Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 6/14/18 Zak Goldstein 6/14/18

PA Super. Ct. Finds Videotaped Forensic Child Abuse Interviews Not Necessarily Admissible as Prior Recorded Statements

Zak T. Goldstein, Esq. - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Bond, affirming the defendant’s conviction but limiting the circumstances under which the prosecution may use a “forensic interview” in a criminal child molestation case. Although the court affirmed Bond’s conviction on a harmless error theory due to his incriminating statements, the court also found that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to play the entire videotaped forensic interview of the minor complainant in an case involving Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse (“IDSI”), unlawful contact with a minor, aggravated indecent assault, and indecent assault charges.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Bond

In Bond, the defendant was charged with Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse and related charges for allegedly molesting his girlfriend’s daughter. Shortly after the one incident of alleged sexual contact, the complainant reported the incident to her aunt. The aunt immediately told the child’s mother, and the mother called the police. The child was subsequently interviewed by a “forensic interview specialist” with the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance (“PCA”). The prosecution played a video of the interview for the jury during the trial.

At the end of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of all charges. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 27.5 – 55 years in state prison. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence and for a new trial, and the trial judge denied those motions. The defendant then appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court Appeal

In the appeal, Bond challenged the trial court’s decision to allow the Commonwealth to play the video of the PCA Interview. By way of background, PCA is an organization in Philadelphia which contracts with the police to help investigate child abuse cases. In almost all Philadelphia child abuse and child molestation cases, the investigating Special Victims Unit detective refers the case to PCA in order to have a PCA employee conduct a videotaped, recorded video of the complainant. The PCA interview is supposed to be conducted in an environment in which the child will feel more comfortable and in which the investigator will ask non-leading questions so as to avoid suggesting incriminating answers to the complainant. In practice, PCA procedures produce mixed results. In some interviews, the interviewers are relatively neutral, but in others, they appear to act more like an arm of law enforcement and not as a neutral, unbiased interviewer. PCA handles these interviews in Philadelphia, but most law enforcement agencies in counties throughout Pennsylvania rely on similar organizations to conduct these “forensic interviews.”

The Issues on Appeal

Bond’s appeal focused on the issue of whether the PCA interview video should have been played for the jury. In general, when a witness makes an out-of-court statement, the statement will not be admissible in court because it will be hearsay. The criminal justice system in the United States is based on the principles of in-court testimony and cross-examination, meaning that in most cases, a live witness will have to testify to what happened in court. The prosecution may not simply call witnesses to testify as to what other alleged witnesses said previously or to play videotaped statements. However, there are a number of exceptions to the rule against hearsay which could allow for an out-of-court, videotaped statement like a PCA interview to be played at trial.

Prior Consistent Statements in Criminal Cases

In this case, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to play the videotaped interview under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 613(c). The rule provides that under some circumstances, a witness’s prior consistent statement may be used to rehabilitate a witness who has been impeached and had his or her credibility attacked by the defense on cross-examination.

Rule 613(c) provides:

(c) Witness’s Prior Consistent Statement to Rehabilitate. Evidence of a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility if the opposing party is given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the statement and the statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of:

(1) fabrication, bias, improper influence or motive, or faulty memory and the statement was made before that which has been charged existed or arose; or

(2) having made a prior inconsistent statement, which the witness has denied or explained, and the consistent statement supports the witness’s denial or explanation.

However, as the court eventually ruled, more is required for a prior consistent statement to become admissible than just that the complainant or witness has been impeached or accused of lying. Instead, the court recognized that “[T]o be admissible to rebut a charge of improper motive, as is the case here, the prior consistent statement must have been made before the motive to lie existed.” Further, a prior consistent statement, if admissible at all, is admissible only as rebuttal or rehabilitation evidence. It is not admissible as substantive evidence. The difference here is that substantive evidence may be considered by the jury as evidence of a defendant's guilt, whereas rebuttal or rehabilitation evidence may be considered by the jury only in assessing the credibility of the witness’s original testimony.

In this case, Bond argued that the trial court erred in admitting the video because the case did not involve any prior statements that predated the complainant’s motive to fabricate. His defense attorneys argued at trial that the complainant fabricated the allegations from the beginning because she did not like living with her mother and Bond and she was upset about the absence of her natural father, who was in jail. He argued that Rule 613 permits prior consistent statements only when the statement predates the alleged fabrication, bias, improper influence or motive, or faulty memory. Therefore, because the defense lawyers suggested that the fabrication existed from the start, the video which was taken after the allegations were made, was not actually a prior consistent statement because it did not predate the false allegations.

The Superior Court ultimately agreed. It found that the statement was not a prior consistent statement because it was not prior to anything – the videotaped interview was not recorded prior to the date on which the defense claimed that the child began fabricating the allegations. Therefore, the statement should not have been admitted as a prior consistent statement pursuant to Rule 613.

Harmless Error

Unfortunately for Bond, the Superior Court nonetheless affirmed the conviction for two reasons. First, the Court found that the admission of the video was harmless error. The defense had extensively cross-examined the complainant on what she said at the interview, so the jury had already heard a great deal about it. Additionally, the defendant had made a number of incriminating statements, including texting the complainant’s mother that he was sorry and very scared about what had done. He also took steps to try to avoid having the complainant testify. Second, the Court held that because defense counsel had asked so many questions about the testimony on the video, the trial court also properly admitted it into evidence under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 106.

Rule 106 is basically the rule of completeness. It provides that:

If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

Thus, because the defendant’s attorneys asked so many questions about the videotaped statement, it was only fair for the Commonwealth to actually play the video and let the jury see the whole thing.

Although things did not work out for Bond in this case, the case is actually incredibly important for anyone facing child abuse allegations. In general, these PCA videos and forensic interviews can be very damaging for the defense as they allow the Commonwealth to play a video of the child often being led into saying incriminating things by the interviewer where the child does not have to testify in public or face cross-examination. The story that comes out on the witness stand is often different from the testimony in the PCA video, and so allowing the Commonwealth to supplement its live testimony with pre-recorded, coached videos in any case in which the defense attacks the complainant’s credibility is incredibly unfair. This decision strongly protects the rights of a criminal defendant to face his or her accusers in court and for the defense to cross-examine witnesses before the judge or jury. The prosecution may not rely on out of court hearsay simply because it is easier or better for them.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC - Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients. We are experienced and understanding defense attorneys with the skill and expertise to fight even the most serious cases at trial, on appeal, and in Post-Conviction Relief Act litigation. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a defense lawyer today.

Zak Goldstein 6/9/18 Zak Goldstein 6/9/18

PA Superior Court Recognizes Defendant’s Right to Present Personal Safety Defense in Fleeing or Eluding Case

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Weber, reversing Weber’s conviction for fleeing or eluding where the trial court precluded him from presenting the statutorily-recognized “personal safety defense."

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Weber

In Weber, the defendant was charged with fleeing or eluding police in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. Sec. 3733. At trial, police testified that they saw the defendant driving through an intersection in Pittsburgh at a high rate of speed. The officers were in uniform and driving a marked police vehicle. They followed the defendant and learned that his vehicle’s registration sticker had expired. When the defendant stopped at an intersection, the officers pulled up next to him and were able to see that his car had valid, but expired inspection and emission stickers, as well. Based on these observations, the officers decided to conduct a traffic stop. They activated their lights and sirens. The defendant eventually pulled over in a parking lot.

The officers exited their patrol car and approached the defendant’s car. One went to the driver’s side door and one went to the passenger side door. The officers testified that the defendant was nervous, acting kind of strangely, and told them that he did not have a license in this country. More officers arrived, and eventually one of the officers observed a large bulge in the defendant’s jacket. The defendant kept reaching for it, so the officers asked him if he had any weapons on him. He began to get very agitated, so the police told the defendant that they were going to have to remove him from the car. As they tried to remove him, the defendant took off at a high rate of speed, crossed four lanes of traffic, and ran a red light. Officers followed him for a while but eventually gave up the chase due to safety concerns. They later found the car abandoned. However, because they had already run his information through the system, they had his name and were able to get an arrest warrant. They arrested him five months later pursuant to the warrant and charged him with Fleeing or Eluding.

The defendant also tried to testify at trial. He testified that the officers were belligerent and kept punching his car right before he fled. He also tried to testify that he fled because he was afraid for his life, but the trial court precluded him from testifying to that effect. The court convicted him of fleeing and sentenced him to 9-18 months of incarceration followed by three years of probation. The defendant appealed.

The Criminal Appeal

The defendant appealed to the Superior Court. On appeal, he argued that the trial court deprived him of the right to a fair trial and due process by preventing him from raising the personal safety defense. In general, the fleeing statute provides:

“Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, commits an offense.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a).

In most cases, fleeing or eluding is a felony of the third degree. At the same time, the statute provides a specific defense to the charges:

"It is a defense to prosecution under this section if the defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to stop immediately for a police officer's vehicle was based upon a good faith concern for personal safety."

The statute provides a number of factors for a court to consider when evaluating whether the defendant had a good faith concern for personal safety. In determining whether the defendant has met this burden, the court may consider the following factors:

(i) The time and location of the event.

(ii) The type of police vehicle used by the police officer.

(iii) The defendant's conduct while being followed by the police officer.

(iv) Whether the defendant stopped at the first available reasonably lighted or populated area.

(v) Any other factor considered relevant by the court.

Prior to trial, the judge held a conference in chambers to discuss the case. The criminal defense lawyer told the judge that the defense intended to assert the personal safety defense through the cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and the testimony of the defendant. The trial judge, however, ruled that the court would not allow the defendant to assert the defense. Essentially, the trial judge conducted his own evaluation of the factors, compared that to the Commonwealth’s allegations, and found that the defendant could not credibly assert the defense. Therefore, the judge refused to instruct the jury on the availability of the defense and prevented the defendant from testifying that he fled because he was afraid that the officers were going to harm him.

PA Superior Court Recognizes the Personal Safety Defense in Fleeing Cases

The Superior Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and awarded him a new trial. The court found that the trial judge violated the defendant’s right to due process by preventing him from asserting a statutorily-available defense and testifying to his belief that he had to flee out of concerns for his own safety. The court found that the above factors are simply factors which the fact-finder, in this case the jury, must consider in deciding whether the defendant is entitled to the defense. They are not elements of the defense that must be met prior to trial – they are just things to consider when the jury is deliberating. Thus, the trial judge may not preclude a defendant from testifying and trying to establish a good faith fear for personal safety.

The court also noted that the defendant’s subjective belief, which would have been established through the defendant’s testimony, was relevant to the defense because in order to assert the defense, the defendant must actually hold the subjective belief that the police are going to harm him. At the same time, the defendant must also hold that belief in good faith. But part of analyzing whether the defendant holds the belief in good faith means allowing the defendant to testify as to what he thought would happen and why. The trial court erred by taking the above factors as a prerequisite to the defendant testifying instead of simply factors to consider. Accordingly, the court awarded the defendant a new trial and ordered that he be permitted to present a full defense.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We are experienced and understanding defense attorenys who will fight for you. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/8/18 Zak Goldstein 6/8/18

PA Superior Court: Commonwealth Cannot Appeal Dismissal for Lack of Evidence at Preliminary Hearing, Must Re-File Instead

Commonwealth v. Perez

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Perez, holding that the Commonwealth may not file an interlocutory appeal following the dismissal of charges for lack of evidence at a preliminary hearing. The court held that the Commonwealth must instead re-file the charges and ask that a different magistrate hear the case.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Perez

In Perez, the defendant was charged with first-degree Murder and Possession of an Instrument of Crime (“PIC”). The Commonwealth filed the charges against the defendant in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, and the case was scheduled for a preliminary hearing before a Municipal Court judge. At the conclusion of the hearing, the MC judge dismissed the charges, finding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of Murder or PIC at the preliminary hearing.

The Commonwealth re-filed the charges. When the Commonwealth re-files on homicide charges in Philadelphia, the preliminary hearing takes place again before a judge in the Court of Common Pleas. When the Commonwealth re-files in the suburban counties, a different Magisterial District Justice, or sometimes even the same justice, will hear the case again. In this case, the Common Pleas homicide judge presided over the second preliminary hearing, and the Commonwealth presented additional evidence. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth presented additional evidence, the Common Pleas judge agreed that there was simply not enough evidence to find that the defendant committed the murder. The judge again dismissed the charges, and the Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court.

Why would a case get dismissed at the preliminary hearing?

In a criminal trial before a judge or a jury, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or the factfinder must acquit the defendant. The standard at a preliminary hearing, which typically occurs within the first few weeks or months of a case, is much lower. The Commonwealth must only show that a crime occurred and the defendant probably committed it. The Commonwealth is entitled to all reasonable inferences in its favor and in the suburban counties, may generally proceed entirely on hearsay presented by police officers. In Philadelphia, the Commonwealth generally cannot get away with proceeding entirely based on hearsay, but some hearsay is still allowed under the rules. If the Commonwealth fails to prove that it is more likely than not that the defendant committed the crime charged, then the court should dismiss the charge or reduce the gradation to the level that was proven by the prosecution.

Is the case over if it gets dismissed at a preliminary hearing?

There are two main reasons why a case would be dismissed at a preliminary hearing. First, if the prosecution is repeatedly not ready to proceed because witnesses have failed to appear, then the case could be dismissed for lack of prosecution (“DLOP”). In Philadelphia, this typically takes place when the Commonwealth is not ready to go three times in a row. Second, if the prosecution presents a case but the evidence fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (51%) that the defendant committed the crimes charged, then the judge should dismiss the charges for lack of evidence (“DLOE”). Both types of dismissals are not necessarily the end of the case because the Commonwealth may re-file the charges. When the Commonwealth re-files the charges, the preliminary hearing will be heard again by a different judge. In Philadelphia, re-filed cases stemming from dismissal for lack of evidence are heard either in Motions court by a Common Pleas judge if it is a non-homicide case or by one of the homicide judges in a murder case. The Common Pleas judge will review the notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing and receive any additional evidence which the parties wish to present. In the suburban counties, a Magisterial District Justice will conduct an entirely new preliminary hearing.

Are there limits on the Commonwealth’s ability to re-file after a dismissal at the preliminary hearing?

Although the Commonwealth may re-file the charges following a dismissal for lack of evidence, the Commonwealth’s ability to re-file is not unlimited. Pennsylvania appellate courts have held that where the charges are repeatedly dismissed by the preliminary hearing magistrates, the successive re-filing of the charges could eventually reach the point of prosecutorial harassment and implicate due process rights. In that case, the charges could be dismissed without prejudice or the trial judge could prohibit the Commonwealth from re-filing the charges. The Commonwealth would then be limited to appealing the case to the Superior Court and asking the Superior Court to find that the evidence presented was sufficient to show that defendant probably committed the crime.

The Criminal Appeal in Perez

In Perez, the Commonwealth re-filed the charges once with the homicide judge in the Court of Common Pleas, and that judge still dismissed the murder charge without prejudice. Instead of attempting to re-file again before a different judge, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal order and eventually appealed the case to the Superior Court when that motion to reconsider was denied.

The Superior Court rejected the appeal, however, and refused to reach the merits of the case. The court found that the Commonwealth could not appeal the trial court’s decision because the order dismissing the charges was not a final order. In general, Pennsylvania appellate courts only have jurisdiction over appeals of final orders. A final order is one that disposes of all of the parties and all of the claims, meaning no further action is pending in the trial court. However, when a trial court dismisses criminal charges at a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth can simply re-file the charges (assuming that they have not re-filed so many times that it would constitute prosecutorial harassment). Therefore, the Superior Court found that the appeal from the dismissal order was interlocutory and premature. The court denied the appeal, finding that the Commonwealth should have simply re-filed instead. Had the dismissal of the charges been with prejudice, meaning that the Commonwealth could not re-file, then the appeal would have been proper. Thus, Perez clearly establishes that the Commonwealth must re-file until no longer allowed before taking an appeal to the Superior Court.

The Impact of Perez

The Superior Court’s decision is somewhat counter-intuitive, but there are still protections for a defendant who is facing criminal charges. First, if more than one judge dismisses the charges, the Commonwealth may decide that they simply do not have a case and give up instead of continuing to re-file the charges. Second, Pennsylvania appellate courts have held that the Commonwealth’s ability to re-file is not limitless. Although there is no set number of times that the Commonwealth may re-file, the courts have found that “[I]f the Commonwealth’s conduct intrudes unreasonably upon the due process right of individuals to be free from governmental coercion, the Commonwealth should not be permitted to present the case repeatedly before successive magistrates.” In practice, this usually means that if the Commonwealth re-files more than once and the case is dismissed two or three times, the courts will likely dismiss the charges with prejudice and prevent the Commonwealth from re-filing. In that case, the Commonwealth could appeal the dismissal of the criminal charges to the Superior Court because that would be a final order. Likewise, where a trial judge in the Court of Common Pleas grants a Motion to Quash (also called a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the suburban counties), the Commonwealth may appeal that ruling to the Superior Court because the Commonwealth is prohibited from simply re-filing in order to evade the Common Pleas judge’s decision quashing the charges.

It is hard to say whether the court’s opinion in Perez benefits the Commonwealth or the defense. In general, allowing the Commonwealth to repeatedly re-file charges can be extremely expensive and stressful for a defendant as the defendant has to repeatedly defend against the charges at successive preliminary hearings. It also allows the Commonwealth to keep trying until the Commonwealth gets a judge that will rubber stamp the charges. At the same time, defending an appeal to the Superior Court is far more complicated, time-consuming and expensive than defending a preliminary hearing. Superior Court appeals can also take years. Therefore, criminal defendants may benefit in terms of cost and obtaining a resolution more quickly as this decision requires the Commonwealth to proceed by re-filing until prohibited by court order from doing so.

Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein 6/5/18 Zak Goldstein 6/5/18

PA Superior Court: Tracing IP Addresses at Trial Requires Authentic Evidence and Expert Witnesses

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Manivannan. In Manivannan, the Superior Court reversed the defendant’s cyber-stalking related convictions after finding that prosecutors improperly failed to prove that the defendant was the person who accessed the complainant’s e-mail account without permission. This is an important decision because it continues a trend of Pennsylvania appellate courts recognizing that electronic evidence can easily be fabricated and therefore must be properly authenticated in order to be admitted into evidence.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Manivannan

In August 2011, the defendant worked at the United States Department of Energy. While employed there, he met and began dating the complainant. The complainant would occasionally use his computer to access her email, but she never gave him permission to access her email account. In November 2013, the complainant ended the relationship with the defendant and began seeing another man.

The defendant did not take the breakup well. By January 2014, the defendant was regularly contacting the complainant through various means of communication despite being asked to stop. On one night, the complainant and her new boyfriend were sitting in her car when the defendant pulled up behind them. The defendant proceeded to follow the two after the complainant drove away. Thereafter, the complainant confronted the defendant and told him that he needed to stop following her.

The defendant continued to engage in this type of behavior. For example, the complainant and her new boyfriend planned a weekend trip to Morgantown, West Virginia. While there, she became aware that the defendant was in the area, as well. Obviously, she became suspicious that the defendant’s presence was not coincidental. She then learned that the accommodation emails she obtained from the hotel were forwarded to her mother, even though the complainant did not send them herself.

The complainant checked the log-in records for her email account and learned that her email account had been accessed twenty-one times from thirteen different Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses located in various states. She screenshotted the suspicious activity and gave the photos to the police. The police then used a website called Geektools.com to determine which internet service providers owned the IP addresses, and the police then subpoenaed the account information for those IP Addresses from Comcast.

Comcast provided the police with a fax on Comcast letterhead with information stating that the IP addresses used to access the complainant’s e-mail account belonged to the defendant. The defendant was then charged criminally with five counts of unlawful use of a computer and one count of harassment.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and went to trial. At trial, the judge permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the screenshots taken from the complainant’s log-in records despite the defendant’s objection that there was no basis for authenticating that those IP addresses were actually the addresses that accessed the complainant’s e-mail account. The trial court also permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the letter from Comcast. This letter did not indicate an individual author, but it was signed “Comcast Legal Response Center.” The defendant objected to the introduction of this letter because it failed to identify an individual author and it was not an original as required under Rule 1002 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. To overcome this, the Commonwealth provided a separate, faxed, boilerplate Pa.R.E. 902(11) declaration that was dated on April 18, 2016 that gave no context for the document its signor purported to certify. This document made no reference to the Comcast letter, and the Commonwealth also presented no evidence that the certification it offered had actually accompanied the Comcast letter. The Commonwealth argued that it qualified as a Business Record and thus an exception to the rule against hearsay. After argument, the trial court allowed the introduction of this letter.

The trial court further allowed the police officer and the complainant to testify that the defendant was in Los Angeles, California when someone accessed the complainant’s email account with an IP address that was located in Los Angeles. However, neither the complainant nor the officer were qualified as expert witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant, and the court sentenced him to nearly five years of probation. The court also attempted to ban the defendant from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, although it later rescinded that unconstitutional provision. The defendant appealed his conviction based on the unreliable electronic evidence, and the Commonwealth appealed the fact that the court did not sentence the defendant to jail time.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court reversed the conviction. It found both that the Commonwealth failed to properly authenticate the IP address tracking that the police had done and that authenticating these documents required the testimony of an expert witness.

What is the Business Record Exception to the Hearsay Rule?

Typically, hearsay is not admissible in trial. Hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Hearsay is typically not admissible because it is not trustworthy and because the defense has no opportunity to cross-examine the person that made the statement. However, there are exceptions to the general ban on hearsay. One such exception is the Business Records Exception. This rule allows statements that would otherwise be hearsay to be admitted into evidence if certain requirements are met. The logic behind is the rule these records are inherently reliable because businesses have an interest in having accurate records. It is important to remember that the record does not have to come from the traditional definition of a business. Associations, institutions, non-profit organizations, etc. can all produce documents that qualify as a “business record” for purposes of this rule.

Prosecutors routinely use the Business Records Exception in their cases. In Pennsylvania, there is a five part test that must be satisfied for a statement to qualify as an Business Record: 1) the record was made at or near the time by-or from information transmitted by-someone with knowledge; 2) the record was kept in the course of regularly conducted activity of a “business”; 3) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 4) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12), or with a statute permitting certification; and 5) neither the source of the information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness (i.e. a document that was made in anticipation of litigation would not be deemed reliable). All of these elements must be met before a document can be entered into evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

In Manivannan, one of the main issues was whether the Commonwealth properly authenticated the Comcast letter. Notably, the Commonwealth failed to present testimony from a custodian of records or other qualified witness. Instead, it attempted to authenticate the Comcast letter using the vague certification. The problem with the certification was that it was not specific. Specifically, the court stated that there was “no discernable correlation between this document and the evidence it purports to authenticate.”

This is very significant because prosecutors frequently attempt to introduce documents under the Business Record Exception without complying with all of the requirements. Here, the court held that the trial court erred when it admitted this letter into evidence. The Court further held that this was reversible error because the letter provided the only direct evidence of the defendant’s connection to the IP address that unlawfully accessed the complainant’s e-mail account.

The Commonwealth Must Present Expert Witnesses to Trace IP Addresses At Trial

The Superior Court also found that the trial court should have required the Commonwealth to present expert witnesses as to the IP address tracing. The court found that lay witnesses cannot draw conclusions from highly technical issues such as ascertaining geographic locations from IP addresses and testify to these conclusions at trial. In Manivannan’scase, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of various IP accounts, testimony about how IP addresses work, and how those addresses were traced back to the defendant without ever offering evidence that the officer or complainant were expert witnesses in the relevant field. The Superior Court rejected the introduction of this testimony without an expert witness, finding that expert testimony is required when the Commonwealth seeks to introduce this highly technical evidence. In other words, subjects such as IP addresses, how e-mail accounts are maintained, the ability to link a physical addresses to an IP address, and other computer science related issues are not common knowledge. Therefore, the trial court should have prohibited this testimony without an expert witness. Accordingly, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction for this reason, as well.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help

Manivannan illustrates that a case can be won or lost based on challenges to the evidence that is allowed to be presented to the jury. If you are charged with a highly technical crime, you need a skilled defense attorney who is up-to-date on the rules of evidence and able to use them to your advantage. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients at trial and on appeal. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to anyone who is facing criminal charges or under investigation. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.