Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 9/21/26 Zak Goldstein 9/21/26

PA Superior Court: No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Bag Left in the Open Bed of a Pickup Truck Where Defendant Had No Connection to the Truck

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Attorney in Philadelphia

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Serrano, 2026 PA Super 205 (Pa. Super. Sept. 18, 2026), holding that the trial court erred in suppressing a gun that police found in a bag in the open bed of a parked pickup truck. The Commonwealth produced evidence that the defendant’s only connection to the truck was that he stood next to it, and he did not present any evidence to the contrary. The Court concluded that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck and that he abandoned the bag when he left it there and ran. It did not decide whether the open bed of a pickup truck should receive the same protection as the inside of a vehicle in a case where a defendant actually establishes a connection to the truck.

What happened in Commonwealth v. Serrano?

On August 26, 2024, two uniformed Philadelphia police officers received a call from another officer who had seen the defendant near Reese and Somerset Streets with a black fanny pack. The officers ran a warrant search and found an active arrest warrant. When they arrived, they saw the defendant crouching behind a parked pickup truck. One officer asked to speak with him, and he ran. Police arrested him after a brief chase. He did not have keys to the truck.

Meanwhile, the second officer looked around the truck and saw a black satchel on the floor of the open truck bed. He reached in, took the bag to the police car, searched it, and found a gun. The officer did not have a search warrant. The officers testified that the defendant was not holding the bag when they arrived.

The Commonwealth charged the defendant with three firearms/VUFA offenses, and he moved to suppress. The suppression court granted the motion under the Pennsylvania Constitution. It reasoned that society would treat the bed of a pickup truck as part of the vehicle, with the same expectation of privacy as the interior. It also found that the Commonwealth did not meet its initial burden of showing that the defendant lacked a privacy interest in the truck. In the court’s view, the only evidence on that point was the absence of keys, and the defendant could have been spending time outside his home in his neighborhood. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court reversed. Under Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695 (Pa. 2014), the Commonwealth bears the initial burden of producing evidence that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. The defendant then bears the burden of persuasion. The Court found that the suppression court did not consider the totality of the circumstances and wrongly treated the question as one of ownership. A person who does not own a vehicle may still have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it if he lawfully possesses or controls it. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 340 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2025).

Here, the Court found that the Commonwealth showed more than missing keys. The officers did not see anyone in the truck, no one claimed it, no one saw the defendant operate it, and his only apparent connection to it was that he stood near it. He did not introduce any evidence linking himself to the truck. The Court relied on Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680 (Pa. 2005), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant who stood beside a parked car and tossed items into it did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. In the cases the defense cited, the police saw the defendant inside the vehicle. The Court did criticize the Commonwealth, noting “with displeasure” that it never ran the truck’s registration and that running the registration could have made things a lot easier for everyone.

The Court then turned to the bag. A defendant cannot maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in property he has abandoned. Leaving property in a place open to the public is not enough. The evidence must also show that the person tried to dissociate himself from it. The Court found that showing here because the defendant walked away from the truck and the bag when the police approached, ran, and did nothing to suggest that he intended to come back for it.

Because the defendant did not have a privacy interest in the truck, the Court declined to decide whether an open truck bed is protected like the rest of the vehicle. In a footnote, it said that the defendant might have prevailed on that argument, but that the question requires analysis because the Fourth Amendment does not protect what a person knowingly exposes to the public.

The Takeaway

Serrano is a reminder that the defendant carries the ultimate burden on the expectation of privacy. When police find a gun or drugs in a car that is not registered to the client, and the client was not inside it, the defense should be prepared to present evidence connecting him to it. Without it, the Commonwealth can meet its burden by showing that the police did not find any link between the defendant and the place they searched. It is also a reminder that people who run and throw contraband are usually worse off for a motion to suppress than people who remain calm and do not run away.

