Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/5/26 Zak Goldstein 8/5/26

PA Supreme Court: Commonwealth Must Prove the Warrant Was Valid to Convict a Defendant of Resisting Arrest Where the Warrant Was the Only Basis for the Arrest

Zak Goldstein Criminal Defense Lawyer — Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided Commonwealth v. Steadly, 62 EAP 2024 (Pa. July 21, 2026), holding that when police arrest a defendant based solely on a warrant, the Commonwealth must produce evidence at trial that the warrant was actually valid in order to prove the lawful arrest element of resisting arrest. Testimony that a warrant appeared in a police database and that a dispatcher confirmed it over the radio is not enough. Because the Commonwealth never produced the warrants or any evidence of their validity, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and vacated his sentence.

**What Happened in Commonwealth v. Steadly?**

On an evening in August 2021, a Philadelphia police officer stopped the defendant for driving with an illegally tinted windshield. The defendant could not produce his license, registration, or proof of insurance, but he identified himself verbally. The officer returned to his cruiser, ran that information through the Mobile Data Terminal in his patrol car, and saw two bench warrants in the defendant’s name. A police dispatcher then confirmed over the radio that the warrants were active. Bench warrants typically issue when a person fails to appear in court. The officer admitted at trial that he had no idea what the warrants were for and that the warrants were the only reason he decided to arrest the defendant.

When the officer ordered the defendant to turn off the car and get out, the defendant refused. The officer opened the door and tried to remove him, and a struggle followed. The defendant dislodged the officer’s body camera and elbowed him in the face, although the officer testified that he was not hurt. Several officers needed one to two minutes to subdue him. The Commonwealth charged the defendant with recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”) and resisting arrest under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.

At a bench trial in Philadelphia Municipal Court, the trial judge sustained a best evidence objection to the officer’s testimony about what the database said, allowing that testimony only to explain why the officer decided to make the arrest. The Commonwealth never introduced the warrants themselves, any records from the database, or any other evidence that the warrants were valid. The court acquitted Steadly of REAP but convicted him of resisting arrest and sentenced him to six months of probation. The Court of Common Pleas denied his petition for writ of certiorari, and the Superior Court affirmed. In the Superior Court’s view, the officer had probable cause to believe that warrants existed, and that belief alone made the arrest lawful for purposes of the resisting arrest statute.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed in a majority opinion by Justice Donohue. Resisting arrest is unusual among criminal statutes because the legislature made a lawful arrest an element of the offense. A defendant cannot be convicted of resisting arrest unless the underlying arrest was lawful. Commonwealth v. Biagini, 655 A.2d 492, 497 (Pa. 1995). The Commonwealth therefore must prove the lawfulness of the arrest beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, just like every other element of a criminal offense.

An arrest based solely on a warrant is lawful only if the warrant is valid. Under the collective knowledge doctrine, an officer in the field may rely on a database entry, a bulletin, or a radio call in deciding to make an arrest. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). But that reliance does not insulate the arrest from review in court. If the underlying warrant turns out to be invalid, the arrest was unlawful no matter how reasonably the officer acted. The Court held that when an arrest is justified solely on the basis of a warrant, “the Commonwealth must produce evidence of the validity of the warrant beyond an officer’s second-hand knowledge of its existence to prove the arrest was lawful.” It explained that “[p]roof that a warrant exists, by virtue of its appearance in a police database, is never sufficient evidence of its validity under any standard of proof.” A database entry may reflect a warrant that already expired, was previously served, or was issued without probable cause in the first place.

The Court rejected the Superior Court’s line of cases holding that an officer’s probable cause to believe a warrant exists is enough, and it expressly disapproved Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc), on that point. Under the Superior Court’s approach, an arrest could qualify as lawful even if no warrant existed at all, so long as the officer reasonably believed one did. The Supreme Court called that standard constitutionally untenable. It observed that the approach effectively imported the federal good faith exception into Pennsylvania law, even though the Court rejected that exception under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). Because the Commonwealth produced no evidence of the warrants’ validity, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law, and the Court reversed the conviction outright. Justice Mundy dissented.

