PA Superior Court: Defendant May Be Ordered to Remove Non-Prescription Glasses During Trial

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth. v. Ellis, holding that the trial court did not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by ordering him to remove his non-prescription glasses during trial. The Court found that the trial court’s order did not require the defendant to testify or give evidence against himself. The Superior Court also found sufficient evidence to affirm the conviction for murder.

The Facts of Ellis

In Ellis, the defendant was charged with attempting to rob a gas station in York, Pennsylvania. Prosecutors alleged that he shot and killed the gas station attendant during the attempted robbery. The shooting was captured by the gas station’s surveillance cameras, but the footage was too blurry to clearly identify the defendant from his face. Two ex-girlfriends, however, testified that they recognized the person on the camera footage as the defendant based on his distinctive coat, sneakers, and build. He also got rid of the clothes and the murder weapon by throwing those items in the river, he shaved his facial hair, and he attempted to wear non-prescription glasses at trial. The jury could not reach a verdict at the first trial, so the trial resulted in a mistrial. Prosecutors retried the defendant, and he was convicted.

During the second trial, the defendant attempted to wear non-prescription glasses. The trial court ordered him to remove the glasses so the jurors could better see his face, and the defense objected. The defense argued that requiring him to remove the glasses was the same as requiring him to testify against himself or give evidence against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The trial court overruled the objection and required him to remove his glasses. The jury ultimately convicted, and the defendant appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court affirmed the conviction. First, with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court concluded that the combination of surveillance footage, witness testimony, and Ellis’s own actions in getting rid of his clothes and gun after the murder established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue, the court found that the removal of the glasses did not constitute testimonial evidence and thus did not violate his rights. The Court reasoned that that physical or demonstrative evidence, such as appearance alterations, did not fall under the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination. The defendant was not required to testify or say anything to incriminate himself; he was only required to show the jury his face without fake glasses on it. The Court found that this action was not protected by the Fifth Amendment.

The Takeaway

This case is not particularly controversial, but it does show the impact that getting rid of evidence or a defendant attempting to change their appearance can have at trial. Getting rid of clothing and a weapon made the defendant look particularly guilty, and insisting on wearing fake glasses likely did not help his case, either. In these types of cases, the Commonwealth can actually seek a jury instruction under which the trial judge will instruct the jury that the destruction of evidence or decision to change one’s appearance can be considered as evidence of guilt against the defendant. Further, the Fifth Amendment generally only protects a defendant from having to speak with the police or testify; it does not allow a defendant to shield their appearance from the view of the jurors.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.  

PA Superior Court: Police Do Not Need a Search Warrant to Get Parolee’s GPS Monitoring Data

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Rosendary, holding that the police do not need a search warrant to get a parolee’s GPS monitoring data from parole agents so long as the parolee was already on GPS monitoring for reasons unrelated to the investigation of the new crime. In this case, the defendant’s GPS monitor put him at the scene of the crime, but the police had obtained that data without getting a search warrant for it. The Superior Court, however, rejected Rosendary’s arguments that the evidence should be suppressed, finding that police do not need a search warrant to get this type of data from parole agents and that the police did not use the parole agents as “stalking horses” for the police investigation.  

