Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 7/20/23 Zak Goldstein 7/20/23

PA Superior Court: Defendant Must Show Link Between Case and Trial Judge's Subsequent Arrest in Order to Win New Evidence PCRA

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein,

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Myers, holding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s PCRA petition because the defendant failed to show that unrelated corruption by the trial judge tainted the conviction in his case. Myers shows the importance of actually linking subsequent misconduct by police and court officials to the defendant’s individual case. Where the defendant can show only that the police or judge did something wrong that was unrelated to the case, the defendant is unlikely to prevail in PCRA litigation.

The Facts of Myers

Myers pleaded guilty to third-degree murder. Pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, he received a sentence of 20 – 40 years’ incarceration. His co-defendant also pleaded guilty and received a shorter sentence. Two or three years later, the trial judge resigned from the bench because he had been caught stealing drugs from an evidence room in the courthouse. The judge pleaded guilty to related crimes, and the Supreme Court permanently disbarred him.

About seven years later, Myers filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition arguing that he should receive a new trial as a result of the judge’s corruption. Myers invoked the newly discovered evidence exception. Ordinarily, a PCRA petition must be filed within a year of a defendant’s sentence becoming final. There is an exception, however, for when a defendant uncovers new evidence which could not have been discovered prior to trial through the exercise of due diligence and that evidence calls the validity of the conviction in to doubt. In that case, the statute allows the defendant a new one year window in which to file a PCRA petition and seek a new trial based on the new evidence.

Here, the judge resigned from the bench in 2012 and was convicted in 2015. The defendant, however, did not file his PCRA petition until 2022. He claimed that he did not learn of the judge’s corruption until shortly before he filed his petition because he did not have access to many resources while in prison.

The trial court denied the petition. It found that 1) the judge’s conviction had been a matter of public record since at least 2015, so the defendant should have filed a petition within the 60 day deadline for new evidence that applied at the time, 2) the defendant admitted in his petition that he found out about the conviction in March 2021 but did not file the petition within the old 60 day deadline, and 3) the defendant failed to link the judge’s conviction to his own case or show how the judge’s drug theft and issues affected his ability to accept the negotiated guilty plea. The defendant appealed.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court affirmed the denial of the PCRA petition. The Court rejected the trial court’s first two reasons but accepted the third. Specifically, the defendant was not required to file anything within 60 days of the conviction becoming public because the public records presumption no longer applies. Recognizing that inmates do not necessarily have access to the news or legal databases, the Supreme Court eliminated the presumption that inmates are aware of public records like court documents in a case called Commonwealth v. Small in 2020. Therefore, the defendant was not expected to know about the judge’s conviction or resignation.

Second, a PCRA based on newly discovered evidence must be filed within a year based on a 2018 amendment that extended the deadline from 60 days to one year. As the trial court denied the petition for not having been filed within 60 days, the Superior Court found that the trial court erred for that reason, as well. The court simply failed to recognize the amendment to the law.

The Superior Court affirmed on the third reason, however. The Court found that the defendant failed to show that anything about the judge’s illegal behavior tainted his own case. The defendant had accepted a negotiated guilty plea, meaning he agreed to plead guilty and that he and the Commonwealth would recommend the same sentence to the judge. The judge accepted that negotiated plea. Thus, even if the judge had significant corruption or personal issues, there was nothing about those issues that would have affected the guilty plea or the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. In other words, the defendant was unable to show that anything about the judge’s behavior actually affected the case.

Finally, although the Court did not apply the old public records presumption, it did express skepticism that the defendant would not have heard about the judge’s behavior for so long. Although the presumption no longer applies, a defendant must be able to plead and prove that they acted with due diligence and could not reasonably have learned of the new evidence sooner. Here, the defendant failed to do so. Therefore, the Court affirmed the denial of the petition.

The Impact of Myers

The Court’s ruling shows the importance of linking a judge or police officer’s misconduct to the defendant’s specific case. In many cases, detectives or police officers get arrested long after a defendant has been found guilty and sentenced. In those cases, the arrest is often not the officer’s first incident of misconduct, and the Commonwealth and/or police may have had information in their files as to other acts of misconduct that should have been disclosed prior to trial. In that case, it may be possible to invoke the newly discovered evidence exception and allege a Brady violation. In other cases, there may not have been anything that the Commonwealth should have disclosed at the time, but the misconduct may have been so similar to something that happened in the defendant’s case that it calls the legitimacy of the defendant’s conviction into question. For example, if a witness claimed that the police coerced them into giving a statement and the officer involved is later disciplined for doing something similar, it may be possible to argue that the behavior is so similar that it should allow for a new trial under the newly discovered evidence exception.

Ultimately, the mere fact of a subsequent arrest or disciplinary action against someone involved in the case does not automatically result in a new trial. When a detective, judge, or prosecutor gets arrested after someone has been convicted, it is critical to understand when the exception applies and when it does not. It is also important to re-investigate the case thoroughly in order to establish any possible links between the misconduct and the defendant’s case.

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Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/6/23 Zak Goldstein 7/6/23

PA Supreme Court: Parole Agents May Add Conditions of Supervision, Probation Officers May Not

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Koger, holding that the statutes governing state parole differ from those governing probation and allow parole agents to add conditions of supervision that were not included as part of the original sentencing order. This means that in some ways, probation provides more protections than parole. A probationer may not be convicted of violating probation conditions which were not ordered by the sentencing judge on the record at the time of sentencing, but a parolee may be found in violation of parole for violating conditions which were later imposed by the supervising parole agent.

The Facts of Koger

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and criminal use of a communications facility. The charges stemmed from an incident in which his daughter found contraband images on his cell phone. He pleaded guilty in state court and received a sentence of 8 - 23 months’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation. The court also ordered him to have no contact with any of the victims or persons displayed in the images, to submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation, to complete any recommended treatment, perform 100 hours of community service, and complete sexual offender counseling.

The court did not advise the defendant of the general conditions of probation or parole at the time of sentencing. Instead, a probation officer explained the general conditions of Washington County, PA’s probation and parole immediately following the sentencing hearing. None of those conditions were put on the record or placed in the sentencing order.

As the defendant had already served the minimum sentence, the court immediately paroled him. A few weeks later, the defendant violated his parole by possessing pornographic images. The trial court revoked his parole and sentenced him to his back time with work release for the parole violation. It resentenced him to another three years’ probation to run consecutively on the CUCF charge.

Following his release, the Commonwealth again charged him with violating his probation and/or parole. This time, the Commonwealth alleged that he violated some of the conditions of probation and parole which were not put on the record at the time of sentencing but were instead explained by the probation officer following sentencing. For example, the Commonwealth charged him with failing to report and consent to searches, violating criminal laws, committing assaultive, threatening, or harassing behavior, and failing to avoid unlawful and disreputable places.

Ultimately, the alleged violations stemmed from an incident in which the probation officers conducted a home visit and asked to search the defendant’s home. He refused to let them search the phone, they had to use force to detain him, and when they searched the phone, they found explicit chats between the defendant and a user who identified themselves as a 15-year-old female. They also found more illegal pornography. Finally, the defendant also threatened the probation officer as the officer dropped him off at the jail.

The trial court found that the defendant violated his parole and probation by committing technical violations. It revoked both the probation and parole and sentenced him to his back time for the parole violation and 1 - 3 years’ incarceration for the probation violation.

The defendant appealed, challenging both the legality of the sentence and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the revocation of probation and parole. The Superior Court remanded, finding that the record did not contain sufficient evidence as to whether the conditions of probation and parole were made part of the sentencing order and proceeding. The trial court issued a supplemental opinion conceding that the conditions were not part of the sentencing proceedings. The Superior Court therefore reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court could not find the defendant in violation of probation and/or parole conditions which were not imposed at the time of sentencing. The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the appeal.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court previously ruled in Commonwealth v. Foster that conditions of probation must be made part of the record at sentencing or a defendant cannot be charged with violating them. The issue in this case, however, was whether the same rules apply to a potential parole violation or whether parole agents/officers may impose conditions after sentencing. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth, finding that parole is different from probation and parole agents may add their own conditions even where the trial court has not specifically included those conditions in the sentencing order or put them on the record.

When it comes to probation, the statute directs that the court shall attach reasonable conditions . . . as it deems necessary to assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life. A sentencing court may impose somewhat general conditions and then leave it to the probation officers to provide more specifics, but the basic conditions must be imposed by the sentencing court.

The statute, however, does not mention parole. Instead, the only relevant statute directs that when imposing a county sentence, the sentencing court shall place the inmate in the charge of and under the supervision of a designated probation officer. Therefore, the probation officer may decide the conditions of supervision during county parole.

State parole is also different as the Prisons and Parole Code authorizes the Parole Board to make general rules for the conduct of parolees and establish special conditions for supervision. The parole statute specifically authorizes the board to establish the conditions of supervision. Thus, the statutes require the sentencing judge to decide the conditions for probation, but it allows much more discretion to a state parole agent or county parole officer.

Therefore, the trial court properly found the defendant in violation of his county parole even though the conditions were imposed by a probation officer rather than the court. The probation violation was illegal, however, because the conditions for probation were not decided by the judge. This results in significant differences between probation and parole. For parole, the parole agent or officer may decide the conditions of supervision. But for probation, any conditions must be placed on the record at the time of sentencing.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

Zak Goldstein 6/22/23 Zak Goldstein 6/22/23

PA Supreme Court: Prosecutor’s Reference to Defendant’s Post-Arrest Silence Requires New Trial

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Rivera, holding that even a brief mention of a defendant’s post-arrest silence by the prosecution will almost always require a new trial. Both the state and federal constitutions give an individual the right to remain silent and not speak with the police. This case recognizes that such a right would be meaningless if the government could then argue at trial that the defendant is guilty because they refused to make a statement. It is important to note, however, that courts are much more likely to reverse a conviction where the government tries to take advantage of post-arrest silence than silence that occurred prior to an arrest or the giving of Miranda warnings.

The Facts of Rivera

In Rivera, the defendant was accused of sexually abusing a number of minors. The Pennsylvania State Police investigated the case, and they eventually filed rape charges against him. The police went to his house to arrest him, advised him of the charges, and read him his Miranda warnings. They then formally placed him under arrest. The defendant did not say anything at that time; he did not incriminate himself, and he also did not deny the allegations. Instead, he remained silent. He had an absolute right to do so under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions.

The defendant proceeded by way of jury trial. At trial, his defense attorney challenged the credibility of the witnesses. The defense centered around arguing that the complainants were not telling the truth and that they had made up the allegations. During the cross-examination, the defense attorney asked the investigating state trooper a number of questions about the investigation in order to show that the trooper had not done much of an actual investigation. One of those questions was whether the trooper had spoken with the defendant, and the trooper said that he had tried to but was unsuccessful. On re-direct, the prosecutor asked the trooper about the Miranda warnings. Specifically, the following exchange occurred:

Q. [Commonwealth Attorney]: I’d like to direct your attention to June 26, 2018, at about 1400 hours, did you . . . go to the home of [Rivera]?
A. [Trooper Higdon]: Yes.
Q. And was he arrested based on the arrest warrant?
A. I had an arrest warrant in hand, correct.
Q. At approximately 1430 hours, did you read [Rivera] his Miranda [w]arnings?
A. Yes.
Q. So what, what are the Miranda [w]arnings?
A. Miranda [w]arnings are, I’ll say in easy terms of their right to remain silent.
Q. Okay. After you read him his Miranda warnings, he never told you that he didn’t do anything to any of these kids?
A. No.
Q. He never denied doing anything to –
Defense Counsel: Objection to that. A person doesn’t have to deny.
The Court: You’re correct, I think he’s just asking if he did. You may answer.
A. He did not deny.
Q. He never said[,] I didn’t do this?
A. No.
Q. What did he say?
A. Nothing, he said he wished not to talk.
Q. No more questions.

As is reflected in the exchange, the defense attorney objected to this line of questioning, but the trial court overruled the objection. The trial court did not provide a cautionary instruction to the jury. The jury convicted on many of the charges, and the defendant appealed.

The Superior Court affirmed. It held that the prosecutor should not have asked the questions about the defendant’s response to receiving his Miranda warnings, but it found that the error amounted to harmless error. It also found that the prosecutor’s questioning was a fair response to the defense’s opening the door on the issue by asking if the trooper had spoken with the defendant. The defendant petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review, and the Supreme Court granted allocatur.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Court emphasized that the prosecution simply may not ask questions about a defendant’s decision to remain silent after being arrested and receiving Miranda warnings. The issue is more complicated when a defendant has not yet been arrested - in that case, the courts may be more forgiving should a police witness testify that a defendant did not give a statement while describing the steps that the officer took to investigate the allegations.

Post-arrest, however, there is an absolute right to remain silent, and the prosecution may not try to take advantage of silence in order to suggest that a defendant is guilty. Indeed, the Court noted that “referencing a defendant’s post-arrest silence may imperil an entire case.” Even though the evidence in this case appeared to be strong, the Court found that the error was not harmless. First, it found that the reference to silence was not de minimis - the prosecutor had asked four questions about it. Second, the evidence was not merely cumulative of other evidence in the case. Third, the evidence was not so overwhelming that the defendant could not have been prejudiced. Accordingly, the Court granted Rivera a new trial.

In general, the prosecution may not use a defendant’s silence against them at trial. Even references to pre-arrest silence may be inadmissible and lead to reversal on appeal. But this case makes it very clear that references to post-arrest silence are particularly problematic and that even just a few questions about it may lead to a new trial. Prejudice is essentially presumed when the prosecutor attempts to use a defendant’s post-arrest decision to remain silence against them.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Read the case

Zak Goldstein 6/14/23 Zak Goldstein 6/14/23

PA Supreme Court: Trial Court May Not Revoke Probation Before It Begins

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Rosario, holding that a trial court may not revoke a probationary sentence before it begins. This decision is extremely important as it provides a great deal of protection to individuals who are still serving the incarceration or parole portions of sentences that have a probationary tail. Previously, a judge could revoke a consecutive probationary tail and sentence a defendant up to the maximum possible sentence for the offense. With parole, however, the maximum possible sentence is the portion of the jail sentence that has not yet been served. This case upholds the Superior Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Simmons which prohibited a longstanding practice of judge’s finding a defendant in violation of probation which has not yet started.

The Facts of Rosario

In Rosario, the defendant pleaded guilty to carrying a firearm without a license and drug charges. He received a sentence of 2.5 - 5 years’ incarceration followed by five years’ probation. He made parole before the maximum prison sentence expired, and while on parole, he was arrested and charged with kidnapping and then shooting a man. The Commonwealth prosecuted him for attempted murder and related charges in the new case. The trial court also revoked Rosario’s parole and probation in the original gun and drug case. The trial court sentenced him to the remaining unserved sentence of his five year prison term (improperly in this case as the parole board had jurisdiction) as well as an additional 5 - 10 years’ incarceration and five years’ probation for the violation of the probation on the drug charges. Rosario’s probation, however, had not yet started at the time of the new offense. The court had run the probation consecutively to the prison sentence, so he was still on the parole portion of the sentence.

Rosario appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. While his appeal was pending, the Superior Court decided the case of Commonwealth v. Simmons. In Simmons, the Superior Court held that a trial court may not find someone in violation of probation which has not yet started. In other words, the law does not allow anticipatory probation violations. Accordingly, the Superior Court applied the new rule of Simmons to Rosario’s case, vacated the prison sentences on the drug charges because the probation had not started when he committed the new crime, and remanded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing. The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the case.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed and held that anticipatory probation violations are illegal. Examining the language of the statute, the Court found that a trial court may only revoke a probationary sentence which has already begun. For example, one portion of the statute specifically provides that the court may “revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation.” 42 Pa.C.S. §9771(b). In other words, only a violation of the probation itself may trigger revocation, not a violation of a probation order before the probation term has started. A different section requires the court resentencing a defendant following a revocation to give “due consideration . . . to the time spent serving the order of probation.” 42 Pa.C.S. §9771(b). Obviously, if the probation had not yet started at the time of the violation or revocation, then the court could not consider how the defendant had done on probation or for how long the defendant had been on probation. Likewise, another section provides: “[t]here shall be no revocation” of probation “except after a hearing at which the court shall consider . . . evidence of the conduct of the defendant while on probation.” 42 Pa.C.S. §9771(d).

Ultimately, numerous sections of the statute direct the resentencing court to consider how the defendant did while on probation, how long the defendant was on probation, and whether the probation itself was violated. None of these things can be evaluated for someone who has not yet started their probation, suggesting that the legislature intended that only probation which has begun can be violated. The court therefore found that the statute is unambiguous and the plain language prohibits an anticipatory violation. Even if the statute were ambiguous, however, the rule of lenity would apply. The rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity in a criminal statute be construed in favor of the defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed. A trial court may not find a defendant in violation of a consecutive period of probation when the defendant is still in custody or on parole.

There are ways around this ruling for pending and future cases, however. Previously, trial judges would often sentence a defendant to a prison sentenced followed by a period of probation on the lead charge and no further penalty on the remaining counts. For example, a defendant charged with carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia might receive a sentence of 11.5 - 23 months in jail followed by two years’ probation on the carrying without a license offense and no further penalty on the carrying on the streets of Philadelphia count. Now, a judge can impose 11.5 - 23 months’ incarceration on one offense and concurrent probation on the other so that the probation will start immediately. This limits the overall potential maximum penalty for a violation in that the probation is only on one offense, but it does still limit the effects of this ruling. For many defendants who are currently serving sentences of incarceration or parole, however, it provides a tremendous amount of protection against a probation violation for a probation sentence that has not started yet.