The decision also leaves room for future litigation. The Court left open whether the police need a warrant to take property from an open truck bed when the defendant has a connection to the truck. And abandonment only helps the Commonwealth when the police acted lawfully. Here, the police had an arrest warrant. Where the police unlawfully seize someone and he discards property in response, the forced abandonment doctrine requires suppression, as the Superior Court held two days earlier in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 2026 PA Super 202. This defendant may have lost either way. If the police found the warrant, they likely could have searched him incident to arrest, and if the gun was on him, they would have found it. But running away will usually not improve your case.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 9/19/26 Zak Goldstein 9/19/26

PA Superior Court: No Mere Encounter Where Officer Pointed Gun At Suspect (Obviously)

Zak Goldstein Defense Lawyer — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Thomas, 2026 PA Super 202 (Pa. Super. Sept. 16, 2026), holding that a Philadelphia police officer seized the defendant when he approached him with his gun drawn. The officer claimed that he only asked for identification, but he did not turn on his body camera until after the chase ended, and the suppression court did not believe him. Because a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away from an officer holding a gun, the Superior Court affirmed the order suppressing the firearm that the defendant discarded before he ran.

**What happened in Commonwealth v. Thomas?**

On May 16, 2024, an officer setting up narcotics surveillance saw the defendant walk by with a rectangular bulge near his hip that, according to the officer, moved like an unholstered gun. He put out a radio call that the man might have a gun. A second officer, who was alone, out of uniform, and driving an unmarked car, responded to the 3900 block of North Smedley Street. He testified that the defendant picked up the pace, so he got out to try to engage him in a mere encounter and ask for identification. According to the officer, the defendant bladed his body away, dipped down behind a parked car, and ran. Police caught him after a chase, and the officer recovered a gun from the wheel well of the parked car.

As is typical, the officer’s body camera video did not have any sound for the first minute. When the defendant began to stand back up from behind the parked car, the officer had his gun in his right hand, pointed chest-high across the car towards him. The officer testified that the gun was initially pointed up and that he lowered it when the defendant ran.

The suppression court first denied the motion, finding a mere encounter that turned into a stop supported by reasonable suspicion when the defendant dipped behind the car. The defense moved for reconsideration, and the court amended its findings. It found that the officer approached with his gun out and that, without audio, it could not know what he actually said. The court cited a Philadelphia police directive that requires officers to activate their cameras before conducting any pedestrian investigation, found that the officer deliberately failed to do so, and did not credit his testimony about what he said. It granted the motion, and the Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Superior Court first considered sua sponte whether the suppression court had jurisdiction to reverse itself more than 30 days after its original order. It did because a pre-trial suppression order is interlocutory and the 30-day limit in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 does not apply. Commonwealth v. James, 69 A.3d 180 (Pa. 2013). The Court did not endorse the procedure because Rule 581(J) makes the denial of a suppression motion final absent previously unavailable evidence, but the Commonwealth did not preserve that challenge.

On the merits, police may generally use abandoned property as evidence, but not where unlawful police action coerced the abandonment. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 343 A.3d 1016 (Pa. 2025). On appeal, the Commonwealth argued only that the interaction was a mere encounter and did not claim that the officer had reasonable suspicion. The question therefore became whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have felt free to leave.

The Court held that he would not. An officer may approach someone in public and ask for identification without any suspicion, but the display of a weapon is one of the recognized factors that turns an encounter into a seizure. The video supported the finding that the officer activated his camera only after he had approached, chased, and apprehended the defendant, and the suppression court did not commit a clear and manifest error by discrediting him on that basis. The officer’s testimony that his gun was initially pointed up supported the conclusion that he pointed it towards the defendant before the defendant dipped down.

The Commonwealth argued that the defendant never saw the gun because he had turned away and was wearing a hood. The Court disagreed. The video does not show the defendant during the first six seconds after the officer got out of the car, and the Court found it reasonable to infer that he bladed away because he saw the gun. The Commonwealth also argued that the officer reasonably held his gun at his side for his safety. The Court responded that the question is whether a reasonable person would feel free to ignore the officer, not whether the officer acted reasonably for his safety. The Court affirmed. Judge Sullivan noted a dissent.

The Takeaway

Thomas is a helpful case for anyone charged with possessing a gun or drugs that the police recovered after a chase. Under Pennsylvania’s forced abandonment doctrine, if the police unlawfully seize someone and he throws something away in response, the Commonwealth cannot use it. Where an officer does not follow the body camera directive, defense counsel should ask the court to consider that failure in deciding whether to believe him.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein 9/4/26 Zak Goldstein 9/4/26

PA Superior Court: Trial Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Move to Suppress Parole Violation Admission Obtained Without Miranda Warnings

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Ames, 2026 PA Super 179 (Pa. Super. Aug. 10, 2026), holding that a parole agent conducted a custodial interrogation when he took a parolee into custody in handcuffs and shackles, read him the complainant’s allegations of new crimes, and presented him with a form on which he could admit that he had violated his parole by committing that conduct. The agent never gave Miranda warnings, so the signed admission should have been suppressed, and trial counsel had no reasonable basis for letting the Commonwealth use it at a trial where the whole defense was that the complainant had made the allegations up. The Court reversed the denial of the defendant’s PCRA petition and remanded for a new trial.

**What Happened in Commonwealth v. Ames?**

In 2016, the defendant pleaded no contest to simple assault and terroristic threats for assaulting his wife, L.A. While he was on parole for that case, L.A. alleged that he strangled her, beat her, threatened to kill her, and sexually assaulted her on two occasions in late 2018. In March 2019, she reported the incidents to his parole agent. The agent passed the allegations to the local police, and when the police did not file charges right away, he ordered the defendant to report to the parole office. When the defendant arrived, the agent handcuffed and shackled him, took him to an interview room, read him the notice of charges describing L.A.’s allegations in detail, and gave him the choice of a hearing on the violation or a signed waiver admitting it. The defendant signed the form admitting that he had violated parole by engaging in assaultive behavior and violating a no-contact order. The agent never gave Miranda warnings.

The Commonwealth charged the defendant with strangulation, aggravated assault, sexual assault, and related offenses. At trial, it introduced the signed admission and the agent’s testimony about the meeting. The defense argued that L.A. had fabricated the allegations to get the defendant in trouble with parole, and it called two medical experts, including L.A.’s treating physician, who testified that L.A. told her that storage containers had fallen on her. The jury convicted the defendant of everything, and the court sentenced him to forty and a half to eighty years in prison. The Superior Court affirmed on direct appeal. The defendant then filed a PCRA petition arguing that trial counsel should have moved to suppress the admission. The PCRA court denied relief, and he appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Commonwealth conceded that the defendant was in custody, so the only question was whether the agent interrogated him. In Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370 (Pa. 2015), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a parole agent who handcuffs a parolee and questions him about new crimes must give Miranda warnings, because at that point the agent’s conduct is the functional equivalent of a police officer’s. The Commonwealth argued that Cooley did not apply because the agent never asked the defendant any questions and the meeting was a routine part of the parole process.

The Superior Court rejected both arguments. The agent did not bring the defendant in for routine administrative questions. He brought him in to find out whether he had committed the crimes L.A. described, laid out those allegations, told him he believed the defendant had violated parole by engaging in assaultive behavior, and then handed him a form on which he could admit it. That was an interrogation. Miranda protection is not limited to answers to questions; the agent’s words and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and the defendant did not volunteer anything. A motion to suppress would have had merit.

Trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to file it. Her strategy was to show that L.A. was lying, and the signed admission told the jury that L.A. was telling the truth. No competent counsel would allow a confession to the charged conduct into evidence while arguing that the complainant invented the allegations. On prejudice, the Court noted that the defendant’s admissions alone were enough to convict him of several charges, and that the medical evidence was contested. Two defense experts testified that L.A.’s injuries did not match her account, and the Commonwealth did not call any expert to rebut the treating physician. Given that conflict, the confession likely had a substantial impact on the verdict. The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Does a parole agent have to give you Miranda warnings?

Sometimes. Cooley held that a parole agent who questions a handcuffed parolee about new crimes must give Miranda warnings. Ames extends that rule to the situation where the agent does not actually ask anything but simply presents the parolee with an admission form. Anyone on parole or probation who is called in over new allegations should not sign anything admitting to criminal conduct without talking to a lawyer first because the Commonwealth could use the signed form as a confession in the criminal case. And where an agent has already obtained an admission from a client in custody without warnings, defense counsel should move to suppress it. Under Ames, the failure to file that motion can support a successful ineffectiveness claim and lead to a new trial.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case in Pennsylvania? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein Criminal Defense Lawyer — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

Zak Goldstein 9/3/26 Zak Goldstein 9/3/26

PA Superior Court: Possession of a Stolen Truck Alone Does Not Establish a Prima Facie Case of Receiving Stolen Property

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 2026 PA Super 171 (Pa. Super. Aug. 3, 2026), holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of receiving stolen property against a tow truck driver whom police stopped while he was towing a stolen truck for his employer. The Commonwealth proved that the truck was stolen and that the defendant had it. It did not produce any evidence that he knew or had reason to know it was stolen. Because possession alone does not establish guilty knowledge, the Superior Court affirmed the order granting the defendant’s habeas corpus motion and quashing the charge.

**What happened in Commonwealth v. Alvarez?**

On October 19, 2024, the owner of a red Volvo truck reported it stolen. About two weeks later, a state trooper pulled the defendant over in Monroe County while he was towing the truck. The defendant, who spoke only broken English, called his employer, who ran a towing business in New Jersey and had sent him to tow the truck. With the defendant within earshot, the employer told the trooper that a property owner had asked him to remove the truck because it had been sitting there for years. Speaking through an interpreter, the defendant then told the troopers that the employer had given him a different story: that the employer had bought the truck and the defendant was delivering it to a buyer in Hazleton. He admitted that the employer’s explanation to the trooper was not truthful. As the Superior Court pointed out, he only knew that because he had just overheard the employer contradict himself.

The Commonwealth charged the defendant with receiving stolen property and two summary traffic offenses. He moved for habeas corpus on the receiving stolen property count. At the hearing, the defense called the employer, who testified that he had bought the truck from a third party a few weeks earlier, produced a bill of sale but not the title, and said that the defendant had nothing to do with the purchase. The trial court granted the motion and quashed the charge. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

To establish a prima facie case, the Commonwealth must produce evidence of each element of the offense and probable cause to believe the defendant committed it. Receiving stolen property requires proof that the property was stolen, that the defendant possessed it, and that he knew or had reason to know it was stolen. The Commonwealth may prove guilty knowledge circumstantially, but it may not prove it solely from the fact that the defendant possessed stolen property.

The Commonwealth argued that the defendant’s admission that the employer had given him a false story showed guilty knowledge. The Superior Court disagreed. The defendant learned that the employer had told two different stories only during the traffic stop, when he overheard the phone call. The Commonwealth did not present any evidence that he knew before the stop that the truck was stolen or that the employer had fed him a false story, and it did not refute the employer’s testimony that the defendant had nothing to do with the purchase. That left possession as the only evidence of knowledge, which is not enough. The Court affirmed.

President Judge Emeritus Stevens concurred to note that the Commonwealth apparently never charged the employer, even though the employer claimed to have bought the truck, could not produce a title, arranged its sale, sent the defendant to move it, and gave the police and the defendant conflicting stories. As he put it, “Appellee was charged, [the employer] was not.”

The Takeaway

The prima facie standard is low, but the Commonwealth still has to put on some evidence of every element. In a receiving stolen property case, that means some evidence of guilty knowledge beyond the fact that the defendant had the property. Tow truck drivers, delivery drivers, and employees who move property for someone else often have no way to know where it came from, and where the Commonwealth cannot show more than possession, a habeas corpus motion should succeed. The defense can also present witnesses at the habeas hearing, as it did here, and where the Commonwealth does not rebut that testimony, the court may consider it.