Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
Recent Case Results - Motion to Suppress and Speedy Trial Motions Granted
Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers
The Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys of Goldstein Mehta LLC continue to obtain outstanding results both in and out of the court room. Our defense lawyers have fought for successful outcomes in cases involving a wide variety of charges including robbery, burglary, assault, probation violations and probation detainers, and gun charges. Some of our recent success stories include:
Commonwealth v. G. – Motion to Suppress Confession for Lack of Miranda Warnings Granted in Shooting Case
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.
In Commonwealth v. G., Attorney Goldstein successfully moved for the suppression of an incriminating statement in a case in which the defendant was charged with gun charges including Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”) Sections 6108, 6106, and 6105 as well as conspiracy, tampering with evidence, and recklessly endangering another person. The Commonwealth alleged that G. accompanied his co-defendants to a location where a shooting broke out. After the complainants returned fire and shot one of the co-defendants, G. allegedly took the gun and hid it. When G. went to visit his friend at the hospital, police arrested him and began interrogating him, resulting in a confession which implicated G. in hiding the gun.
Attorney Goldstein moved to suppress the statement and the firearm due to violations of the Miranda rule. Pennsylvania and federal law both require the police to read suspects their Miranda warnings prior to interrogating them. Prior to asking any questions which could lead to incriminating answers, police must advise a suspect who has been arrested and taken into custody that the suspect has:
The right to remain silent,
The right to an attorney and that the attorney will be paid for by the government if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, and
That anything the suspect says can be used against them in court.
Shortly before trial, prosecutors admitted that detectives had actually interrogated G. twice. First, they interrogated him immediately upon his arrival at the police station when they had not yet provided him with Miranda warnings at that time. After obtaining a confession, police quickly provided G. with Miranda warnings, questioned him again, and obtained a signed statement.
Attorney Goldstein successfully moved to have both statements suppressed due to detective’s failure to provide Miranda warnings prior to the first interrogation. Under federal law, police may not intentionally fail to provide Miranda warnings in order to obtain a confession, then provide warnings, and quickly re-interrogate the defendant after providing the warnings. Instead, federal courts have applied a sort of “good faith exception” when evaluating whether prosecutors may use a second, Mirandized statement which is substantially similar to a prior un-Mirandized statement. Where police make a mistake in failing to provide Miranda warnings or where the circumstances change enough so that the second statement is not directly related to the first, the statement may become admissible. The Commonwealth attempted to justify the failure to warn by arguing that it had been inadvertent and that there was a break in the chain between the first and second interrogations due to the passage of time.
Here, Attorney Goldstein successfully argued that the police intentionally failed to provide Miranda warnings during the first statement. Additionally, there was no break in the chain between the two interrogations. The second interrogation happened almost immediately, took place in the same location, and involved the same police detective. The trial court agreed and granted the Motion to Suppress, ruling that both statements could not be used at trial. Once the statements were excluded, the Commonwealth agreed that it would not appeal the court’s ruling if G. accepted a plea deal for a misdemeanor charge and probation. The successful Motion to Suppress helped G. avoid a felony gun conviction and years in state prison.
Commonwealth v. A. – Robbery, Burglary, and Assault Charges Dismissed for Speedy Trial Violation.
In Commonwealth v. A., Attorney Goldstein successfully moved to have all charges against the client dismissed due to the prosecution’s violation of Pennsylvania Speedy Trial Rules, specifiically Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A). A. and a co-defendant were charged with dressing up as police officers and forcing their way into a massage parlor. Once inside, the defendants allegedly demanded money from the employees. The employees called the police, and the defendants were arrested inside the massage parlor. The Commonwealth immediately brought charges for robbery, burglary, assault, and other related charges.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, the Commonwealth brought the charges without completing its investigation. At the first trial listing, the Commonwealth was not prepared to proceed because it had improperly failed to turn over critical witness statements and evidence in advance of trial. The trial court marked the continuance as a Commonwealth continuance request, and by the time the second jury trial listing arrived, the defendant had been awaiting trial for two years.
Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(A) requires that all criminal defendants be brought to trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal Complaint. There are exceptions for things like court continuances and circumstances outside of the prosecution’s control, but in order to qualify for an exception, the Commonwealth must show that its prosecutors acted with due diligence in prosecuting the case. In this case, Attorney Goldstein successfully argued that the judge at the first trial listing had already found that the prosecution acted without due diligence in failing to provide witness statements and other discovery materials in advance of the first trial date. Because the Commonwealth never asked the first judge to reconsider the ruling in writing, Rule 600 barred the Commonwealth from asking the new trial judge to reconsider the first judge’s ruling without some showing of obvious error on the part of the first judge. The court agreed and dismissed all of the charges in this extremely serious case.
Commonwealth v. M. – Car Theft Charges Dismissed at Preliminary Hearing
In Commonwealth v. M., the client was charged with multiple counts of Receiving Stolen Property, Theft by Unlawful Taking, Unauthorized Use of an Automobile, and Theft from a Motor Vehicle. Prosecutors alleged that in one case, M. stole the complainant’s car and drove it around for a night before leaving it abandoned on a nearby street. Further, numerous valuable items were missing from the car, leading to additional allegations that M. had stolen the items.
In a second case which had been joined for the preliminary hearing, prosecutors alleged that M. broke into a parked car, stole valuable items, and transported those items to his house. When prosecutors executed a search warrant on M.'s house, they found M. and another gentleman in the living room along with the stolen items. Neither man was closer to the items, said anything incriminating, or attempted to flee, and the other man's hospital ID had actually been found by police in the stolen car in the first case.
In both cases, the prosecution attempted to rely entirely on hearsay at the preliminary hearing under the Superior Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Ricker. The prosecution sought to have a police detective, who had no personal knowledge of who took the car or took items from the other car, testify that a witness who failed to appear for court saw M. driving the car on the night in question.
Attorney Goldstein’s repeated objections to this hearsay testimony led to it being excluded from evidence at the preliminary hearing, and without the hearsay, the evidence was completely insufficient for the preliminary hearing judge to hold M. for court. This was particularly true in light of the fact that the other gentleman's hospital wristband was found by police in the stolen car. Accordingly, the court dismissed all charges against M. This case shows that even with the trend of judges permitting more and more hearsay at preliminary hearings, there are still limits. This is especially true in Philadelphia where judges tend to require that witnesses have some level of personal knowledge before they will hold a case for court.
Probation Detainers Lifted – In the last six weeks, our Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys have successfully moved to have probation detainers lifted for three separate clients who were on probation and subsequently arrested on new charges. This includes the lifting of a probation detainer for a client who was on probation for a gun charge and who was arrested on a new case of Possession with the Intent to Deliver.
State v. D. – Prosecution Agrees to Dismiss All Charges in New Jersey Prison Contraband Case
In State v. D., the client was charged with third degree indictable offenses in New Jersey for allegedly smuggling drugs into the prison during a visit with a friend. The prosecution obtained both video of the incident and phone calls which it claimed implicated D. in the offense. After convincing the Assistant Prosecutor that even if real, the phone calls would not be admissible against D. due to violations of New Jersey wiretap and recording laws, the prosecution agreed to dismiss all charges. D. will avoid a felony conviction and jail time.
Commonwealth v. K. – All Charges Dismissed in Third Strike Carjacking (Robbery of a Motor Vehicle) Case.
K. was charged with stealing his ex-girlfriend’s car by snatching the keys out of her hand and driving off in the car. Although this allegation would only have been Robbery as a felony of the second degree, the case became a third strike and a carjacking because of the fact that K. allegedly took a car. Carjacking (Robbery of a Motor Vehicle) is considered a crime of violence under Pennsylvania law for purposes of the three strikes rule. Due to prior convictions, K. would have faced a mandatory 25-50 years in prison if convicted of Robbery of a Motor Vehicle because carjacking is a “strike” case. Fortunately, our criminal defense attorneys were able to have all charges dismissed at the preliminary hearing level.
Commonwealth v. J. – Our criminal defense lawyers were able to successfully negotiate a misdemeanor offer of probation for a client who was initially charged with F1 Strangulation, Robbery, and Aggravated Assault. First, we were able to have the strangulation charge dismissed at the preliminary hearing and the other felonies graded as felonies of the second degree. Once the felonies were no longer F1 strike offenses, the Commonwealth’s offer substantially improved, and we were eventually able to negotiate a misdemeanor probationary offer for the client, thereby avoiding jail time and a felony conviction.
Criminal Defense Attorney Demetra P. Mehta, Esq.
Commonwealth v. A. – All charges against A. were dismissed after our defense lawyers negotiated for A. to participate in the domestic violence diversionary program. After A. completed community service, counseling, and paid a small fine, the Commonwealth withdrew Simple Assault, Terroristic Threats, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person charges against A.
Commonwealth v. R. - The client was arrested and charged with Robbery, Assault, and related charges while on probation for a serious offense. Because there was clear video of the incident occurring, the client was hoping to obtain a plea deal for the shortest possible sentence. The client's previous attorney had been unable to negotiate for anything less than a 1-2 year state prison sentence. After retaining Goldstein Mehta LLC, our defense lawyers were able to negotiate a sentence of 11.5 - 23 months with work release eligibility and no additional jail time on the direct probation violation.
Charged with a crime? Speak with a Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Today
Goldstein Mehta LLC Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers
If you are facing criminal charges or are interested in appealing a conviction, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully resolved countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court Continues to Struggle With Meaning Of "Stop"
Motions to Suppress in Gun and Drug Cases
The first line of defense to criminal charges like gun possession or drug possession is often the Motion to Suppress. If the police stopped or searched you or your belongings without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, it may be possible to have the evidence suppressed. Once the evidence is suppressed, the Commonwealth would not be able to proceed to trial in a case involving a possessory offense, and the case could be thrown out. In cases involving illegal stops or searches of pedestrians, the first thing that the defense must typically show is that the police actually stopped or “seized” the defendant under either Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution or the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
What makes a stop a stop?
As recently as three months ago, in the case of Commonwealth v. Morrison, the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that when a police officer says stop, that means stop. Thus, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, and the encounter rises to the legal level of a Terry stop. In the case of Commonwealth v. Newsome, a different panel of the Superior Court has reached a different conclusion. In Newsome, the Superior Court held that the mere use of the word “stop” does not necessarily transform a police encounter into a Terry stop requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Instead, whether police conduct rises to the level of a stop depends on the totality of the circumstances and the specific facts of each case.
Commonwealth v. Newsome
In Newsome, the defendant was arrested in Philadelphia and charged with various Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”). The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, and the court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. At the hearing, a Philadelphia Police Lieutenant testified that he received an anonymous radio call that a group of males were outside on the 2000 block of Croskey Street passing around a gun. The officer drove to the scene. When he arrived, he saw a group of men huddled together. Two of the men left the group and walked to the other side of the street.
The defendant was one of the two men who crossed the street and began to walk southbound down Croskey street. The officer exited his marked patrol car and asked the defendant to “come here” so he could talk to him, but the defendant refused and continued walking. The officer began to radio for backup to stop the defendant when he observed the defendant reach into his waistband, remove an object that looked like a gun, and place it in a nearby flowerpot. Although the defendant discarded the gun in view of the officer, the gun could be suppressed if the defense could show that the defendant discarded the gun only in response to some sort of unlawful illegal police activity or seizure.
A different police officer recovered the firearm, and the police arrested the defendant. On cross examination, the officer testified that he approached the defendant and the other men because he believed that they may have been violating Philadelphia’s 10:30 pm curfew. He also testified that he had not seen the defendant with any bulges or weapons on his person and that the defendant did not make any suspicious movements prior to putting the gun in the flowerpot.
The trial court found the officer’s testimony credible, but it granted the Motion to Suppress. The trial court concluded that by saying stop and asking the defendant to come talk to him, the officer had stopped the defendant and legally seized him. Thus, the officer was required to have reasonable suspicion in order to make a stop, and the officer did not have that level of suspicion because he did not observe the defendant doing anything suspicious. Further, it is well-settled in Pennsylvania that an anonymous radio call cannot provide the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and even accepting the radio call as true, the radio call did not identify the defendant as the person with the gun.
The Superior Court’s Decision On Appeal
On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision and concluded that the officer had not legally stopped the defendant. Instead, the officer had attempted to have a mere encounter with the defendant, and a mere encounter need not be supported by any articulable level of suspicion. In determining whether the officer conducted a stop, the court noted that it must evaluate all of the circumstances “evidencing a show of authority or exercise of force, including the demeanor of the police officer, the manner of expression used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories or statements.” Courts must also consider the number of officers present, whether the officer accuses the citizen of criminal activity, the officer’s demeanor and voice, the location and timing of the interaction, the visible presence of weapons on the officer, and the questions asked. Where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave due to the behavior of the officer, the encounter rises to the level of a stop and requires at least reasonable suspicion.
Here, the Superior Court found that the officer had not stopped the defendant and reversed the decision of the trial court. The Superior Court found that it was only a mere encounter because the officer simply exited the vehicle and asked the defendant to come here so he could talk to him. Although he was in full uniform and in a marked car, he did not engage the lights and sirens, display his weapon, or tell the defendant that he was not free to leave. He also did not block the defendant from moving in any particular direction. He did admit asking the defendant to stop two or three times, but he did not threaten any consequences for non-compliance or use an authoritative tone. Further, the defendant clearly felt no compulsion to stop because he continued walking away. Only after the defendant discarded the gun did the police arrest the defendant. Therefore, the defendant was not seized and officers were not required to have any level of suspicion.
THE EVIDENTIARY CONSEQUENCES OF AN ILLEGAL STOP
Motions to Suppress guns can be difficult to win, but police are required to follow the law. Although judges may be reluctant to suppress illegal firearms and large amounts of drugs, it remains the law that police must have reasonable suspicion or probable cause prior to making a stop or conducting a search. When the police stop or search someone illegally, the Fourth Amendment requires that the evidence be suppressed, meaning that it may not be used at trial. However, it is critical that the defense establish that the police conducted a stop or a search in order to win a Motion to Suppress. Clearly, the Superior Court’s decision in Newsome conflicts with recent precedent in which the Court held that the use of the word stop transforms an encounter into a Terry stop. Therefore, the question of whether a defendant is stopped for purposes of the Fourth Amendment remains highly fact specific. In many cases, a successful motion to suppress will require skillful cross examination by the defense in order to establish that based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would not have felt free to leave. This is particularly true in cases involving “Forced Abandonment” in which a defendant who has been illegally seized discards a gun or drugs prior to being physically restrained by the police.
AWARD-WINNING PHILADELPHIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS
Goldstein Mehta LLC: Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers
If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended clients against gun charges, drug charges, and other possession of contraband cases in preliminary hearings, pre-trial motions to suppress, and at trial. Call 267-225-2545 for a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session with one of our award-winning defense attorneys.
Read the Opinion: Commonwealth v. Newsome
K9 Searches | When Can Police Use Drug Sniffing Dogs in PA?
Both the Philadelphia Police Department and the Pennsylvania State Police frequently use trained canines to detect drugs and combat drug trafficking. When the police find drugs based on the alert of a drug sniffing dog, there are often issues as to whether the police had the right to conduct the search in the first place. In some cases, it may be possible to challenge the search and seek suppression of the evidence if the police conducted the canine search without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Pennsylvania and Federal law differ on the level of suspicion which police must have in order to conduct a K9 search. However, both federal and state law provide substantial protections to individuals from unlawful searches.
Pennsylvania Law on Drug Detection Dogs
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a canine search constitutes a search under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Therefore, if police conduct a canine sniff without the required level of suspicion, the results of the search could be suppressed.
Canine Sniffs of the Person
Under Pennsylvania law, police are required to have different levels of suspicion depending on whether the search was of a person or a car. When the police want to use a drug sniffing dog to detect whether a person has drugs on them, the police are required to have probable cause for the search. In Commonwealth v. Martin, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that “an invasion of one’s person is, in the usual case, a more severe intrusion on one’s privacy interest than an invasion of one’s property.” While reasonable suspicion may justify a canine sniff of a place or a car, reasonable suspicion is too low of a standard for the search of a person.
When the sniff is of a person, the police must have probable cause to believe that a canine search will produce contraband or evidence of a crime. Probable cause means that it is more likely than not that some evidence or illegal contraband will be found. This means that if the police conduct a canine sniff without probable cause, the results of the search could be suppressed in court by filling a Motion to Suppress.
Canine Sniffs of a Car
When the police want to conduct a canine sniff of a car, they are only required to have reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. Reasonable suspicion permits an officer to detain an individual in order to conduct an investigation if the officer reasonably suspects that the individual is engaging in criminal conduct. When evaluating whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, the court will look at the totality of the circumstances and whether the officer can provide specific, articulable facts as to why the officer believed the suspect was engaged in criminal activity. If the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, then the officer may conduct a K9 sniff.
Recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court approved of a canine sniff in the case of Commonwealth v. Green. In Green, the Court found reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention and canine sniff based on the following factors:
The defendant was overly nervous for a routine traffic stop,
The vehicle belonged to an absent third party,
The defendant stated he was returning from Philadelphia, and the Trooper believed Philadelphia to be a source location for narcotics trafficking,
The Trooper had prior contacts with the defendant during which the Trooper found drugs, and
The defendant had numerous arrests and convictions for both violent crimes and drug offenses
Federal Limits on Police Canine Sniffs
There are other limits on police canine sniffs in addition to the requirement that police have either reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the decision to employ a canine. For example, police must still have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the initial stop of the defendant that leads to the subsequent search. If the police pull a car over without any evidence of a crime or traffic offense, the results of a search could be suppressed even if the police later developed reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the canine search. Suppression would be required because of the illegality of the initial stop.
Recently, in Rodriguez v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s protections against unreasonable seizures. In Rodriguez, police stopped a car for driving on the shoulder of the highway. When police spoke with the driver, Rodriguez, he told them that he had swerved to avoid a pothole. The officer obtained the Rodriguez' paperwork and asked him to come with him to the patrol car. Rodriguez asked if he had to do so, and the officer said no. The officer returned to the patrol car to run the paperwork. After doing so, he returned to Rodriguez’ car. The officer questioned the front seat passenger, took his paperwork, and conducted a records check on that person. The officer then wrote a written warning and returned to the car to give it to Rodriguez.
After giving Rodriguez the warning, the stop should have been over. Instead, the officer asked Rodriguez for permission to conduct a canine sniff. Rodriguez politely declined, and the officer detained him anyway while he waited for backup. Once backup arrived, the officer conducted a canine sniff, the dog alerted for drugs, and police then searched the car and found drugs. Approximately eight minutes elapsed between the time when the officer finished issuing the warning and when the officer conducted the canine sniff.
Under federal law, a canine sniff is not considered a search and does not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause. However, the United States Supreme Court found that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Rodriguez for the additional eight minutes before they conducted the canine sniff. The Court concluded that police may not prolong an ordinary traffic stop in order to conduct a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion. Although police may decide whether to issue a traffic ticket and check the driver’s paperwork, the police may not detain the car for additional time without a basis for doing so. Therefore, the Court reversed the conviction and ordered that the drugs be suppressed.
The Effect of Canine “Alerts”
The courts have held that canine sniffs where the canine ‘”alerts” provide police with probable cause to conduct a full blown search of a person or vehicle. Under Pennsylvania and Federal law, police are not required to get a warrant prior to searching a vehicle. Instead, they are required only to have probable cause prior to conducting a search. Therefore, if a trained police dog alerts to the presence of drugs, police may search the car or person. However, as the case law illustrates, there are still significant limits on canine searches. The courts have held that the initial stop must still be justified by reasonable suspicion or probable cause and the Pennsylvania courts have found that police must have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the search of a car or a person. If the police make an illegal stop, improperly extend a traffic stop, or conduct a canine sniff without the required level of suspicion, then the results of the search should be suppressed.
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers for Drug Cases
Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys Zak T. Goldstein, Esq. and Demetra Mehta, Esq.
The Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys of Goldstein Mehta LLC have successfully represented hundreds of clients in drug possession and drug trafficking cases. We are experienced and understanding defense attorneys who will use our high level of skill and expertise on your behalf. We have successfully litigated pre-trial motions and obtained pre-trial dismissals and acquittals at trial. If you are facing drug possession charges, call 267-225-2545 for a free criminal defense strategy session.
PA Supreme Court Finds Car Passenger Entitled to Suppression of Contraband in Illegally Stopped Car
Commonwealth v. Shabezz
In the case of Commonwealth v. Shabezz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has affirmed on appeal that a passenger in a vehicle may successfully move to suppress evidence which is recovered from the vehicle where the vehicle was illegally stopped. The passenger may move for suppression even if the passenger did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the vehicle.
This means that if you are the passenger in a car you do not own and the police stop and search the car and find something illegal, you may move to suppress the contraband due to the initial illegal stop. Previously, it was unclear whether a passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of someone else’s car, and trial judges would frequently use that line of argument in order to deny motions to suppress.
Motions to Suppress
The first line of defense to gun charges and in drug cases is often the motion to suppress. In cases where the prosecution cannot show that the police legally recovered the evidence in question, it may be possible to have the evidence excluded at trial and the case dismissed by litigating a motion to suppress. In Pennsylvania, it is typically not enough for the defendant to show only that some sort of illegal search occurred. The defendant must also show both that he or she has standing to challenge the search and that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place that was searched.
What is a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?
Standing is generally not an issue because Pennsylvania appellate courts have held that any defendant charged with a possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure that led to the recovery of the evidence. Reasonable expectation of privacy, however, is frequently an important issue. The defendant must show that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. If the defendant cannot show that he or she had a reasonable expectation of privacy which the police violated, then the court will deny the motion to suppress even if the police did something illegal. The prosecution bears the burden of showing that the police obtained the evidence in a lawful manner, but the defendant bears the burden of first showing that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In many cases, reasonable expectation of privacy is relatively easy to understand. If you have drugs in your pocket, reasonable expectation of privacy is not going to be an issue because everyone will agree that you had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of your pocket. In other cases, it is clear that you do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. If the police search your friend’s house when you are not in it and recover evidence which connects you to a crime, you will not be able to have that evidence suppressed even if police did not first obtain a search warrant. You simply do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in someone else’s house where you are not present or staying. Therefore, although the police may have violated your friend's constitutional rights, they have not violated your rights, and you have no remedy.
Appellate courts have recognized that the basis test for reasonable expectation of privacy is as follows:
An expectation of privacy will be found to exist when the individual exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. In determining whether a person’s expectation of privacy is legitimate or reasonable, the totality of the circumstances must be considered and the determination will ultimately rest upon a balancing of the societal interests involved. The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.
Thus, a defendant generally does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in houses or cars belonging to other people or in public places. At the same time, a defendant may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain places at work or in a restroom.
In Commonwealth v. Shabezz, the Supreme Court held that a defendant-passenger need not show a reasonable expectation of privacy in a car which has been stopped illegally in order to have drugs or guns suppressed. In Shabezz, officers testified at a motion to suppress hearing that they observed what they believed to be a drug transaction and therefore stopped the car in which Shabezz was a passenger. Shabezz ran, and the police quickly caught him. They found marijuana and cash on him. They then searched the car from which he fled and found more marijuana, scales, packaging, some pills, and a gun. Prosecutors charged Shabezz with Possession with the Intent to Deliver.
The trial court, however, did not believe the police as to the reasons why they stopped the car. Although police testified to observing a drug transaction prior to stopping the car, they had completely failed to mention the drug transaction in any of the police reports which they prepared at the time of the arrest. They also testified that they were able to see the exchange of money for small objects from 45 feet away at night without binoculars. Therefore, the court granted the motion to suppress, finding that the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal.
The prosecution appealed, and the appeal eventually reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that the motion should have been denied because Shabezz was merely a passenger in a vehicle, and as a passenger, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car.
What Happens if the Police Illegally Stop a Car?
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected that argument. It noted that there is a difference between standing and reasonable expectation of privacy. In order to prevail in a motion to suppress, the defendant must typically be able to show both. As explained, standing is easy – if you are charged with a possessory offense, you have standing. But reasonable expectation of privacy is often more complicated. In this situation, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that no reasonable expectation of privacy was required. The defendant must simply show that he was a passenger in the car and that the car was stopped illegally prior to the police finding the evidence which the prosecution wants to use. Here, the Court found that the initial police illegality of unlawfully stopping the vehicle tainted all of the subsequently recovered evidence. That evidence became fruit of the poisonous tree, and therefore, the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress.
The Court's opinion simplifies the remedy for challenging an illegal car stop. If the police stop a car illegally and find contraband, it does not matter if the defendant is the driver or the passenger. Both the driver and the passenger have had their rights violated by being seized without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Therefore, both the driver and the passenger now have the same remedy.
Charged with a crime? We Can Help
If you are facing criminal charges in Pennsylvania or New Jersey, our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers can help. We have successfully litigated countless motions to suppress in gun and drug cases, and we have helped clients favorably resolve all types of criminal charges. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to anyone who is facing criminal charges or who may be under investigation. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an award-winning defense attorney today.