Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
PA Supreme Court Finds Autopsy Reports Testimonial under Confrontation Clause
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Brown, holding that autopsy reports are testimonial and therefore may not be introduced at trial unless the witness who prepared the report testifies. In this case, however, the court found that the improper admission of the autopsy report was harmless error, so the defendant did not receive a new trial.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Brown
In Brown, the defendant attended a party on Stanley Street in Philadelphia. Before arriving at the party, he hid a gun in the wheel well of a nearby parked car. The defendant argued with someone during the party, and his co-defendant then retrieved the gun from the car and gave it to the defendant. The defendant shot the person with whom he was arguing four times, killing him. A doctor with the Philadelphia Medical Examiner’s Office performed an autopsy and prepared a report of the findings. The report found that the decedent had been shot four times, the shots struck the ribs, heart, lungs, and shoulder of the victim, and three of the bullets entered the front of the victim’s body while one entered his back. The report also described the trajectory of the bullets in the victim’s body and noted that there was no soot, stippling, or muzzle imprints around any of the gunshot wounds. The report noted that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was homicide.
At the time of trial, the doctor who performed the report no longer worked for the city. The Commonwealth did not call him to testify at the trial. Instead, the Commonwealth admitted the report into evidence by calling a different doctor who had reviewed the report to testify to the other doctor’s report. The defendants objected, arguing that the admission of the report without the testimony of the doctor who prepared it violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States. Based on the other doctor’s report, the testifying doctor told the jury that the wounds were consistent with a scenario in which someone shot the victim from a distance of six to eight feet away while facing him, and then shot the victim in the back after the victim turned away. He further testified that the victim could have walked a few feet before collapsing.
The jury convicted the defendant of third-degree murder and related offenses, and the court sentenced him to 25 – 50 years in prison. The defendant appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed his conviction. The court first ruled that the report should not have been admitted, but it found harmless error because there was no real dispute about the cause of death.
The Criminal Appeal
The defendants again appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that autopsy reports are not testimonial because they are not necessarily created for trial in the same way that a BAC report or drug test report is prepared specifically for trial. Instead, state law requires coroners to prepare autopsy reports regardless of whether there is an ongoing criminal activity. The defendant argued that although some autopsy reports are prepared regardless of whether there is a suspicion of criminal activity, the law requires the coroner to prepare a report in response to any suspicious death and cooperate with the prosecutor. Further, the report in this case was prepared for the prosecution of homicide charges.
What is the Confrontation Clause?
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court that the report was testimonial and therefore should not have been admitted without the testimony of the doctor who prepared it. The Confrontation Clause, which is part of the Sixth Amendment, provides criminal defendants with the right to confront the witnesses against them. This means that they have the right to cross-examine witnesses under oath at trial.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that in Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court created the modern analysis of the Confrontation Clause. The Court barred the admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Thus, the key question for whether a statement violates the Confrontation Clause is whether the statement is testimonial. In general, statements are testimonial when their primary purpose is to establish or prove past events for purposes of proof at a criminal trial. This means that statements made to police officers who are investigating cases are typically going to be testimonial. Likewise, lab reports prepared to prosecute a criminal defendant at trial will also generally be found to be testimonial. On the other hand, statements which are not made for the purposes of criminal prosecution – such as a phone call to 911 in order to obtain emergency assistance – will often be found non-testimonial.
The Court's Decision
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the autopsy report was testimonial. Pennsylvania law requires the preparation of autopsy reports in all cases of sudden, violent, and suspicious deaths, or deaths by other than natural causes, and in such cases, the autopsy and subsequent report are designed to determine whether the death occurred as the result of a criminal act. The law also requires the coroner to advise and cooperate with the District Attorney. Therefore, the primary purpose of an autopsy report is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution. Any person creating the report would reasonably believe it would be available for use at a later criminal trial. Therefore, an autopsy report is testimonial.
What is Harmless Error?
At the same time, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the admission of the report amounted to harmless error. Even where the trial court has made a mistake in an evidentiary ruling, an appellate court may find harmless error where 1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis, 2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence, or 3) the property admitted and un-contradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.
Here, the Court found that the error was harmless error because the report was merely cumulative to the properly admitted testimony of the testifying doctor relating to the cause of death. Specifically, it was harmless error because the doctor had reached his own independent opinion regarding the cause of death which did not rely entirely on the inadmissible autopsy report. Further, an expert witness generally may rely on inadmissible evidence if it is the type of evidence that an expert in the field would normally rely on in reaching a determination. Thus, the report itself should not have been admitted, but the doctor was properly permitted to rely on it in reaching his own conclusions. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial.