The Facts of Rosendary

The defendant was on parole for a robbery conviction. As part of his parole, he was eventually placed on GPS monitoring. He signed a consent form agreeing to the monitoring. He did not have much of a choice, though, as the alternative to GPS monitoring would have been incarceration. The police subsequently arrested him and charged him with another robbery. At his trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence from his parole GPS ankle monitor which incriminated him by putting him at the crime scene.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the GPS data. He argued that the police should have obtained a search warrant in order to get the GPS information from his parole agent and that alternatively, the parole agent had worked as a “stalking horse” for the police in order to evade the warrant requirement. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Superior Court denied the appeal. First, it rejected the defendant’s argument that the police violated the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by getting the GPS data without a search warrant. Although the police ordinarily need a search warrant in order to get GPS location data for a suspect, the Court held that they did not need to get a search warrant in this case. Specifically, the defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in his GPS data because he was on parole, he had agreed to wear the monitor in lieu of incarceration, and he knew that the data would be shared with his parole agent. Thus, he had no reasonable expectation that the data would be kept private, and he had agreed to wear the ankle monitor. Therefore, law enforcement did not need a search warrant to get the data. Further, the parole agent had not shared unlimited data with the police. Instead, the parole agent had shared only the location data for where the defendant was at the time of his suspected involvement in the robbery. The Court found that this was not a significant intrusion into his privacy because the data shared was limited in time and scope.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s stalking horse challenge. Under the stalking horse doctrine, the police may not take advantage of a suspect’s status as a probationer or parolee to avoid the warrant requirement. In other words, the police may not ask probation or parole to conduct a warrantless search for the purpose of finding evidence related to a police investigation. Instead, the police should get a warrant. For example, if a defendant could show that the police had asked a probation officer to conduct a search of the defendant’s house to look for evidence because the police suspected the defendant of a crime, then that search could potentially violate the stalking horse doctrine and require suppression of the evidence. Here, however, the defendant introduced no evidence that the police had directed the search or directed parole to put the defendant on GPS monitoring. He was already on GPS monitoring, and the police simply requested the data from his parole agent. As he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data, the parole agent was free to share this information with the police.

The Takeaway

This result is not particularly surprising. It is usually not possible to suppress evidence that was shared with the public as suppression requires a reasonable expectation of privacy. A probationer or parolee who is subject to GPS monitoring has no real reason to believe that the evidence would be kept private, so courts are generally not going to suppress it.

As a general rule, it’s best not to commit new crimes while wearing a probation or parole GPS tracking device. The evidence will likely be admissible in court, and the police will not be required to get a search warrant for the evidence. There is still the possibility of challenging the collection of this type of evidence should the defendant be able to show that probation or parole improperly conducted a search at the request of the police and that the police may not have otherwise had the authority to conduct such a search, but that type of violation is often difficult to prove.   

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case? We can help.

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.  

PA Superior Court: Lawyer Ineffective in Failing to Move for Severance of Unrelated Cases

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Hamilton, finding the defendant’s trial attorney provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the Commonwealth’s motion to join the defendant’s two unrelated cases into one trial. The defense attorney should have moved to sever the charges. Had he done so, severance would have been granted, and the defendant would have been more likely to win. Therefore, the Superior Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial.  

The Facts of Hamilton

Three men named Cutshall, Barger, and Heasley conspired to rob the defendant for a debt he owed to Heasley. They lured the defendant into a car under the guise of giving him a ride to purchase marijuana in another town. The defendant sat as the rear-passenger on the driver’s side. Cutshall sat next to him while Barger drove the car with Heasley in the front passenger seat. The driver pulled the car over so he and the front passenger could go to the bathroom.

The driver and front seat passenger returned to the car. Cutshall then pulled out a BB gun and robbed the defendant. The incident took place at night, so the BB gun looked to be a real gun to the defendant. The defendant complied and handed over his cellphone, wallet, and a small drawstring bag which contained a small amount of marijuana. Cutshall, the backseat passenger, ordered the defendant to get out of the vehicle.

Unbeknownst to the three robbers, the defendant had a real handgun in his waistband. Coincidentally, the defendant had stolen the handgun from an unlocked pickup truck the day before. When he got out of the car, the defendant asked the driver if he knew about the robbery plan and the driver acknowledged he did. The defendant then held open the rear door and fired five shots into Cutshall, the man who robbed him, fatally wounding him in the neck. The defendant then went to the rear of the car and fired more rounds into the car striking Healy, the front seat passenger, once in the shoulder.

The defendant then fled into the woods but later met up with the two remaining men after the driver moved the car to a parking lot of a chiropractic center. By the time the four of them met up, Cutshall, the rear passenger, had died. The defendant stayed in the area even though he knew Heasley had called 911. The Pennsylvania State Police found the four of them in the parking lot.

