Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 1/15/26 Zak Goldstein 1/15/26

US Supreme Court Clarifies Standard for Warrantless Home Entries During Emergencies: Reasonable Basis, Not Probable Cause, is Required

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Supreme Court of the United States has issued a unanimous decision in Case v. Montana, settling a disagreement among lower courts about when police may enter a private home without a warrant to provide emergency assistance.

In an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court held that police do not need probable cause to enter a home to render emergency aid. Instead, officers only need an “objectively reasonable basis” for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened by such injury. This ruling reinforces the standard previously set in Brigham City v. Stuart and rejects the argument that the arguably higher “probable cause” standard used in criminal investigations should apply to emergency aid situations.

The Facts of the Case

The case arose from a domestic disturbance in Montana. The petitioner, William Case, allegedly called his ex-girlfriend and threatened to kill himself. During the call, she heard what sounded like a gun cocking, followed by a “pop” and then silence. She immediately called 911 and drove to his home.

The police drove to the home, as well. When police officers arrived, they knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window but received no response. Peering inside with flashlights, they saw an empty handgun holster and a notepad that appeared to contain a suicide note. Concerned that Case might have shot himself and was bleeding out, the officers decided to enter the home without a warrant to render emergency aid.

Upon entering a bedroom, Case emerged from a closet holding an object that looked like a gun. An officer, fearing for his safety, shot and injured Case. Case survived and was subsequently charged with assaulting a police officer. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the entry, arguing that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Legal Issue on Appeal: Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Basis

The Fourth Amendment generally protects the home from warrantless searches and seizures. However, there are exceptions, including the “emergency aid” exception.

The legal dispute in Case v. Montana centered on the standard of proof required for this exception. Case argued that because the home is constitutionally protected, officers should be required to have probable cause to believe an emergency exists. Probably cause is the same standard used for criminal warrants.

The Montana Supreme Court had upheld the entry but used a “community caretaker” doctrine that resembled a lower “reasonable suspicion” standard often used for street stops and car searches such as Terry frisks. The defendant appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, asking the Justices to impose the stricter probable cause requirement.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the application of the probable cause standard to emergency aid cases. Justice Kagan explained that the concept of “probable cause” is “peculiarly related to criminal investigations” and assesses the likelihood of finding evidence of a crime.

The Court held that transplanting criminal law standards into a non-investigatory, lifesaving context makes little sense. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the rule from Brigham City v. Stuart: officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened.

Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found the officers’ entry was lawful. The combination of the specific suicide threat, the “pop” heard over the phone, and the visual observation of the empty holster and suicide note gave officers a reasonable basis to believe Case needed immediate medical attention.

Key Takeaways

This decision provides clarity for both law enforcement and defense attorneys regarding the “emergency aid” exception:

Distinct from Criminal Investigation: The Court firmly separated emergency aid entries from criminal investigations. The higher “probable cause” standard does not apply when the primary purpose is saving lives, not gathering evidence.
Limited Scope of Entry: Importantly, the Court noted that this exception is not an open invitation to search. An emergency aid entry “provides no basis to search the premises beyond what is reasonably needed to deal with the emergency.” If police enter to check on a suicidal person, they cannot start rummaging through drawers for drugs unless those drawers are relevant to the emergency.
Community Caretaking Clarified: The Court criticized the lower court's reliance on the “community caretaker” doctrine, reiterating that broad community caretaking duties do not justify warrantless home entries on their own; there must be an actual exigency or emergency.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 11/7/25 Zak Goldstein 11/7/25

Attorney Goldstein Wins Federal Suppression Motion in Electronic Contraband Case

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, of Goldstein Mehta LLC recently secured a major victory in federal court when a judge granted his motion to suppress all evidence in a serious federal criminal case. The ruling, issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, resulted in the exclusion of every item seized by investigators and effectively ended the government’s case.

The client had been charged in federal court with offenses involving the alleged possession and production of unlawful digital material. The prosecution’s entire case depended on evidence taken from a series of search warrants that allowed agents to seize and examine the client’s computers, phones, and other electronic devices.

Attorney Goldstein challenged the legality of those searches in a “four corners” motion, arguing that the warrants were unconstitutional because they were not supported by probable cause. In particular, he demonstrated that the affidavits failed to draw any meaningful connection between the conduct being investigated and the belief that illegal material would be found on the client’s electronic devices. Instead, the government relied on a boilerplate assumption that people accused of sexual misconduct are likely to possess such material on their electronics. Attorney Goldstein argued that this “profile-based” reasoning violated long-standing Third Circuit precedent, which requires a clear factual nexus between the alleged crime and the evidence sought.

The federal judge agreed, ruling that the affidavits were too speculative to support probable cause and that the warrants were so deficient that the “good faith” exception did not apply. The court found that no reasonable officer could have believed that the affidavits established a sufficient basis to search the client’s home and devices. Because the subsequent search warrants were based on evidence obtained from the initial unconstitutional searches, all of the evidence in the case was suppressed.

This outcome is a tremendous win and a relatively rare event in federal criminal litigation. Federal suppression motions are extremely difficult to win. Courts often defer to the government’s investigative process, and they routinely apply a good faith exception where, as here, investigators obtain a search warrant even if the warrant itself turns out to be lacking. Attorney Goldstein’s success demonstrates the value of a deep understanding of constitutional law and the willingness to challenge law enforcement overreach through careful, methodical, and aggressive litigation.

Facing federal criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client, and we frequently spot issues and defenses that other lawyers miss. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/21/20 Zak Goldstein 6/21/20

PA Superior Court: Car Stop in High Crime Area at Night Not Enough to Justify Search of Defendant's Vehicle

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Arrington, holding that the police cannot search a person or car for weapons solely because they stopped that person at night in a high-crime area. Instead, there has to be something about the person’s behavior more than the timing and location of the search that would justify such an intrusion on someone’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Commonwealth v. Arrington

On October 25, 2016, Pittsburgh Police officers were on patrol in the Homewood neighborhood of Pittsburgh. At around 2:00 AM, the officers observed the defendant’s vehicle driving towards them in their lane of travel. The defendant’s vehicle remained in the incorrect lane of travel for several seconds before returning to the correct side of the road. The officers suspected that the defendant was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and conducted a traffic stop.

When the officers approached the defendant’s vehicle, they witnessed the defendant exhibit several signs of intoxication. The defendant did provide the officers with his driver’s license. However, because of his alleged intoxication, the officers asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle. The defendant did not immediately respond, so the officers physically removed the defendant from the vehicle, conducted a pat down search of him, and placed him in handcuffs. Once the defendant was detained, the officers ran the defendant’s name through the National Crime Information Center (hereinafter “NCIC”). This NCIC search revealed that the defendant had a revoked concealed-carry permit.

The officers then asked if the defendant if he was in possession of any weapons to which the defendant replied he was not. The officers subsequently searched the defendant’s car, without a search warrant, and found a handgun in the backseat. The handgun’s serial number was run through NCIC, and it came back that the weapon had been reported stolen. Police arrested the defendant. The officers then searched the vehicle again as well as the defendant. Upon searching the vehicle, the officers discovered 81 bags of heroin, U.S. currency, a digital scale, and four cell phones. After searching the defendant, they discovered additional U.S. currency and another bag of heroin.

Prosecutors filed various charges for firearms and drug trafficking offenses. Specifically, they charged the defendant with firearms not to be carried without a license (VUFA 6106), possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a controlled substance, possession with the intent to deliver, and various traffic offenses. Notably, the defendant was not charged with DUI.

Prior to his trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that the search of his vehicle was illegal. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant then elected to proceed by way of a non-jury trial where the court found him guilty of the previously mentioned offenses. He received fifteen months of probation. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

Are the Police Allowed to Search My Vehicle for Weapons?

The police are only allowed to search your vehicle for weapons during a car stop (also known as a protective sweep) if they have reasonable articulable suspicion that you are armed and dangerous. To conduct this search, the officer must reasonably believe that his safety or the safety of others is threatened. If the search is found to be unreasonable, the judicial remedy is to exclude all evidence that derived from this illegal search.

In making this determination, the court will look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer’s actions were legally justified. Some of the factors that courts will consider are: whether the stop occurred at night; whether the defendant appeared to conceal something; whether the defendant was nervous during the interaction; whether the area the stop occurred is considered a high crime area; whether weapons are in plain view; and other factors that the trial court may deem appropriate.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision and held that the contraband and weapons found in the defendant’s car should have been suppressed. In making its decision, the Superior Court held that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the officers reasonably believed that the defendant was armed and dangerous. Although the stop did occur at night, the defendant did not make any furtive movements nor did he display any nervousness. Further, the defendant provided the officers his driver’s license and no weapons were visible when he was initially stopped. According to the Superior Court, the only factors that supported reasonable suspicion was that the stop occurred at night and in a high-crime neighborhood. Therefore, because the defendant “posed no threat to the officers’ safety” the Superior Court reversed the trial court and ordered that the contraband seized from his car should have been suppressed. As such, the defendant’s conviction will be vacated, and he will get a new trial.