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NOT GUILTY: Attorney Goldstein Obtains Full Acquittal in Jury Trial for Client Charged with “Second Strike” Gunpoint Robbery
Commonwealth v. R.R.
The Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC continue to obtain outstanding results in the courtroom. Recently, a Philadelphia jury acquitted Attorney Goldstein’s client of all charges in a gunpoint Robbery case following a two-day trial.
The Evidence
Prosecutors charged R.R. with Conspiracy, Robbery, Theft, Receiving Stolen Property, and various Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. Prosecutors alleged that R.R. and another gentleman followed the complainants home from a Burger King at around 2 in the morning and blocked the complainants from parking. The complainants claimed that the robbers eventually let them park, and they then got out of the car. The robbers got out also, and one of the robbers pulled a gun and pointed it at the complainants. The driver of the SUV, who was alleged to be R.R., then went through the male complainant’s pocket and the car. The person stole $700, a cell phone, and some of his paperwork. The robbers then got back into their SUV and drove off.
Police took statements from the complainants, and the complainants claimed that they remembered the numbers on the license plate of the SUV in which the robbers fled the scene. The complainants gave those numbers to the police along with the make and model of the SUV, and police then ran the plate numbers through the computer. They determined that R.R. had been stopped in a similar SUV with the same four numbers on the plate approximately two hours before the Robbery. Police detectives put R.R. in a photo array and showed that photo array to the complainants a few days later. The female complainant identified R.R. in the photo array as the driver of the SUV, but the male complainant could not identify anyone. Based on the identification of the one complainant, detectives arrested R.R. and charged him with gunpoint Robbery as a felony of the first degree.
The Defense
R.R. quickly retained Attorney Goldstein to defend him. Mr. Goldstein moved for a pre-trial lineup at the preliminary hearing, and the Philadelphia Municipal Court judge granted the motion for the lineup. Both complainants were required to appear for the lineup. Again, the female complainant identified R.R. at the lineup as the driver, and the male complainant was not able to make an identification. However, when the preliminary hearing occurred, the female complainant admitted that she had been drinking heavily prior to the robbery. The male complainant was also again unable to identify R.R. as having anything to do with the Robbery. Nonetheless, the Municipal Court judge found that the female complainant’s shaky identification was sufficient to force R.R. to stand trial.
R.R. decided to have a jury trial, and Attorney Goldstein was successfully able to use cross examination to show that the complainants had simply picked out the wrong guy. First, Attorney Goldstein highlighted the fact that the female complainant was initially only 90% sure that the defendant was the right person, she had been drinking heavily all night, and she had not provided the license plate number to the police officer who first responded to the scene. Attorney Goldstein also highlighted the significant discrepancies in the description she gave of the driver of the vehicle and what R.R. looked like at the time.
Second, Attorney Goldstein cross examined the male complainant on the fact that he had never previously been able to identify R.R. as being involved in the Robbery. For the first time ever, however, the male complainant claimed that R.R. was the driver of the SUV despite never identifying him at the preliminary hearing, photo array, or pre-trial lineup. Attorney Goldstein was able to impeach him with his prior statements to show that he did not really know what the person who robbed him looked like.
Finally, Attorney Goldstein highlighted the poor job that the detective had done in preparing the photo array in that every other photo in the photo array was of a person who weighed significantly more or less than the defendant. Attorney Goldstein closed on a misidentification theory; the complainants believed they had picked the right guy, but they had made a mistake, and R.R. looked totally different from the person that they described to the police on the night of the Robbery. The fact that R.R. was stopped in a similar vehicle a few hours before simply did not prove that he was the robber.
After hearing all of the evidence, the jury deliberated for approximately two hours before acquitting R.R. of all charges. Although the complainants claimed that they were 100% sure that R.R. was the driver of the vehicle and that they would never forget his face, R.R. was found Not Guilty of all charges and quickly released from custody. Due to a prior record, R.R. would have been facing 10-20 years in jail or more if he had been convicted in this case.
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PA Superior Court Continues to Undermine US Supreme Court's Birchfield Ruling
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Moser. In Moser, the Superior Court concluded that police lawfully obtained the defendant’s blood sample without a search warrant because the defendant consented to the blood draw before police read him defective and coercive O’Connell warnings. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the results of the blood test.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Moser
Moser was charged with Homicide by vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (Homicide by DUI), three counts of DUI, homicide by vehicle, and related traffic offenses. Moser filed a motion to suppress, arguing that police coerced him into submitting to warrantless blood testing by reading him defective O’Connell warnings which informed him that if he refused the blood testing, he would be subjected to stricter criminal penalties. The United States Supreme Court has previously held in Birchfield v. North Dakota that a state cannot impose criminal penalties on a defendant who refuses to submit to a warrantless blood draw, and Pennsylvania courts have suppressed blood testing in which defendants were told they would face criminal penalties if they refused prior to the testing.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress. It found that the behavior of the police was unlawfully coercive and violated Moser’s rights because the police told him that he would face criminal penalties if he refused the testing. By granting the motion to suppress, the court ordered that the prosecution could not use the results of the blood testing at the homicide trial.
The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that Moser had actually agreed to the blood testing while in the back of the police car on the way to the hospital. The police who were investigating the case did not read him the defective warnings until he arrived at the hospital. Therefore, the prosecution argued that he had already agreed to the blood draw prior to hearing anything coercive. Because the warnings were not provided until later, they could not have coerced him into giving up his right to insist on a search warrant prior to a blood test.
The Superior Court agreed. It found that although the warnings were improper and could have been coercive, the warnings did not coerce the defendant in this case because they were not given until after he had already consented to the blood draw in the back of the police car. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered that the blood test results may be introduced at trial going forward.
This case continues a recent trend in the Sueprior Court of rejecting these Birchfield challenges and allowing the Commonwealth to use evidence even where the police gave improper warnings. A number of Birchfield cases are still on appeal, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted review in at least one of them. Therefore, although this is a significant set back for the defendant in this case, it is possible that the rules surrounding blood testing in DUI cases will continue to change and that the Superior Court could be overturned. For the time being, the Superior Court continues to regularly undermine the basic holding of Birchfield that states may not impose criminal penalties on a defendant for refusing blood testing when police have not obtained a search warrant. Obviously, the constitution requires search warrants, but the appellate courts continue to allow police to ignore this requirement and forgives their basic refusal to set up electronic or telephonic warrant application systems for DUI cases.
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PA Legislature Revises SORNA in Attempt to Fix Unconstitutional Megan's Law Provisions
The Pennsylvania Legislature recently enacted HB 631, amending Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute which governs who must register as a sex offender under Megan’s Law, the type of information that must be provided, how often that information must be provided, and for how long an offender must register. HB 631 is the legislature’s response to recent appellate decisions finding various provisions of SORNA unconstitutional. However, HB 631 fails to address many of the issues that led to SORNA being found unconstitutional in the first place, and many of its provisions remain subject to litigation when applied to offenders who were convicted of crimes for acts which were committed prior to December 20, 2012.
Recent Changes in SORNA
Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law registration scheme has gone through a number of significant changes in the last few years. For example, in 2012, the original SORNA law took effect. SORNA made Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration scheme more punitive by imposing registration requirements on juveniles, increasing the number of offenses which require registration upon conviction, and retroactively increasing the length of the registration period for many people who had already been convicted.
For example, SORNA made M2 Indecent Assault a Tier I Sex Offense requiring 15 years of registration upon conviction. M2 Indecent Assault did not previously require Megan’s Law registration for a first offense. Various provisions in SORNA also attempted to retroactively require registration for people who had already been convicted of Indecent Assault even if they had been convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment.
Since the enactment of the law, Pennsylvania appellate courts have found many of these provisions unconstitutional. For example, courts quickly concluded that requiring people to register as adults for life following juvenile delinquency adjudications was irrational and unconstitutional. More recently, in Commonwealth v. Muniz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that retroactively requiring people to register under SORNA for longer periods of time, for offenses that did not require registration at the time that they were committed, and under more onerous conditions, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The ex post facto clause prohibits the Government from imposing criminal penalties for actions which were not illegal at the time that they were taken. It also prevents the Government from retroactively increasing the punishment for a given crime.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court quickly followed suit in Commonwealth v. Butler, holding that because Megan’s Law registration can be considered criminal punishment, Pennsylvania’s Sexually Violent Predator classification process violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. The SVP procedure violates a defendant's jury trial rights because it allows a judge, instead of a jury, to find that a defendant should be required to register as a Sexually Violent Predator for life. It also allows the judge to make this finding under a clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction.
The Effect of Muniz and Butler on Pre-2012 Offenders
An important side effect of the Supreme Court’s Muniz decision is that it arguably eliminated the registration requirement completely for anyone who had been convicted of a sex crime for conduct which occurred prior to December 20, 2012. This is because the SORNA statute explicitly repealed the prior Megan’s Law scheme that was in effect at the time. Thus, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that SORNA could not be applied retroactively to people who had been convicted of crimes for conduct which took place prior to the December 20, 2012 enactment, the Court left no alternative registration scheme in place for these offenders. With SORNA unconstitutional for those people and Megan’s Law repealed, even lifetime offenders (such as those convicted of rape or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) who properly had to register prior to December 20, 2012, would arguably be eligible for removal from the State Police registry. The legislature responded quickly in an attempt to aovid this outcome.
The Legislature’s Response to Muniz and Butler
Concerned that many people would no longer have to register at all, the Pennsylvania Legislature responded by amending the SORNA statute in the hopes of “re-capturing” pre-December 20, 2012 offenders. The act amends SORNA “to address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Butler (2017 WL3882445).” It is debatable, however, whether the amendments are constitutional. It is also questionable whether they address the problems identified in Muniz and Butler.
Changes for Post-2012 Registrants
For the most part, the amendments made very few changes to SORNA as applied to offenders who committed the acts for which they must register after December 20, 2012. For example, SORNA no longer requires registration for one offense. A conviction for the interference with custody of children where the defendant is the child’s parent, guardian, or lawful custodian no longer requires registration.
The amendments also created a mechanism by which even Tier III lifetime registrants and Sexually Violent Predators may petition the court for removal from Megan’s Law. Now, a registrant who avoids conviction for any offenses punishable by more than a year for twenty-five years following his or her release from custody may petition to have the registration requirement lifted. A petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is not a threat to others. It is unclear how many petitioners will receive relief under this provision, and it is important to note that even if the Petitioner meets this heavy burden, the court is not required to actually grant the removal petition.
Finally, the new amendments relax the in-person registration requirement for some registrants. An offender who must register more than once a year may register in-person once and by phone for the other registration requirements that year if the offender is compliant with all of the requirements for the first three years of registration and does not get convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year.
Although these changes are relatively minor, they do provide some relief to Tier III and SVP offenders who would otherwise have to register for life with no hope of ever obtaining removal from Megan’s List. It is likely that the legislature included this provision so that the Commonwealth's lawyers could argue that the statute is now less punitive and therefore does not violate the ex post facto clause.
Changes for Pre-2012 Registrants
With respect to registrants who committed the crimes for which they were convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment, the changes primarily seek to decrease the requirements to what they would have been under the old Megan’s Law Scheme. For example, the period of time for which the offender must register has been reduced to what it would have been under the pre-SORNA Megan’s Law. Thus, offenders must either register for ten years or for life, whereas new offenders could have to register for 15 years, 25 years, or for life.
The information that offenders must provide to the State Police continues to be roughly the same. A registrant still must inform the State Police of where they live, work, and go to school. They must all inform the State Police if any of those things change, and the State Police will continue to post that information on the internet and to provide that information to local police departments. The amendments also make it a crime to fail to comply with these requirements, and they make it even more difficult on “transient” offenders who do not have a fixed address.
The most surprising part of the new bill is that the amendments do not change the procedure by which an offender may be classified as a Sexually Violent Predator. An offender may still be found to be a Sexually Violent Predator by the sentencing judge under the clear and convincing evidence standard, and the requirements for Sexually Violent Predators are still essentially the same with the exception that they may petition for removal from the list after 25 years. It is entirely unclear how this re-enactment of the same unconstitutional sentencing scheme will survive appellate review.
SORNA Litigation
The appellate courts have not yet addressed whether the new amendments to SORNA are constitutional. It is likely that there will be numerous challenges both to the legislature’s attempt to retroactively apply the statute to pre-SORNA offenders given that SORNA repealed their original registration requirement and to the continuation of the same procedures for making the Sexually Violent Predator determination. Although appellate decisions may eventually bring relief to thousands of people, the ongoing litigation leaves many people uncertain as to their registration requirements. If you are currently subject to registration requirements, it is important that you continue to register with the State Police as required until the State Police or a court inform you that you no longer have to register. If you believe that you should no longer have to register, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney about the possibility of petitioning the state police or the trial court for removal from Megan’s Law. It is also likely that other issues will arise as attorneys have more time to review the changes in the new bill.
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If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal, post-conviction relief act petition, or Megan's Law removal petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.