Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
US Supreme Court: Police Must Obtain Search Warrant for Cell Phone Location Data
The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Carpenter v. United States, holding that police must obtain a search warrant based on probable cause prior to getting cell phone location data from a cell phone provider. In Carpenter, law enforcement officers had obtained cell phone location data for the defendant which linked the defendant to various gunpoint robberies without a search warrant. Therefore, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
The Facts of Carpenter v. United States
In 2011, police arrested four men for robbing a number of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in Detroit. One of the men confessed that over the previous four months, the group (along with other individuals) had robbed nine different stories in Michigan and Ohio. The suspect identified 15 other people who had participated in the robberies. He gave the FBI some of their cell phone numbers. The FBI then reviewed his call records to identify additional numbers that he had called around the time of the robberies.
Based on this information, the FBI began to suspect Timothy Carpenter, the defendant, of participating in some of the robberies. The FBI obtained court orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone records for Carpenter and other suspects. That statute permitted the FBI to compel the disclosure of cell phone records from the cell phone provider based on a showing of specific and articulable facts that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the records sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. These court orders are not the same as a search warrant, and the showing necessary to obtain one is much lower than the probable cause standard which law enforcement officers must meet when seeking a search warrant.
The FBI agents obtained two orders from federal magistrate judges directing MetroPCS and Sprint to disclose cell site location data for Carpenter’s phones. The first order sought 152 days of cell-site records from MetroPCS, and MetroPCS produced 127 days worth of records. The second order directed Sprint to produce two days of records for when Carpenter’s phone was roaming in Ohio, and Sprint produced the two days worth of records. In total, the FBI obtained 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements – an average of 101 data points per day.
The Criminal Charges Against Carpenter
The Government eventually charged Carpenter in federal court with six counts of robbery and six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) and 1951(a). Prior to trial, Carpenter’s defense attorneys filed a motion to suppress the cell phone location data, arguing that the FBI violated the Fourth Amendment when it obtained the location data without a search warrant supported by probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Carpenter proceeded to trial, and seven of his co-conspirators testified against him. They indicated that he was the leader of the robbery operation. In addition, an FBI agent offered expert testimony regarding the cell phone data. The agent explained that each time a cell phone taps into a wireless network, the carrier logs a time-stamped record of the cell site and the particular sector that were used. With this information, the FBI agent was able to produce maps that placed Carpenter’s phone near the scene of four of the charged robberies. According to the Government, this data showed that Carpenter was right where the robbery occurred at the exact time of the robbery. The jury found Carpenter guilty of all of the charges except one of the gun charges, and the trial court sentenced him to more than 100 years in prison.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress. It held that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone location data because the information had been shared with his wireless carriers. Given that cell phone users voluntarily convey cell-site data to their carriers in order to use the phone, the court concluded that the business records produced by the carriers are not subject to Fourth Amendment protection on the basis that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in something that a person has shared with someone else.
The Supreme Court Appeal
Carpenter’s defense lawyers appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the case. In what it described as a narrow opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress the cell phone location data. The court noted a number of recent opinions in which the Fourth Amendment has been applied to protect not just places, but also other types of information that people would expect to be private. For example, in Kyllo v. United States, the court held that police could not use a thermal imager to detect heat radiating from the side a defendant’s home (as part of searching for a marijuana grow operation) without a search warrant. Likewise, in Riley v. United States, the court found that law enforcement generally must obtain a search warrant prior to searching a suspect’s cell phone and that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to a cell phone. Finally, in United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that police must obtain a search warrant prior to secretly planting a GPS tracker underneath a suspect’s car and monitoring the tracker for 28 days.
At the same time, the court noted that the third-party doctrine would normally defeat Carpenter’s claim. The third-party doctrine provides that police are not required to obtain a search warrant in order to obtain information which a person has voluntarily shared with third parties. Thus, police may obtain bank records via subpoena without obtaining a search warrant because a person has voluntarily shared their financial information with the bank. Likewise, police need not obtain a search warrant in order to obtain a list of outgoing phone numbers dialed on a landline telephone because the information provided by such a pen register is limited and the numbers are used by the telephone company for a variety of legitimate business purposes.
After analyzing these various cases, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the FBI should have obtained a search warrant for the cell phone data. Although the third-party doctrine has typically applied in cases such as this, where the defendant shared all of the information voluntarily with the cell phone companies, there is something different about a system that creates such a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s movements. Accordingly, given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. The court therefore held that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his or her physical movements as captured by the cell phone companies.
Although the court reversed the conviction in this case, it did note that the decision is meant to be a narrow one. It does not necessarily apply to real-time cell phone location data or “tower dumps” (a download of information on all of the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval). It should also not call into question the prior opinions on bank records and pen registers or prevent the use of evidence obtained from security cameras. Finally, it does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security, and there may also be situations in which exigent circumstances eliminate the need for a search warrant.
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Defenses to Aggravated Assault Charges in Pennsylvania
The following is an automated transcript of the video. Please excuse typos and otherwise errors as it was produced electronically and only lightly edited.
Hi, my name's Zak Goldstein, I'm a criminal defense attorney in Philadelphia with the law firm Goldstein Mehta LLC. We handle a lot of aggravated assault cases. And so that's the topic that I'm going to talk about today, which is aggravated assault. Now in general, Aggravated Assault is always a felony in Pennsylvania in state court, and there are three main types of aggravated assault that a criminal defendant could find themselves dealing with in Philadelphia and in counties throughout Pennsylvania. The first type is the most serious. It's a felony of the first degree, and when aggravated assault is charged as a felony of the first degree, then it typically involves serious bodily injury, meaning the defendant caused knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly caused or attempted to cause serious bodily injury to another person. Typically, that's going to involve either someone, someone really being injured, or it's going to involve a weapon.
So if you shoot somebody, if you stab somebody, multiple times, you know, you punch someone 100 times and bones are broken, that's usually going to be aggravated assault as a felony of the first degree. Now, the second type is aggravated assault involving law enforcement or other protected classes. It could be a correctional officer, police officer, a judge, public defender, district attorney, a Septa employee or a healthcare worker or doctor, all members of protected classes for the felony of the second degree, aggravated assault statute. In that case, it no longer has to be serious bodily injury. If you try to cause bodily injury or knowingly or intentionally, and it can't be reckless, meaning it can't be an accident, you can't just be flailing around. It's got to really be an attempt to, or something you meant to do. If you caused bodily injury or attempted to cause bodily injury to someone who's set out in the statute, like a police officer, then that is always a felony of the second degree. This is true even if that person just has some minor bruises or redness or swelling, it doesn't have to be a serious bodily injury.
And then the third type of aggravated assault is also a felony of the second degree. That's bodily injury with a deadly weapon. Meaning say you stab somebody in the arm and they're totally fine. They make a full recovery, they get a stitch or two, you know, it's not a major permanent injury, then that might just be bodily injury with a deadly weapon because the knife used for the stabbing a is a deadly weapon, but it's not serious bodily injury or business, not something that's going to permanently effect their lives. There was no risk that they were going to die. It's aggravated assault as a felony of the same with the grade. Now, for each of these charges, there are defenses.
You're charged in state court in Pennsylvania. You have the absolute right to a trial with a judge or the jury. In most cases you're also gonna have a preliminary hearing. And so with some of these aggravated assault charges, there are defenses even at the preliminary hearing level with the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly with aggravated assault as a felony of the first degree. Many times the winner of a flight gets charged with aggravated assault. The complainant will say, oh, I got punched, you know, five times, 10 times. I got punched a bunch of times in the head and the prosecution will try to argue that that's aggravated assault as a felony of the first degree. So in terms of the sufficiency defense, there's probably going to be a defense. Well, serious bodily injury was not caused. This person was not really injured and just punching or throwing some kicks is part of a fight, well, that's not an attempt to cause serious bodily injury, so the charge should be thrown out and should just be a simple assault even at a preliminary hearing where there's a relatively lower standard than at a trial.
In terms of sufficiency for the other statutes, there can be challenges to what the defendant actually intended to do. With the law enforcement, aggravated assault - It can't just be resisting arrest, it can't be flailing around trying not to be taken into custody. Even if a police officer ends up with some bruising, that has to be the defendant's goal and had to either be intentional or knowing. It can't just be something that happened because of reckless conduct. So that could be a defense to the aggravated assault as a felony of the second degree charge, and then there's also sufficiently defenses for the bodily injury with a deadly weapon type of aggravated assault, which can be challenging whether or not it was really a deadly weapon. You see a lot of felony two aggravated assaults where the prosecution and the police, they're never really quite sure what kind of weapon was involved.
Maybe it was a screwdriver, maybe the defendant was wearing a ring that led to a large cut. A deadly weapon has a very specific definition, which means it's either a firearm, whether loaded or unloaded. It's something that is a weapon like a knife. Otherwise, when it's some sort of random object, if it's a pen, a screwdriver, a plate, something that the defendant just grabbed, then it has to be used in a manner which was calculated to or likely to produce serious, uh, to produce death or serious bodily injury. So if an object is grabbed in the course of the fight, it is not automatically a deadly weapon. There has to be something about the object that makes it particularly deadly like a knife or a gun, or it has to be the way in which it was used. Sufficiency is often a potential defense in these types of cases, but there are also the other types of defenses that come in with, with any criminal case.
Aggravated Assault can be a charge for a shooting, in which case the defenses could be misidentification. That comes down to the credibility of the witnesses. Did the witnesses really point out the right person? There can be credibility defenses - are the witnesses telling the truth about what they saw or the truth about their injuries. Are they telling the truth that the defendant really tried to do this? And then there are other defenses that are, that are really case specific. That would be speedy trial defenses. The defendant is brought to trial fast enough. They're going to be motions to suppress evidence if the defendant is stopped by the police or questioned illegally without Miranda rights or questioned as part of an illegal stop. These are all potential defenses to aggravated assault charges and potential defenses in any case, because there's always the right to a jury, there's the right to a trial with a judge if you choose to go that route.
And then there are also the constitutional defenses such as the right to a speedy trial, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and the right to Miranda warnings. Now, we have handled countless aggravated assault cases, countless attempted murder cases, both as trials with judges and with juries. We have won full acquittals in aggravated assault and attempted murder cases. And if you were dealing with any type of assault charge or any type of criminal charge, we can help. Our criminal defense attorneys offer a free 15 minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. So, call us at 267-225-2545 discuss your case today.
PA Superior Court Recognizes Defendant’s Right to Present Personal Safety Defense in Fleeing or Eluding Case
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Weber, reversing Weber’s conviction for fleeing or eluding where the trial court precluded him from presenting the statutorily-recognized “personal safety defense."
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Weber
In Weber, the defendant was charged with fleeing or eluding police in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3733. At trial, police testified that they saw the defendant driving through an intersection in Pittsburgh at a high rate of speed. The officers were in uniform and driving a marked police vehicle. They followed the defendant and learned that his vehicle’s registration sticker had expired. When the defendant stopped at an intersection, the officers pulled up next to him and were able to see that his car had valid, but expired inspection and emission stickers, as well. Based on these observations, the officers decided to conduct a traffic stop. They activated their lights and sirens. The defendant eventually pulled over in a parking lot.
The officers exited their patrol car and approached the defendant’s car. One went to the driver’s side door and one went to the passenger side door. The officers testified that the defendant was nervous, acting kind of strangely, and told them that he did not have a license in this country. More officers arrived, and eventually one of the officers observed a large bulge in the defendant’s jacket. The defendant kept reaching for it, so the officers asked him if he had any weapons on him. He began to get very agitated, so the police told the defendant that they were going to have to remove him from the car. As they tried to remove him, the defendant took off at a high rate of speed, crossed four lanes of traffic, and ran a red light. Officers followed him for a while but eventually gave up the chase due to safety concerns. They later found the car abandoned. However, because they had already run his information through the system, they had his name and were able to get an arrest warrant. They arrested him five months later pursuant to the warrant and charged him with Fleeing or Eluding.
The defendant also tried to testify at trial. He testified that the officers were belligerent and kept punching his car right before he fled. He also tried to testify that he fled because he was afraid for his life, but the trial court precluded him from testifying to that effect. The court convicted him of fleeing and sentenced him to 9-18 months of incarceration followed by three years of probation. The defendant appealed.
The Criminal Appeal
The defendant appealed to the Superior Court. On appeal, he argued that the trial court deprived him of the right to a fair trial and due process by preventing him from raising the personal safety defense. In general, the fleeing statute provides:
“Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, commits an offense.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a).
In most cases, fleeing or eluding is a felony of the third degree. At the same time, the statute provides a specific defense to the charges:
"It is a defense to prosecution under this section if the defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to stop immediately for a police officer's vehicle was based upon a good faith concern for personal safety."
The statute provides a number of factors for a court to consider when evaluating whether the defendant had a good faith concern for personal safety. In determining whether the defendant has met this burden, the court may consider the following factors:
(i) The time and location of the event.
(ii) The type of police vehicle used by the police officer.
(iii) The defendant's conduct while being followed by the police officer.
(iv) Whether the defendant stopped at the first available reasonably lighted or populated area.
(v) Any other factor considered relevant by the court.
Prior to trial, the judge held a conference in chambers to discuss the case. The criminal defense lawyer told the judge that the defense intended to assert the personal safety defense through the cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and the testimony of the defendant. The trial judge, however, ruled that the court would not allow the defendant to assert the defense. Essentially, the trial judge conducted his own evaluation of the factors, compared that to the Commonwealth’s allegations, and found that the defendant could not credibly assert the defense. Therefore, the judge refused to instruct the jury on the availability of the defense and prevented the defendant from testifying that he fled because he was afraid that the officers were going to harm him.
PA Superior Court Recognizes the Personal Safety Defense in Fleeing Cases
The Superior Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and awarded him a new trial. The court found that the trial judge violated the defendant’s right to due process by preventing him from asserting a statutorily-available defense and testifying to his belief that he had to flee out of concerns for his own safety. The court found that the above factors are simply factors which the fact-finder, in this case the jury, must consider in deciding whether the defendant is entitled to the defense. They are not elements of the defense that must be met prior to trial – they are just things to consider when the jury is deliberating. Thus, the trial judge may not preclude a defendant from testifying and trying to establish a good faith fear for personal safety.
The court also noted that the defendant’s subjective belief, which would have been established through the defendant’s testimony, was relevant to the defense because in order to assert the defense, the defendant must actually hold the subjective belief that the police are going to harm him. At the same time, the defendant must also hold that belief in good faith. But part of analyzing whether the defendant holds the belief in good faith means allowing the defendant to testify as to what he thought would happen and why. The trial court erred by taking the above factors as a prerequisite to the defendant testifying instead of simply factors to consider. Accordingly, the court awarded the defendant a new trial and ordered that he be permitted to present a full defense.
Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We are experienced and understanding defense attorenys who will fight for you. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an attorney today.
PA Superior Court: Commonwealth Cannot Appeal Dismissal for Lack of Evidence at Preliminary Hearing, Must Re-File Instead
Commonwealth v. Perez
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Perez, holding that the Commonwealth may not file an interlocutory appeal following the dismissal of charges for lack of evidence at a preliminary hearing. The court held that the Commonwealth must instead re-file the charges and ask that a different magistrate hear the case.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Perez
In Perez, the defendant was charged with first-degree Murder and Possession of an Instrument of Crime (“PIC”). The Commonwealth filed the charges against the defendant in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, and the case was scheduled for a preliminary hearing before a Municipal Court judge. At the conclusion of the hearing, the MC judge dismissed the charges, finding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of Murder or PIC at the preliminary hearing.
The Commonwealth re-filed the charges. When the Commonwealth re-files on homicide charges in Philadelphia, the preliminary hearing takes place again before a judge in the Court of Common Pleas. When the Commonwealth re-files in the suburban counties, a different Magisterial District Justice, or sometimes even the same justice, will hear the case again. In this case, the Common Pleas homicide judge presided over the second preliminary hearing, and the Commonwealth presented additional evidence. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth presented additional evidence, the Common Pleas judge agreed that there was simply not enough evidence to find that the defendant committed the murder. The judge again dismissed the charges, and the Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court.
Why would a case get dismissed at the preliminary hearing?
In a criminal trial before a judge or a jury, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or the factfinder must acquit the defendant. The standard at a preliminary hearing, which typically occurs within the first few weeks or months of a case, is much lower. The Commonwealth must only show that a crime occurred and the defendant probably committed it. The Commonwealth is entitled to all reasonable inferences in its favor and in the suburban counties, may generally proceed entirely on hearsay presented by police officers. In Philadelphia, the Commonwealth generally cannot get away with proceeding entirely based on hearsay, but some hearsay is still allowed under the rules. If the Commonwealth fails to prove that it is more likely than not that the defendant committed the crime charged, then the court should dismiss the charge or reduce the gradation to the level that was proven by the prosecution.
Is the case over if it gets dismissed at a preliminary hearing?
There are two main reasons why a case would be dismissed at a preliminary hearing. First, if the prosecution is repeatedly not ready to proceed because witnesses have failed to appear, then the case could be dismissed for lack of prosecution (“DLOP”). In Philadelphia, this typically takes place when the Commonwealth is not ready to go three times in a row. Second, if the prosecution presents a case but the evidence fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (51%) that the defendant committed the crimes charged, then the judge should dismiss the charges for lack of evidence (“DLOE”). Both types of dismissals are not necessarily the end of the case because the Commonwealth may re-file the charges. When the Commonwealth re-files the charges, the preliminary hearing will be heard again by a different judge. In Philadelphia, re-filed cases stemming from dismissal for lack of evidence are heard either in Motions court by a Common Pleas judge if it is a non-homicide case or by one of the homicide judges in a murder case. The Common Pleas judge will review the notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing and receive any additional evidence which the parties wish to present. In the suburban counties, a Magisterial District Justice will conduct an entirely new preliminary hearing.
Are there limits on the Commonwealth’s ability to re-file after a dismissal at the preliminary hearing?
Although the Commonwealth may re-file the charges following a dismissal for lack of evidence, the Commonwealth’s ability to re-file is not unlimited. Pennsylvania appellate courts have held that where the charges are repeatedly dismissed by the preliminary hearing magistrates, the successive re-filing of the charges could eventually reach the point of prosecutorial harassment and implicate due process rights. In that case, the charges could be dismissed without prejudice or the trial judge could prohibit the Commonwealth from re-filing the charges. The Commonwealth would then be limited to appealing the case to the Superior Court and asking the Superior Court to find that the evidence presented was sufficient to show that defendant probably committed the crime.
The Criminal Appeal in Perez
In Perez, the Commonwealth re-filed the charges once with the homicide judge in the Court of Common Pleas, and that judge still dismissed the murder charge without prejudice. Instead of attempting to re-file again before a different judge, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal order and eventually appealed the case to the Superior Court when that motion to reconsider was denied.
The Superior Court rejected the appeal, however, and refused to reach the merits of the case. The court found that the Commonwealth could not appeal the trial court’s decision because the order dismissing the charges was not a final order. In general, Pennsylvania appellate courts only have jurisdiction over appeals of final orders. A final order is one that disposes of all of the parties and all of the claims, meaning no further action is pending in the trial court. However, when a trial court dismisses criminal charges at a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth can simply re-file the charges (assuming that they have not re-filed so many times that it would constitute prosecutorial harassment). Therefore, the Superior Court found that the appeal from the dismissal order was interlocutory and premature. The court denied the appeal, finding that the Commonwealth should have simply re-filed instead. Had the dismissal of the charges been with prejudice, meaning that the Commonwealth could not re-file, then the appeal would have been proper. Thus, Perez clearly establishes that the Commonwealth must re-file until no longer allowed before taking an appeal to the Superior Court.
The Impact of Perez
The Superior Court’s decision is somewhat counter-intuitive, but there are still protections for a defendant who is facing criminal charges. First, if more than one judge dismisses the charges, the Commonwealth may decide that they simply do not have a case and give up instead of continuing to re-file the charges. Second, Pennsylvania appellate courts have held that the Commonwealth’s ability to re-file is not limitless. Although there is no set number of times that the Commonwealth may re-file, the courts have found that “[I]f the Commonwealth’s conduct intrudes unreasonably upon the due process right of individuals to be free from governmental coercion, the Commonwealth should not be permitted to present the case repeatedly before successive magistrates.” In practice, this usually means that if the Commonwealth re-files more than once and the case is dismissed two or three times, the courts will likely dismiss the charges with prejudice and prevent the Commonwealth from re-filing. In that case, the Commonwealth could appeal the dismissal of the criminal charges to the Superior Court because that would be a final order. Likewise, where a trial judge in the Court of Common Pleas grants a Motion to Quash (also called a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the suburban counties), the Commonwealth may appeal that ruling to the Superior Court because the Commonwealth is prohibited from simply re-filing in order to evade the Common Pleas judge’s decision quashing the charges.
It is hard to say whether the court’s opinion in Perez benefits the Commonwealth or the defense. In general, allowing the Commonwealth to repeatedly re-file charges can be extremely expensive and stressful for a defendant as the defendant has to repeatedly defend against the charges at successive preliminary hearings. It also allows the Commonwealth to keep trying until the Commonwealth gets a judge that will rubber stamp the charges. At the same time, defending an appeal to the Superior Court is far more complicated, time-consuming and expensive than defending a preliminary hearing. Superior Court appeals can also take years. Therefore, criminal defendants may benefit in terms of cost and obtaining a resolution more quickly as this decision requires the Commonwealth to proceed by re-filing until prohibited by court order from doing so.
Criminal Charges? We Can Help.
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We are experienced and understanding defense attorenys who will fight for you. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an attorney today.