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Criminal Defense Lawyers in Philadelphia

Zak Goldstein 4/7/20 Zak Goldstein 4/7/20

US Supreme Court: Police Have Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Car Where Owner Has Revoked Driver’s License

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Kansas v. Glover, holding that a Kansas deputy sheriff had reasonable suspicion to pull over a car after running the car’s license plate and learning that the registered owner had a revoked driver’s license. This is an absolutely disastrous decision for privacy and civil rights as it almost goes without saying that the mere fact that the car is registered to a particular owner tells the police absolutely nothing about whether or not the owner is actually driving the car or whether the driver of the car has a valid driver’s license. This decision continues a trend of anti-fourth amendment rulings from the United States Supreme Court in the context of automobile stops.

The Facts of Glover

Glover had an unusual set of facts in that instead of actually calling live witnesses for a motion to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated to a certain set of facts. In this case, the defendant was charged with driving as a habitual violator under a Kansas traffic law. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the stop of his car. At the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated to the following facts:

Deputy Mark Mehrer is a certified law enforcement officer employed by the Douglas County Kansas Sheriff’s Office.
On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mehrer was on routine patrol in Douglas County when he observed a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ.
Deputy Mehrer ran Kansas plate 295ATJ through the Kansas Department of Revenue’s file service. The registration came back to a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck.
Kansas Department of Revenue files indicated the truck was registered to Charles Glover Jr. The files also indicated that Mr. Glover had a revoked driver’s license in the State of Kansas.
Deputy Mehrer assumed the registered owner of the truck was also the driver, Charles Glover Jr.
Deputy Mehrer did not observe any traffic infractions, and did not attempt to identify the driver [of] the truck. Based solely on the information that the registered owner of the truck was revoked, Deputy Mehrer initiated a traffic stop.
The driver of the truck was identified as the defendant, Charles Glover Jr.

Obviously, this is not the normal way that a motion to suppress is litigated. Normally, the Commonwealth or Government would be held to the burden of proving that a stop occurred in a constitutional manner. In order to do so, the Government would have to call live witnesses to testify as to what happened, and the credibility and observations of those witnesses would be subject to attack on cross-examination. Here, the parties agreed to the above stipulations, leaving only the narrow legal issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car where the registered owner’s license was suspended and where the officer had not seen anything to suggest that the driver was not in fact the owner.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court reversed again, finding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion without taking any steps to determine who the actual driver was before pulling over the car.

The United States Supreme Court’s Decision

The United States Supreme Court accepted the appeal and reversed again, finding that the sheriff had reasonable suspicion to stop the car despite the fact that the sheriff based his decision solely on the fact that the driver’s license of the registered owner was listed as revoked. The sheriff had obtained no other evidence, did not know who was actually driving the car, and had seen no other traffic violations. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that it was reasonable for the sheriff to assume that Glover was driving the car and make the stop.

This is a terrible decision. Reasonable suspicion typically requires an individualized, reasonable belief based on all of the facts and circumstances that some sort of criminal activity is afoot. Here, the sheriff clearly did not have that because he had not seen who was driving the car and any number of people could have borrowed Glover’s car. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled against the defendant.

Despite this ruling, there are still ways to litigate a motion to suppress in Philadelphia, PA based on similar facts. First, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that reasonable suspicion would not have existed had the officer observed that someone else was driving the car or that the person driving the car could not have been Grover based on age, race, or other physical characteristics. Second, the concurrence noted that reasonable suspicion existed in this case in part due to the nature of the Kansas statute which led to Glover’s license revocation. Glover’s license had been revoked due to repeated violations of Kansas’s traffic laws, which may give rise to an inference that he is the type of person who is likely to continue driving despite having a suspended license. Had the license been revoked solely for one traffic infraction, reasonable suspicion may not have existed. This inference also could have been challenged through the user of statistics regarding the likelihood of driving with this type of suspended license in that jurisdiction. Finally, Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Constitution provide greater privacy protections than the United States Constitution. Therefore, a criminal defense attorney in Pennsylvania should make sure to bring a motion to suppress under both the federal and state constitutions as a Pennsylvania appellate court could (and previously has) find that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not allow this type of stop.

The ultimate mistake here by the criminal defense lawyer was likely not conducting any cross-examination of the sheriff. Had the defense lawyer litigated a normal motion to suppress, he or she may have been able to establish that the sheriff knew or should have known that it was not Glover driving the car or that the officer had credibility issues which would have provided an alternative basis for granting the motion to suppress. Nonetheless, this is a very bad decision for privacy and Fourth Amendment rights.

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