Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/28/21 Zak Goldstein 10/28/21

PA Supreme Court: New Claims of Ineffective Assistance of PCRA Counsel May Be Raised on Appeal

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Bradley, holding that a petitioner who has had a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition (“PCRA”) denied by the Court of Common Pleas and who has retained new counsel may raise new claims relating to PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness while still on appeal from the denial of the PCRA Petition. This is a dramatic change in Pennsylvania PCRA practice because Pennsylvania previously provided almost no protections against the ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel. Instead, a criminal defendant who sought to challenge his or her sentence due to the ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel would have to wait until after the PCRA appeal was denied to file a habeas petition in federal courts. The federal procedural rules are extremely difficult to navigate, and federal courts are often hostile to these claims. This decision could provide some benefit to PCRA petitioners who may have received the ineffective assistance of counsel from their PCRA attorney. This is unfortunately a common occurrence.

What is a PCRA?

The most common use of the PCRA is for a criminal defendant who has lost his or her direct appeal to seek a new trial or sentencing based on the ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. For example, if trial counsel failed to call critical defense witnesses, object to improper jury instructions, or litigate a meritorious motion to suppress, then the defendant can file a PCRA petition asking the trial judge to overturn the conviction because had the trial lawyer done their job properly, the defendant would have won the case or received a better outcome.

In order to win a PCRA Petition, a petitioner must show that a claim has arguable merit, prior counsel had no reasonably strategic basis for what they did or failed to do, and that the petitioner suffered prejudice from counsel’s failure. Prejudice essentially means that the mistake could have lead to a different outcome. Thus, a PCRA Petition in a rape case could allege that a defense attorney who represented a defendant who had no criminal record at the time of trial should have called character witnesses to testify about the defendant’s excellent reputation in the community for being a peaceful, law-abiding person. Character evidence is really important, and defense attorneys frequently do not understand their obligation to present this evidence on behalf of their clients. In such a case, the defendant could receive a new trial due to the attorney’s failure.

Prior to this decision, however, if the defendant filed a PCRA and did not mention character witnesses but should have, then the defendant would not be able to raise that issue on appeal from the denial of some other claim even if the defendant changed lawyers for the appeal and it was obvious that the defendant had those witnesses available. Instead, the defendant had to wait until the PCRA appeals were denied and potentially file a habeas petition in federal court.

The Change in PCRA Procedure

Under Bradley, however, the defendant may now raise the claims directly in the Pennsylvania Superior Court even if they were not raised in the trial court. If the claim can be resolved without any need to develop a record at an evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court can rule on the claim. If the claim suggests that the trial court needs to make an evidentiary record, then the Superior Court may remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas for that Court to receive evidence and make an initial ruling. The appeal would then begin again if either side is unhappy with the outcome. This means that some claims may now be addressed on appeal in the Superior Court, preventing the need for these claims to be raised for the first time years later in the federal courts which often do not particularly want to hear them. That provides some benefit to defendants.

Will this affect federal habeas corpus litigation?

There are some concerns about whether this will limit a petitioner’s ability to seek relief in federal court. Currently, defendants may file a habeas petition to challenge their state conviction in federal court and allege the ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel. Thus, if the PCRA lawyer from the prior example failed to raise the character issue and the federal lawyer realized that the PCRA lawyer should have done so, the federal lawyer could allege in federal court that PCRA counsel was ineffective in failing to bring a PCRA against trial counsel for failing to call character witnesses.

Under a relatively recent case called Martinez v. Ryan, the federal courts would then generally review a claim of this nature on the merits. The federal courts, however, would not review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate PCRA counsel. That means that all of this is very complicated - will the federal courts continue to allow merits review of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel claims given that those claims may now be raised in the Superior Court? Could the Martinez rule be extended to appellate counsel? Or will the federal courts find that now that Pennsylvania has provided a mechanism for challenging PCRA counsel’s performance on appeal, it is no longer necessary for them to get involved? The answers to these questions are not clear.

What should I do if my direct appeal has been denied and I want to keep fighting?

Ultimately, criminal appeals, PCRAs, and federal habeas petitions are very complicated. They are all particularly specialized areas of law. In general, a criminal defendant has about a year (sometimes slightly more) from the denial of the appeals to begin the PCRA or federal habeas process. These deadlines are for real, and so it is extremely important that if you are serving a long sentence, have lost your appeal, and want to continue to fight your case, that you contact an attorney who regularly litigates PCRA and habeas petitions and appeals. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers are well versed in this area of the law and are happy to discuss whether you may have a viable claim on appeal or that you received the ineffective assistance of counsel.

Read the case

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Zak Goldstein 10/21/21 Zak Goldstein 10/21/21

PA Superior Court: Police Must Obtain “Meaningful Consent” Before Searching a Cell Phone Without a Warrant

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Gallagher, holding that the trial court properly suppressed evidence collected from a defendant’s phone because the Commonwealth had not established that the defendant provided “meaningful consent to the invasive search it performed.” In this case, the defendant had actually consented to a search, but the Superior Court ultimately found that the extraction of the full contents of the phone exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent. Therefore, the evidence should be suppressed.

Commonwealth v. Gallagher

An officer with the Adams Township Police Department responded to a 911 dispatch from a 16-year-old female caller reporting that she had been the victim of an attempted kidnapping and had escaped and was in hiding. She testified that she also had suffered a head injury. The officer drove to the complainant’s stated location and found her. According to the officer, she was “hysterical, panicky, and scared.” The complainant told the officer that she had been picked up in McKeesport by the defendant and his friend. They stopped at a gas station and at a cemetery where they drank alcohol. Afterwards, they went to meet a friend. She did not remember anything else. She claimed that she woke up on the side of a road with someone on top of her and their hand down the front of her pants. She also claimed that her pants and underwear were pulled down. She then ran away and hid in the woods.

The complainant said the defendant was the one on top of her. She was eventually transported to a local hospital to conduct a sexual assault examination. An unknown amount of time later, the defendant was arrested under suspicion for driving under the influence. He was given his Miranda rights and interviewed for about an hour and a half. During the interrogation, a detective asked the defendant if he could look at his cell phone. The defendant did not object and showed the detective a picture of the two girls he was with the previous weekend. The defendant also signed a consent to the search of stored electronic media. The relevant part of this statement said “I [defendant] having been advised of my rights by [the police] consent to having my computer hardware and all equipment which can collect, analyze, create, display, convert, store, conceal, or transmit electronic, magnetic, optical, or similar computer impulses or data.” The police then seized evidence from the defendant’s phone.

Police eventually arrested the defendant and charged him with attempted rape and other offenses. The defendant filed a pretrial motion seeking suppression of evidence from the “phone dump” conducted by the police during the interview. At the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s pretrial suppression motion, suppressing all the evidence that was seized from the defendant’s cellphone. The Commonwealth filed an appeal and argued that this suppression order substantially handicapped its prosecution.

The Superior Court’s Panel Decision

On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that “[c]ommon sense and a view of the surrounding situation would indicate to any reasonable, semi-intelligent person that if a request is being made of him, the converse option is also a possible right available to him.” The defendant argued that the consent form that he signed “did not advise him what his rights where, and [the detective] never told him that he was free to leave and free to withhold consent.” A three-member panel of the Superior Court agreed with the defendant and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Commonwealth then filed an application for re-argument with a full panel of the Superior Court.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s En Banc Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Superior Court agreed with the trial court that “the Commonwealth did not establish that the defendant consented to the cell phone dump” and that the form used by detectives “fails to explain [the defendant’s] rights with regard to stored data.” Additionally, the form did not explain what the defendant was consenting to. Further, the detective asking the defendant “if he minded if we looked at his phone” did not make it clear that the police intended to do a complete data dump of his phone. Therefore, the defendant must still stand trial for the aforementioned charges, but the Commonwealth will not be allowed to use the evidence they obtained from his phone at trial.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

