Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/21/24 Zak Goldstein 8/21/24

Attorney Goldstein Wins Sentencing Appeal in Corrupt Organizations Case

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won a sentencing appeal for a client in the case of Commonwealth v. S.G. In S.G., the defendant was convicted at trial in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas of corrupt organizations, conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations, washing vehicle titles, and related charges for an alleged car title washing scheme. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences on the corrupt organizations and conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations charges.

S.G. retained Attorney Goldstein for his appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Attorney Goldstein filed post-sentence motions and eventually an appeal. On appeal, Attorney Goldstein challenged whether the trial court could properly sentence S.G. to consecutive time on the conspiracy and corrupt organizations charges because S.G. had been convicted of the subsection of corrupt organizations that specifically requires participation in a conspiracy.

The corrupt organizations statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 911, provides:

(b) Prohibited activities.--
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such person participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise: Provided, however, That a purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issue held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity after such purchase, do not amount in the aggregate to 1% of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer: Provided, further, That if, in any proceeding involving an alleged investment in violation of this subsection, it is established that over half of the defendant's aggregate income for a period of two or more years immediately preceding such investment was derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that such investment included income derived from such pattern of racketeering activity.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.

S.G. was convicted of subsection 4, which specifically makes it illegal to conspire to violate any of the other provisions.

At the same time, the conspiracy statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, makes the following conduct illegal:

(a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

Here, the trial court sentenced S.G. to consecutive time on both conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations and corrupt organizations - conspiracy. Attorney Goldstein argued that such a sentence was illegal because the two offenses merged for sentencing purposes.

When do offenses merge for sentencing?

The Superior Court agreed with the defense’s merger argument on appeal. It recognized that under § 9765 of the sentencing code,

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765

The Superior Court’s Ruling

In order to impose consecutive sentences, a sentencing court must find either that each statute contains an element that the other does not or that there was more than one criminal act involved in the violations of the statutes. In this case, conspiracy and corrupt organizations - conspiracy involve the exact same elements. That is, they both require an agreement to violate sections 1 - 3 of the corrupt organizations statute. Further, the Commonwealth introduced no evidence that S.G. entered into more than one conspiracy. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes, making it illegal for the court to impose consecutive sentences.

The Superior Court remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing in the Court of Common Pleas. Attorney Goldstein represented S.G. at the new sentencing hearing and obtained a reduced sentence which made him immediately eligible for parole.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/22/24 Zak Goldstein 7/22/24

PA Supreme Court: Defendant May Appeal Adverse Ruling on Motion in Limine Even Where Defendant Preemptively Introduces Damaging Evidence

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Raheem Stevenson, holding that a defendant may still appeal a trial court’s pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction even if the defendant preemptively introduces the harmful evidence during direct examination.

The Facts of Stevenson

The defendant and his co-defendant were arrested for an alleged armed robbery that took place in 2017. During trial, the Commonwealth moved in limine to introduce evidence that the defendant had a prior 2005 conviction for burglary. The defense objected, but the trial court found that the evidence was properly admissible.

The trial court issued its ruling prior to trial as part of a hearing on a motion in limine. A motion in limine allows the parties to get a ruling from the trial judge on the admissibility of certain evidence prior to the trial or prior to the testimony itself so that neither party has to be surprised by the eventual ruling when the issue comes up during the trial. This lets the parties know what evidence they may mention during opening statements and potentially avoid triggering a mistrial by introducing evidence that should not come in.