The Takeaway

Steadly matters because warrant arrests happen every day, and police databases are not always right. Warrants can linger in the system long after they have been served, recalled, or satisfied. Going forward, when the Commonwealth prosecutes someone for resisting arrest and the only basis for the arrest was a warrant, it must come forward with real evidence that the warrant was valid. Testimony that an officer saw the warrant in a database or heard about it from a dispatcher will not sustain a conviction. The Court did not spell out exactly what proof will suffice in future cases. It held only that the Commonwealth must present some evidence of the warrant’s validity so that the court or jury can decide whether the arrest was lawful. Defense attorneys should hold the Commonwealth to that burden and challenge the sufficiency of the evidence when the proof falls short.

One caution: Steadly does not give anyone a license to fight the police. The Court repeated the rule that a dispute about the lawfulness of an arrest “is an issue to be resolved in a courtroom, not on a street corner.” Biagini, 655 A.2d at 497. A person who commits new crimes while resisting, such as assaulting an officer, may still be prosecuted for those crimes even if the arrest itself was unlawful. The better course is always to comply and then fight the case in court, where decisions like Steadly give the defense real tools to win.

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Zak Goldstein 6/16/21 Zak Goldstein 6/16/21

United States Supreme Court Limits Reach of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Van Buren v. United States, holding that a person does not violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) by accessing information on a computer or network to which the person has lawful access even if they access the information for improper reasons. This is a huge win for everyday individuals because had this case been decided differently, potentially millions of people could have been subjected to criminal liability for violating their employers’ policies. As such, this decision acts as a check on the government from prosecuting behavior that is not inherently criminal.

Van Buren v. United States

The defendant, a former police sergeant, worked for a Georgia police department. The defendant and his fellow officers were warned about a certain individual in town. This individual was known to police as “very volatile” and officers were told to be careful when around him. Despite these warnings, the defendant formed a personal relationship with him. Eventually, the defendant asked the individual for a personal loan. Unbeknownst to the defendant, this individual recorded his conversation with him and then took it to the local sheriff’s office where he complained that the defendant tried to “shake him down for money.” Eventually, the FBI obtained this taped conversation.

The FBI then decided to run a sting operation on the defendant. They concocted a scheme where the defendant would run a license plate for the individual in exchange for $5,000. The defendant then used the state law enforcement computer database to search for this license plate. This would have violated his police department’s policy. After obtaining the FBI-created license-plate entry, the defendant then reached out to the individual. After he made this contact, the defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with a felony violation of the CFAA which subjects an individual to criminal liability to anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access.” The defendant proceeded by jury trial where he was found guilty of the aforementioned charge and sentenced to 18 months in prison. The defendant then filed a timely appeal with the Eleventh Circuit.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, he argued that the CFAA’s clause that states “exceeds authorized access” applies only to those who obtain information to which their computer access does not extend, not to those who misuse access that they already have. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s argument. The Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant violated the CFAA by accessing the law enforcement database for an “inappropriate reason.” Undeterred, the defendant filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed to hear his case.

What is the CFAA?

The CFAA subjects individuals to criminal liability to anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access” and then subsequently obtains information based on this improper access. The statute defines the term “exceeds authorized access” to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” The CFAA applies to all information from all computers that connect to the Internet. In addition to criminal penalties, the statute also allows persons who suffered damages to sue the perpetrators for monetary relief.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision

The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant did not violate the CFAA. In making its decision, the Supreme Court first reviewed the plain language of the statute. The Court focused on the clause “exceeds authorized access” because that was the most relevant text in the defendant’s case. The Supreme Court held that an individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization, but then obtains information located in a particular area of a computer that is off-limits to him. In other words, an individual only violates the CFAA when he accesses information that he was not entitled to obtain. An individual does not violate the CFAA if he accesses information, that he is otherwise entitled to access, but does so in violation of a company policy. The Government had argued for a much more expansive view of the statue. However, the Court rejected this interpretation because it would have allowed the government to prosecute individuals when they violated workplace policies. Consequently, the defendant’s conviction is reversed and his sentence is vacated.

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Zak Goldstein 4/2/21 Zak Goldstein 4/2/21

PA Supreme Court: Nanny Cams Do Not Violate the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mason, holding that “nanny cams” do not violate the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act (“Wiretap Act”). This decision is significant because so many parents utilize these cameras when they employ caretakers to watch their children. Therefore, these caretakers should be mindful of this and understand that they will not be able to rely on the stringent protections of the Wiretap Act to protect them if they are subsequently prosecuted for crimes arising out of secret recordings made while they are working.

Commonwealth v. Mason

The defendant was hired as a nanny for a parent who lived in Franklin County, PA. During the hiring process, the parent told the defendant that she could not use corporal punishment on her children. Approximately one month after the defendant was hired, the parent’s three-year-old son told him that the defendant was “thumbing” him in the face and hitting his twin two-year-old sisters. The parent had previously noticed that his son had marks on his face and that one of the twins had a “busted lip.” When asked about his daughter’s injured lip, the defendant initially offered no explanation. However, the defendant later suggested that she may have injured herself while attempting to climb out of her playpen. The parent also asked why his son accused the defendant of “thumbing” him and striking the twins, and the defendant stated she did not know why such allegations were being made.

In response to these allegations, the parent placed a secret camera in his children’s bedroom which was capable of capturing sound and video of its surroundings. Notably, the parent did not tell the defendant that he placed the camera in the bedrooms. At some point, the camera recorded the defendant yelling at one of the children before she forcefully placed the child in their crib. Audio portions of the recording suggested that the defendant may have struck the child several times. The parent then gave the recordings to the police.

The defendant was subsequently charged with aggravated assault, simple assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. The defendant filed a habeas corpus petition to dismiss the aggravated assault charge, which was granted. She then filed an omnibus pretrial motion to suppress the audio and video recordings captured by the hidden cameras. In support of her motion, the defendant invoked the Wiretap Act, arguing that the parent had illegally intercepted her electronic and oral communications. A hearing was held to determine whether to grant the defendant’s motion. At the hearing, the parent was the sole witness called who testified to the above facts. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The Commonwealth then filed a timely interlocutory appeal arguing that the trial court’s decision would substantially handicap its case.

The Superior Court’s Opinion

A divided Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s suppression order. The lead opinion held that the verbal utterances captured by the cameras were to be excluded because there had been no judicial authorization or applicable exception to the Wiretap Act to permit their use at trial. Further, the lead opinion held that the defendant had no reason to believe her statements would be recorded and thus had a “justified expectation that she would not be audio recorded.” The Superior Court did reverse the trial court and held that the video, sans audio, could be used by the Commonwealth in its trial. The Commonwealth then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hear the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to take the case, and on appeal it addressed two issues: whether a babysitter has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bedroom of a child she is caring for and whether the sounds coming from a child constitute oral communications under the Wiretap Statute.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and held that the Commonwealth could use the recordings (both audio and visual) against the defendant at her trial. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in order to succeed in her claim that these recordings should be deemed inadmissible at her trial, the defendant would have had to establish that she possessed a justifiable expectation that her oral communications would not have been intercepted. Based on its review of the record, the Court determined that the defendant did not meet her burden. Specifically, the Court held that the use of these cameras is so widespread that they even have a name (nanny cams) and thus no reasonable nanny should assume that they are not being recorded while performing their duties. As such, the Commonwealth will be able to use these recordings in their trial against the defendant.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

Zak Goldstein 1/25/21 Zak Goldstein 1/25/21

Third Circuit Court of Appeals Rejects Entrapment Defense in United States v. Davis

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the case of United States v. Davis, holding that a defendant failed to prove that he had been entrapped when he willingly engaged with an agent, posing as a child, to meet and engage in sexual activity. Further, the Third Circuit held that an agent can be tenacious in their conversations with a defendant without entrapping them. Although this defendant did not win on appeal, the case does explain the basics of the entrapment defense in federal court. It also highlights the fact that entrapment can be a very difficult defense to prove in cases involving sex crimes.

United States v. Davis

The defendant answered an ad in the “w4m” section of Craiglist.com. This section is for women who are supposedly looking for casual sex with men. The ad was titled “Wild child” which was run, unbeknownst to the defendant, by an agent with the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office. The ad stated that the poster was an eighteen-year-old woman and requested that interested men respond “if you are looking for fun.” The defendant responded to the post. The agent identified himself as “Marissa” and stated that she was actually fourteen years old, to which the defendant stated “that’s ok, I know how to be respectful, do you wanna meet today?”

The defendant and “Marissa” eventually began text messaging one another. During the eight days that they texted, the defendant told “Marissa” that he was gay and lied about his age. Additionally, he avoided engaging in lewd conversation and expressed a fear of getting caught. He must have sensed that “Marissa” might not have genuine intentions because he asked if she was “affiliated with any type of law enforcement.” However, despite this concern, the defendant still engaged in grooming behavior with “Marissa.” He specifically asked her about her virginity, asked when she as not being supervised, and repeatedly offered to buy her gifts, including an iPad.

Eventually, the defendant and “Marissa” agreed that she would skip school and meet him at a McDonalds near her house in Pennsylvania. Once they came up with a plan to meet, their conversation became sexual. “Marissa” explained that she was concerned about getting pregnant to which the defendant assured her that he would “bring protection.” On the day they were supposed to meet, the defendant traveled from New York to the McDonalds where they were supposed to meet. He was subsequently arrested by the agent posing as “Marissa.”

During questioning, the defendant admitted that he knew “Marissa” was fourteen and that he had brought condoms for his visit with her. The defendant further admitted that he became attracted to young girls after visiting a water park and that he specifically liked 14-year-old girls because he believed prostitutes were unclean. The defendant would later testify at trial that he never made those statements to the agent.

The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged in federal court with one count of use of an interstate facility to attempt to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity and one count of travel in interstate commerce with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor. The defendant elected to proceed by jury trial. At trial, he argued that he was entrapped to commit the crime and that he did not knowingly entice a minor because he believed “Marissa” was an adult who was role-playing as a fourteen-year-old. The jury was not swayed and convicted the defendant of the aforementioned charges. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to 127 months imprisonment and five years of supervised released. He was also required to register as a sex offender. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. For purposes of this blog, only the issue of entrapment will be discussed.

What is Entrapment?

Entrapment is an affirmative defense to a crime. It occurs when a defendant, who was not predisposed to commit a crime, does so as a result of the government’s inducement. To be successful in raising an entrapment defense, a defendant must establish two things: that there was government inducement of the crime and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct. If a defendant makes this prima facie showing of these two elements, the burden then shifts to the government to disprove the entire defense by disproving one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Usually, the government will try to show that the defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime. The government can prove predisposition by showing one of the following: an existing course of criminal conduct similar to the crime for which the defendant is charged, an already formed design on the part of the accused to commit the crime for which he is charged, or a willingness to commit the crime for which he is charged as evidenced by the accused’s ready response to the inducement.

The Third Circuit’s Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence The defendant argued that he had been entrapped to commit these crimes because he lacked a predisposition to commit them. Specifically, he argued that that because he attempted to avoid sexual conversation with “Marissa,” his lack of criminal history, and the agent’s tenacity in the sting operation, the government induced him to break the law. The Third Circuit saw things differently. In its opinion, the Third Circuit found that the defendant did in fact have a willingness to commit these crimes. Specifically, the Third Circuit found compelling the defendant’s statements that he was attracted to young girls despite his denial of them at trial. Further, the Third Circuit also found that the defendant immediately asked “Marissa” to meet after she told him she was fourteen was significant to show that that he intended to commit these crimes. The Third Circuit rejected all of his other arguments on appeal. His convictions will stand, and he will not get a new trial.

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Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta