Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 12/11/24 Zak Goldstein 12/11/24

PA Superior Court: Joint Purchase of Lethal Drugs Does Not Necessarily Eliminate Liability for Drug Delivery Resulting in Death

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Scott, upholding the defendant’s conviction for drug delivery resulting in death and rejecting the defendant’s argument that he could not be prosecuted for DDRD because he and the decedent planned to use the jointly purchased drugs together. Following Scott, the joint purchase of drugs to share may still provide a defense to DDRD charges, but the analysis is heavily fact specific.

The Facts of Scott

The charges in Scott stemmed from the overdose death of the decedent on June 29, 2019. The decedent and a friend arranged to purchase heroin from the friend’s drug dealer, "Ro-Ro." When Ro-Ro was unavailable, the defendant, identified as Ro-Ro's son, facilitated the purchase. The defendant was picked up by the decedent and the friend. He directed them to multiple locations in Harrisburg, and he was eventually able to pick up the drugs with money provided by the decedent. The group then went to a park where the decedent and the friend used the heroin. The heroin was mixed with fentanyl, and the decedent overdosed and died.

The Criminal Trial

At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant physically handled the drug transactions and delivered the fentanyl to the friend, who acted as an agent for the decedent. The defendant’s defense attorney argued that the defendant was merely a joint user and not a dealer, asserting that the trio had a mutual plan to acquire and use drugs together. The defense attorney requested a jury instruction on joint acquisition and use instructing the jury that this would be a defense to the charges. The trial court denied the requested instruction.

The jury convicted Scott of DDRD and possession with the intent to deliver (PWID) but acquitted him of third-degree murder and evidence tampering. The trial court sentenced him to seven to nineteen years of incarceration followed by probation.

The Superior Court Appeal

The defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and the court affirmed. On appeal, the defendant challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of the requested jury instruction.

Sufficiency of Evidence: Scott argued that the evidence did not establish that he "delivered" the drugs to Savage. He claimed the trio were joint users and the drugs were jointly acquired for mutual use, negating the "delivery" element required for DDRD and PWID.
Jury Instruction: Scott argued the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the theory of joint acquisition and use, depriving the jury of a full understanding of his defense.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

Delivery and Sufficiency of Evidence: First, the Superior Court rejected the sufficiency argument. The court applied the statutory definition of "delivery" under Pennsylvania law, which includes the actual or constructive transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another. The court concluded that the defendant’s physical conveyance of the fentanyl to the friend, who was acting as the decedent’s agent, constituted delivery. The evidence established that the decedent provided the funds, and the defendant facilitated the purchase and transfer of the drugs that caused the decedent’s death.
The court also hinted but did not conclusively decide that Pennsylvania law does not necessarily support the theory that joint acquisition and use negate delivery. The record reflected that the decedent had no personal relationship with the defendant and only participated in the transactions because the friend was unable to reach her usual dealer. The decedent’s role was limited to providing transportation and funds, undermining the claim of joint acquisition. She did not actually use drugs with the defendant but instead used him to purchase the drugs. Accordingly, even if joint acquisition and use would provide a defense, the facts did not necessarily support that defense in this particular case.
Jury Instruction: The Superior Court also upheld the trial court's decision with respect to the denial of the proposed jury instruction, finding that the requested instruction was unsupported by Pennsylvania law and the evidence. The trial court’s instructions accurately reflected the statutory and legal standards for "delivery" and DDRD.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this was not the best set of facts for a defendant assert a joint acquisition and use or joint constructive possession defense to a charge of drug delivery resulting in death. Where two friends go buy drugs from someone and use them, with fatal results, it may still be possible to argue that the friend who physically received the drugs from the seller is not on the hook for drug delivery resulting in death even if they physically then handed a portion of the drugs to the eventual decedent. The problem here is that the defendant and decedent were not friends, they did not really buy drugs together, they did not use the drugs at the same time, and they did not have the kind of relationship that showed that this was some kind of joint venture. Instead, the relationship seemed more like a typical buyer-seller relationship in that the decedent employed the defendant to find the drugs for her. The fact that the defendant also used the drugs therefore did not defeat the DDRD charges. This case certainly limits the defense under Pennsylvania law, but the case may be subject to additional appeals, and the defense may still be available for defendants with better facts in terms of the prior relationship between the acquirer and recipient of the drugs.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 12/10/24 Zak Goldstein 12/10/24

PA Supreme Court: Plain View Doctrine Still Applies to Cars in Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Saunders. In Saunders, the Court held addressed the legality of a warrantless seizure of a gun from a car during a routine traffic stop. The decision, issued on November 20, 2024, affirmed the lower courts' rulings, concluding that the seizure complied with constitutional requirements under the plain view doctrine. Prior to this decision, it was a somewhat open question as to whether the plain view doctrine still applied in Pennsylvania or whether the police were required to get a search warrant prior to seizing contraband that was in plain view in an car in the absence of some kind of emergency or exigent circumstance. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now held that the police may go into the car and seize contraband which is in plain view before they get the warrant.

The Facts of Saunders

On November 18, 2020, police officers stopped Saunders’ car in Philadelphia for several traffic violations, including illegal window tint and failure to use a turn signal. During the stop, Officer Ibbotson observed Saunders making “furtive movements” toward the floor of the car. Looking through the windshield, the officer saw the handle of a gun beneath the driver’s seat. During questioning, Saunders admitted that he did not possess a valid license to carry a firearm. The officers subsequently seized the gun without a warrant, and they determined from the serial number that the gun had been reported stolen. Prosecutors charged Saunders with various firearms offenses under the uniform firearms act.

Saunders moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the seizure violated his constitutional rights under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. He argued that, under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander, a warrant was required for any vehicle search or seizure unless exigent circumstances were present. He further argued that the police could have secured the car and obtained a search warrant prior to going into the car and retrieving the gun. Thus, the issue on appeal was whether the “plain view exception” to the warrant requirement still applies in Pennsylvania or whether the police must get a warrant before seizing even contraband which is in plain view.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the seizure under the plain view doctrine, which allows warrantless seizures if:

The officer views the object from a lawful vantage point,
The incriminating nature of the object is immediately apparent, and
The officer has a lawful right of access to the object.

The Court reasoned:

Officer Ibbotson had a lawful vantage point during the traffic stop and observed the gun through the windshield. He did not have to go into the car without a warrant in order to see the gun.
The gun’s incriminating nature was immediately apparent because Saunders admitted he lacked a firearm license before the officer retrieved the weapon.
The officer had lawful access to the vehicle due to the unexpected nature of the discovery, consistent with precedent from another case, Commonwealth v. McCree.

Key Takeaways

Plain View Doctrine: The Court reaffirmed that unexpected probable cause during a lawful stop can justify warrantless seizures of objects in plain view.
Privacy Interests: The ruling emphasized the distinction between minor intrusions to seize objects in plain view and full-scale vehicle searches, which require a warrant or exigent circumstances.
Impact of Precedent: The decision clarified that Alexander, which overruled broad warrant exceptions for vehicle searches, did not eliminate the plain view doctrine.

Outcome

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Saunders was convicted of multiple firearms offenses, including carrying a firearm without a license, and sentenced to three and a half to seven years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress, concluding that evidence lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine remains admissible in Pennsylvania.

This decision makes clear that there are exceptions to the Supreme Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Alexander that the police must get a search warrant before going into the car. If the police see guns, drugs, or other evidence in plain view from outside of the vehicle, they may be able to enter the car to seize it before they get a search warrant. And once in the vehicle, they may be able to legally seize anything else they can now see while retrieving the contraband that was in plain view. Ultimately, it is generally not advisable to leave an illegal gun lying around. However, motions may still be litigated as to whether the police had reasonable suspicion for the stop, whether they extended the stop improperly, whether they asked questions which went beyond the actual mission of the stop, and whether they could actually see the contraband before entering the vehicle. Therefore, in many cases, there may still be challenges to police action even where the police claim that they could see contraband in plain view. For example, even if the gun was in plain view, it would still likely be suppressed had the police pulled the car over without a legitimate reason.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein 11/22/24 Zak Goldstein 11/22/24

PA Superior Court: Police Violate Miranda by Claiming They Won’t Use Defendant’s Statement in Court During Interrogation

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Phillips, reversing the defendant’s conviction for murder and finding that the police violated his Miranda rights by initially giving his Miranda warnings but then telling him that they would not use his confession in court after they gave the Miranda warnings. The entire premise of Miranda is that an individual who is subjected to a custodial interrogation must be warned that they have the right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, and that anything they say can can be used against them in court. Therefore, the police cannot give those warnings, subsequently undermine them by promising something false to the contrary, and then use the resulting confession in court.

The Facts of Phillips

The defendant was accused of committing a 2019 shooting in North Philadelphia that killed one man and injured another. Surveillance video showed the shooting. The shooter was on a bicycle and wearing a distinctive floral-patterned shirt. The Philadelphia Police received a tip for an Instagram account linked to a specific handle which appeared to implicate the account owner in the shooting. The police connected the defendant to that Instagram account and ultimately charged him with murder and related charges.

The Interrogation

Two Philadelphia homicide detectives interrogated the defendant at the police station while the defendant was in custody on unrelated charges. The detectives provided the defendant with his Miranda warnings. During the interrogation, the defendant admitted to ownership of the Instagram account, confirmed his presence at the crime scene, and claimed that he participated in the shooting as a lookout under the mistaken belief that the incident was only supposed to be a robbery, not a murder. Obviously, these statements did not help the defendant at his trial.

The key issue with respect to the confession arose when the defendant asked: “You all going to use this in court on me?” One detective falsely responded, “Nobody’s using anything in court,” in an apparent effort to assuage the defendant’s concerns. This statement directly contradicted the Miranda warning that anything said “can and will be used against you in a court of law.”

After making this false statement, the detectives continued questioning the defendant, ultimately eliciting inculpatory statements. The defendant later moved to suppress these statement, arguing that the detective’s promise of confidentiality invalidated his waiver of Miranda rights and rendered his statements involuntary.

The Motion to Suppress

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The court concluded that the detective’s statement was meant to address the defendant’s fear of retribution in being perceived as a snitch and did not negate his understanding of the Miranda warning. After a second trial (the first ended in a mistrial due to a COVID-19 outbreak), the defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for first-degree murder along with additional consecutive sentences for other offenses.

The defendant appealed to the Superior Court, asserting that:

The trial court erred in admitting his statements to detectives because his Miranda waiver was invalid.
The trial court improperly sentenced him without considering mitigating factors, including his psychological background, due to its refusal to order a presentence investigation report.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress because the police violated the Miranda rule by lying to the defendant and telling him that his statement would not be used in court.

The Superior Court focused on the interrogation’s adherence to Miranda standards. Under the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Miranda v. Arizona, police must inform suspects of their rights, including the right to remain silent and the warning that anything said can be used against them in court whenever the police conduct a custodial interrogation. If they do not do so, then anything said by the defendant generally cannot be used in court, with some exceptions. Additionally, a suspect’s waiver of the Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

The Superior Court evaluated whether the Miranda waiver was voluntary and whether the defendant really understood the rights he was giving up. In other words, the court asked whether the waiver was the product of free choice, without intimidation, coercion, or deception. It also evaluated whether the defendant understoodstood the nature of the rights and the consequences of waiving them.

The Superior Court found that the detective’s statement that “Nobody’s using anything in court” misrepresented the consequences of the defendant’s waiver. A reasonable person in the defendant’s’ position could have interpreted this as a promise that his statements would not be used against him. The Court emphasized that such false promises contradict the Miranda warnings’ purpose: ensuring suspects understand their statements can be used as evidence in court.

Because the detective’s statement undermined the Miranda warnings, the Superior Court concluded that the defendant’s waiver was invalid. Accordingly, the trial court should have suppressed the statement.

The Court also rejected the argument that this error was harmless. Without the defendant’s confession, the remaining evidence against him was largely circumstantial and consisted of:

Internet searches for extended 9mm handgun clips on the day of the shooting.
Cell tower data placing the defendant near the crime scene.
Surveillance footage showing a bicyclist in a floral-patterned shirt—similar to clothing associated with Phillips.

While this evidence could have suggested the defendant’s involvement, it lacked the direct and unequivocal nature of his confession. The confession was critical to the jury’s guilty verdict.

Therefore, the Superior Court vacated the defendant’s judgment of sentence and remanded the case for a new trial without the statement. It will obviously be harder for the Commonwealth to obtain a conviction on remand. Ultimately, the police are free to tell are sorts of lies during an interrogation, but they are not free to tell lies that undermine the Miranda warnings.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 11/17/24 Zak Goldstein 11/17/24

PA Supreme Court: Unlawful Contact Conviction Requires Prior Communication, Not Just the Assault or Touching Itself

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Strunk, holding that unlawful contact cannot be proven solely through evidence that the defendant had some sort of illegal physical sexual contact with the alleged victim. Instead, the statute requires some kind of prior communication to facilitate a sex crime. This narrows the reach of the statute to more closely match the legislative intent behind it as the point of the statute is to prevent communications designed to facilitate illegal sex acts rather than to criminalize the actual assault itself given that other existing statutes criminalize the assault.

Recent cases from the Superior Court, however, had found that a violation of the statute could be proven without any evidence of any prior communication. That is no longer the case, but the actual illegal contact or sex act can still be prosecuted under the statute that covers the substantive contact. This reading of the statute by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court returns the statute to its original purpose and makes sure that people will not be prosecuted twice for the exact same conduct.

The Facts of Strunk

The defendant was convicted in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas following testimony from the complainant which detailed repeated sexual assaults occurring over a period when she lived in the same household. The complainant’s testimony described incidents where the defendant allegedly initiated physical contact while she pretended to be asleep. Despite the obviously illegality of the sexual acts themselves, the crux of the appeal centered on whether the defendant’s conduct met the statutory requirements for "unlawful contact with a minor" because there was no real evidence that the defendant said or did anything in advance to facilitate to assaults.

The complainant specifically testified to three instances of alleged sexual assault:

The defendant fondled the complainant while she slept on a couch and proceeded to sexually assault her. Afterward, he whispered something unintelligible to her, but there was no evidence of prior communication to facilitate the assault.
The defendant assaulted the complainant again while she was recuperating on the couch after dental surgery. She testified that she was heavily sedated and unable to respond. He digitally penetrated her during this assault, but the complainant testified that there was no verbal or nonverbal communication beforehand.
The defendant assaulted the complainant in her bedroom while she pretended to be asleep. This assault was interrupted by the victim’s mother, but again, the complainant testified that there was no communication between her and Strunk before or during the assault.

The complainant’s testimony was consistent in that she denied any verbal or nonverbal communication between her and the defendant that facilitated the actual assaults.

The Supreme Court Appeal

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review on two issues:

Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for Unlawful Contact with a Minor under § 6318, given the lack of communication.
Whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court erred in interpreting § 6318 to allow physical contact beyond the sexual acts themselves to satisfy the statute's communication requirement.

The statute provides:

§ 6318. Unlawful contact with minor.
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if the person is intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of duties who has assumed the identity of a minor or of another individual having direct contact with children, as defined under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a) (relating to definitions), for the purpose of engaging in an activity prohibited under any of the following, and either the person initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this Commonwealth:
(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses).
(2) Open lewdness as defined in section 5901 (relating to open lewdness).
(3) Prostitution as defined in section 5902 (relating to prostitution and related offenses).
(4) Obscene and other sexual materials and performances as defined in section 5903 (relating to obscene and other sexual materials and performances).
(5) Sexual abuse of children as defined in section 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children).
(6) Sexual exploitation of children as defined in section 6320 (relating to sexual exploitation of children).
(b) Grading.--A violation of subsection (a) is:
(1) an offense of the same grade and degree as the most serious underlying offense in subsection (a) for which the defendant contacted the minor; or
(2) a felony of the third degree; whichever is greater.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 criminalizes being “in contact with” a minor for purposes such as engaging in a prohibited sexual act. Historically, courts, including the Pennsylvania Superior Court, have interpreted this statute as focused on communication — either verbal, written, or non-verbal cues that facilitate the illegal conduct. The Superior Court, however, upheld the defendant’s conviction in this case even though he did not say anything, reasoning that non-communicative physical acts, such as manipulating clothing before the assault, were sufficient to fulfill the statute's requirements.

However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed. The Court found that the statute was ambiguous, and therefore an analysis of what exactly it covers required looking at the legislative intent behind it. Further, the Court found that the legislative intent behind § 6318 focused on criminalizing communication aimed at facilitating sexual exploitation, rather than physical actions alone. The analysis delved into both statutory language and legislative history, concluding that while "contact" can imply physical touch in other contexts, its interpretation within § 6318 should remain tied to prior communication.

The Legislative and Judicial Context

The majority opinion highlighted that § 6318, as conceived, aimed to address the risks posed by communication—whether through digital means or in-person interactions—that predators might use to groom or manipulate minors. Legislative debates leading to the statute’s enactment emphasized combating "cyber enticers," reflecting an emphasis on communicative acts over physical ones. In other words, the Legislature clearly enacted the statute to criminalize the type of behavior at issue in shows like To Catch a Predator. The statute is designed to make it illegal to contact minors to set up illegal sexual encounters; it does not criminalize the illegal sexual encounter itself because other statutes already do that. The Court therefore held that the Superior Court erred by conflating physical contact with communicative efforts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized that § 6318 is not designed to criminalize physical acts alone, as those are addressed by other statutes.

This interpretation aligns with some prior Superior Court rulings like Commonwealth v. Leatherby which required clear evidence of communication intended to facilitate sexual offenses. In this defendant’s case, however, the Court noted that although his actions were egregious, there was no evidence of verbal or non-verbal communication facilitating the assaults during the incidents in question. It is now clear that the statute is not violated by evidence of the illegal physical contact alone. Other statutes are violated, but the unlawful contact statute is not.

The Takeaway

The PA Supreme Court's decision to vacate the defendant’s conviction for unlawful contact did not affect his convictions for other sexual offenses, but it does not limit what had become an overly broad reach for this particular statute. If someone gropes a minor, then the appropriate charge for that is indecent assault. If someone communicates with a minor online or by text message to facilitate a groping, then the appropriate charge is unlawful contact even if the groping never happens. If the groping then happens, then the defendant could be charged with both unlawful contact and indecent assault. But it is now clear that unlawful contact may not be proven through evidence of the groping alone.

This is an important case because unlawful contact is a serious charge; it often carries more time in prison or more serious Megan’s Law requirements than the underlying sex offense. This opinion clarifies the scope of § 6318, reinforcing its focus on criminalizing communication intended to exploit minors rather than physical actions associated with sexual offenses. It underscores the need for clear evidence of communication to sustain a conviction under this statute.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein Criminal Defense Lawyer — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire