Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 4/2/21 Zak Goldstein 4/2/21

PA Supreme Court: Nanny Cams Do Not Violate the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mason, holding that “nanny cams” do not violate the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act (“Wiretap Act”). This decision is significant because so many parents utilize these cameras when they employ caretakers to watch their children. Therefore, these caretakers should be mindful of this and understand that they will not be able to rely on the stringent protections of the Wiretap Act to protect them if they are subsequently prosecuted for crimes arising out of secret recordings made while they are working.

Commonwealth v. Mason

The defendant was hired as a nanny for a parent who lived in Franklin County, PA. During the hiring process, the parent told the defendant that she could not use corporal punishment on her children. Approximately one month after the defendant was hired, the parent’s three-year-old son told him that the defendant was “thumbing” him in the face and hitting his twin two-year-old sisters. The parent had previously noticed that his son had marks on his face and that one of the twins had a “busted lip.” When asked about his daughter’s injured lip, the defendant initially offered no explanation. However, the defendant later suggested that she may have injured herself while attempting to climb out of her playpen. The parent also asked why his son accused the defendant of “thumbing” him and striking the twins, and the defendant stated she did not know why such allegations were being made.

In response to these allegations, the parent placed a secret camera in his children’s bedroom which was capable of capturing sound and video of its surroundings. Notably, the parent did not tell the defendant that he placed the camera in the bedrooms. At some point, the camera recorded the defendant yelling at one of the children before she forcefully placed the child in their crib. Audio portions of the recording suggested that the defendant may have struck the child several times. The parent then gave the recordings to the police.

The defendant was subsequently charged with aggravated assault, simple assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. The defendant filed a habeas corpus petition to dismiss the aggravated assault charge, which was granted. She then filed an omnibus pretrial motion to suppress the audio and video recordings captured by the hidden cameras. In support of her motion, the defendant invoked the Wiretap Act, arguing that the parent had illegally intercepted her electronic and oral communications. A hearing was held to determine whether to grant the defendant’s motion. At the hearing, the parent was the sole witness called who testified to the above facts. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The Commonwealth then filed a timely interlocutory appeal arguing that the trial court’s decision would substantially handicap its case.

The Superior Court’s Opinion

A divided Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s suppression order. The lead opinion held that the verbal utterances captured by the cameras were to be excluded because there had been no judicial authorization or applicable exception to the Wiretap Act to permit their use at trial. Further, the lead opinion held that the defendant had no reason to believe her statements would be recorded and thus had a “justified expectation that she would not be audio recorded.” The Superior Court did reverse the trial court and held that the video, sans audio, could be used by the Commonwealth in its trial. The Commonwealth then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hear the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to take the case, and on appeal it addressed two issues: whether a babysitter has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bedroom of a child she is caring for and whether the sounds coming from a child constitute oral communications under the Wiretap Statute.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and held that the Commonwealth could use the recordings (both audio and visual) against the defendant at her trial. According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in order to succeed in her claim that these recordings should be deemed inadmissible at her trial, the defendant would have had to establish that she possessed a justifiable expectation that her oral communications would not have been intercepted. Based on its review of the record, the Court determined that the defendant did not meet her burden. Specifically, the Court held that the use of these cameras is so widespread that they even have a name (nanny cams) and thus no reasonable nanny should assume that they are not being recorded while performing their duties. As such, the Commonwealth will be able to use these recordings in their trial against the defendant.

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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 3/13/21 Zak Goldstein 3/13/21

PA Superior Court: It's Possible to Conspire to Commit Involuntary Manslaughter

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Arrington, holding that a defendant can be found guilty of committing the crime of conspiracy to commit involuntary manslaughter. The court reached this conclusion despite conspiracy being a specific intent crime. The decision makes no sense - involuntary manslaughter is an unintended homicide. Conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a particular crime. Thus, conspiracy to commit an involuntary manslaughter requires an agreement to commit an unintended homicide. Such an agreement, of course, is impossible. Nonetheless, the Superior Court has approved of this charge.

Commonwealth v. Arrington

The defendant contacted an individual and offered to sell him heroin. This individual resided in Clarion County. This individual did not have any money to buy drugs, so he contacted the decedent because he would routinely buy drugs for the individual. The decedent also lived in Clarion County. The individual and the decedent then drove to Pittsburgh to meet with the defendant and bought drugs 30 bags of heroin that was laced with fentanyl from the defendant. The decedent gave the individual five bags and kept 25 for himself. The individual then dropped the decedent off at his home that he shared with his girlfriend.

