Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
PA Superior Court: ARD Does Not Count as Prior Offense for DUI Sentencing
The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Chichkin, holding that a defendant’s prior acceptance of an accelerated rehabilitative disposition (“ARD”) does not qualify as a prior conviction for purposes of the DUI sentencing statute. This decision is a huge win for DUI defendants because many people will no longer be exposed to longer mandatory minimum sentences for a second DUI arrest if the prior arrest was resolved with the ARD program. It also fully recognizes that ARD does not count as a conviction or admission of guilt for any purposes.
Commonwealth v. Chichkin
The defendant was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence for an incident that occurred on December 8, 2017. His case proceeded to trial in the Philadelphia Municipal Court on May 18, 2018, at which time the court found him guilty of two counts of DUI-general impairment under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). The Municipal Court sentenced him to a term of 30 days to six months’ imprisonment, with two months’ concurrent probation. The 30-day mandatory minimum was imposed under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(b)(2)(i) because the defendant had accepted ARD for a prior DUI offense in 2013. If he had not had a prior ARD acceptance, then the mandatory minimum for his DUI sentence would have instead been 48 hours’ incarceration.
The defendant filed a timely motion for reconsideration seeking to “bar consideration of [his] prior ARD acceptance for sentencing purposes because the statutory framework violates several provisions of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.” The court granted reconsideration and vacated the defendant’s sentence. However, following a hearing on the post-sentence motion, the Municipal Court denied reconsideration and reinstated the original sentence. The defendant filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas. The trial court denied the writ but stayed the defendant’s sentence pending appeal. The defendant then filed a timely appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
Why Does it Matter if I Have a Prior Conviction for DUI?
The reason it matters is because if you have a prior DUI, then you will be subjected to an enhanced mandatory minimum if you are convicted of a subsequent DUI. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804 lists the criminal penalties for a defendant after a conviction for DUI. These penalties can be quite harsh, especially considering that these are mandatory sentences and therefore the judge has no discretion in the imposition of the sentence.
For example, let’s assume a defendant is convicted of DUI while under the influence of controlled substances and this is his first DWI conviction. Because it is the defendant’s first conviction, the mandatory minimum for a first offense involving a controlled substance is three days’ incarceration. However, let’s assume that this defendant actually had a prior conviction for drunk driving and then is found guilty of DWI while under the influence of controlled substances. The mandatory minimum for this offense is now 90 days’ incarceration. This means that the defendant’s prior record can have a dramatic effect on his or her sentence.
Why Would ARD Count as a Prior Conviction?
Under the language of the statute, entry into the ARD program should count as a prior conviction. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806 defines what constitutes a prior conviction for the DUI statute. According to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804, if you previously accepted an ARD offer, the ARD counts as a prior conviction and thus you would be subjected to the enhanced penalties for second time offenders. In the instant case, the defendant was appealing this issue based on his argument that the statute was unconstitutional.
The Superior Court’s Decision
The Superior Court found that it was unconstitutional to count the defendant’s prior ARD as a prior conviction. In reaching its decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court looked at previous appellate decisions. In its research, the Superior Court found that it was not unconstitutional to give a defendant an enhanced or mandatory sentence based on a prior conviction. However, the Superior Court found that it is unconstitutional to give a defendant an enhanced or mandatory sentence based on a fact that a defendant was not found guilty of beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of fact (i.e. a jury or a judge).
This scenario used to be common in drug possession cases (for example, selling drugs within a certain distance of a school or based on the weight of a drug). Not too long ago, a defendant could receive an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence because the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant had a certain amount of drugs or was within a certain amount of feet near a school. However, Pennsylvania courts found that this was unconstitutional. They held that in order for a defendant to receive this enhanced or mandatory sentence, the trier of fact must specifically find that the defendant committed the conduct which increased the penalty in question beyond a reasonable doubt. It was not sufficient for the Commonwealth to merely present this fact during its case-in-chief or to the judge at sentencing. Instead, the trier of fact had specifically find that the defendant committed this fact beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant could receive the enhanced sentence.
This resulted in many Pennsylvania mandatory minimum statutes being struck down because they allowed the judge to make findings on mandatory minimum issues at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence standard instead of requiring that these things be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the Superior Court analogized these prior decisions which struck down mandatory minimum sentences in Pennsylvania to the ARD statute, which allowed for a defendant to receive an increased sentence despite no finding of guilt by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the question was whether a prior ARD qualified as a “fact” or a prior conviction.
