PA Superior Court: Home Improvement Fraud Does Not Require a Signed Contract

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that a contractor can be convicted of home improvement fraud even when the contractor and homeowner never signed a written contract. In Commonwealth v. Sims, decided November 3, 2026, the Court ruled that an oral agreement can satisfy the contract requirement under Pennsylvania’s Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act. The Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, seven years of probation with electronic monitoring for the first year, and $13,000 in restitution.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Sims

In the fall of 2022, the defendant met with two Berks County homeowners about improvements to their pool area, hot tub, gazebo, and retaining wall. Sims visited the property approximately a dozen times and provided a written proposal estimating the project at $25,000. The proposal did not contain original signatures, and the parties did not sign another contract.

The parties expected the initial work to take about two weeks. They planned to finish the pool work in the spring while the homeowners investigated whether the original pool installer would contribute to the repairs. In November 2022, the homeowners paid the defendant $13,000 toward the project.

The defendant and an employee installed a cement slab for the pool filter and started the retaining wall. The defendant did not finish the wall or complete the other promised improvements. The defendant repeatedly scheduled work and then offered explanations for failing to perform it. He blamed problems with his employee and agreed to return at least some of the money, but he never made a refund. He also failed to provide receipts accounting for the advance payment.

By July 2023, the homeowners were still seeking repayment. They eventually contacted the police. After a bench trial, the trial court convicted the defendant of home improvement fraud. the defendant appealed, arguing that the Commonwealth could not prove the offense without a written contract meeting the Act’s requirements.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court rejected that argument. The defendant was convicted under 73 P.S. § 517.8(a)(2), which addresses contractors who accept advance payments and then fail to provide the agreed services or materials when required and fail to return payment for what they did not provide. The statute accounts for circumstances extending the deadline, including certain events beyond the parties’ control, unforeseen labor strikes, and extensions agreed to by the homeowner.

The Commonwealth must also prove that the defendant acted with intent to defraud or injure someone, or knew that he was facilitating fraud or injury. A homeowner’s dissatisfaction with a project does not eliminate that requirement.

The defendant relied on a separate provision, Section 517.7(a), which requires a written, signed contract containing specified information before a contractor can enforce a home improvement contract against a homeowner. He argued that the Commonwealth likewise needed a written contract to obtain a criminal conviction.

The Court explained that the legislature included the writing requirement in the provision governing enforcement against homeowners. The legislature did not include the same requirement in the criminal provision. Other parts of the home improvement fraud statute expressly address both written and oral agreements. Reading those provisions together, the Court concluded that the Commonwealth could establish the necessary agreement without a signed document.

The Court also rejected the argument that the rule requiring courts to resolve serious uncertainty in a criminal statute in the defendant’s favor required a different result. Although the term contract could initially refer to either an agreement or a written document, the Court found that the surrounding statutory provisions resolved that ambiguity.

The Commonwealth proved an agreement in this case through the proposal, the payment, the text messages, and the defendant’s decision to begin the work. Those facts supported the trial court’s finding that the parties agreed on the work, price, and timing. The Superior Court also relied on the substantially unfinished project, repeated missed commitments, missing receipts, and unfulfilled refund promise. The defendant’s limited performance did not require an acquittal.

The Takeaway

The defendant makes it harder for a contractor to defeat a home improvement fraud charge solely because the parties never signed a contract. The Commonwealth still must prove the actual agreement, the failure to perform and refund payment as the statute requires, and the defendant’s fraudulent intent or knowledge. Defense counsel should examine the promised work and deadlines, any agreed extensions, the work actually performed, material purchases, payments, and communications about delays or refunds. A contractor may have defenses based on those facts even when the absence of a signature will not resolve the case. Prosecutors must prove the required mental state beyond a reasonable doubt; they cannot obtain a conviction simply by showing that a customer paid for an unfinished job.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder.

We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

PA Supreme Court: A Lie on a Benefits Application Is Not Theft Unless It Changed the Benefits

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided Commonwealth v. Gaspard, holding that the Commonwealth cannot convict a public benefits recipient of theft by deception just by proving that she left a source of income off her paperwork. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(b), a falsehood counts as deception only if it has pecuniary significance. In a benefits case, that means the Commonwealth must prove that the missing information would have made the defendant ineligible or reduced the amount she received. Because the prosecution never tried to prove that, the Court reversed the Superior Court and vacated the defendant’s judgment of sentence. The Court also overruled Commonwealth v. Volk, 444 A.2d 1182 (Pa. Super. 1982), a Superior Court decision that prosecutors had relied on for the opposite rule.

The Facts of Gaspard

The defendant received Section 8 housing benefits through the Monroe County Housing Authority from March 2017 until July 2021. In 2021, she asked to move to a new unit. When her caseworker called her, the call went to a voicemail greeting for the defendant’s soap-making business. The caseworker reviewed the file and found that the defendant had not listed the business as employment, income, or an asset on her 2016 application or on any of her annual recertifications. She had signed a form promising to report all changes in income and assets.

The Housing Authority terminated her benefits and referred the case to law enforcement, and the Commonwealth charged her with theft by deception and false swearing. At trial, the defendant testified that the business never made a profit because all of her sales went to expenses. The prosecution never tried to show what effect the business would have had on her eligibility. The caseworker agreed that a person who reported self-employment income might still be eligible for benefits, and she admitted that the Housing Authority never determined that the defendant was ineligible. In closing, the prosecutor told the jury that “[t]his case isn’t about income, it’s about disclosure.”

The jury convicted her of both counts, and the trial court imposed two years of probation and $10,000 in restitution by stipulation. The Superior Court affirmed, reasoning that her silence prevented the Housing Authority from acquiring information that might have affected her eligibility. Commonwealth v. Gaspard, 323 A.3d 1276 (Pa. Super. 2024).

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Commonwealth must prove that the benefits would have been different if the defendant had reported the income. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Donohue held that it must.

The theft by deception statute excludes from the definition of deception any “falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(b). The Court read that phrase to mean a falsehood with monetary consequences for the specific parties and transaction involved. It relied on Commonwealth v. Gallo, 373 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 1977), where the defendant falsely called himself an “account executive,” but the victim testified that he would have signed the contract anyway. Because the lie made no difference to the deal, it lacked pecuniary significance. As the Court put it, “proving a lie and receipt of property alone does not suffice to establish theft by deception.”

Applying that rule, the Court held that when the property is an income-based public benefit, the Commonwealth must show that the recipient’s failure to list a source of income “impacted her eligibility for public benefits such that it caused the payor to award money that the recipient was not entitled to receive.” The Commonwealth did not present any evidence that the defendant’s business income or assets would have made her ineligible or reduced her subsidy, and its caseworker admitted that the Housing Authority never made that determination. The Court pointed out that under the Commonwealth’s theory, the defendant would be guilty even if her business had no income or assets at all.

The Court also overruled Volk, where the Superior Court had upheld the convictions of public assistance recipients who failed to report newly acquired assets without asking whether those assets affected their eligibility. The Court explained that the reasoning in Volk might support a false swearing conviction, but not a theft conviction. Finally, the Court faulted the Superior Court for relying on the idea that the defendant prevented the Housing Authority from acquiring information. That theory belongs to subsection (a)(2) of the statute, and the Commonwealth charged her only under subsection (a)(1).

The Court vacated the theft conviction and remanded for resentencing on the false swearing conviction, which the defendant did not challenge.

Why Gaspard Matters

Prosecutors frequently charge benefits recipients with theft by deception on the theory that an unreported job, business, or bank account is enough. Gaspard rejects that theory. In an income-based benefits case, the Commonwealth now has to present evidence that the truth would have cost the defendant benefits, which usually means a witness who actually runs the eligibility numbers. Defense attorneys should hold the Commonwealth to that proof at the preliminary hearing and at trial and move for judgment of acquittal when the prosecution skips it. Outside the benefits context, the rule is the same: the lie must have mattered to the deal. A false statement that made no financial difference may support a false swearing charge, which is a misdemeanor, but it does not make the defendant a thief.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

PA Superior Court: Possession of a Stolen Truck Alone Does Not Establish a Prima Facie Case of Receiving Stolen Property

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 2026 PA Super 171 (Pa. Super. Aug. 3, 2026), holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of receiving stolen property against a tow truck driver whom police stopped while he was towing a stolen truck for his employer. The Commonwealth proved that the truck was stolen and that the defendant had it. It did not produce any evidence that he knew or had reason to know it was stolen. Because possession alone does not establish guilty knowledge, the Superior Court affirmed the order granting the defendant’s habeas corpus motion and quashing the charge.

What happened in Commonwealth v. Alvarez?

On October 19, 2024, the owner of a red Volvo truck reported it stolen. About two weeks later, a state trooper pulled the defendant over in Monroe County while he was towing the truck. The defendant, who spoke only broken English, called his employer, who ran a towing business in New Jersey and had sent him to tow the truck. With the defendant within earshot, the employer told the trooper that a property owner had asked him to remove the truck because it had been sitting there for years. Speaking through an interpreter, the defendant then told the troopers that the employer had given him a different story: that the employer had bought the truck and the defendant was delivering it to a buyer in Hazleton. He admitted that the employer’s explanation to the trooper was not truthful. As the Superior Court pointed out, he only knew that because he had just overheard the employer contradict himself.

The Commonwealth charged the defendant with receiving stolen property and two summary traffic offenses. He moved for habeas corpus on the receiving stolen property count. At the hearing, the defense called the employer, who testified that he had bought the truck from a third party a few weeks earlier, produced a bill of sale but not the title, and said that the defendant had nothing to do with the purchase. The trial court granted the motion and quashed the charge. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

To establish a prima facie case, the Commonwealth must produce evidence of each element of the offense and probable cause to believe the defendant committed it. Receiving stolen property requires proof that the property was stolen, that the defendant possessed it, and that he knew or had reason to know it was stolen. The Commonwealth may prove guilty knowledge circumstantially, but it may not prove it solely from the fact that the defendant possessed stolen property. 

The Commonwealth argued that the defendant’s admission that the employer had given him a false story showed guilty knowledge. The Superior Court disagreed. The defendant learned that the employer had told two different stories only during the traffic stop, when he overheard the phone call. The Commonwealth did not present any evidence that he knew before the stop that the truck was stolen or that the employer had fed him a false story, and it did not refute the employer’s testimony that the defendant had nothing to do with the purchase. That left possession as the only evidence of knowledge, which is not enough. The Court affirmed.

President Judge Emeritus Stevens concurred to note that the Commonwealth apparently never charged the employer, even though the employer claimed to have bought the truck, could not produce a title, arranged its sale, sent the defendant to move it, and gave the police and the defendant conflicting stories. As he put it, “Appellee was charged, [the employer] was not.”

The Takeaway

The prima facie standard is low, but the Commonwealth still has to put on some evidence of every element. In a receiving stolen property case, that means some evidence of guilty knowledge beyond the fact that the defendant had the property. Tow truck drivers, delivery drivers, and employees who move property for someone else often have no way to know where it came from, and where the Commonwealth cannot show more than possession, a habeas corpus motion should succeed. The defense can also present witnesses at the habeas hearing, as it did here, and where the Commonwealth does not rebut that testimony, the court may consider it.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Supreme Court Recognizes a “Miscarriage of Justice” Limit on Appeal Waivers

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

On June 18, 2026, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s promise not to appeal his sentence cannot be enforced when enforcing it would produce a miscarriage of justice, meaning an error so egregious that it would bring the judicial system into disrepute. Justice Kagan wrote for eight members of the Court in Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. ___ (2026). Justice Thomas dissented.

The ruling settles a question that had divided the federal courts of appeals for years, and it clarifies when a knowing and voluntary appeal waiver, a standard feature of most federal plea agreements, must give way.

Background

Federal prosecutors charged Munson Hunter III with ten counts of bank and wire fraud arising from a years-long scheme that cost financial institutions about half a million dollars. Hunter signed a written plea agreement. He pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud, and in exchange, the government dismissed the other nine counts and agreed not to prosecute him for the conduct they described.

The agreement included an appeal waiver. Hunter gave up the right to appeal both his conviction and his sentence, reserving only the right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. It also stated that any modification of its terms had to be in writing and signed by all parties. The district court accepted the plea as knowing and voluntary.

At sentencing, the Probation Office recommended that Hunter, as a condition of supervised release, “take all mental-health medications that are prescribed by [his] treating physician.” Hunter objected, telling the court he did not want to be “forced to medicate.” The court imposed the condition anyway and sentenced Hunter to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. As the hearing closed, the judge told Hunter, “You have a right to appeal.” When the court asked whether counsel had anything to add, the defense answered, “Nothing from the defense,” and the prosecutor said, “Your Honor, I believe—well, no. I—no.”

Hunter appealed the medication condition, arguing that it infringed a due process liberty interest in refusing unwanted mental-health medication. The government moved to dismiss based on the appeal waiver. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal. Under its precedent, an appeal waiver gives way in only two situations: when ineffective assistance of counsel tainted the waiver, and when the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Neither applied.

The Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court first rejected Hunter’s argument that the sentencing hearing itself had undone his waiver. The judge’s misstatement about a right to appeal did not modify the plea agreement, which required any change to be in writing and signed by both sides, and nothing at the hearing reflected the mutual agreement a modification requires. The government’s silence did not surrender its right to enforce the waiver either. The proper time to assert that right, the Court explained, comes after a defendant files a notice of appeal, not at sentencing. The Court noted that it had reached a parallel result in Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018).

The Court then reached the central question: whether the government’s right to enforce an appeal waiver has limits. It held that it does. Courts are not bystanders to these waivers. A district court must accept a plea agreement before an appeal waiver takes effect, and a court of appeals decides whether the waiver will be enforced at all. Because enforcement can lock an unlawful sentence into place, the Court reasoned, the standard for enforcing waivers implicates the integrity of the judiciary, not only the interests of the parties. Relying on Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), and United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995), the Court concluded that enforcing every waiver automatically would risk institutional harm.

The Court adopted the standard that most federal circuits already apply: an appeal waiver is unenforceable when enforcing it would result in a miscarriage of justice. It emphasized that this sets a high bar. The error must be obvious, not one a judge could reasonably make, and of a kind that would undermine public confidence in the courts. Ordinary mistakes in applying sentencing law do not qualify.

The Court offered three illustrations of errors that could clear that bar. A sentence exceeding the statutory maximum qualifies. So does a sentence infected with a blatant constitutional error, such as reliance on an impermissible factor like race or an unconstitutional condition of supervised release. And so does a sentence imposed without some minimum of civilized procedure. The Court described these as examples rather than an exhaustive list.

The Court did not decide whether the medication condition in Hunter’s case met the standard. Describing itself as “a court of review, not of first view,” it vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and sent the case back for that court to apply the new standard.

The Concurrences and the Dissent

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, concurred. He traced the rise of plea bargaining and appeal waivers and raised, for a future case, whether a defendant can knowingly waive the right to appeal a sentence he cannot yet foresee. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Alito and Barrett, wrote separately to stress that the exception reaches only extreme cases, and to register his disagreement with what he read as a broader approach in Justice Gorsuch’s opinion. Justice Barrett added that the decision rests on established waiver principles rather than any supervisory power over the lower courts.

Justice Thomas dissented. He argued that the Court identified no source of law for its new exception. The right to appeal a sentence is a statutory right of relatively modern origin, he wrote, and a defendant who waives it in a valid plea agreement should be held to that bargain.

The Takeaway

Hunter confirms that a signed appeal waiver is not absolute, though the Court designed the exception to be narrow. For defendants in Pennsylvania and elsewhere in the Third Circuit, the decision largely ratifies existing practice, because the Third Circuit has applied a miscarriage-of-justice limit since United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001). The remaining questions return to the courts of appeals, which will decide, case by case, which sentencing errors are serious enough to overcome a waiver.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, serving a state or federal sentence, or considering a direct appeal, post-conviction petition, or federal habeas petition, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and we have won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.