The Criminal Charges

The Commonwealth charged the defendant under two separate dockets for crimes related to the shooting and for the theft of the handgun from the pickup truck. The Friday before the defendant’s shooting trial, during jury selection, the Commonwealth filed a motion to join the shooting docket and the gun theft docket into one trial, arguing the joinder would not prejudice the defendant, it would promote judicial economy, and it would eliminate the need for separate trials. The defendant’s lawyer did not object.

The trial court therefore granted the motion without objection. The trial lasted for four days. The prosecution called 16 witnesses during the trial, and only two of them testified about the theft. The Commonwealth, however, emphasized the theft heavily in its opening statement. Specifically, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the defendant as a thief and used the term “stole” or “stolen” 15 times before calling any witnesses. The Commonwealth did not dispute that the defendant was the victim of the robbery plot by Cutshall and the others.

The jury found the defendant not guilty of murder and possession with intent to deliver. The jury found him guilty of two counts each of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, theft by receiving stolen property, and criminal conspiracy. It also convicted on one count each of aggravated assault, criminal attempt, firearms not to be carried without a license, theft from a motor vehicle, criminal conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking, possession of a small amount of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia.

The trial judge sentenced the defendant to an aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration followed by 37 months of reporting probation. The defendant appealed to the Superior Court, challenging the jury instructions and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The Superior Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review, so the defendant filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition.

The PCRA Petition

In the PCRA petition, the defendant argued that he should receive a new trial because his trial attorney provided the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) not contesting the Commonwealth’s joinder motion; (2) not objecting to instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the trial prosecutor’s opening remarks; (3) not objecting to the jury verdict sheet; (4) not objecting to the charging of multiple counts of theft by receiving stolen property; and (5) not objecting to the charging of multiple counts of conspiracy in the gun theft case. The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant’s trial counsel testified.

Trial counsel testified that he did not object to the Commonwealth’s joinder motion because he believed evidence for the theft case would come in anyway and that the motion would pass the judicial test for joinder. He further testified that he believed if he objected the Commonwealth would delay the homicide trial and try the theft case first. He claimed that joinder was prudent because the jury would hear justification as a defense for theft, which they would not if the theft case were tried alone. Finally, regarding the joinder motion, defendant’s trial counsel testified that he believed the judge would let evidence for the theft come in under the res gestae exception in that it would be relevant in telling the full story of the homicide.

The PCRA court granted the petition with respect to the failure to object to the multiple counts of conspiracy because the multiple conspiracy counts were duplicative, but it denied the rest of the petition. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Superior Court and again raised the joinder issue.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court ultimately ruled in the defendant’s favor. It noted that in order to prevail under the PCRA, a defendant must show three things. First, a petitioner must show that the claim is of arguable merit. Second, the petitioner must show that no reasonably strategic basis existed to support the attorney’s action or omission. Third, the petitioner must show that the attorney’s error caused prejudice, meaning there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the attorney handled things properly.

The defendant argued that trial counsel’s failure to object to joinder had merit because the theft of the revolver was wholly immaterial for the jury’s consideration of whether he shot Cutshall with criminal intent or whether he concealed the firearm illegally. Therefore, it would have been inadmissible as a prior bad act. He further argued that trial counsel’s above reasons for not objecting were unreasonable - the motion would not have been granted had he objected, and the introduction of the evidence caused him a great deal of prejudice. Finally, he argued that he was prejudiced when the cases were tried together because it enabled the Commonwealth to vilify him in the eyes of the jury as a thieving criminal. This made the jury less likely to view him as the victim of a serious crime.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed. It ruled that the evidence that the gun was stolen had nothing to do with the facts of the shooting. The only issue was whether the defendant acted in self-defense, and whether or not the gun was stolen really had no bearing on that. It also found that the defendant suffered prejudice from the failure to object. The prosecution was able to paint him as a thief rather than as a victim, thereby making it more likely that he would get convicted. Finally, the trial attorney had no reasonably strategic basis for failing to object. The lawyer was incorrect about the evidence of the stolen gun being admissible at the homicide trial, and the other reasons were not supported by the law. Specifically, the justification defense would not have applied to the gun charge either way. Therefore, trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the defendant will receive a new trial.

This is a good opinion for the defense from the Superior Court. Prosecutors are often eager to consolidate cases that should not be consolidated - it allows the Commonwealth to paint the defendant as a bad person who committed more than one crime, which makes it more likely that the defendant will get convicted by a judge or jury. It also makes it harder to defend the case, and it saves the prosecution the resources of having to try two cases. Judges do not always apply as much scrutiny to these motions as they should given the amount of prejudice that inherently comes from having two separate cases tried together. Therefore, this case should provide some limits on the ability on the Commonwealth to smear a defendant with totally unrelated criminal conduct, particularly in a murder prosecution. 

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in PA? We can help.

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

PA Supreme Court: Commonwealth's Suppression of Key Witness's Mental Health Records Requires New Trial

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Conforti, affirming the PCRA court’s decision to vacate the defendant’s convictions for murder, rape, and related charges. The Court affirmed the reversal of the defendant’s death sentence because the defendant was able to show in PCRA proceedings that the Commonwealth hid psychological records for the witness which could have been used to impeach the witness at the time of trial.

The Facts of Conforti

In 1990, Kathleen Harbison and and her friend, Sue Fritz, were drinking at Cousins Restaurant and Bar in Wayne County, Pennsylvania. Harbison was seen in the company of the defendant, Michael Conforti, and James Bellman. Harbison left the bar to warm up her car in the early morning hours while Fritz said goodbye to friends. Fritz left the bar a few minutes later. She found Harbison’s car in the parking lot with the engine running, the driver door locked, the passenger door unlocked, the heater running, the radio on high volume, and Harbison’s purse on the back seat. Harbison was nowhere to be found. Before Fritz came outside, someone saw Bellman in his car, which was parked next to Harbison’s car.

A few days later, Harbison’s body was found in a secluded wooded area of Wayne County. Harbison had been stabbed twelve times, and four of the wounds were lethal. The cause of death was multiple stab wounds. There was evidence that Harbison had been bound by the wrists and ankles by handcuffs and that the acts were committed by more than one person.

The defendant and Bellman were arrested and charged with murder and other offenses related to Harbison’s death. Bellman gave a statement admitting to his involvement while the defendant offered no statement. The two were tried at the same time in the Wayne County Courthouse in two separate trials. Then-Wayne County District Attorney (and future judge) Wayne Hamill prosecuted Bellman, and then-Assistant District Attorney Mark Zimmer prosecuted the defendant. After testimony closed in Bellman’s trial but before closing arguments, Bellman, District Attorney Hamill, and Bellman’s lawyer had a meeting in a conference room in the back of the courtroom. After the meeting, Bellman informed District Attorney Hamill that he would testify for the Commonwealth in the defendant’s then ongoing trial.

Bellman testified that on the night of the murder, he and Harbison left the bar in Wayne County and went to the defendant’s house in Pike County. He claimed the defendant forced Harbison to engage in oral sex after telling Bellman to handcuff her. Harbison was then forced into Bellman’s car and driven to a secluded dirt road in Wayne County. Bellman claimed he and the defendant pulled her from the car and then the defendant repeatedly stabbed her with a knife the defendant brought from his trailer before they left.

Bellman continued, that after the killing, he and the defendant stopped at Ledgedale Bridge where the defendant threw the knife and handcuffs into the water. They then burned the blood-stained clothing and car mats from Bellman’s car in the defendant’s burn barrel and cleaned and vacuumed the defendant’s trailer and Bellman’s car. Bellman identified the recovered knife as the murder weapon.

Bellman claimed he decided to testify due to his sympathy for the victim’s family. He claimed that he did not have a plea agreement with the Commonwealth and would not receive anything for his testimony. The day after Bellman’s testimony, the prosecutor and defense attorney stipulated to the following:

The Commonwealth and Defense have stipulated that after Bellman had informed the District Attorney that he wished to testify at this trial -- that is to say the trial of [defendant] -- the District Attorney told him that if he did so and pled guilty to first degree murder in his own trial, the District Attorney would not seek the death penalty.

Mr. Hamill, the District Attorney, further told James Bellman that if he did not plead guilty, he would receive no consideration for his testimony against [defendant].

At the time Mr. Bellman testified in this trial here yesterday, he had not made up his mind which of these options he wished to take.

Since that time, he has pled guilty to first degree murder and he has been sentenced to life in prison.

The defendant took the stand in his own defense, contradicting Bellman’s testimony, and denying any involvement in the murder. The jury convicted the defendant of murder, and the court sentenced him to death. The trial court denied all post-sentence motions, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction and judgement of sentence on direct appeal.

 The Defendant’s Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition

The defendant filed a timely pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). The Office of the Attorney General represented the Commonwealth. Multiple hearings were held between October 2018 and November 2021.

Immediately before the PCRA hearing on November 5, 2021, the Commonwealth, represented by the Office of the Attorney General, provided the defendant’s counsel with two of Bellman’s mental health reports from 1980. The reports were created when Bellman was represented by Hamill while Hamill was in private practice. Hamill requested Bellman be evaluated by mental health experts. The reports, based on these evaluations, showed that Bellman was diagnosed as a sociopath by both evaluating doctors.

At the hearing on the petition, the parties entered a stipulation providing that the Office of the Attorney General was provided the file for Commonwealth v. Conforti which was maintained by the Wayne County District Attorney’s Office. The file had been in the possession of the Office of the Attorney General since that time. Counsel further stipulated that the mental health reports were contained in the Wayne County District Attorney’s file in a folder labeled “Misc. Police Reports,” and counsel for the Commonwealth from the Office of the Attorney General was unaware of its presence prior to its discovery and disclosure.

The PCRA judge granted the defendant’s petition, vacating his conviction and sentence on multiple grounds due to Constitutional violations for failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence that may have affected the outcome of the trial. The PCRA court based its decision in Brady v. Maryland, finding that the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose the exculpatory mental health reports.

The PCRA Court Opinion

The PCRA court made a number of factual determinations in support of the grant of a new trial. First, it concluded that Bellman was negotiating with the Commonwealth for weeks prior to his testimony and that the negotiations were for Bellman to testify against the defendant in order to strengthen a weak, circumstantial case against the defendant. Accordingly, under Brady v. Maryland, this information should have been disclosed prior to trial because Brady requires that any material showing that a Commonwealth witness was looking for favorable treatment or otherwise was motivated to curry favor with the prosecution be disclosed.

Second, the PCRA court addressed the defendant’s claim that the failure to disclose the mental health records also constituted a Brady violation. The court determined that the Commonwealth had possession of Bellman’s mental health reports since 1980 and that the reports remained in the possession of the Commonwealth since that time. The court found that none of the evidence of Bellman’s mental health issues was disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial.

The court emphasized this determination by explaining, had this information been provided to defendant’s counsel prior to trial, defendant’s attorney could have called the authors to tell the jury what they determined to be Bellman’s mental health issues. The court highlighted excerpts of the report stating Bellman had no empathy for others, was selfish, narcissistic, and felt no guilt.

The PCRA court determined the information contained in the reports would have been devastating to Bellman’s credibility at trial. It highlighted the fact that Bellman was the Commonwealth’s key witness, the defendant maintained his innocence, and the rest of the evidence against the defendant was circumstantial.

The court relied heavily on the Third Circuit’s decision in Dennis v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, which held that Brady material does not have to be evidence that would have resulted in an acquittal, but rather must only be evidence that would undermine confidence in the jury verdict.