In order to mitigate against the potential impact of this prior conviction, the defense attorney asked the defendant about it when he testified on direct examination. When damaging evidence is going to come in no matter what, it is often strategic for the affected party to introduce it themselves and avoid looking like they were attempting to hide it. It may also give the party the opportunity to explain the circumstances or provide more detail where helpful. Here, the trial attorney objected to the admission of the evidence in advance. But when the trial court ruled that it would be admissible, the attorney decided it would be strategic to have his client testify about it rather than waiting for the Commonwealth to bring it up in cross-examination.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The jury convicted the defendant, and the defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant raised the issue of whether the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of the prior burglary conviction. The Superior Court affirmed, but it did so because it found that the defense had waived the issue for appeal by introducing the evidence on direct examination. The Superior Court concluded that the defendant could not complain about evidence that he had introduced himself. The Superior Court relied primarily on the United States Supreme Court case of Ohler v. United States. There, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a defendant who introduces evidence preemptively cannot later claim it was admitted in error. That is still the rule in federal court.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision, concluding that the rule in Ohler should not apply under Pennsylvania law. Under Pennsylvania law, the defendant may still raise the issue on appeal even if the defendant preemptively introduced the bad evidence where there was clearly a hearing on a motion in limine, the prosecution clearly made a request, the defendant clearly objected, and the trial court made an unequivocal ruling in favor of the prosecution prior to trial. Where the trial court’s ruling is unambiguous and the defense has definitely objected to the prosecution’s request, the defense may preemptively introduce the harmful evidence without waiving the issue for appeal.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 103, a defendant preserves the right to appeal a ruling on evidence admissibility by making a motion in limine. The rule does not require the defendant to renew the objection during the trial once the court has made a definitive ruling.

The Court recognized that defense attorneys sometimes need to preemptively disclose potentially damaging evidence to mitigate its impact. This strategy is a legitimate trial tactic. Forcing defendants to forgo this tactic to preserve their right to appeal would be unfair and contrary to the principles of a fair trial.

The Court noted that while federal courts take a different approach under the Ohler case, many state Supreme Courts have rejected Ohler and adopted the reasoning of the dissent in that case. The dissent in Ohler argued that a defendant should not lose the right to appeal a ruling simply because they chose to introduce the evidence themselves after an adverse in limine ruling. The Court noted that Pennsylvania civil cases have upheld the right to appeal adverse rulings after preemptive disclosure. Thus, in federal court, a defendant must choose between trying to disarm the damaging evidence following an adverse ruling and preserving the issue for appeal, but in Pennsylvania state court, the defendant may preemptively introduce the evidence so long as the objection was clearly made in advance.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 4/24/24 Zak Goldstein 4/24/24

PA Superior Court: Defendant Making Hand into Shape of Gun and Pretending to Shoot Witness Is (Obviously) Direct Criminal Contempt

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Williams, holding that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas properly found the defendant guilty of direct criminal contempt for making his hand into the shape of a gun and pretending to shoot the witness against him during his preliminary hearing.

The Facts of Williams

The defendant was charged with burglary and related charges. When he was brought into courtroom for his preliminary hearing, he made his hand into the shape of a gun and made a shooting motion at the witness against him. The witness did not actually see it, but unfortunately for Williams, the judge did. The judge finished the hearing, held the charges against Williams for court, and then moved directly into a trial on a summary charge of direct criminal contempt for obstructing the proceedings.

The defendant agreed that his hand had been in that position, but he claimed that he had some sort of twitching disorder which caused it to happen involuntarily. He admitted he had not warned anyone that this could happen when he was brought into the courtroom, but he claimed that he did not realize he was going into a courtroom. Unsurprisingly, the trial court promptly rejected this testimony, found him guilty, and sentenced him to 30 – 60 days’ incarceration. The defendant had an extensive criminal record, which did not help his case or his claim that he did not know he was headed into the courtroom. The defendant appealed.

Direct criminal contempt includes misconduct in the court's presence that is committed with the intent to obstruct proceedings. The conduct may qualify as contemptuous even if it does not directly disrupt the court’s operation but only threatens the dignity and authority of the court. Here, the conduct arguably did both.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court quickly affirmed. It found substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s ruling and that the trial judge was best suited to determine whether or not the defendant’s somewhat silly explanation was credible. The trial judge had the right to reject that explanation, and it was not the Superior Court’s job to reweigh the evidence.

The Superior Court opined that misconduct need not cause a visible interruption to the proceedings or a delay in the proceedings in order to constitute an obstruction of justice. Of course, the mere act of threatening a witness may impede the fairness and integrity of the proceedings, and the trial judge properly rejected the defendant’s explanation. The Superior Court therefore upheld the conviction.

The Takeaway

This case is not particularly surprising. Threatening witnesses in court does not go over well with the judge and the DA, and it usually does not make the case better. It can lead to increases in bail, relatively minor contempt charges, jury instructions that the jury may hold the actions against the defendant in deciding guilt, and even serious felony witness intimidation charges. The system does not always seem fair to criminal defendants and other witnesses, and it often may not be. But threatening witnesses is usually not going to improve the situation, and the appellate courts are not likely to be sympathetic in these cases.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein 3/21/24 Zak Goldstein 3/21/24

PA Superior Court: Police Do Not Need a Search Warrant to Get Parolee’s GPS Monitoring Data

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Rosendary, holding that the police do not need a search warrant to get a parolee’s GPS monitoring data from parole agents so long as the parolee was already on GPS monitoring for reasons unrelated to the investigation of the new crime. In this case, the defendant’s GPS monitor put him at the scene of the crime, but the police had obtained that data without getting a search warrant for it. The Superior Court, however, rejected Rosendary’s arguments that the evidence should be suppressed, finding that police do not need a search warrant to get this type of data from parole agents and that the police did not use the parole agents as “stalking horses” for the police investigation.

The Facts of Rosendary

The defendant was on parole for a robbery conviction. As part of his parole, he was eventually placed on GPS monitoring. He signed a consent form agreeing to the monitoring. He did not have much of a choice, though, as the alternative to GPS monitoring would have been incarceration. The police subsequently arrested him and charged him with another robbery. At his trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence from his parole GPS ankle monitor which incriminated him by putting him at the crime scene.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the GPS data. He argued that the police should have obtained a search warrant in order to get the GPS information from his parole agent and that alternatively, the parole agent had worked as a “stalking horse” for the police in order to evade the warrant requirement. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Superior Court denied the appeal. First, it rejected the defendant’s argument that the police violated the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by getting the GPS data without a search warrant. Although the police ordinarily need a search warrant in order to get GPS location data for a suspect, the Court held that they did not need to get a search warrant in this case. Specifically, the defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in his GPS data because he was on parole, he had agreed to wear the monitor in lieu of incarceration, and he knew that the data would be shared with his parole agent. Thus, he had no reasonable expectation that the data would be kept private, and he had agreed to wear the ankle monitor. Therefore, law enforcement did not need a search warrant to get the data. Further, the parole agent had not shared unlimited data with the police. Instead, the parole agent had shared only the location data for where the defendant was at the time of his suspected involvement in the robbery. The Court found that this was not a significant intrusion into his privacy because the data shared was limited in time and scope.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s stalking horse challenge. Under the stalking horse doctrine, the police may not take advantage of a suspect’s status as a probationer or parolee to avoid the warrant requirement. In other words, the police may not ask probation or parole to conduct a warrantless search for the purpose of finding evidence related to a police investigation. Instead, the police should get a warrant. For example, if a defendant could show that the police had asked a probation officer to conduct a search of the defendant’s house to look for evidence because the police suspected the defendant of a crime, then that search could potentially violate the stalking horse doctrine and require suppression of the evidence. Here, however, the defendant introduced no evidence that the police had directed the search or directed parole to put the defendant on GPS monitoring. He was already on GPS monitoring, and the police simply requested the data from his parole agent. As he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data, the parole agent was free to share this information with the police.

The Takeaway

This result is not particularly surprising. It is usually not possible to suppress evidence that was shared with the public as suppression requires a reasonable expectation of privacy. A probationer or parolee who is subject to GPS monitoring has no real reason to believe that the evidence would be kept private, so courts are generally not going to suppress it.

As a general rule, it’s best not to commit new crimes while wearing a probation or parole GPS tracking device. The evidence will likely be admissible in court, and the police will not be required to get a search warrant for the evidence. There is still the possibility of challenging the collection of this type of evidence should the defendant be able to show that probation or parole improperly conducted a search at the request of the police and that the police may not have otherwise had the authority to conduct such a search, but that type of violation is often difficult to prove.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case? We can help.

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.