Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 11/7/25 Zak Goldstein 11/7/25

Attorney Goldstein Wins Federal Suppression Motion in Electronic Contraband Case

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, of Goldstein Mehta LLC recently secured a major victory in federal court when a judge granted his motion to suppress all evidence in a serious federal criminal case. The ruling, issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, resulted in the exclusion of every item seized by investigators and effectively ended the government’s case.

The client had been charged in federal court with offenses involving the alleged possession and production of unlawful digital material. The prosecution’s entire case depended on evidence taken from a series of search warrants that allowed agents to seize and examine the client’s computers, phones, and other electronic devices.

Attorney Goldstein challenged the legality of those searches in a “four corners” motion, arguing that the warrants were unconstitutional because they were not supported by probable cause. In particular, he demonstrated that the affidavits failed to draw any meaningful connection between the conduct being investigated and the belief that illegal material would be found on the client’s electronic devices. Instead, the government relied on a boilerplate assumption that people accused of sexual misconduct are likely to possess such material on their electronics. Attorney Goldstein argued that this “profile-based” reasoning violated long-standing Third Circuit precedent, which requires a clear factual nexus between the alleged crime and the evidence sought.

The federal judge agreed, ruling that the affidavits were too speculative to support probable cause and that the warrants were so deficient that the “good faith” exception did not apply. The court found that no reasonable officer could have believed that the affidavits established a sufficient basis to search the client’s home and devices. Because the subsequent search warrants were based on evidence obtained from the initial unconstitutional searches, all of the evidence in the case was suppressed.

This outcome is a tremendous win and a relatively rare event in federal criminal litigation. Federal suppression motions are extremely difficult to win. Courts often defer to the government’s investigative process, and they routinely apply a good faith exception where, as here, investigators obtain a search warrant even if the warrant itself turns out to be lacking. Attorney Goldstein’s success demonstrates the value of a deep understanding of constitutional law and the willingness to challenge law enforcement overreach through careful, methodical, and aggressive litigation.

Facing federal criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client, and we frequently spot issues and defenses that other lawyers miss. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 11/6/25 Zak Goldstein 11/6/25

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rejects Public Record Presumption and Orders Hearing on Juror Bias Claim in Commonwealth v. Blakeney

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Laweyr Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has issued an important decision in Commonwealth v. Blakeney, vacating the dismissal of a third Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the PCRA court improperly relied on the discredited “public records presumption” and applied an unreasonably high diligence standard when it dismissed the petitioner’s serial petition as untimely. The decision continues the Supreme Court’s recent trend of reinforcing the fact that petitioners must be given a fair opportunity to prove newly discovered facts under the PCRA.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses for the 2000 killing of his girlfriend’s two-year-old child in Dauphin County. During jury selection, one juror, identified as Juror #7, initially marked “yes” on her juror questionnaire in response to the question of whether she or a close family member had been charged with a crime, then crossed out “yes” and marked “no.” More than twenty years later, new post-conviction counsel investigating potential juror bias discovered an obituary listing Juror #7’s family members. Counsel determined that the juror’s nephew had been charged with attempted murder and related offenses involving his own infant child. The juror’s nephew’s own preliminary hearing occurred on the very day that the juror was being questioned during voir dire in the defendant’s trial.

The defendant, whose prior appeals and PCRAs has been denied, filed a third PCRA petition arguing that this information constituted newly discovered facts that could not have been found earlier through reasonable diligence. He contended that Juror #7 provided a misleading answer during voir dire and that he was therefore denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.

The PCRA Court’s Ruling

The PCRA court issued a notice of intent to dismiss under Rule 907 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and ultimately denied the petition without a hearing. The PCRA court held that the claim was untimely because the nephew’s criminal case had been reported in a 2002 newspaper article, meaning that the information was publicly available and could have been discovered earlier. The court concluded that the defendant had not exercised due diligence and that his claim therefore failed to satisfy the PCRA’s timeliness exception for newly discovered facts under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The defendant appealed, and because he had received the death penalty at sentencing, the appeal went directly to the state Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The Court emphasized that the PCRA court erred by invoking the “public record presumption,” a doctrine that previously held defendants responsible for facts contained in public sources such as newspapers or court filings. The Supreme Court has repeatedly disapproved of that presumption in recent years, explaining that it is inconsistent with the plain language of the PCRA. The PCRA requires only reasonable diligence, not omniscience. It also recognizes that many petitioners are in custody and do not have normal access to public records.