The PCRA court further rejected the Commonwealth’s position claiming that counsel for the defendant could have obtained Bellman’s mental health information from sources other than the Commonwealth. The court found that Dennis held that a defendant is entitled to presume that prosecutors will disclose information they are required to disclose. The court ultimately found that Hamill knew about the reports and was obligated to turn them over to the defendant prior to trial. The court therefore granted the defendant a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed. First, the Court addressed the mental health reports. It recognized that in Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even if there has been no request by the accused, and that the duty may encompass impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution’s Brady obligation extends to exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the same government bringing the prosecution.

A Brady violation occurs when:

1.     The evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it could be used for impeachment purposes;

2.     the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution either willfully or inadvertently; and

3.     prejudice ensued, meaning the disclosure of the evidence could have resulted in a different outcome.

First, the Court addressed the Commonwealth’s argument that the defendant waived any claim of a Brady violation by not raising the claim sooner. The Supreme Court agreed with the PCRA court, finding the defendant raised the Brady violation as soon as possible as the defendant did not have the psychiatric reports until they were disclosed in November of 2021. The defendant filed a PCRA petition within one year as required.

The Court continued its analysis by accepting the factual determination that the Commonwealth had the reports in its possession in 1980 and they were located in the case file, yet the Commonwealth failed to disclose them to defendant’s counsel.

The Commonwealth also argued that it did not have to disclose the reports because the reports were not material. The Commonwealth argued there was no reasonable probability that had the reports been disclosed, the result of the defendant’s trial would have been different. The Commonwealth claimed the reports would never have made it to the jury, and even if they had, they did not establish that the defendant did not participate in the murder.

The Commonwealth further argued the reports could not have been used to impeach Bellman’s credibility because only mental health disabilities that impair a witness’s ability to observe, recall, or report events are admissible to impeach credibility.

The defendant responded: “Bellman’s status as a sociopath, including his compulsion to blame others for his actions, his attempts to deceive evaluators, and his inability to feel guilt, made his testimony against defendant unreliable as it impacted his ‘ability to perceive events and to truthfully relate the facts to which he testified at trial.” The defendant further asserted the reports show Bellman to be a sophisticated actor capable of committing the crime on his own and that the reports would have been extremely damaging to Bellman’s testimony.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the defendant’s analysis, determining the reports could have been used to impeach Bellman due to his status as a sociopath. The Court explained his compulsion to blame others for his actions, attempts to deceive the evaluators, and his inability to feel guilt made his testimony unreliable. Ultimately the Court determined the reports qualified as impeachment evidence that was favorable to the defendant. They were therefore Brady material that the Commonwealth was required to turn over so defense counsel could present Bellman’s mental health issues to the jury and the jury could evaluate whether those issues impacted his credibility.

Finally, the Court addressed the prejudice component of the Brady violation. The Court agreed with the PCRA court’s determination that Bellman was the Commonwealth’s key witness. It noted that without Bellman’s testimony, the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial. Bellman’s testimony directly connected the defendant to the murder and even alleged that it was the defendant’s idea to murder the victim. The Court further pointed out that Bellman’s credibility was crucial to the case because the defendant testified in his own defense, directly contradicting Bellman. The reports regarding Bellman’s mental health status would have called his credibility into question. The Court determined that if those reports were properly disclosed, there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different.

The Takeaway

This case does not really change the law in Pennsylvania, but it shows that the courts often take Brady violations seriously. The prosecution has a duty to produce exculpatory evidence. If it does not, then the defendant may obtain a new trial, sometimes even decades later. The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office currently has an open file policy for old homicide cases and will allow a defense attorney to review the prosecutor’s file as well as the detectives’ homicide file. In many cases, there may be exculpatory evidence which was never disclosed to the defense. If the evidence is compelling enough, it may be the basis for filing a new PCRA and getting back into court. This case is an example of that type of evidence.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.