Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 1/23/26 Zak Goldstein 1/23/26

PA Supreme Court Fails to Reach Decision on Whether Search Warrant Required for Google’s Search Records

On December 16, 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a fractured decision in Commonwealth v. Kurtz, addressing a cutting-edge digital privacy question: do you have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the terms you type into a Google search bar?

The Court’s answer was “no”—at least for general, unprotected searches. However, because the decision was reached by a plurality (meaning a majority of justices did not agree on a single legal reasoning), it is not binding, and the ruling leaves significant questions unanswered regarding other types of digital data, particularly Internet Service Provider (ISP) records and IP address subscriber information.

Commonwealth v. Kurtz: The “Reverse Keyword” Warrant

In Kurtz, police were investigating a violent home invasion rape but had no DNA match or suspect. Investigators obtained a “reverse keyword search warrant” compelling Google to identify any IP addresses that had searched for the victim’s home address prior to the crime. Google identified an IP address associated with the defendant, leading to additional investigation, an eventual DNA match, and his conviction for rape in this case and other unsolved cases.

The defendant challenged the warrant, arguing he had a privacy interest in his search history and that the warrant provided no reason to believe that the perpetrator conducted a Google search at all let alone for the victim’s address. The trial court rejected this claim, and the defendant appealed. The Superior Court rejected the claim, too, finding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records maintained by Google and that the police had obtained a legitimate search warrant even if he did. The defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. That Court, however, failed to reach a decision - three justices concluded that he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the search records, three concluded that the warrant was fine and declined to address the REOP decision, and one justice would have granted the motion to suppress.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction as it would have required four justices to vote to overturn it. In support of upholding the conviction, Justice Wecht authored an Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (OAJC) which reasoned that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information and that investigators did not have to obtain a warrant at all because:

Voluntary Disclosure: By typing a query into Google, the user voluntarily discloses that information to a third party, meaning the user does not make an attempt to keep the information private.
Notice: Google’s privacy policy explicitly warns users that it collects search queries and shares them with law enforcement.
Lack of Necessity: The Court noted that using Google is a choice, not a necessity; users can use other search engines, libraries, or physical maps. They can also take steps to shield their identities and increase their privacy.

Accordingly, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the search results.

Why Kurtz Is Not the Final Word

While Kurtz is a significant ruling for search history and the Superior Court’s ruling stands, it is not a total defeat for digital privacy rights in Pennsylvania for two key reasons:

1. It Is a Plurality Opinion: Crucially, the main opinion in Kurtz was joined by only three of the seven justices. When a court decides a case without a majority opinion, the holding is generally limited to the specific result of that case, and the legal reasoning is not fully binding precedent for future cases. This means the broad language about the third-party doctrine may not apply automatically to different factual scenarios or even similar scenarios.

2. It Is Limited to "Unprotected" Searches: The Court repeatedly stressed that its ruling applied only to “general, unprotected internet searches.” The justices expressly stated they were not deciding the privacy rights of users who utilize Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), private browsing modes, or encrypted browsers. Moreover, the courts have required legitimate search warrants where investigators seek to obtain bank records, phone records, and location data.

The Next Battleground: IP Addresses and ISP Records

The Kurtz decision creates a sharp distinction that defense attorneys can use in cases involving IP addresses and ISP subscriber records (the information “behind” the IP address, such as the customer's name and address).

In Kurtz, the Court emphasized that users have a choice: they can use Google, or they can use a privacy-focused competitor (like DuckDuckGo) or offline resources . However, this logic does not apply to IP addresses. Kurtz dealt with whether the police could obtain a list of IP addresses that had searched for a particular address. It did not address whether the police could obtain the information behind the resulting IP addresses without a search warrant, and in Pennsylvania, police often use administrative subpoenas to obtain that information rather than warrants. Whether they can do that under the Pennsylvania Constitution remains questionable for the following reasons:

Necessity vs. Convenience: You cannot use the internet without an IP address. It is technologically impossible. Unlike choosing a search engine, assigning an IP address is an involuntary condition of internet access, similar to how bank records or phone numbers are necessary to participate in modern life. Pennsylvania courts have long held that citizens do have privacy rights in bank records (Commonwealth v. DeJohn) and phone records (Commonwealth v. Melilli) because they are essential services.
The “Information Behind the IP”: Kurtz dealt with the content of a search communicated to Google. ISP inquiries deal with the identity of the user maintained by the internet provider. This information is generated automatically by the ISP, not voluntarily typed out by the user.

The Takeaway

At least for now, Commonwealth v. Kurtz establishes that if you type a search into Google without privacy protections, you cannot expect that search to remain private from police. However, because the decision relies heavily on the “voluntary” nature of using Google and Google’s explicit privacy warnings, it may not extend to the mandatory, automatic records generated by simply connecting to the internet via an ISP.

If you are facing charges based on digital evidence, IP address identification, or administrative subpoenas, the specific technical details of your case matter. The law is evolving rapidly, and a nuanced defense strategy is essential.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are under investigation or facing charges involving digital evidence, search warrants, or administrative subpoenas, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/18/26 Zak Goldstein 1/18/26

PA Superior Court Affirms Homicide by Vehicle while DUI Conviction Despite Inconsistent Verdicts

Commonwealth v. Kling

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Kling, affirming a defendant’s conviction for Homicide by Vehicle while Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") and Homicide by Vehicle.

The decision is significant for Pennsylvania DUI defense because it addresses “inconsistent verdicts.” Specifically, it addresses whether a defendant can be convicted of causing death while under the influence even if a jury acquits them of the specific DUI charge that involves being “impaired.”

The Facts of the Case

On April 20, 2023, the defendant was operating a motorcycle with a passenger on High Street in Limerick Township. At a red light, a Honda Accord driven by a third person pulled up beside him. When the light turned green, both vehicles accelerated rapidly toward a merge point about a quarter-mile away.

Witnesses and surveillance video established that neither driver would yield. As they approached the merge point, the Honda Accord overtook the motorcycle and merged into the left lane. The defendant struck the back of the Honda, causing the motorcycle to crash. His passenger was thrown from the bike and killed.

Police and EMS arrived and noted that the defendant appeared dazed, had pinpoint pupils, and was in pain. The defendant admitted he did not have a motorcycle license and the bike was unregistered. Toxicology reports later revealed fentanyl, amphetamine, and methamphetamine in the defendant’s blood.

The Inconsistent Verdicts

At trial, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with multiple counts of DUI. Notably, the jury acquitted him of DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2), which requires proof that the defendant was under the influence to a degree that impaired their ability to safely drive.

However, the jury convicted him of DUI under § 3802(d)(1), which prohibits driving with any amount of a Schedule I controlled substance (or metabolite) in the blood, regardless of actual impairment. They also convicted him of Homicide by Vehicle while DUI. The conviction under § 3802(d)(1) did not require actual impairment. He received a lengthy state prison sentence.

The Appeal

The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the Homicide by Vehicle while DUI conviction.

His argument was based on causation. To be convicted of Homicide by Vehicle while DUI, the Commonwealth must prove that the death was the "result of" the DUI violation. The defendant argued that because the jury acquitted him of the impairment charge (§ 3802(d)(2)), the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was actually impaired or that his intoxication caused the crash. He relied on Commonwealth v. Magliocco, arguing that an acquittal on a predicate offense should invalidate the greater offense.

The Superior Court's Decision

The Superior Court rejected the defendant’s arguments and affirmed the judgment of sentence.

1. Inconsistent Verdicts Are Permitted: The Court explained that inconsistent verdicts are generally allowed in Pennsylvania. The jury may have acquitted the defendant of the impairment DUI for reasons of leniency rather than a factual finding that he was sober. As long as the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 3802 (in this case, having drugs in his system), the statutory requirement for the Homicide by Vehicle while DUI charge was met. The acquittal on the (d)(2) charge did not negate the elements of the homicide charge as a matter of law.

2. Evidence of Causation Was Sufficient: Even without a conviction on the impairment count, the Court found sufficient evidence that the defendant’s drug use caused the death. The Commonwealth presented expert testimony that high doses of methamphetamine can cause aggressive, impulsive, and risky driving.

The Court distinguished this case from Commonwealth v. Lenhart, where a driver with a high BAC crashed but there was no evidence of how the accident happened. Here, there was ample evidence of reckless driving. Specifically, the "deadly race" to the merge point. The Court concluded the jury could infer that the drugs in the defendant’s system contributed to this aggressive behavior, thereby causing the crash.

3. Recklessness Established: The Court also upheld the separate conviction for Homicide by Vehicle (which requires recklessness but not necessarily DUI). The Court held that the defendant’s decision to race another car to a merge point while unlicensed, driving an unregistered bike, and carrying a passenger without a helmet showed a conscious disregard for the value of human life.

Conclusion

This case reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will often uphold serious felony convictions even when jury verdicts appear logically inconsistent. It also highlights the danger of per se DUI charges (based solely on the presence of drugs in the blood) serving as the basis for Homicide by Vehicle convictions, provided the Commonwealth can link the drug presence to the driving behavior.

It remains true, however, that evidence of a DUI and a death is not enough for a homicide by vehicle while DUI conviction. Instead, the Commonwealth must show that the DUI actually caused the death. Here, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence. And even though the homicide by vehicle while DUI statute requires a DUI conviction and the defendant was acquitted of the DUI section that requires impairment, the Court affirmed the conviction because he was still convicted of a DUI. The Superior Court simply found no requirement that the defendant be convicted of any particular subsection and refused to draw any factual inferences from the jury’s acquittal.

The inconsistent verdict rule is hard to reconcile with common sense, and it is often inconsistently applied as there are some cases where it has been rejected. But in most cases, the courts will disregard an inconsistency verdict and instead look only at evidentiary sufficiency.

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Zak Goldstein 1/15/26 Zak Goldstein 1/15/26

US Supreme Court Clarifies Standard for Warrantless Home Entries During Emergencies: Reasonable Basis, Not Probable Cause, is Required

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Supreme Court of the United States has issued a unanimous decision in Case v. Montana, settling a disagreement among lower courts about when police may enter a private home without a warrant to provide emergency assistance.

In an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court held that police do not need probable cause to enter a home to render emergency aid. Instead, officers only need an “objectively reasonable basis” for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened by such injury. This ruling reinforces the standard previously set in Brigham City v. Stuart and rejects the argument that the arguably higher “probable cause” standard used in criminal investigations should apply to emergency aid situations.

The Facts of the Case

The case arose from a domestic disturbance in Montana. The petitioner, William Case, allegedly called his ex-girlfriend and threatened to kill himself. During the call, she heard what sounded like a gun cocking, followed by a “pop” and then silence. She immediately called 911 and drove to his home.

The police drove to the home, as well. When police officers arrived, they knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window but received no response. Peering inside with flashlights, they saw an empty handgun holster and a notepad that appeared to contain a suicide note. Concerned that Case might have shot himself and was bleeding out, the officers decided to enter the home without a warrant to render emergency aid.

Upon entering a bedroom, Case emerged from a closet holding an object that looked like a gun. An officer, fearing for his safety, shot and injured Case. Case survived and was subsequently charged with assaulting a police officer. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the entry, arguing that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Legal Issue on Appeal: Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Basis

The Fourth Amendment generally protects the home from warrantless searches and seizures. However, there are exceptions, including the “emergency aid” exception.

The legal dispute in Case v. Montana centered on the standard of proof required for this exception. Case argued that because the home is constitutionally protected, officers should be required to have probable cause to believe an emergency exists. Probably cause is the same standard used for criminal warrants.

The Montana Supreme Court had upheld the entry but used a “community caretaker” doctrine that resembled a lower “reasonable suspicion” standard often used for street stops and car searches such as Terry frisks. The defendant appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, asking the Justices to impose the stricter probable cause requirement.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the application of the probable cause standard to emergency aid cases. Justice Kagan explained that the concept of “probable cause” is “peculiarly related to criminal investigations” and assesses the likelihood of finding evidence of a crime.

The Court held that transplanting criminal law standards into a non-investigatory, lifesaving context makes little sense. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the rule from Brigham City v. Stuart: officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened.

Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found the officers’ entry was lawful. The combination of the specific suicide threat, the “pop” heard over the phone, and the visual observation of the empty holster and suicide note gave officers a reasonable basis to believe Case needed immediate medical attention.

Key Takeaways

This decision provides clarity for both law enforcement and defense attorneys regarding the “emergency aid” exception:

Distinct from Criminal Investigation: The Court firmly separated emergency aid entries from criminal investigations. The higher “probable cause” standard does not apply when the primary purpose is saving lives, not gathering evidence.
Limited Scope of Entry: Importantly, the Court noted that this exception is not an open invitation to search. An emergency aid entry “provides no basis to search the premises beyond what is reasonably needed to deal with the emergency.” If police enter to check on a suicidal person, they cannot start rummaging through drawers for drugs unless those drawers are relevant to the emergency.
Community Caretaking Clarified: The Court criticized the lower court's reliance on the “community caretaker” doctrine, reiterating that broad community caretaking duties do not justify warrantless home entries on their own; there must be an actual exigency or emergency.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 1/14/26 Zak Goldstein 1/14/26

En Banc Pennsylvania Superior Court Clarifies That Probation May Run Concurrently with Incarceration

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has issued a significant en banc decision in the case of Commonwealth v. Jennings, resolving a recent conflict in Pennsylvania sentencing law. Overruling several recent panel decisions, the Court held that trial judges are in fact permitted to sentence defendants to terms of probation that run concurrently with terms of incarceration, including state prison sentences.

This decision restores the sentencing flexibility that defense attorneys and judges have long utilized and clarifies the plain language of the Sentencing Code.

The Facts of the Case

In Commonwealth v. Jennings, the defendant was convicted of attempted statutory sexual assault, unlawful contact with a minor, and related offenses after engaging in sexually explicit conversations with an undercover detective posing as a 14-year-old girl.

Due to prior convictions for rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) from 1989, the defendant faced mandatory minimum sentencing provisions which required the judge to impose a sentence of at least 25 to 50 years in prison. The trial court went well above that and ultimately sentenced him to an aggregate term of 50 to 100 years of incarceration. Relevant to this appeal, for the charge of criminal use of a communication facility (CUCF), the judge imposed a seven-year term of probation to run concurrently with the state prison sentence.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence was illegal. He relied on recent Superior Court decisions which had suggested that probation cannot be served while a defendant is incarcerated because probation is, by definition, a "less restrictive" alternative to jail meant for rehabilitation in the community and that it is not even possible to comply with the conditions of probation while in custody. For example, an inmate in a state prison cannot remain in the county of conviction or report to the county probation officer.

The Legal Issue: Can Probation and Prison Run Together?

The primary issue before the en banc panel was whether a sentencing court has the authority to order a term of probation to be served at the same time as a term of total confinement.

This question arose because of a string of recent unpublished panel opinions (such as Commonwealth v. Qawiee, Commonwealth v. Patel, and Commonwealth v. Bowers) which had vacated such sentences as illegal. Those panels reasoned that under cases like Commonwealth v. Allshouse and Commonwealth v. Basinger, probation was incompatible with incarceration.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court rejected the reasoning of those recent panels and affirmed the legality of concurrent probation. The Court based its decision on the plain text of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a), which outlines the sentencing alternatives available to a judge (such as probation, guilt without penalty, partial confinement, total confinement, and fines). The statute explicitly states that the court “may impose them consecutively or concurrently.”

The Court held:

Therefore, by its plain language, Section 9721(a) permits trial courts to impose concurrent terms of probation and total confinement. . . . To the extent that [prior cases] suggest that the Sentencing Code provides no authority for imposing probation concurrently with a term of total confinement, we disapprove of their rationales.

The Court explained that concurrent probation still serves a purpose. Even while incarcerated, a concurrent probationary tail can serve as a deterrent. If the defendant commits a new crime or misconduct in prison, that probation could theoretically be revoked. More importantly, the Court emphasized that statutory text supersedes policy arguments about whether concurrent supervision is “practical.” In other words, the policy justifications only come into play for an ambiguous statute, and here, the Court concluded that the statute was not ambiguous. A trial court may impose consecutive or concurrent probationary and prison sentence.

Secondary Issue: Notice for Mandatory Minimums

The defendant also challenged his mandatory minimum sentence on the grounds that the Commonwealth failed to include the triggering facts (his prior convictions) in the criminal information, which is the formal charging document in Pennsylvania.

The Superior Court rejected this argument, as well. Relying on Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent in Commonwealth v. Aponte, the Court held that prior convictions are a “sentencing factor,” not an element of the crime. Therefore, the Commonwealth is not required to list them in the criminal information. Providing reasonable notice of the intention to seek the mandatory minimum after conviction but before sentencing is sufficient to satisfy due process, although once a defendant has been convicted, it is too late for them to do anything about a mandatory minimum. A rule that requires notice prior to trial would be far better, but the appellate courts have not required that kind of notice.

Key Takeaways for Criminal Defendants

This decision is legally significant for several reasons:

Sentencing Flexibility: Judges often use concurrent probation as a way to close out a less serious count without adding a “tail” that keeps a defendant under state supervision for decades after their release. Jennings confirms this practice is legal.
Structuring Pleas: Defense attorneys can once again confidently negotiate plea deals that involve concurrent probation without fear that an appellate court will sua sponte vacate the sentence as illegal. Agreeing to a lengthy probationary sentence may in some cases result in less jail time for the defendant.
Mandatory Minimums: Unfortunately, the case serves as a reminder that the Commonwealth does not need to show its hand regarding mandatory minimums in the initial charging documents, provided they give notice before sentencing.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.