After reviewing these prior decisions, the court found that admission into an ARD program could not be considered a prior conviction for any offense other than DUI’s. Further, when the Superior Court analyzed the procedure of accepting an ARD offer, it found that because a defendant does not have to admit his guilt and the Commonwealth is not required to prove the defendant’s culpability beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant’s prior acceptance of ARD does not qualify as a “prior conviction.” As such, the Superior Court found that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806 and § 3804 are unconstitutional. The defendant will be re-sentenced as a first-time offender.
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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
PA Supreme Court: Reckless Introduction of False Evidence Bars Retrial of Wrongfully Convicted Defendant
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson, holding that the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial where the original conviction was based on false evidence and prosecutorial misconduct occurred in the form of prosecutors acting recklessly with respect to seeking the admission of the false evidence. This is an important case which sharpens the teeth of PA’s Double Jeopardy Clause and which provides some accountability for prosecutors who introduce evidence at trial that turns out to be false.
The Facts of Johnson
In Johnson, the victim, Walter Smith, told the police that a man named Clinton Robinson had killed a woman named Margaret Thomas. Later that year, Smith was shot and killed outside of a Philadelphia bar. Based on the ballistics evidence, police believed that there were multiple shooters. Police also found a red baseball cap near Smith’s body.
Debbie Williams, a friend of Smith’s, went to the police station and made a statement to Philadelphia police. She claimed that as they left the bar, there were numerous people outside on the sidewalk or in the street. A man who was wearing a red article of clothing pushed past her towards Smith. She heard shots, so she ducked, and she did not see the shooting. She then saw people run away. After the gunshots, she saw the person who had been wearing the red hat run past her, as well. She went to Smith’s body and picked up his baseball hat, which had a hole in it. The police arrived soon thereafter and took her to the station. She gave the hat to the police.
The case was not solved until 2005. In 2005, a jailhouse informant named Bryant Younger, who was under indictment in a federal drug case, told police that he heard the defendant, who was also in custody, make statements implicating himself in Smith’s murder. The police obtained the defendant’s DNA and compared it to DNA recovered from the red hat. They found that there was a match.
The Commonwealth then somehow got confused and failed to realize that there were two hats – a red hat which was found in the street, and a black hat which Smith had been wearing. The black hat had been tested and in fact had Smith’s blood and DNA on it, and the red hat had the defendant’s DNA on it. But somehow the Commonwealth believed that there was one hat with both men’s DNA on it. The Commonwealth arrested the defendant and charged him with first-degree murder, conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of crime. The case went to trial, and at trial, the Commonwealth’s crucial piece of evidence was the red hat with the DNA on it.
However, due to the Commonwealth’s apparent confusion, the prosecutor argued that the shooter, who was wearing the red hat, must have gotten in close to Smith and shot him, leading both to his own DNA being on the red hat as well as Smith’s blood. This was wrong because Smith’s blood was not actually on the red hat; it was on the black hat.
Nonetheless, the DNA analyst also testified that Smith’s blood and the defendant’s DNA were both found on “the hat.” The defendant’s attorney somehow never challenged the underlying premise that there were two hats. He argued that the DNA may not have been reliable and that no one actually saw the defendant commit the shooting. The prosecution emphasized that the decedent’s blood was on the same hat as the defendant’s DNA in closing argument. The jury convicted, and the court sentenced the defendant to death.
The Post-Conviction Relief Act Litigation
The defendant eventually filed a PCRA Petition after his attorneys uncovered the fact that there had been two hats and the decedent’s blood was only on the black hat. The Commonwealth agreed that the defendant should receive a new trial and also agreed not to seek the death penalty. The court granted a new trial.
Discovery Motions and Double Jeopardy Motions
The defendant then began filing discovery motions based on the finding of the two hats. The motion eventually evolved into a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds due to prosecutorial misconduct in introducing false evidence – the false evidence being that there was only one hat. This led to various evidentiary hearings at which the prosecutors and detectives involved in the original trial had to testify. It quickly became clear to the court that the Commonwealth had not intentionally misstated the evidence but had gotten confused and believed that there was only one hat. Some police officers, however, had also exaggerated the evidence if not completely misstated it.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the defendant moved to dismiss the case. One officer had exaggerated the extent to which he saw blood stains on the red hat, and the other detectives and prosecutors believed that there was only one hat despite the fact that the Commonwealth clearly had two hats in its possession with separate property receipt numbers. He argued that regardless of whether the mistake was intentional or reckless, he had to spend nine years on death row, and the case should therefore be dismissed. The Commonwealth agreed that mistakes were made, but it argued that the mistakes had not been intentional, so it should be permitted to retry the defendant.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. It found that the Commonwealth had acted recklessly, not intentionally, and because the Commonwealth had not acted in bad faith, the double jeopardy clause did not apply. It did, however, permit the defendant to appeal prior to the re-trial by finding that such an appeal would not be frivolous. The Superior Court affirmed, and the defendant appealed further to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted the case and reversed the conviction.
The Supreme Court’s Ruling
The Court barred the prosecution of the defendant and dismissed the charges against him.
First, it accepted the trial court’s findings that prosecutors had not acted intentionally but had acted either recklessly or with gross negligence. They had not conspired to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, but they had made so many inexplicable mistakes that the mistakes rose to a level of more than just ordinary negligence.
Second, the Court found that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protections than the United States Constitution. Federal appellate courts have found that the United States Constitution requires intentional misconduct in order for the double jeopardy clause to apply and bar a retrial. But the Supreme Court found that Pennsylvania’s Constitution bars a retrial where the first conviction was vacated as a result of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred recklessly.
The purpose of the double jeopardy clause is not only to penalize prosecutorial error, but also to protect citizens from the embarrassment, expense, and ordeal of a second trial for the same offense. It should also prevent compelling them to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent they may be found guilty.
When the government engages in improper actions sufficiently damaging to undercut the fairness of a trial, it does not matter much to the defendant whether the prosecution did it on purpose. Therefore, the double jeopardy clause applies to bar retrial both when the prosecution acts intentionally as well as recklessly. Because the prosecution here clearly acted recklessly, the Commonwealth could not re-try the defendant, and the Court dismissed the case.
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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, DUI, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
PA Superior Court: Restraining Child in Room With Baby Gate May Have Been Justified
The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yachimoski, holding that a defendant who used a gate to keep his child in her room from leaving at night was entitled to a parental justification jury instruction. This case, aside from the absolute absurdity of it being prosecuted in the first place, highlights the importance of jury instructions in a criminal case. For one, it shows that jury instructions provide guidance to a jury on how to decide a case and, if provided, can help a defendant avoid a wrongful conviction. Additionally, it highlights the fact that a criminal court giving an improper jury instruction is often one of the strongest potential issues on appeal. If a jury is not instructed on a legal defense when there was evidence which would have supported that defense, then a defendant will often be entitled to a new trial.
Commonwealth v. Yachimowski
The defendant and his co-defendant (the mother of his child) were charged with endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”). The alleged victim in this case was their five-year-old daughter. The defendants elected to proceed by way of a jury trial and at their trial, the Commonwealth called several witnesses. The first witness was a case manager for Family Psychological Associates. She testified that at approximately 10:30 AM on May 17, 2018, she knocked on the front door of the defendants’ home. The defendant opened the door while holding a portable drill and let her in. After he let her in, the defendant walked to the doorway of his daughter’s room. According to this witness, she saw two baby gates which were stacked one on top of the other. The gates blocked the doorway into the child’s room. The defendant then used the drill to unscrew the top baby gate to allow his child to leave the room.
The witness then stated that she saw the child chewing on either tissue paper or a paper towel. When asked why his daughter was chewing on this, the defendant responded that his daughter “was hungry.” It is worth noting that according to this witness, the child did not look like she was underfed or lacking in proper hygiene. Additionally, she testified that the home was not in disarray and that it looked normal.
The Commonwealth also called a caseworker from Clarion County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”). The caseworker testified that she had received a report that the defendant’s child was being confined in her room by the use of secured baby gates. She also testified that she, along with two Pennsylvania State Troopers, entered the defendants’ home and went to the child’s bedroom. In the room, there was a “potty chair sitting on the floor with a box of wipes and a bed.” The CYS worker asked why they were using baby gates to block the child’s doorway and they responded it was to make sure the child “didn’t get into things whenever they hadn’t gotten out of bed in the morning.”
This was the extent of the Commonwealth’s case. After the Commonwealth rested, the co-defendant testified. She testified that they installed the baby gates in the doorway because the child “likes to get up at two or three in the morning and play” while she and the defendant are asleep. According to the co-defendant, they placed the baby gates to prevent the child’s nightly wanderings. She also testified that the CYS worker spoke to the defendants in a “raised” voice and that she told them they should not have the gates in case there was a fire. The co-defendant then testified that they “didn’t think of that when [they] put the gates up…[w]e were only doing it for [the child’s] safety.”
After being told of the dangers, they took down the gates and put them in the shed. The co-defendant reiterated that these gates were for the child’s safety. Following this testimony, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to reopen its case. A Pennsylvania State Trooper testified that he obtained a search warrant for the defendants’ shed and they found the baby gates in the defendants’ shed with drill holes in them. They executed this search warrant during the trial because the defendants had denied fully attaching the gates to the wall.
After all the evidence was presented, the defendants’ attorneys requested that the trial court provide the jury with a parental justification instruction. The trial court denied their request because “the defendants did not use force upon or toward the child.” The jury then found the defendants guilty. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of nine months to two-years-less-one-day in Clarion County Jail and his co-defendant to a term of three years’ probation. The defendants then filed a post-sentence motion which was denied. They then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised one claim: whether the trial court erred in failing to provide a justification defense instruction.
What is the Parental Justification Instruction?
The Parental Justification Instructionderives from 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 509(1). That statute provides:
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if:
(1) The actor is the parent or guardian or other person similarly responsible for the general care and supervision of a minor or a person acting at the request of such parent, guardian or other responsible person and:
(i) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, including the preventing or punishment of his misconduct; and
(ii) the force used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation.
The parental justification defense defines conduct that is otherwise criminal, but which under the circumstances is socially acceptable and which deserves neither criminal liability nor even censure. The purpose of the parental justification defense is designed to balance competing interests. Finally, the parental justification defense has four statutory elements:
The actor uses “force upon or toward the person of another;”
The actor “is the parent or guard or other person similarly responsible for the general care and supervision of a minor or a person acting at the request of such parent, guardian or other responsible person;”
The force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, including the preventing or punishment of his misconduct;” and
The force used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation.”
In the instant case, the only issue in terms of whether the instruction should have been provided was the first element which was whether the defendants used “force upon or toward the person of another.” The trial court had reasoned that the defendants did not use force upon the child by simply putting up a gate, so they were not entitled to the instruction. However, in general, defendants are entitled to an instruction for any defense which could be supported by the evidence.
The Superior Court’s Decision
The Superior Court found that the trial court committed reversible error and granted the defendant a new criminal trial. In its decision, the Superior Court analyzed the crimes code and determined that “force” was not defined. Next, the Superior Court reviewed the language of the statute. The Superior Court found that under the plain language of the statute, the defendants’ actions could constitute “the use of force toward” their child. The Superior Court found that the defendants’ actions of creating a physical barricade was a “force that was directed towards [their child].” Additionally, the Superior Court analyzed other statutes and found that confinement qualifies as a use of force in other criminal statutes. As such, the Superior Court found that the trial court erred when it did not grant this jury instruction and the defendant will get a new trial. This does not mean that the Superior Court ruled that the evidence could not possibly support a conviction of the defendants. Instead, it means that they were improperly deprived of a legal defense which was potentially supported by the evidence. The jury should have been instructed that the parents were potentially justified in using the force if they were doing it for the child’s safety. Therefore, they will receive a new trial.
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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, DUI, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.
United States Supreme Court Reverses NJ “Bridgegate” Fraud Convictions
The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Kelly v. United States, reversing the defendants’ convictions for conspiracy, wire fraud, and federal program fraud. This was an extremely high profile case just a few years back in which New Jersey officials associated with then-Governor of New Jersey Chris Christie were accused of creating traffic jams on the George Washington Bridge in order to punish a local mayor who had refused to endorse Christie’s re-election campaign. The decision, while likely alarming to anyone who is against public corruption and the misuse of state resources to punish political opponents, continues a trend of narrowing the federal wire fraud statute’s applicability as a tool to prosecute state and local governmental corruption.
In Kelly, the defendants were Bridget Anne Kelly, the Governor’s deputy chief of staff, David Wildstein, a Port Authority Official, and Port Authority Deputy Executive Director William Baroni. David Wildstein cooperated with federal prosecutors and pleaded guilty, meaning his conviction will likely stand, while Kelly and Wildstein went to trial and were found guilty by a jury.
The basic scheme was that Governor Christie sought to obtain endorsements from both republican and democratic officials throughout the State of New Jersey for his re-election campaign. After the mayor of Fort Lee declined to endorse the governor, his staff conspired to retaliate against the mayor by causing traffic problems at the George Washington Bridge’s toll plaza by closing the lanes which were normally reserved for the residents of Fort Lee. The scheme was disguised as a “traffic study,” but the evidence overwhelmingly showed that it was meant to punish Fort Lee.
The defendants used Port Authority staff to close the lanes, and they had to pay an additional toll collector overtime so that that toll collector would be able to cover for the main toll collector when that person went on break. The scheme resulted in massive traffic jams for days, causing people to struggle to get to work and ambulances to have trouble picking up heart attack victims.
When the scheme came to light, the defendants were indicted by a federal grand jury in the District of New Jersey and charged with conspiracy, wire fraud, and federal program fraud. Wildstein cut a deal with the government and cooperated against the other two, who were convicted. They appealed to the Third Circuit, which affirmed the convictions. The United States Supreme Court then agreed to review the case.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that fraud had not actually occurred because the defendants had taken no steps to convert government money or property for their own purposes.
What is federal wire fraud?
The federal wire fraud statute makes it a crime to effect (with the use of the wires) “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U.S.C. Section 1343.
What is federal program fraud?
The federal program fraud bars obtaining by fraud the property (including money) of a federally funded program or entity.
What is conspiracy?
Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime. It generally requires that two people agree that they are going to commit a crime and then that at least one of the two takes a substantial step (an overt act) towards the commission of that crime. Once that happens, a criminal defendant may be guilty of conspiracy as well as the underlying offense.
Here, the conspiracy charges were dependent on proper convictions for fraud, and both fraud charges required that the defendants actually gain some sort of money or property from the scheme. As the scheme did not encompass any attempt to gain money, the Court’s analysis hinged on whether they had actually attempted or successfully obtained property.
The Supreme Court’s Ruling
The Court reversed the convictions. It noted that the fraud statutes are limited in scope to the protection of property rights and do not authorize federal prosecutors to set standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials. The government had made two arguments as to how the defendants had actually stolen property. First, the government argued that closing the lanes themselves involved actually taking control of the property of those lanes. Second, the government argued that the cost of paying the traffic engineers who reviewed the “study” and the backup toll collectors involved depriving the Port Authority of money.
The Court rejected both arguments. First, it found that the realignment of the access lanes was an exercise of regulatory power and that a scheme to alter a regulatory choice generally is not a taking of the government’s property, particularly where the move is temporary. Second, it found that while the costs in paying for the “study” and the toll collectors could qualify as property, in order to be relevant for purposes of wire fraud, they must be the object of the fraud. That means it must have been the actual goal of the conspiracy to steal that time and money. But those costs were merely incidental to the regulatory decision. Therefore, they were not the object of the conspiracy, and the defendants had not conspired to steal or stolen any property or money. Accordingly, the Court reversed the conviction.
Although this decision is unique in that it involved such a high-profile political situation, it will likely have lasting effects on the ability of federal prosecutors to file criminal charges based on state and local criminal corruption. The Court did not dispute that the evidence showed that the defendants had unethically used their positions to punish political rivals. The Court simply found that they had not stolen anything to do so. This decision, however, drastically limits the reach of the wire fraud and federal programs fraud statutes because it prevents federal prosecutors from filling charges to address local political corruption where the corruption does not actually involve bribery or theft. This leaves the prosecution of political corruption to state and local officials, who may not have the independence necessary to bring charges. It also leaves it to the voters, who may demand the resignation of corrupt political officials. However, federal prosecutors probably already have enough power, so anything that reins them in is usually a good thing.
Do you need a criminal lawyer in Philadelphia? We can help.
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, DUI, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.