates leading to the statute’s enactment emphasized combating "cyber enticers," reflecting an emphasis on communicative acts over physical ones. In other words, the Legislature clearly enacted the statute to criminalize the type of behavior at issue in shows like To Catch a Predator. The statute is designed to make it illegal to contact minors to set up illegal sexual encounters; it does not criminalize the illegal sexual encounter itself because other statutes already do that. The Court therefore held that the Superior Court erred by conflating physical contact with communicative efforts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized that § 6318 is not designed to criminalize physical acts alone, as those are addressed by other statutes.

This interpretation aligns with some prior Superior Court rulings like Commonwealth v. Leatherby which required clear evidence of communication intended to facilitate sexual offenses. In this defendant’s case, however, the Court noted that although his actions were egregious, there was no evidence of verbal or non-verbal communication facilitating the assaults during the incidents in question. It is now clear that the statute is not violated by evidence of the illegal physical contact alone. Other statutes are violated, but the unlawful contact statute is not.

The Takeaway

The PA Supreme Court's decision to vacate the defendant’s conviction for unlawful contact did not affect his convictions for other sexual offenses, but it does not limit what had become an overly broad reach for this particular statute. If someone gropes a minor, then the appropriate charge for that is indecent assault. If someone communicates with a minor online or by text message to facilitate a groping, then the appropriate charge is unlawful contact even if the groping never happens. If the groping then happens, then the defendant could be charged with both unlawful contact and indecent assault. But it is now clear that unlawful contact may not be proven through evidence of the groping alone.

This is an important case because unlawful contact is a serious charge; it often carries more time in prison or more serious Megan’s Law requirements than the underlying sex offense. This opinion clarifies the scope of § 6318, reinforcing its focus on criminalizing communication intended to exploit minors rather than physical actions associated with sexual offenses. It underscores the need for clear evidence of communication to sustain a conviction under this statute.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein Criminal Defense Lawyer

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.  

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