Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 5/1/18 Zak Goldstein 5/1/18

Recorded Prison Visits and Phone Calls Are Admissible as Evidence Against You in PA

Prison phone calls and recorded visits can usually be used against you in Pennsylvania. If you are a defendant facing criminal charges and you say something incriminating in a recorded phone call, that incriminating statement can often be used as evidence of guilt in court. This article explains when a telephone or other audio recording is admissible as evidence in court.

Are Prison Tapes Admissible at Trial?

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Byrd. In Byrd, the Superior Court re-affirmed the long-standing rule that prison tapes and recorded prison visits may be used against a defendant at trial. This means that if a defendant says something incriminating in a recorded phone call, that incriminating statement can be used against the defendant as a confession as long as the defendant was on notice that the call could be recorded.

The Facts of Byrd

Byrd involved gun charges and Possession With the Intent to Deliver charges. Police officers testified at a motion to suppress that they received a phone call for a specific address in McKeesport, PA that a female received threatening phone calls from a suspect who was parked outside of her residence in a grey, F-150 truck. Police arrived at the house, spoke with the woman who had called 911, and learned that a man known to her as “Reek” had threatened to kill her, had a gun, and was parked outside the house in the truck. She pointed at the grey truck.

The officer then went to confront the man in the truck, who turned out to be the defendant. The officer attempted to stop the defendant, and the defendant rolled the window down 2-3 inches. The officer could immediately smell a strong odor of marijuana through the window. The officer also testified that the defendant was acting in a nervous manner, his hands were shaking, and he was breathing rapidly. The officer called for back-up.

When back-up arrived, the officer ordered the defendant to get out of the truck. The defendant refused, so officers pulled him out. The defendant resisted, pulled away, and eventually began to run. Officers caught him. After placing him into custody, they returned to the truck and looked in the window. They observed a gun magazine under a piece of cloth on the front seat of the truck. They then searched the car. When an officer lifted the cloth, he found a .40 caliber handgun. Police also found other drugs and drug paraphernalia in the car which suggested that the defendant may have been likely to sell those drugs.

After police arrested the defendant, he made a number of incriminating statements in recorded inmate visits while awaiting trial in custody at the Allegheny County jail.

The Motion to Suppress

Prosecutors charged the defendant with persons not to possess firearms, carrying a firearm without a license, three counts of possession with the intent to deliver, and three counts of possession with a controlled substance. The defendant moved to suppress the gun and drugs. He also subsequently moved to suppress statements recorded at the Allegheny County jail after prosecutors notified his attorney that they planned to use the recordings at trial. Prison authorities had recorded conversations in which the defendant made incriminating statements to visitors while in custody. Thus, he moved to suppress the statements, arguing that the prison violated Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act when it made the recordings. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the priosn tapes and some of the drugs.

The Criminal Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's order. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress both the physical evidence and the recorded statements. With respect to the physical evidence, the Court concluded that because officers had smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and because the defendant seemed nervous and resisted arrest, the officers had probable cause to search the entire vehicle for contraband pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Gary. As a general rule, police do not need a search warrant for a car because cars may be easily moved. Instead, police must establish at a suppression hearing only that they had probable cause to search a vehicle. The odor of marijuana, coupled with the defendant’s behavior, gave the officers the probable cause necessary to search the car.

The Admissibility of Prison Phone Calls in Pennsylvania

The Superior Court also found that the prison phone calls were admissible in evidence against the defendant. The Court noted that Pennsylvania’s Wiretap Act makes Pennsylvania a two-party consent state. This means that a person may not make secret audio recordings of another person in Pennsylvania. It can actually be a felony to do so, and a violation of the Act typically leads to the suppression of the evidence. Under the Wiretap Act, both parties to a call must consent to its recording, or they must at least be on notice of a potential recording and implicitly consent to the recording by continuing to make a call, anyway.

Although the trial court reasoned that the defendant had not been sufficiently warned that the phone calls would be recorded, the Superior Court rejected this analysis. The testimony at the motions hearing was that inmate visitation at the Allegheny County Jail is conducted over a closed-circuit system using telephone receivers. Guards take a visitor to the jail to a windowed cubicle with chairs and a telephone receiver. The inmate is escorted to a room on the other side of the visitor window with another telephone receiver. The inmate picks up the receiver, enters his or her jail ID number, and then the visitor picks up the receiver. Before the parties speak through the phone, a recording stating that the visit “may be monitored or recorded” is played. However, there is nothing in the inmate handbook which indicates that the visits are recorded and there was no testimony regarding whether [Byrd] heard the recording before each visit. The Commonwealth called the defendant’s visitor, however, to testify that she did hear the warning before the conversations. Additionally, in some of the phone calls, the defendant attempted to whisper and suggested that he did not care if he was being recorded, suggesting that in addition to hearing the warning, he did know that he was being recorded.

Prison Tapes Are Admissible

The Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the evidence did not establish that he actually heard the warning or that the warning that he “may be” recorded instead of “would be” recorded somehow rendered the recording illegal. The Court concluded that the defendant was properly warned that he could be recorded, knew that he was being recorded based on the things that he said, and that he implicitly consented to the recordings by continuing with the visits, anyway. Thus, the Court found that the evidence was not obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act and could be used at trial.

The bottom line is that prison phone calls, and in many cases in-person prison visits, are recorded. This is particularly true in Philadelphia where all prison phone calls are recorded and a warning is played before each call. As long as the prison provides some sort of notice that the phone calls could be recorded, those conversations are admissible in evidence against a criminal defendant if the defendant says something incriminating. They are often even more damaging to a case than a detective or police officer claiming that a defendant confessed because in many cases, the jury will actually be able to listen to the recordings. Many prosecutors throughout the Commonwealth will listen to these recordings prior to trial and see if the defendant confessed at any point during a visit or phone call, and if the defendant did, it could seriously undermine the defense at trial. There is very little that can be done to mitigate the potential damage caused by incriminating statements once they are made. Even statements which seem harmless can often be used against a defendant if the prosecutor can suggest that the defendant was speaking in code or that the statement meant something else. The Superior Court’s opinion re-affirms that prison inmates have very few privacy rights, and if they make recorded phone calls, law enforcement may listen in and use those phone calls at trial.

Experienced and Understanding Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentence, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief act petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today

Zak Goldstein 4/27/18 Zak Goldstein 4/27/18

PA Supreme Court: Arrest Warrant Does Not Allow Police to Enter Home

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Romero. In Romero, the Court held that the police must obtain a search warrant prior to entering a private residence to arrest someone. The police may no longer enter a private home armed only with an arrest warrant. Instead, in order to avoid the risk that police will enter the wrong house, they must also obtain a search warrant from a magistrate after showing the magistrate that they have probable cause to believe the person to be arrested will be found in that location.

The Facts of Romero

In Romero, police were looking for a man named Earnest Moreno who had absconded from a halfway house in Philadelphia. Moreno was on state parole and left the facility. His parole agent obtained a warrant for his arrest and began attempting to locate him. The agent, assisted by Deputy United States Marshalls, attempted to execute the arrest warrant at an address in Philadelphia where they believed that he might live. The residence actually belonged to Moreno’s half-brother, Angel Romero, and his wife, Wendy Castro.

The agents did not find Moreno in the house. Instead, they found a marijuana grow operation. After finding the marijuana, the agent contacted the Philadelphia Police Department. Philadelphia Police obtained a search warrant and searched the house. They recovered marijuana, paraphernalia for growing marijuana, a gun, and identification which linked the defendants to the house.

Motions to Suppress

Romero and Castro moved to suppress all of the contraband found in their house. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and Romero and the agent testified at the hearing. The agent testified that he had a number of different reasons for believing that he would find Moreno at the house. First, it was the address listed on Moreno’s most recent driver’s license, which had expired years prior. Second, the last time Moreno had been arrested, he gave the police that address. Third, he testified that someone from the halfway house told him that Moreno gave them that address when he entered the facility. Finally, he testified that his investigation revealed that Moreno’s family continued to live at the address in question, but he refused to reveal how he learned that information. He agreed that there were other possible addresses for Moreno, but based on those four factors, he believed the address that he searched to be the most likely location for finding Moreno.

He then described the search. He testified that he knocked on the door, announced his and the other officers’ presence, and then was permitted to enter the residence by someone inside. He could not recall whether the occupants actually said he could enter, but he testified that they did not say no. He did remember that the residents began to object to the search of the home, but the agents and marshals ignored those objections. The officers then found the marijuana grow operation.

Romero testified also. He testified that he had previously lived at the address in question with his wife and two children. He testified that Moreno was his half-brother, but he said that he did not associate with him because Moreno was addicted to heroin. He said that he had not spoken with Moreno in fifteen years, did not know where Moreno lived, did not know that Moreno was on parole, and did not know that Moreno had listed that address on his expired driver’s license. He said that Moreno did not receive mail at that address. He also contradicted the agent’s description of the search. He claimed that he heard a knock, his wife opened the door, and police entered without permission. They then began searching the house without speaking to anyone except to tell Romero to sit down after cursing at him.

The trial court granted the Motion to Suppress. The court found that authorities did not need a search warrant to enter the house. Instead, the trial court concluded that the agent simply had to show that his belief as to why Moreno lived at that location was reasonable. However, the trial court found that the belief was unreasonable. It concluded that the information possessed by the parole agent was simply too old to justify the belief that Moreno would be found at that address. Therefore, the court granted the motion and excluded the evidence of drugs, guns, and paraphernalia that the agents found while searching for Moreno.

The Criminal Appeal

The Superior Court reversed and remanded the case for trial. The Superior Court felt that “so long as the authorities had reason to believe that the subject of an arrest warrant . . . lived in and could be found in the apartment, they had a valid basis to search the apartment for the subject of the warrant.” Further, the Superior Court concluded that the agent’s belief was reasonable because Moreno had allegedly given the halfway house that address despite the agent’s refusal to testify from where that information came.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

The defendants appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Superior Court. The Court recognized that under prior United States Supreme Court decisions, police officers may enter the home of the subject of an arrest warrant to effect an arrest, but they must obtain a valid search warrant before entering the home of a third party. Although this standard makes sense in theory, it poses real problems in practice. The problem with this standard is that the police often do not know whether the place that they want to search is the suspect’s home or the home of a third party. In some cases, police may know exactly where the subject of an arrest warrant lives. In others, they may have trouble finding out. Even where police have solid, recent information as to a suspect's whereabouts, the suspect may have recently moved or gone into hiding. That person may also be living with others who have not have done anything wrong and who have their own privacy interests.

The Court therefore concluded that police must have probable cause to believe that the suspect will be found at the location. The Court then had to decide whether the probable cause requirement means that police must obtain a search warrant prior to entering the house or whether the probable cause could simply be challenged by a defendant after-the-fact if the police guessed wrong. The Court rejected the idea that police officers could determine for themselves whether they have probable cause that a defendant will be found at a particular location. Instead, the Court concluded that police must first obtain a search warrant, based on probable cause, from a magistrate or judge prior to entering a private residence.

This ruling does not prevent the police from arresting someone based on probable cause or an arrest warrant where the police encounter that person in public. They may also obtain consent to enter a private residence. However, in order to enter a residence without consent and search from someone, a police officer must first obtain an arrest warrant and a search warrant from a judge. This means that even where police know where the person lives, they cannot enter the house without a search warrant even if they have already obtained an arrest warrant.

Facing Criminal Charges or Planning an Appeal? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein 4/26/18 Zak Goldstein 4/26/18

PA Supreme Court: Defendants Sentenced to Fines or No Further Penalty May Claim Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Post-Sentence Motions

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Delgros. In Delgros, the Court created a new equitable exception which permits a defendant who is convicted of a crime and sentenced only to a fine or to no further penalty to claim ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-sentence motion. Under prior case law interpreting Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, a defendant who was not incarcerated or serving a sentence of probation or parole could not file a PCRA Petition and claim ineffective assistance of counsel in seeking a new trial or sentencing because the PCRA requires that a defendant be serving a sentence.

Commonwealth v. Delgros

Delgros involved the theft of construction materials. The defendant hired the complainant to install a double-wide mobile home on his property. The complainant purchased materials for the project and left some of the materials on the defendant’s property for a period of time, intending to pick them up later. When the complainant returned to pick them up, the materials were gone. The defendant denied knowing what had happened to them. The complainant reported the theft to the police, and the police questioned the defendant. The defendant told the police that he did not know what happened to the materials. He permitted police to search the premises, but the police did not find anything.

Several months later, the defendant and his father hid the materials in the woods. Five to seven years later, the defendant and his father used the materials to build a porch on the defendant’s house. Police subsequently received a report that the defendant had the materials on his porch, and the defendant’s father eventually confessed to the police that the defendant had told him from where the materials came. Police then went to the house armed with a search warrant and saw the stolen materials.

Receiving Stolen Property Charges

Police arrested the defendant and charged him with Receiving Stolen Property as a felony of the third degree. A jury convicted the defendant, and the trial court sentenced him to pay restitution of $2,800 and a fine of $15,000. The court did not sentence him to any jail time or probation. The defendant filed post-sentence motions, claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial lawyer because his trial lawyer had not properly challenged the gradation of the Receiving Stolen Property charge. He alleged that his trial lawyer should have been able to prove that the value of the materials was less than $2,000. The $2,000 amount is significant because Receiving Stolen Property or Theft of less than $2,000 is a misdemeanor instead of a felony.

Jurisdiction for a PCRA Petition

The trial court denied the post-sentence motions, finding that the defendant could not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-sentence motion or in a direct appeal. That was the rule prior to this case. Instead, existing Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions required that ineffective assistance of counsel claims be raised in a Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition after direct appeals have already been litigated. The defendant appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed the result.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

After the Superior Court affirmed, the defendant filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the appeal and reversed the trial court’s denial of the Post-Sentence Motions without a hearing. The Court recognized that on its face, the Post-Conviction Relief Act requires that a Petitioner be serving a sentence in order to file a Petition and claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, someone who is not sentenced to incarceration or probation cannot file a PCRA based on the language in the statute.

However, the Court noted that previous decisions have created two exceptions to this general rule: First, a defendant may file ineffective assistance claims in post-sentence motions and on direct appeal where the claim of ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice. Second, a defendant may show good cause and knowingly and expressly waive his entitlement to seek subsequent PCRA review from his conviction and sentence.

The Court Creates a New Exception

The defendant argued that the trial court should have entertained his arguments under both exceptions or found that the denial of the opportunity to litigate ineffective assistance issue would violate his Sixth Amendment right to competent representation at trial, thereby depriving him of due process. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed.

The Court recognized that the deferral of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is preferable in most cases, but it recognized the fundamental unfairness of a system in which a defendant could be convicted of a felony due to the incompetent performance of his or her lawyer and then not have the opportunity to challenge the conviction based on that incompetent performance. Therefore, the Court recognized a new exception. Under this case, in order to ensure that criminal defendants are afforded an opportunity to challenge trial counsel’s stewardship, the Court adopted a new exception requiring trial courts to address claims challenging the defense attorney’s performance where the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review due to not being sentenced to incarceration or probation.

This exception will provide many defendants with the opportunity to challenge unfair convictions. Previously, defendants convicted of most summaries, many misdemeanors, and even some felonies, would not have been able to ever claim ineffective assistance of counsel because the sentence, if any, would be finished by the time the defendant would have the opportunity to file a PCRA Petition. Now, a defendant who will not be able to file a PCRA Petition may raise those claims in post-sentence motions and request an evidentiary hearing if there is a need to make a record. This decision ensures some degree of basic fairness and that a Court cannot sentence a defendant to no further penalty on a felony charge just to prevent a defendant from appealing based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

Facing Criminal Charges or Considering an Appeal? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief act petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 4/19/18 Zak Goldstein 4/19/18

PA Legislature Revises SORNA in Attempt to Fix Unconstitutional Megan's Law Provisions

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Legislature recently enacted HB 631, amending Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute which governs who must register as a sex offender under Megan’s Law, the type of information that must be provided, how often that information must be provided, and for how long an offender must register. HB 631 is the legislature’s response to recent appellate decisions finding various provisions of SORNA unconstitutional. However, HB 631 fails to address many of the issues that led to SORNA being found unconstitutional in the first place, and many of its provisions remain subject to litigation when applied to offenders who were convicted of crimes for acts which were committed prior to December 20, 2012.

Recent Changes in SORNA

Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law registration scheme has gone through a number of significant changes in the last few years. For example, in 2012, the original SORNA law took effect. SORNA made Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration scheme more punitive by imposing registration requirements on juveniles, increasing the number of offenses which require registration upon conviction, and retroactively increasing the length of the registration period for many people who had already been convicted.

For example, SORNA made M2 Indecent Assault a Tier I Sex Offense requiring 15 years of registration upon conviction. M2 Indecent Assault did not previously require Megan’s Law registration for a first offense. Various provisions in SORNA also attempted to retroactively require registration for people who had already been convicted of Indecent Assault even if they had been convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment.

Since the enactment of the law, Pennsylvania appellate courts have found many of these provisions unconstitutional. For example, courts quickly concluded that requiring people to register as adults for life following juvenile delinquency adjudications was irrational and unconstitutional. More recently, in Commonwealth v. Muniz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that retroactively requiring people to register under SORNA for longer periods of time, for offenses that did not require registration at the time that they were committed, and under more onerous conditions, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The ex post facto clause prohibits the Government from imposing criminal penalties for actions which were not illegal at the time that they were taken. It also prevents the Government from retroactively increasing the punishment for a given crime.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court quickly followed suit in Commonwealth v. Butler, holding that because Megan’s Law registration can be considered criminal punishment, Pennsylvania’s Sexually Violent Predator classification process violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. The SVP procedure violates a defendant's jury trial rights because it allows a judge, instead of a jury, to find that a defendant should be required to register as a Sexually Violent Predator for life. It also allows the judge to make this finding under a clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction.

The Effect of Muniz and Butler on Pre-2012 Offenders

An important side effect of the Supreme Court’s Muniz decision is that it arguably eliminated the registration requirement completely for anyone who had been convicted of a sex crime for conduct which occurred prior to December 20, 2012. This is because the SORNA statute explicitly repealed the prior Megan’s Law scheme that was in effect at the time. Thus, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that SORNA could not be applied retroactively to people who had been convicted of crimes for conduct which took place prior to the December 20, 2012 enactment, the Court left no alternative registration scheme in place for these offenders. With SORNA unconstitutional for those people and Megan’s Law repealed, even lifetime offenders (such as those convicted of rape or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) who properly had to register prior to December 20, 2012, would arguably be eligible for removal from the State Police registry. The legislature responded quickly in an attempt to aovid this outcome.

The Legislature’s Response to Muniz and Butler

Concerned that many people would no longer have to register at all, the Pennsylvania Legislature responded by amending the SORNA statute in the hopes of “re-capturing” pre-December 20, 2012 offenders. The act amends SORNA “to address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Butler (2017 WL3882445).” It is debatable, however, whether the amendments are constitutional. It is also questionable whether they address the problems identified in Muniz and Butler.

Changes for Post-2012 Registrants

For the most part, the amendments made very few changes to SORNA as applied to offenders who committed the acts for which they must register after December 20, 2012. For example, SORNA no longer requires registration for one offense. A conviction for the interference with custody of children where the defendant is the child’s parent, guardian, or lawful custodian no longer requires registration.

The amendments also created a mechanism by which even Tier III lifetime registrants and Sexually Violent Predators may petition the court for removal from Megan’s Law. Now, a registrant who avoids conviction for any offenses punishable by more than a year for twenty-five years following his or her release from custody may petition to have the registration requirement lifted. A petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is not a threat to others. It is unclear how many petitioners will receive relief under this provision, and it is important to note that even if the Petitioner meets this heavy burden, the court is not required to actually grant the removal petition.

Finally, the new amendments relax the in-person registration requirement for some registrants. An offender who must register more than once a year may register in-person once and by phone for the other registration requirements that year if the offender is compliant with all of the requirements for the first three years of registration and does not get convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year.

Although these changes are relatively minor, they do provide some relief to Tier III and SVP offenders who would otherwise have to register for life with no hope of ever obtaining removal from Megan’s List. It is likely that the legislature included this provision so that the Commonwealth's lawyers could argue that the statute is now less punitive and therefore does not violate the ex post facto clause.

Changes for Pre-2012 Registrants

With respect to registrants who committed the crimes for which they were convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment, the changes primarily seek to decrease the requirements to what they would have been under the old Megan’s Law Scheme. For example, the period of time for which the offender must register has been reduced to what it would have been under the pre-SORNA Megan’s Law. Thus, offenders must either register for ten years or for life, whereas new offenders could have to register for 15 years, 25 years, or for life.

The information that offenders must provide to the State Police continues to be roughly the same. A registrant still must inform the State Police of where they live, work, and go to school. They must all inform the State Police if any of those things change, and the State Police will continue to post that information on the internet and to provide that information to local police departments. The amendments also make it a crime to fail to comply with these requirements, and they make it even more difficult on “transient” offenders who do not have a fixed address.

The most surprising part of the new bill is that the amendments do not change the procedure by which an offender may be classified as a Sexually Violent Predator. An offender may still be found to be a Sexually Violent Predator by the sentencing judge under the clear and convincing evidence standard, and the requirements for Sexually Violent Predators are still essentially the same with the exception that they may petition for removal from the list after 25 years. It is entirely unclear how this re-enactment of the same unconstitutional sentencing scheme will survive appellate review.

SORNA Litigation

The appellate courts have not yet addressed whether the new amendments to SORNA are constitutional. It is likely that there will be numerous challenges both to the legislature’s attempt to retroactively apply the statute to pre-SORNA offenders given that SORNA repealed their original registration requirement and to the continuation of the same procedures for making the Sexually Violent Predator determination. Although appellate decisions may eventually bring relief to thousands of people, the ongoing litigation leaves many people uncertain as to their registration requirements. If you are currently subject to registration requirements, it is important that you continue to register with the State Police as required until the State Police or a court inform you that you no longer have to register. If you believe that you should no longer have to register, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney about the possibility of petitioning the state police or the trial court for removal from Megan’s Law. It is also likely that other issues will arise as attorneys have more time to review the changes in the new bill.

Facing Criminal Charges or Considering an Appeal? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal, post-conviction relief act petition, or Megan's Law removal petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.