One night, after the girlfriend returned home from work, she found the decedent dead, lying face down on their living room floor. Investigators located 21 bags of heroin in the decedent’s pants pockets and ruled that he had died from a fentanyl overdose. After the decedent’s death, the police were able to locate the individual. The individual agreed to serve as a confidential informant for the Clarion County Police Department. At the police’s direction, the individual purchased heroin from the defendant in Pittsburgh. He performed another controlled buy from the defendant five days later.

The defendant was then subsequently arrested and was charged with involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy to commit involuntary manslaughter, and Drug Delivery Resulting in Death. The defendant elected to proceed by jury trial where he was found guilty of the aforementioned crimes. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 11 ½ to 23 years’ incarceration. The defendant filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied. He then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised several issues. For purposes of this blog, only the issue of whether conspiracy to commit involuntary manslaughter is a cognizable offense in Pennsylvania will be addressed.

What is Involuntary Manslaughter?

18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2504 is the statute that governs the crime of involuntary manslaughter. It provides:

A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.

Practically, this is an easier crime for the Commonwealth to prove in comparison to First-Degree Murder. Why? Because to convict a defendant of First-Degree Murder, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant specifically intended to kill someone. Whereas for Involuntary Manslaughter, the Commonwealth only needs to prove that the defendant was acting reckless or in a grossly negligent way.

What is Conspiracy?

18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903 is the statute that governs the crime of conspiracy. To sustain a conviction for the crime of conspiracy, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant 1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person(s), 2) with a shared criminal intent, and 3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is known as a “specific intent” crime, which are the hardest crimes for the Commonwealth to prove because they must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually intended to commit the crime.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the defendant’s conviction. In his appeal, the defendant argued that because conspiracy is a specific intent crime and involuntary manslaughter involves an unintentional death, a person cannot conspire to commit involuntary manslaughter because one cannot intend to commit an unintentional act. The Superior Court rejected this argument. The Court cited previous decisions where Pennsylvania appellate courts have found that a defendant can be found guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime that resulted in an unintentional consequence. Further, the Superior Court has held that an individual can commit the crime of conspiracy to commit drug delivery resulting in death.

According to the Court, it is sufficient to be found guilty of conspiracy to commit drug delivery resulting in death if the Commonwealth is able to prove that a defendant delivered drugs to an individual and that individual died as a result of using said drugs. Therefore, using this logic, the Superior Court found that “when a defendant acts with another to intentionally commit an unlawful act characterized by the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk…that results in a death that was a natural and probable result of that act, the defendant is guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Involuntary Manslaughter.” Additionally, the Superior Court denied his other issues he raised on appeal. Consequently, the defendant will not get any relief and, barring further appeals, will be forced to serve the remainder of his sentence.

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Zak Goldstein 3/4/21 Zak Goldstein 3/4/21

PA Superior Court: No Probable Cause from Marijuana Odor to Search Parked Car

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The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Grooms, holding that the smell of marijuana alone does not establish probable cause to search a parked automobile. This decision is significant because it adds to a growing list of appellate decisions that restrict the police’s authority to search a person’s property because the police smelled the odor of marijuana. Hopefully, this trend persists and the Superior Court continues producing opinions similar to Grooms.

Commonwealth v. Grooms

Swatara Township police officers were on routine patrol at the Harrisburg Mall. According to the officers, the Harrisburg Mall parking lot is a high-drug area and they frequently make narcotics arrests there. The officers were walking through the parking lot where they came across an unrelated individual who they subsequently arrested for possession of marijuana. They arrested this individual about three rows away from the defendant’s vehicle.

After they were done with that arrest, they continued their patrol where they detected an odor of marijuana coming from the defendant’s vehicle. The officers then approached the vehicle and confirmed that they were smelling “fresh” marijuana emanating from the defendant’s vehicle. They then shined their flashlights into the vehicle to observe any contraband in plain view, but did not see any contraband. The police then tried to open the defendant’s car door, but it was locked. The officers then retrieved their lockout tool to unlock the vehicle. Once inside the vehicle, they said the odor of marijuana was stronger. While searching the vehicle they located two bags of marijuana, a marijuana-filled cigar, crack cocaine and some ecstasy. At no point did the police obtain a search warrant. Shortly after they finished their search, they saw the defendant and a woman walking up to the vehicle. The defendant then told the police that “anything found in the car was his.” The defendant was arrested and charged with criminal use of a communication facility, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of cocaine and methamphetamine.

The defendant then filed a motion to suppress alleging that the police lacked probable cause to search his car. At the hearing, the above facts were placed on the record. During cross-examination, the officers conceded that they searched the defendant’s vehicle solely because they smelled marijuana coming from the defendant’s vehicle. The officers also conceded that they only waited a few minutes before they began searching the defendant’s car because their shift was going to end soon. Finally, the officers acknowledged that dry-leaf marijuana was legal for medical purposes in Pennsylvania.

At the conclusion of arguments, the trial court denied his motion to suppress. The trial court justified this by stating that the “odor of marijuana alone may establish probable cause.” The defendant then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial where the defendant was found guilty of the aforementioned crimes. He was then sentenced to 30 to 60 months’ imprisonment. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. In its decision, the Superior Court held that the odor of marijuana alone does not establish probable cause, but instead is a factor that may contribute to a finding of probable cause when assessed under the totality-of-the circumstances.

The reason for this is because of the passage of the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”) which legalized dry leaf marijuana for medicinal purposes. The Superior Court acknowledged that because of the MMA there would be “hundreds of thousands of Pennsylvanians” who could potentially be emitters of marijuana odor. Thus, it would be improper to subject law-abiding citizens to police detention solely on the basis of the odor of marijuana.

This was the logic in Commonwealth v. Barr. In that case, the police conducted a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped vehicle after they detected an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. In Barr, the Superior Court held that the odor of marijuana alone, absent any other circumstances, could not establish probable cause because so many Pennsylvanians lawfully possess marijuana. Thus, applying the logic of Barr, the Superior Court held that the trial court erred when it applied a per se rule that the smell of marijuana establishes probable cause. As such, the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed and his conviction is vacated.

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Zak Goldstein 3/2/21 Zak Goldstein 3/2/21

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein Wins Full Dismissal of First Degree Murder Charges

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won the full dismissal of first-degree murder charges in the case of Commonwealth v. DH. Prosecutors had charged DH with first degree murder, conspiracy, and firearms charges for a shooting incident which occurred in Philadelphia. The incident resulted in the death of one man and injuries to a surviving complainant.

DH retained Attorney Goldstein immediately upon learning that there were charges pending. Attorney Goldstein was able to help DH turn himself in safely and then moved for the charges to be dismissed at the preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence that DH was present while one of his friends got into a physical altercation with the surviving complainant. DH watched the fight, and during the fight, one of the men even dropped a cell phone. DH picked it back up and handed it to him. The fight ended, and the two groups separated.

Video evidence then showed that DH and the two co-defendants both got into the same car and began to drive away. The decedent and the surviving complainant began to walk away on foot. The video then showed the car, which DH was allegedly driving, parking near where the two victims were walking. Video then showed the two co-defendants following closely behind the two victims while DH walked even further behind. At some point, the two victims turned around, began to argue with the two co-defendants, and one of the co-defendants allegedly pulled a gun and began firing. Those shots killed the decedent and injured the surviving complainant. The video showed that the three men then fled the scene.

Prosecutors identified DH from the video evidence and charged him with first degree murder and related charges, arguing that he had conspired with the shooter to commit the murder because they were friends, had driven away in the same car, and had come back to the area together. Attorney Goldstein argued for a full dismissal at the preliminary hearing on the basis of the mere presence doctrine. Mere presence is a defense to a criminal conspiracy charge. Mere presence is the idea that just because someone is present at the scene of the crime or friendly with someone else who commits a crime does not mean that they are responsible for the actions of the other person.

Here, there was no evidence that DH actually knew or in any way encouraged the shooter to commit the homicide. Instead, the evidence showed only that they were friends and that DH was nearby when the co-defendant began shooting. Accordingly, the Municipal Court judge dismissed all charges except the firearms charge. DH was then released on bail. Attorney Goldstein subsequently filed a motion to quash the firearms charge, and the Court of Common Pleas granted that motion. Accordingly, all charges were dismissed, and DH is a free man.

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Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta