Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/25/20 Zak Goldstein 8/25/20

PA Superior Court: Megan's Law Registrant May Challenge Retroactive Changes to Registration Laws Outside of PCRA Process

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Duncan. This decision did not make any substantive changes in the law. Rather, it dealt with some of the procedural difficulties that defendants have had in challenging their sex offender registration status following recent changes in the law stemming from Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Superior Court decisions. In this case, the court held that the defendant should have been appointed counsel to represent him when he was challenging the requirement that he register as a sex offender despite being a juvenile when he committed the crimes which triggered registration. This decision makes it clear that registrants may bring challenges to their registration status in the trial court in many cases even when the time for filing a post-conviction relief act petition has expired.

Commonwealth v. Duncan

The defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to the charges of robbery, kidnapping of a minor, unlawful restraint, recklessly endangering another person, and carrying firearms without a license. The defendant received a sentenced of 4-10 years’ imprisonment. Notably, the defendant was a juvenile when he committed his offenses, even though he was charged as an adult. The defendant did not file a direct appeal from his judgment of sentence.

More than a decade after his plea, the defendant filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. The defendant alleged that right before he was to be released from prison, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections told him that he must register as a sex offender upon his release pursuant to the then-effective version of Megan’s Law. This would be due to the kidnapping of a minor conviction. The defendant argued that requiring him to register as a sex offender violated the Ex Post Facto principles of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz. Further, the defendant argued that the Commonwealth was in breach of their agreement because he had never agreed to register as a sex offender. At the time that he pleaded guilty, that charge did not require sex offender registration.

The court initially treated his petition as a Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. At first, the PCRA court agreed with the defendant and ordered that he be removed from the sex offender registry. However, the PCRA court later vacated its decision to allow the Commonwealth an opportunity to respond to his petition. The Commonwealth responded that his request should be denied because it was an untimely filed PCRA petition. The PCRA imposes very strict deadlines and if a defendant misses a deadline they will often not be afforded any relief. Consequently, because the PCRA court thought the PCRA governed the defendant’s petition, it denied his request due to his petition being untimely. The defendant was subsequently appointed counsel, and he then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant only argued that he should have been appointed counsel to help him litigate his claim.

The Ex Post Facto Clause of The United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions

Both the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitutions prohibit Ex Post Facto laws. Those are laws that criminalize past behavior. The reason behind is that individuals have the right to adequate notice and should not be punished for actions that were legal when they did took them. In order to qualify as an Ex Post Facto law, the law must 1) apply retroactively and 2) negatively impact the offender.

In the late ‘90s and early 2000’s, states across the country began passing laws that required individuals convicted of sexual offenses to register as sex offenders. These early Megan’s Law statutes imposed onerous requirements on defendants that were often seemingly punitive in nature. These laws were frequently challenged as violations of the Ex Post Facto clause because they applied to defendants retroactively (i.e. defendants were required to register as sex offenders even though they committed their crimes before the passage of these statutes).

Pennsylvania and many other states would argue that these Megan’s Law requirements were not punitive and therefore the Ex Post Facto clause of their respective constitutions did not apply. And, unfortunately, some of these governments had some success. For example, the state of Alaska was successfully able to defend its Megan’s Law statute all the way to the United States Supreme Court. However, in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in Commonwealth v. Muniz that Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law statute violated the Ex Post Facto clauses of both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a new Megan’s Law (SORNA) statute in the aftermath of the Muniz decision which certainly guarantees that this fight is far from over.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the defendant that he should have been appointed an attorney to represent him when he litigated his PCRA petition. The Court further stated that the PCRA court was not required to treat the defendant’s petition as a PCRA petition. Specifically, the Superior Court cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lacombe which held that because he was raising Ex Post Facto claims, the PCRA court was not required to treat his filing as a PCRA petition and therefore he was not subjected to the stringent filing deadlines of the PCRA. Further, the Superior Court stated that the defendant “might have a valid Ex Post Facto and due process claim” and therefore remanded his case for consideration. This is an important decision due to the deadline issues. The PCRA requires a defendant to file his or her post-conviction relief act petition within one year of his or her sentence becoming final. Obviously, when the legislature passes a new law ten years later imposing new sex offender requirements on someone who did not have to register at that time that they were convicted, that person should have some procedural mechanism for challenging the law. By imposing the one-year deadline for filing a PCRA petition on these petitioners, the courts were able to block them from ever challenging these unconstitutional laws. By recognizing that these filings are not really PCRAs, the appellate courts have removed some of the deadlines for filing them and allowed these important issues to be resolved on the merits.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 8/13/20 Zak Goldstein 8/13/20

PA Supreme Court: Commonwealth Bears Burden of Disproving Claim of Self-Defense in Gun Case

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lineman, reaffirming its decision in Commonwealth v. Torres. The Supreme Court again held that if a criminal defendant properly raises the issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth has the burden of disproving that claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, it is not adequate for the fact-finder to merely disbelieve the defendant’s evidence of self-defense. The Commonwealth must produce actual evidence to counter a defendant’s self-defense claim. The Lineman decision is significant because it applies the logic of Torres to a possessory offense rather than just a crime of violence.

Commonwealth v. Lineman

A Philadelphia Police officer was on routine patrol when he received a radio call indicating that a male was screaming for assistance. The officer arrived on scene and observed the defendant and another male struggling on the ground. The defendant was lying on the ground with the other male on top of him. The officer ordered the male to get off the defendant. As the defendant began to stand he heard the sound of metal scraping the ground. The officer then looked at the defendant’s hand and saw that he was holding an Uzi. According to the officer, the defendant appeared to be under the influence of a controlled substance and was bleeding. The defendant was subsequently arrested for Violation of the Uniform Firearm Act § 6105 (“VUFA 6105”), Persons Prohibited from Possessing a Firearm.

The defendant elected to proceed by way of bench trial. At his trial, he testified in his own defense. Specifically, he testified that he and the other male had been drinking. Eventually, the other male became violent towards him and hit him in the face with the gun, which broke the defendant’s nose. The two then began to wrestle for the gun. The officer arrived while they were wrestling and this is what caused the fight to end. During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the defendant was entitled to an acquittal because he raised the issue of self-defense and the Commonwealth did not present any evidence to rebut this claim as required by the case of Commonwealth v. Torres.

The trial court disagreed. The trial court stated that because this was a possessory offense, he could not raise a self-defense argument. The trial court did state that the defendant could raise a duress defense, but because he did not believe the defendant’s story it was not applicable to him. As such, he found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to three to seven years’ incarceration. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. In its decision, the Superior Court found that because the defendant was still in possession of the firearm after the police officer broke up the fight, this was sufficient to convict him of the charge of VUFA 6105. Undeterred, the defendant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Which side has to prove self-defense in Pennsylvania?

Commonwealth v. Torres is a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision that was decided in 2001. The basic facts of the case were that the police arrived at a house in Philadelphia, PA after they received a radio call. When the police arrived on scene, they met with the complainant who said that the defendant had hit him in the head with a wrench. The defendant was about a half block away from the scene when the police arrived. While investigating the scene, the police were unable to locate a wrench. The defendant was then subsequently arrested and charged with simple assault.

The complainant never appeared to court. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth still elected to prosecute the case against the defendant by calling the police officers who arrived on scene. The officers testified that the complainant said the defendant hit him with a wrench. In response, the defendant testified on his own behalf and stated that he was acting in self-defense. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court stated he disbelieved the defendant and found him guilty. The defendant then filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court which affirmed his conviction. He then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which agreed to hear the case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and vacated the defendant’s conviction. The Court stated that when a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove that claim beyond a reasonable doubt. According to the Court, the Commonwealth must produce some evidence to dispute this claim. Further, the Court specifically stated that it is not sufficient for the trial court to not believe the defendant. Therefore, because there was no evidence on the record to contradict the defendant’s claim that he was acting in self-defense, the defendant’s conviction could not stand and thus was vacated. It is important to note that the defendant in Torres was not charged with a possessory offense (i.e. possessing a gun).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a slip opinion decision vacating the defendant’s conviction. In its opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically cited Commonwealth v. Torres as the reason why it was reversing the lower courts’ decisions. The Court did not provide any additional justification for its decision. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the Court has now expanded Torres to include possessory offenses as well. As a matter of common sense, this decision makes sense. If someone is in danger and uses a weapon to protect themselves in self-defense, they should also be able to avoid a conviction for the possession of said weapon. Regardless of the logic of the decision, this decision is obviously favorable to the defendant because his conviction is now vacated, and he will be released from prison.

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Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

Zak Goldstein 7/21/20 Zak Goldstein 7/21/20

PA Supreme Court: Preliminary Hearing Requires More Than Just Hearsay

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has finally decided the case of Commonwealth v. McClelland, reversing the decisions of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Ricker and McClelland. The Court held that although some hearsay may be admissible at a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth may not meet its burden of proving a prima facie case through hearsay alone. Prior to this decision, most Philadelphia judges required at least some real evidence at a preliminary hearing, but many magistrates throughout the rest of the state did not. This case restores the importance of the preliminary hearing, requires the Commonwealth to produce real evidence at the hearing, and protects the rights of the accused to confront the witnesses against them early in the criminal justice process rather than being forced to wait months or even years for trial.

Commonwealth v. McClelland

In this case, the defendant was charged with committing indecent assault, indecent exposure, and corruption of minors against an eight-year-old child. Specifically, the complaint alleged that on August 3, 2015, the child’s parents reported to the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) that the child told them the defendant touched her face with his penis several months earlier. The child then later provided additional details about the incident during an interview with a Children’s Advocacy Center specialist, which led to the criminal charges against the defendant.

At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth did not call any actual witnesses with personal knowledge of anything. Instead, the prosecution called a Pennsylvania State Police trooper to testify. The trooper had not witnessed the assault and had only witnessed the interview of the complainant. The trooper summarized the contents of the complainant’s interview for the magistrate, and the magistrate held the case for court, meaning the defendant would have had to stand trial without any real evidence being presented at a preliminary hearing.

After the preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The defendant argued that allowing the case to proceed to trial based solely on hearsay evidence violated his rights to confrontation and due process under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s decision denying the defendant’s writ of habeas corpus. In Commonwealth v. Ricker, a panel of the Superior Court had held that the right to confrontation does not apply at a preliminary hearing and a defendant could be held for court based solely on hearsay. In this case, the Superior Court held that due process does not require the Commonwealth to produce any non-hearsay testimony at a preliminary hearing.

Undeterred, the defendant then filed a petition for writ of allowance to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The defendant argued that allowing the Commonwealth to only present hearsay evidence at a preliminary hearing violated his due process rights. Specifically, the defendant argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in a much older case called Commonwealth v. Verbonitz governed this issue, that the Superior Court could not overrule a decision of the Supreme Court, and that the Commonwealth could not meet its burden at a preliminary hearing on hearsay evidence alone without violating due process rights.

The Commonwealth’s Response

On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should adopt the holding of Commonwealth v. Ricker which allowed the Commonwealth to meet its burden at the preliminary hearing on hearsay only. The logic of Ricker is that Rule 542(E) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was amended in 2013, permitted the Commonwealth to meet its burden on hearsay evidence only because it states “[h]earsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an offense, including, not limited to, those requiring proof of the ownership of, non-permitted use of, damage to, or value of property.”

Additionally, it was the Commonwealth’s position that proceeding by hearsay alone does not violate a defendant’s due process rights because preliminary hearings are not constitutionally required. Finally, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed this issue in Commonwealth v. Verbonitz, it was the Commonwealth’s position that the decision was a plurality decision in which no majority of judges actually found that hearsay could not be used at a preliminary hearing. As a plurality decision, Verbonitz was arguably not a binding decision, and therefore the Commonwealth argued that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could depart from it.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the Commonwealth’s arguments and held that the Commonwealth cannot meet its burden at a preliminary hearing using hearsay evidence alone. As a preliminary matter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed the argument that Rule 542(E) permits the Commonwealth to use hearsay to satisfy all the elements of the alleged crimes at a preliminary hearing. The Court specifically held that although Rule 542 is “not the model of clarity,” it does not permit the Commonwealth to establish its entire case at a defendant’s preliminary hearing. Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed Verbanowitz and recognized: “[w]e have little difficult in stating with certainty that five justices [a majority]…agreed a prima facie case cannot be established by hearsay alone.”

Further, the Court found that the primary purpose of a preliminary hearing is to protect an individual’s right against unlawful arrest and detention. The preliminary hearing is a “critical hearing” and not a mere formality. As such, due process requires that the Commonwealth present more than just hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing. Therefore, the case against the defendant was dismissed as the Commonwealth had presented nothing more than hearsay. The Court also disapproved of Ricker, meaning that defendants will likely have substantially increased rights to confront witnesses and challenge the evidence against them at preliminary hearings throughout Pennsylvania.

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Zak Goldstein 5/24/20 Zak Goldstein 5/24/20

PA Supreme Court: Reckless Introduction of False Evidence Bars Retrial of Wrongfully Convicted Defendant

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson, holding that the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial where the original conviction was based on false evidence and prosecutorial misconduct occurred in the form of prosecutors acting recklessly with respect to seeking the admission of the false evidence. This is an important case which sharpens the teeth of PA’s Double Jeopardy Clause and which provides some accountability for prosecutors who introduce evidence at trial that turns out to be false.

The Facts of Johnson

In Johnson, the victim, Walter Smith, told the police that a man named Clinton Robinson had killed a woman named Margaret Thomas. Later that year, Smith was shot and killed outside of a Philadelphia bar. Based on the ballistics evidence, police believed that there were multiple shooters. Police also found a red baseball cap near Smith’s body.

Debbie Williams, a friend of Smith’s, went to the police station and made a statement to Philadelphia police. She claimed that as they left the bar, there were numerous people outside on the sidewalk or in the street. A man who was wearing a red article of clothing pushed past her towards Smith. She heard shots, so she ducked, and she did not see the shooting. She then saw people run away. After the gunshots, she saw the person who had been wearing the red hat run past her, as well. She went to Smith’s body and picked up his baseball hat, which had a hole in it. The police arrived soon thereafter and took her to the station. She gave the hat to the police.

The case was not solved until 2005. In 2005, a jailhouse informant named Bryant Younger, who was under indictment in a federal drug case, told police that he heard the defendant, who was also in custody, make statements implicating himself in Smith’s murder. The police obtained the defendant’s DNA and compared it to DNA recovered from the red hat. They found that there was a match.

The Commonwealth then somehow got confused and failed to realize that there were two hats – a red hat which was found in the street, and a black hat which Smith had been wearing. The black hat had been tested and in fact had Smith’s blood and DNA on it, and the red hat had the defendant’s DNA on it. But somehow the Commonwealth believed that there was one hat with both men’s DNA on it. The Commonwealth arrested the defendant and charged him with first-degree murder, conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of crime. The case went to trial, and at trial, the Commonwealth’s crucial piece of evidence was the red hat with the DNA on it.

However, due to the Commonwealth’s apparent confusion, the prosecutor argued that the shooter, who was wearing the red hat, must have gotten in close to Smith and shot him, leading both to his own DNA being on the red hat as well as Smith’s blood. This was wrong because Smith’s blood was not actually on the red hat; it was on the black hat.

Nonetheless, the DNA analyst also testified that Smith’s blood and the defendant’s DNA were both found on “the hat.” The defendant’s attorney somehow never challenged the underlying premise that there were two hats. He argued that the DNA may not have been reliable and that no one actually saw the defendant commit the shooting. The prosecution emphasized that the decedent’s blood was on the same hat as the defendant’s DNA in closing argument. The jury convicted, and the court sentenced the defendant to death.

The Post-Conviction Relief Act Litigation

The defendant eventually filed a PCRA Petition after his attorneys uncovered the fact that there had been two hats and the decedent’s blood was only on the black hat. The Commonwealth agreed that the defendant should receive a new trial and also agreed not to seek the death penalty. The court granted a new trial.

Discovery Motions and Double Jeopardy Motions

The defendant then began filing discovery motions based on the finding of the two hats. The motion eventually evolved into a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds due to prosecutorial misconduct in introducing false evidence – the false evidence being that there was only one hat. This led to various evidentiary hearings at which the prosecutors and detectives involved in the original trial had to testify. It quickly became clear to the court that the Commonwealth had not intentionally misstated the evidence but had gotten confused and believed that there was only one hat. Some police officers, however, had also exaggerated the evidence if not completely misstated it.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the defendant moved to dismiss the case. One officer had exaggerated the extent to which he saw blood stains on the red hat, and the other detectives and prosecutors believed that there was only one hat despite the fact that the Commonwealth clearly had two hats in its possession with separate property receipt numbers. He argued that regardless of whether the mistake was intentional or reckless, he had to spend nine years on death row, and the case should therefore be dismissed. The Commonwealth agreed that mistakes were made, but it argued that the mistakes had not been intentional, so it should be permitted to retry the defendant.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. It found that the Commonwealth had acted recklessly, not intentionally, and because the Commonwealth had not acted in bad faith, the double jeopardy clause did not apply. It did, however, permit the defendant to appeal prior to the re-trial by finding that such an appeal would not be frivolous. The Superior Court affirmed, and the defendant appealed further to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted the case and reversed the conviction.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Court barred the prosecution of the defendant and dismissed the charges against him.

First, it accepted the trial court’s findings that prosecutors had not acted intentionally but had acted either recklessly or with gross negligence. They had not conspired to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, but they had made so many inexplicable mistakes that the mistakes rose to a level of more than just ordinary negligence.

Second, the Court found that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protections than the United States Constitution. Federal appellate courts have found that the United States Constitution requires intentional misconduct in order for the double jeopardy clause to apply and bar a retrial. But the Supreme Court found that Pennsylvania’s Constitution bars a retrial where the first conviction was vacated as a result of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred recklessly.

The purpose of the double jeopardy clause is not only to penalize prosecutorial error, but also to protect citizens from the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of a second trial for the same offense. It should also prevent compelling them to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent they may be found guilty.

When the government engages in improper actions sufficiently damaging to undercut the fairness of a trial, it does not matter much to the defendant whether the prosecution did it on purpose. Therefore, the double jeopardy clause applies to bar retrial both when the prosecution acts intentionally as well as recklessly. Because the prosecution here clearly acted recklessly, the Commonwealth could not re-try the defendant, and the Court dismissed the case.

Do you need a criminal lawyer in Philadelphia, PA? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, DUI, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.