In the defendant’s case, the Court found that the 2002 newspaper article did not specifically identify Juror #7 or establish any connection between her and her nephew’s case. The article merely reported the nephew’s charges and provided no reason for defense counsel in 2002 to link that case to a juror from the defendant’s trial. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the lower court erred in holding the information was discoverable simply because it existed in the public domain. The proper inquiry, the Supreme Court reiterated, is whether the petitioner could have discovered the fact earlier through reasonable diligence, not just whether the fact appeared somewhere in public records.

Because the defendant’s petition presented specific, potentially verifiable claims about juror bias and newly discovered evidence, the Supreme Court ordered a remand for further factual development. The PCRA court must now conduct a hearing to determine whether the information indeed qualifies as newly discovered and whether it entitles the defendant to relief.

The Takeaway

Commonwealth v. Blakeney reaffirms that Pennsylvania courts may not deny PCRA petitions by assuming defendants should have discovered facts merely because they were once published or theoretically accessible. The Supreme Court continues to reject the public record presumption and to clarify that reasonable diligence is a practical, case-specific standard. Petitioners are not required to scour every public source in existence, and when a claim of newly discovered evidence is plausible, a hearing is often necessary before dismissal.

Facing criminal charges or under investigation?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers in Philadelphia, PA

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/16/25 Zak Goldstein 10/16/25

PA Superior Court: Jurisdiction Exists for Out-of-State Access Device Fraud When Complainant Lives in Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Washington, holding that the Commonwealth could prosecute the defendant for allegedly committing fraud out of state when the complainant and the complainant’s financial accounts were based in Pennsylvania.

The Facts of the Case

In Commonwealth v. Washington, 2025 PA Super 183, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that Pennsylvania courts have jurisdiction to prosecute access device fraud committed outside the Commonwealth when the complainant resides here and the affected financial account is maintained in Pennsylvania. The Court rejected the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge.

The defendant was charged in Montgomery County, PA with one count of Access Device Fraud under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4106(a)(1)(ii). While physically in New York, the defendant used an altered check and fake identification belonging to a Pennsylvania resident. Using the forged documents, he cashed a counterfeit $3,500 check and withdrew $5,000 from the complainant’s KeyBank account.

The complainant lived in Lower Salford Township in Montgomery County, and KeyBank operated branches there. After the transactions, a New York branch manager contacted the complainant, who confirmed that he had not authorized the withdrawals. Surveillance footage identified the defendant, who was arrested and extradited to Pennsylvania. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nine to twenty-three months in jail. On appeal, the defendant argued that Pennsylvania lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and venue because the fraudulent conduct occurred entirely in New York State.

The Superior Court’s Analysis

The Superior Court rejected that argument and affirmed the conviction. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 102, Pennsylvania courts may exercise jurisdiction if either the conduct constituting an element of the offense or the result of that conduct takes place within the Commonwealth. Access Device Fraud under § 4106(a)(1)(ii) criminalizes using another person’s access device without authorization. The Court held that an essential element of the offense—the failure to obtain the owner’s consent—occurs where the victim resides. Because the complainant lived in Montgomery County, the defendant’s unauthorized use of the complainant’s financial information constituted conduct occurring within Pennsylvania even though the defendant was in New York.

The Court also concluded that venue was proper in Montgomery County under § 4106(e), which provides that such offenses may be deemed committed “at the place where the property or services were received or provided, or at the place where the lawful charges for said property or services are billed.” Because the complainant’s account and the relevant KeyBank branch were located in Montgomery County, that county was the proper venue.

Citing similar reasoning from courts in Massachusetts and Florida, the Superior Court confirmed that Pennsylvania may exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state access device or identity-theft offenses when the complainant resides in Pennsylvania and the loss is tied to a Pennsylvania account.

The Takeaway

Commonwealth v. Washington establishes that Pennsylvania courts can prosecute financial crimes committed elsewhere if the victim lives in Pennsylvania and the affected funds are drawn from a Pennsylvania account. Even remote, out-of-state conduct can support Pennsylvania charges when the harm and loss occur within the Commonwealth.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 10/13/25 Zak Goldstein 10/13/25

PA Superior Court holds both that “hey fellas” is not a stop and that probation officers may assist police with catching fleeing suspect.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Stoney, holding that the police did not illegally stop the defendant by saying “hey fellas” as they pulled up to him and that there was nothing illegal about a probation officer helping the police capture the defendant once he fled from them.

The Facts of the Case

The incident began when a Harrisburg police officer and several county probation officers were patrolling a high-crime area near North 6th and Seneca Streets. The police officer observed two men, later identified as the defendant and another individual, standing on a corner. The officer testified that the second man appeared to be concealing a firearm with a drum magazine and that the defendant made a “security tap” on his waistband consistent with carrying a gun.

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

When the officers circled the block and approached on foot, the officer called out, “Hey fellas.” Both men looked back and immediately fled in opposite directions. A probation officer pursued the defendant and saw him remove a gun from his waistband and throw it onto a roof. The officers recovered the firearm and arrested him.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was unlawfully seized when the officer said “hey fellas,” that his flight was provoked by a show of authority, and that the probation officers exceeded their statutory authority because the defendant was not under county supervision. He was, however, on federal supervised release. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion and that the probation officers acted lawfully in assisting the police. The defendant appealed, arguing both that the police stopped him without reasonable suspicion and that the probation officers did not have the authority to stop him at the direction of the police.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court affirmed on appeal. The Court held that a police officer saying “hey fellas” did not amount to a seizure under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Because the phrase was casual and non-coercive, it would not communicate to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave. At that point, the encounter was merely a consensual interaction, not an investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion.

The Court held that the seizure occurred only once the officers began to pursue the defendant and his companion after they fled. By that time, the officers already had reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances: a high-crime location, the officer’s observation of what appeared to be a firearm, the defendant’s “security check,” and unprovoked flight, which the Court has long held can justify a Terry stop.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that county probation officers acted outside their statutory authority. Relying on Commonwealth v. Gibson (2025) and Commonwealth v. Mathis (2017), the panel held that probation officers may assist police in the field as part of their public-safety duties. The “stalking horse” doctrine did not apply because the police already had reasonable suspicion before the probation officers helped with the physical apprehension. The probation officers did not initiate the investigation or stop. Instead, they merely helped the police officers.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the firearm was not discarded as part of a “forced abandonment,” that the detention was lawful, and that the trial court properly denied the motion.

The Takeaway

The decision reinforces that a brief, informal greeting such as “hey fellas” or “what’s up” does not constitute a seizure under Pennsylvania law. A stop begins only when police restrain a person’s movement or communicate that they are not free to walk away. “Stop” is a stop, but other, more casual greetings may not be. And once someone flees for no real reason, police often have at least reasonable suspicion to chase them. Further, although Pennsylvania recognizes forced abandonment and still allows for the suppression of a gun that someone discards while fleeing if the flight was triggered by an illegal stop, federal law does not. Thus, even if the state courts had suppressed the gun, the defendant could have been prosecuted in federal court.

This case also illustrates that courts continue to treat unprovoked flight in a high-crime area as a major factor supporting reasonable suspicion even when the behavior itself is ambiguous. It further confirms that probation officers working with police may lawfully assist in arrests when officers already have reasonable suspicion. The defense was unable to cite any cases which held that the probation officers could not assist the police once the police themselves had reasonable suspicion. The probation officers may not have been able to conduct the investigation alone, but because they were acting at the direction of the police, the Superior Court affirmed.

Facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police?

Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.