Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 5/8/21 Zak Goldstein 5/8/21

PA Superior Court: Nervousness and Fidgeting by Driver Do Not Justify Search of Car

Criminal Defense Lawyer.jpg — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mattis, holding that police cannot search a car during a routine traffic stop solely because the driver exhibited “extraordinary” nervousness and fidgeting. This case continues a recent trend of Pennsylvania appellate courts upholding the privacy rights of the Commonwealth’s citizens and seeking to rein in pretextual searches of people and automobiles, especially in marijuana cases.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and speeding in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. He moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that police had stopped him illegally and searched his car without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. In order to defend the legality of the search, the Commonwealth relied on the affidavit of probable cause for the defendant’s arrest and called the arresting State Trooper to testify.

The affidavit of probable cause indicated that a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper pulled the defendant over for driving 76 mph in a 55 mph zone. The defendant pulled over on command, and the trooper approached the vehicle. He obtained the defendant’s license and paperwork, but he noticed that the defendant was “extraordinarily nervous and fidgeting constantly.” He asked the defendant to get out of the vehicle. The defendant did so, and the Trooper asked for permission to search the car. The defendant gave him permission to search the car. Another Trooper was on scene and assisted with the stop. Police found marijuana, a pipe, and a grinder in the car. Fayette County apparently still prosecutes people for marijuana offenses.

The Motion to Suppress

The defendant filed a motion to suppress. He argued that the Trooper did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to prolong the stop beyond the initial purpose of investigating the speeding offense and that some nervousness and fidgeting did not justify any further investigation.

The Superior Court agreed. The Court recognized that police may stop a vehicle for a traffic infraction as the Trooper did here. However, once the purpose of the initial, valid, traffic stop has ended and a reasonable person would have believed he was free to leave, a second round of questioning with some official restriction on a person’s freedom of movement requires reasonable suspicion of some other crime for it to be justified. As a general rule, police may order the occupants of a vehicle to exit that vehicle for safety reasons during a legitimate traffic stop. But police may not extend the stop longer than necessary, and nervousness alone does not justify reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention or prolonging a stop.

Here, the Trooper testified that he made contact with the defendant and the defendant was nervous and fidgeting around in the vehicle. He confirmed that the defendant did not have any warrants and that he had valid paperwork for the car.

But without any additional reason, he then ordered the defendant to exit the vehicle. Most importantly, the Trooper retained possession of the defendant’s paperwork. The defendant was not free to leave because he obviously could not leave without his driver’s license. The Trooper, while still in possession of the documents, asked the defendant if he could search the car. The defendant granted permission.

The Court suppressed the resulting evidence because it found that the Trooper had improperly extended the stop. Although the Trooper had the right to ask the defendant to exit the vehicle as a general rule, he did so because of the defendant’s nervousness and not because of anything related to the speeding investigation. Because he held onto the paperwork, the defendant was not free to leave. Therefore, the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, and the Court ruled that the evidence should be suppressed because the consent given was not constitutionally valid.

The Superior Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial without the illeglaly seized evidence. The Commonwealth will likely have to withdraw the charges.

Need a criminal defense lawyer? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/6/21 Zak Goldstein 5/6/21

PA Superior Court: DUI With Child In Car Not Automatically Endangering Welfare of Child

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett, holding that evidence that a defendant drove a vehicle with a child in the car while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance is insufficient to support a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child without some evidence of actual reckless driving. The mere act of driving under the influence will no longer support a conviction for this charge. Instead, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant was unable to safely drive. Typically, the Commonwealth would try to show this by introducing evidence that the defendant actually operated the car in an unsafe manner.

Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett

A Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper was patrolling in a marked police cruiser when he observed a white BMW that did not have an inspection sticker on its windshield. The Trooper began following the vehicle and activated his lights. The vehicle pulled over and upon approaching the vehicle, the Trooper smelled a strong odor of marijuana. The defendant was driving the vehicle. The defendant’s girlfriend and their three-month-old baby were also in the vehicle. The Trooper proceeded to search the vehicle. He discovered a digital scale and an “empty twisted corner of a baggie” which, according to the Trooper, often contains some sort of controlled substance. A bag of marijuana was found in the girlfriend’s pants, and the defendant admitted it belonged to him.

The Trooper also performed field sobriety tests on the defendant. According to the Trooper, the field sobriety tests that were performed on the defendant could detect whether someone was under the influence of marijuana. The defendant later admitted to smoking marijuana. The defendant was then arrested. He also consented to a blood draw which showed that he had forty nanograms of the inactive metabolite of marijuana in his system. The defendant was subsequently charged with DUI (a)(1), DUI (d)(2), and EWOC.

The defendant elected to proceed by jury trial. He was acquitted of DUI (a)(1), but was convicted on the other two charges and then sentenced to 42 to 96 months’ incarceration. The defendant then filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied. He filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised two issues. Only the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime of EWOC will be addressed in this blog.

What is EWOC?

18 Pa.C.S. § 4304 (a)(1) governs the crime of EWOC as it relates to parents. It states:

“[a] parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or supervises such a person, commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.” It is a specific intent offense which was enacted in broad terms to safeguard the welfare and security of children. To be convicted for EWOC, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant’s actions amounted to a “knowing violation of a duty of care.”

The Superior Court has adopted a three-prong standard to determine whether the Commonwealth has met its burden to convict a defendant of EWOC. First, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant is aware of his/her duty to protect the child. Next, the Commonwealth must show that the child is in circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare. Finally, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant failed to act or has taken action so lame or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child’s welfare.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the defendant’s EWOC conviction. The Superior Court held that just because the defendant was impaired, he did not knowingly place his child in danger by driving with the child in the vehicle. The Superior Court highlighted the fact that the record omitted any allegations of unsafe driving by the defendant. Therefore, the evidence was not sufficient to support the EWOC conviction. Consequently, the defendant’s conviction for EWOC will be vacated and he will get a new sentencing hearing.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein 4/27/21 Zak Goldstein 4/27/21

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Brady Violation Does Not Bar Re-Trial in Federal Court

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the case of United States v. Brown, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution does not bar a subsequent prosecution when a prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to provide exculpatory evidence prior to the first trial.

United States v. Brown

In 1995, firefighters responded to a fire at the defendant’s residence. At the time, the defendant was 17 years old, and he lived there with his mother and several family members. After arriving on scene, six firefighters entered the basement where the fire had originated. Several of the firefighters became trapped and died when a staircase collapsed. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) opened an investigation. Chemical samples from the basement confirmed the presence of gasoline and investigators located a gas can close to what an expert testified was the fire’s origin. ATF concluded that the fire was intentionally set and offered a $15,000 reward for information leading to arrest and conviction. The police suspected the defendant started the fire at his mother’s direction to collect on a renter’s insurance policy.

The defendant was subsequently charged with three counts of second-degree murder, two counts of arson, and one count of insurance fraud in state court. Local, state, and federal authorities formed a joint prosecution team which consisted of an Assistant District Attorney for Allegheny County and an Assistant U.S. Attorney. At trial, the defendant argued that he could not have set the fire because he had been shopping with his mother when the fire started. However, the prosecutors called witnesses who came forward with testimony undermining the defendant’s alibi. During the trial, the witnesses denied receiving payment and that they were promised payment in exchange for their testimony. The jury found the defendant guilty of the aforementioned charges and he was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment for each murder conviction and a consecutive term of 7.5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the arson conviction.

A few months after the trial, the defendant filed post-sentence motions arguing that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the ATF agents had offered money to potential witnesses. The trial court denied this request. The defendant also filed various appeals with the Pennsylvania Superior Court. He was able to get one of his murder convictions vacated, but he was unsuccessful in obtaining relief for his other convictions. The defendant then filed a habeas petition claiming that the prosecution failed to disclose that it had paid witnesses to testify against him. At the hearing, the Commonwealth’s attorney said that he had reviewed ATF records and contacted the prosecutors and had not seen any record of witness payment. The habeas court denied the defendant’s petition and request for an evidentiary hearing.

Nearly a decade later, the defendant filed a petition in state court under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) alleging that newly discovered evidence based on an expert opinion about the cause of the fire. Additionally, a non-profit organization filed a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request with the ATF seeking all recordings relating to the payment of reward money in the defendant’s case. The ATF provided two canceled checks showing that it had made payments of $5,000 and $10,000 relating to the fire. The non-profit then contacted one of the witnesses who said he had received $5,000 from an ATF agent after the defendant’s trial.

Armed with this information, the defendant filed a new PCRA petition alleging newly discovered facts in the form of a Brady violation. The PCRA court found that the defendant’s claim about the prosecution’s nondisclosure of the witnesses’ rewards satisfied the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar and granted the defendant a new trial. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed this decision. Upon remand to the state trial court, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges on double-jeopardy grounds. While that motion was pending, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant, charging him with destruction of property by fire resulting in death. The Commonwealth then filed a motion to nolle pros the state charges. The state court granted the motion to dismiss the state charges.

The defendant then moved to dismiss the federal indictment on Double Jeopardy grounds. Specifically, the defendant argued that his state prosecution was “a tool of the federal authorities.” The Government argued that the dual-sovereignty principle applied. That rule allows the federal and state governments to charge a defendant for the same crime. After hearing arguments, the federal District Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that the dual-sovereignty principle allowed the defendant’s case to go forward in federal court. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit denied the defendant’s appeal. The Double Jeopardy Clause says that no personal shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” However, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against a second prosecution for the same offense is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. One, obviously, is the dual-sovereignty principle. Another exception is that a prosecutor can retry a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack. This is referred to as the “trial-error rule.” In the instant case, the Third Circuit said the dual-sovereignty principle was not applicable to the defendant’s case, but rather the trial-error rule.

The trial-error rule allows the prosecution to retry a defendant where the conviction is reversed due to trial error such as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence or incorrect jury instructions. Paradoxically, the Third Circuit also categorizes prosecutorial misconduct as a “trial-error.” In other words, according to the Third Circuit, a prosecutor can commit some type of misconduct (i.e. withhold exculpatory evidence) and that will not necessarily bar them from retrying a defendant. However, there is an exception to this rule that if the prosecutor attempted to goad a defendant into asking for a mistrial because they feared an acquittal and the mistrial was granted, then Double Jeopardy could apply. According to the Third Circuit, “the Fifth Amendment does not permit such gamesmanship.”

The Third Circuit found that this exception did not apply in this case. Although the prosecution had failed to provide the defense with discovery, the prosecution had not done so with the intent to prove a mistrial. Therefore, the mistrial exception did not apply in this case. The government will therefore be able to try the defendant in federal court.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein 4/9/21 Zak Goldstein 4/9/21

PA Supreme Court: Separate Conviction for Related Traffic Ticket Bars Prosecution for All Other Charges

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson, holding that a defendant cannot be tried for a felony case if his traffic offense that arose out of the same criminal transaction was adjudicated. This decision is significant and it could result in hundreds of felony cases being dismissed. As a practical matter, it is unclear on how much of an effect it will have on future cases because the Philadelphia Police Department no longer issues a traffic citation when they also arrest a defendant for a non-traffic offense. Nonetheless, this will have a positive impact on many individuals who have outstanding felony cases in Philadelphia.

Commonwealth v. Johnson

The defendant was stopped for a traffic stop and was charged with driving with a suspended license, possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), and the knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance (“K/I”). The defendant was subsequently found guilty, in absentia, of the summary traffic offense. His other charges were not adjudicated. The defendant then subsequently filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (“Section 110”) requires that the government bring all known charges against a defendant arising out of a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district in a single proceeding. In other words, the defendant argued that when he was found guilty of the traffic offense, he could no longer be prosecuted because he had already been found guilty of a criminal offense that arose from this transaction. The trial court was not persuaded and denied his motion. The defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal.

Some insight into how Philadelphia Courts operate is necessary to understand this decision. First, Philadelphia Traffic Court was merged into Municipal Court in 2013 and thus became the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court. Next, in Philadelphia, the Municipal Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal offenses that are punishable up to five years. As an example, a defendant cannot plead guilty to an F1 Robbery in front of a Municipal Court judge because the court does not have jurisdiction to accept that guilty plea. Further, a defendant cannot have a trial for F1 Robbery for the same reason. In the instant case, the defendant was charged with PWID and because he was accused of distributing heroin, the maximum sentence (assuming it was his first PWID conviction) was fifteen years’ incarceration. Consequently, the Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s PWID charge at the trial stage. However, the Municipal Court did have jurisdiction to adjudicate his K/I charge because the maximum sentence he could have received was three years’ incarceration (assuming he had a prior K/I conviction) and thus that charge fell within the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction.

On appeal at the Superior Court, the Commonwealth acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto held that Section 110 generally prohibits the government from proceeding with a prosecution subject to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Commonwealth conceded that they could not prosecute the defendant for the K/I charge because it fell within the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction. However, the Commonwealth argued that because the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over the PWID, then the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss for that claim. In defense of this position, the Commonwealth invoked Section 112(1) of the Crimes Code which states “[a] prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of [Section 110] under any of the following circumstances…(1) [t]he former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant of the offense.” In other words, their argument was that Section 112 applied to the defendant’s case because Municipal Court could not adjudicate the defendant’s PWID charge and it was irrelevant that his traffic case had already been adjudicated.

The Superior Court was persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision with respect to the PWID charge. The defendant then lodged an application for re-argument which was denied by the Superior Court. The defendant then subsequently filed a petition for allowance of appeal to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hear the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The issue for this decision is which offense applies for Section 112. Is it the first offense (in this case the traffic charge) or the subsequent offense (the PWID charge)? The defendant argued that Section 112 bars subsequent prosecutions when the previous court had jurisdiction over the first case whereas the Commonwealth argued that prosecution should not be barred if the original court does not have jurisdiction over the subsequent offense.

In making its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked at the legislative history of Sections 110 and 112, appellate decisions that addressed these rules, and it analyzed the Model Penal Code which Section 112 was derived from. Based on this analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and determined that Section 112 was not applicable to the PWID charge because the Traffic Division did have jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s traffic case. As such, because Section 112 did not apply to his case, Section 110 did apply to the defendant’s PWID charge and therefore his case will be remanded back to the trial court for formal dismissal.