Zak Goldstein 10/15/21 Zak Goldstein 10/15/21

PA Superior Court Reins in Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Homicide Case

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Green, holding that the trial court improperly granted the Commonwealth’s Prior Bad Acts Motion in a homicide trial. The Superior Court found that the facts of the two cases were not sufficiently similar to justify introducing evidence that the defendant had previously committed another crime and therefore the defendant was unfairly prejudiced at trial. This case is very significant because prosecutors frequently attempt to introduce evidence of prior misconduct by the defendant in serious cases and courts routinely grant these motions. Once a jury learns that the defendant already has a criminal record, it becomes extremely difficult to obtain a fair trial. Therefore, it is very important the Superior Court has found a limit to what type of prior bad acts evidence prosecutors may introduce at trial.

Commonwealth v. Green

A woman was shot and killed in her convenience store in South Philadelphia. A man entered the decedent’s store, aimed a firearm at her, and shot her ten times. The man then fled the store. A short time later, the gunman, later identified as the defendant, was seen on video surveillance entering a black Chevrolet Impala located nearby.

A Philadelphia Police detective spoke to the defendant’s girlfriend. The girlfriend told the police about a night that happened six months prior to the murder. According to the girlfriend, the defendant left her alone in his house and after he left, the girlfriend spoke with the decedent’s grandson and they decided to steal the defendant’s favorite necklace. The girlfriend stole the defendant’s necklace and then gave it to the grandson to pawn. They then split the money and used it to buy drugs.

Four days after the shooting, the defendant was arrested and was charged with first-degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia, possession of an instrument of crime, and recklessly endangering another person. The Commonwealth filed a motion to introduce prior bad acts. Specifically, the Commonwealth sought to present evidence regarding an incident that took place 14 months prior to the murder. During this incident, the defendant allegedly had a physical altercation over a drug dispute with an individual named “Jay” and in retaliation, shot at “Jay’s” grandmother’s house. However, the defendant was not arrested regarding this incident. According to the Commonwealth, this showed that the defendant had a common scheme or plan of committing retribution against the grandmothers of those with whom he had drug disputes. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to admit the evidence of the prior shooting.

The defendant elected to proceed by jury trial and represented himself. During his first trial, the trial court declared a mistrial because the jury was unable to return a unanimous verdict. During the defendant’s second trial, he was found guilty of all charges. On the same day, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison. The defendant filed a post-sentence motion which was denied. The defendant filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised several issues, but for purposes of this blog, only the issue of whether the trial court improperly granted the Commonwealth’s prior bad acts motion will be addressed.

What is a Prior Bad Acts Motion?

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) is the relevant rule that governs prior bad acts motions. Rule 404(b) states:

1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.

Evidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the sole purpose of demonstrating a criminal defendant’s propensity to commit crimes. However, this type of evidence may be admissible in certain circumstances where it is relevant for some other legitimate purpose and not utilized solely to blacken a defendant’s character. Specifically, other crimes evidence is admissible if offered for a non-propensity purpose, such as proof of an actor’s knowledge, plan, motive, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. As such, when this evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose, evidence of prior crimes will be admissible if its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.

When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the common plan exception, the trial court must examine the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive. In making its decision, trial courts are supposed to consider the habits or patterns of actions undertaken by the defendant. Additionally, trial courts must also consider the time, place, and types of victims. Further, the common plan evidence must not be too remote in time to be probative to the instant matter.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court and granted the defendant a new trial. The Superior Court found that the two incidents were just too different, and therefore the trial court committed reversible error by granting the Commonwealth’s motion. Specifically, the Superior Court found that two different guns were used in the shootings; the defendant was not arrested in the prior bad acts motion shooting; the two shootings were 14 months apart; and in the prior bad acts shooting, only the door was shot. Because these two shootings were too distinctive from one another, the evidence of the prior shooting should not have been admitted at the trial. Therefore, the Court vacated the defendant’s judgment of sentence, and the defendant will receive a new trial.

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Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

Zak Goldstein 10/12/21 Zak Goldstein 10/12/21

PA Superior Court: Not Every Fatal Automobile Accident Is Criminal

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Fretts, holding that a defendant should not be charged with homicide by vehicle solely because the defendant committed traffic offenses prior to a fatal accident. Instead, the traffic offenses must have actually caused the accident, and the defendant must have acted recklessly. In other words, fatal accidents, no matter how tragic, are not always a crime.

Commonwealth v. Fretts

The defendant was driving a garbage truck in Philadelphia and struck a bicyclist. The defendant was making a right turn and the bicyclist was traveling straight when the accident occurred. There was no evidence that the defendant was speeding at the time of the accident. The intersection where the accident occurred is regulated by a traffic light and both the defendant and the bicyclist were proceeding into the intersection when the light was green. After the accident, the defendant remained at the scene and he was not issued any traffic citations. Unfortunately, the bicyclist died from his injuries. The defendant was then subsequently charged with homicide by vehicle, involuntary manslaughter, and reckless endangerment.

At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence to establish the above facts. Additionally, the Commonwealth played video of the incident. One of the videos showed that the bicyclist was in the defendant’s blind spot. The other video was video from the garbage truck. This video did not show the that defendant was distracted while driving the garbage truck, however it does show that the defendant failed to use a turn signal. Also, a photograph was presented that showed that the intersection had a bicycle lane and that there were signs that read “BEGIN RIGHT TURN LANE” and “YIELD TO BIKES.” For whatever reason, the Commonwealth did not formally submit the videos into evidence. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the municipal court judge ruled that the Commonwealth had presented enough evidence to establish a prima facie case for all charges.

The defendant then filed a pretrial Motion to Quash, asserting that the Commonwealth failed to make out a prima facie case against him and seeking to have the Court of Common Pleas dismiss all of the charges against him. The trial court granted the motion to quash and dismissed all of the charges against the defendant. The Commonwealth then filed a notice of appeal. The Superior Court granted the Commonwealth’s appeal and remanded the matter back to the trial court to consider the video evidence.

The court held a new hearing, and at this hearing, the trial court again dismissed the charge of homicide by vehicle because the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant acted recklessly. However, the trial court did not dismiss the charges of involuntary manslaughter or recklessly endangering another person. The Commonwealth then appealed to the Superior Court again. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that the trial court erred when it held that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case because the evidence showed that the defendant failed to yield the right-of-way to the bicyclist, interfered with her straight procession across the intersection, and failed to signal his turn.

What is Homicide by Vehicle?

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732 governs the crime of Homicide by Vehicle. The statute provides:

Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a felony of the third degree, when the violation is the cause of death.

This offense has three elements: 1) that the defendant violated a statute or ordinance relating to operating or use of a vehicle or regulation of traffic other than the driving under the influence statute; 2) that the violation caused the death of another person; and 3) that the defendant’s conduct was reckless or grossly negligent. The state of mind of gross negligence under the homicide by vehicle statute is the same as recklessness. A defendant acts recklessly when he had both the actual knowledge of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and disregarded that risk despite that knowledge.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision because the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant acted recklessly. According to the Superior Court, there was no evidence that the defendant knew that there was a bicyclist beside the truck when he made the right turn, no evidence that he failed to look before he made the turn, and no evidence that distracted driving caused the accident.

Additionally, the Superior Court was unpersuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument that because the defendant violated three sections of the Vehicle Code (failure to yield to a bicyclist, interference with the bicyclist’s straight procession through the intersection, and failure to use a turn signal), that these violations were sufficient to show that the defendant was acting recklessly. The Superior Court held that none of these violations were probative to show that there was a conscious knowledge of a substantial risk or conscious decision to act notwithstanding the risk. Therefore, the defendant will not be forced to stand trial against the charge of homicide by vehicle.