PA Legislature Revises SORNA in Attempt to Fix Unconstitutional Megan's Law Provisions

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Legislature recently enacted HB 631, amending Pennsylvania’s SORNA statute which governs who must register as a sex offender under Megan’s Law, the type of information that must be provided, how often that information must be provided, and for how long an offender must register. HB 631 is the legislature’s response to recent appellate decisions finding various provisions of SORNA unconstitutional. However, HB 631 fails to address many of the issues that led to SORNA being found unconstitutional in the first place, and many of its provisions remain subject to litigation when applied to offenders who were convicted of crimes for acts which were committed prior to December 20, 2012.

Recent Changes in SORNA

Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law registration scheme has gone through a number of significant changes in the last few years. For example, in 2012, the original SORNA law took effect. SORNA made Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration scheme more punitive by imposing registration requirements on juveniles, increasing the number of offenses which require registration upon conviction, and retroactively increasing the length of the registration period for many people who had already been convicted.

For example, SORNA made M2 Indecent Assault a Tier I Sex Offense requiring 15 years of registration upon conviction. M2 Indecent Assault did not previously require Megan’s Law registration for a first offense. Various provisions in SORNA also attempted to retroactively require registration for people who had already been convicted of Indecent Assault even if they had been convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment.

Since the enactment of the law, Pennsylvania appellate courts have found many of these provisions unconstitutional. For example, courts quickly concluded that requiring people to register as adults for life following juvenile delinquency adjudications was irrational and unconstitutional. More recently, in Commonwealth v. Muniz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that retroactively requiring people to register under SORNA for longer periods of time, for offenses that did not require registration at the time that they were committed, and under more onerous conditions, violates the ex post facto clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The ex post facto clause prohibits the Government from imposing criminal penalties for actions which were not illegal at the time that they were taken. It also prevents the Government from retroactively increasing the punishment for a given crime.   

The Pennsylvania Superior Court quickly followed suit in Commonwealth v. Butler, holding that because Megan’s Law registration can be considered criminal punishment, Pennsylvania’s Sexually Violent Predator classification process violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by jury. The SVP procedure violates a defendant's jury trial rights because it allows a judge, instead of a jury, to find that a defendant should be required to register as a Sexually Violent Predator for life. It also allows the judge to make this finding under a clear and convincing evidence standard instead of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction.

The Effect of Muniz and Butler on Pre-2012 Offenders

An important side effect of the Supreme Court’s Muniz decision is that it arguably eliminated the registration requirement completely for anyone who had been convicted of a sex crime for conduct which occurred prior to December 20, 2012. This is because the SORNA statute explicitly repealed the prior Megan’s Law scheme that was in effect at the time. Thus, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that SORNA could not be applied retroactively to people who had been convicted of crimes for conduct which took place prior to the December 20, 2012 enactment, the Court left no alternative registration scheme in place for these offenders. With SORNA unconstitutional for those people and Megan’s Law repealed, even lifetime offenders (such as those convicted of rape or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) who properly had to register prior to December 20, 2012, would arguably be eligible for removal from the State Police registry. The legislature responded quickly in an attempt to aovid this outcome. 

The Legislature’s Response to Muniz and Butler

Concerned that many people would no longer have to register at all, the Pennsylvania Legislature responded by amending the SORNA statute in the hopes of “re-capturing” pre-December 20, 2012 offenders. The act amends SORNA “to address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Butler (2017 WL3882445).” It is debatable, however, whether the amendments are constitutional. It is also questionable whether they address the problems identified in Muniz and Butler.

Changes for Post-2012 Registrants

For the most part, the amendments made very few changes to SORNA as applied to offenders who committed the acts for which they must register after December 20, 2012. For example, SORNA no longer requires registration for one offense. A conviction for the interference with custody of children where the defendant is the child’s parent, guardian, or lawful custodian no longer requires registration.

The amendments also created a mechanism by which even Tier III lifetime registrants and Sexually Violent Predators may petition the court for removal from Megan’s Law. Now, a registrant who avoids conviction for any offenses punishable by more than a year for twenty-five years following his or her release from custody may petition to have the registration requirement lifted. A petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is not a threat to others. It is unclear how many petitioners will receive relief under this provision, and it is important to note that even if the Petitioner meets this heavy burden, the court is not required to actually grant the removal petition.

Finally, the new amendments relax the in-person registration requirement for some registrants. An offender who must register more than once a year may register in-person once and by phone for the other registration requirements that year if the offender is compliant with all of the requirements for the first three years of registration and does not get convicted of an offense punishable by more than a year.

Although these changes are relatively minor, they do provide some relief to Tier III and SVP offenders who would otherwise have to register for life with no hope of ever obtaining removal from Megan’s List. It is likely that the legislature included this provision so that the Commonwealth's lawyers could argue that the statute is now less punitive and therefore does not violate the ex post facto clause.

Changes for Pre-2012 Registrants

With respect to registrants who committed the crimes for which they were convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment, the changes primarily seek to decrease the requirements to what they would have been under the old Megan’s Law Scheme. For example, the period of time for which the offender must register has been reduced to what it would have been under the pre-SORNA Megan’s Law. Thus, offenders must either register for ten years or for life, whereas new offenders could have to register for 15 years, 25 years, or for life. 

The information that offenders must provide to the State Police continues to be roughly the same. A registrant still must inform the State Police of where they live, work, and go to school. They must all inform the State Police if any of those things change, and the State Police will continue to post that information on the internet and to provide that information to local police departments. The amendments also make it a crime to fail to comply with these requirements, and they make it even more difficult on “transient” offenders who do not have a fixed address.   

The most surprising part of the new bill is that the amendments do not change the procedure by which an offender may be classified as a Sexually Violent Predator. An offender may still be found to be a Sexually Violent Predator by the sentencing judge under the clear and convincing evidence standard, and the requirements for Sexually Violent Predators are still essentially the same with the exception that they may petition for removal from the list after 25 years. It is entirely unclear how this re-enactment of the same unconstitutional sentencing scheme will survive appellate review.  

SORNA Litigation

The appellate courts have not yet addressed whether the new amendments to SORNA are constitutional. It is likely that there will be numerous challenges both to the legislature’s attempt to retroactively apply the statute to pre-SORNA offenders given that SORNA repealed their original registration requirement and to the continuation of the same procedures for making the Sexually Violent Predator determination. Although appellate decisions may eventually bring relief to thousands of people, the ongoing litigation leaves many people uncertain as to their registration requirements. If you are currently subject to registration requirements, it is important that you continue to register with the State Police as required until the State Police or a court inform you that you no longer have to register. If you believe that you should no longer have to register, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney about the possibility of petitioning the state police or the trial court for removal from Megan’s Law. It is also likely that other issues will arise as attorneys have more time to review the changes in the new bill. 

Facing Criminal Charges or Considering an Appeal? We Can Help. 

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal, post-conviction relief act petition, or Megan's Law removal petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

Third Circuit Rejects De Facto Life Sentences for Most Juvenile Offenders

The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals has just announced its decision in United States v. Grant, rejecting effective life imprisonment sentences for most juveniles as unconstitutional. Although other federal circuits had already addressed this issue, this was a case of first impression for the Third Circuit which will have dramatic consequences for juvenile offenders who are tried as adults in Pennsylvania and those who are already serving what would effectively be life sentences without parole. 

United States v. Grant

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

In March 1987, local law enforcement in Elizabeth, New Jersey became aware of an organized group of teenagers that referred to themselves as The E-Port Posse (“The Posse”). The Defendant was a member of The Posse. The Posse operated a narcotics network that sold cocaine in Elizabeth and would routinely use threats and physical violence to further its enterprise.  

An example of this is occurred in August 1989. The defendant, who was 16 years old at the time, encountered a group of rival drug dealers while delivering drugs for The Posse. The defendant spoke to one of these dealers and told him not to be in the Posse’s territory. The rival drug dealer refused to leave. In response, The defendant struck him in the head with a gun while another Posse member assaulted him. The rival drug dealer fled and the defendant and his associate shot him in the leg. The rival drug dealer survived the incident.

Later that month, the defendant encountered the rival drug dealer’s brother, who was also a drug dealer. The defendant warned the brother not to sell in Posse territory. The defendant confronted the brother in an apartment courtyard where he tried to get the brother to go into an apartment. The brother escaped, but the defendant ordered his associate to shoot the brother to prevent said escape. The associate killed the brother. 

In 1991, a superseding indictment charged the defendant with RICO offenses; Racketeering; Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute cocaine; two counts of Possession with the Intent to Distribute cocaine; and two counts of Possession of a Weapon in Relation to a Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking. Although the defendant was not specifically charged with murder, the attempted murder of the rival drug dealer and the actual murder of his brother were the predicate offenses for the racketeering charge.   

The defendant was tried as an adult even though he was under the age of 18 when these crimes were committed. A jury came back with a split verdict, but found the defendant guilty of RICO, racketeering, and drug and gun possession counts. The jury found that the defendant attempted to murder the rival drug dealer, and murdered his brother. At sentencing, the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory sentencing guidelines of life without parole (hereinafter “LWOP”) on the RICO counts, as well as a concurrent forty-year term of imprisonment on the drug-trafficking counts, and a five-year consecutive term of imprisonment on the gun possession count. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

The defendant caught a break with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory Life Without Parole (LWOP) sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Consequently, the defendant received a new sentencing hearing.

At the resentencing hearing, the District Court determined that because of the defendant’s upbringing, debilitating characteristics of youth, and post-conviction record, he was not incorrigible, and thus an LWOP sentence was not appropriate. However, the District Court imposed a term of sixty years imprisonment to run concurrently with the drug charges which resulted in a new effective sentence of sixty-five years without parole. Based on this sentencing, the defendant would have been eligible for release when he reached the age of 72 years old. He appealed again. 

Adolescent Development and the Supreme Court

Over the past two decades, adolescent brain development has been an important issue in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. This began with its decision in Roper v. Simmons which banned the death penalty for juvenile offenders. In its decision, the Roper Court utilized science and social science to reason that juveniles lack maturity, have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures. In other words, the United States Supreme Court has found that children’s brains are not as developed as those of an adult and thus they should not be held to the same moral standard when addressing criminal conduct and sentencing. 

The United States Supreme Court further expanded on its jurisprudence in the subsequent years. In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life without parole is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders who commit crimes other than homicide. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that that mandatory LWOP even in homicide cases is unconstitutional. Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held that Graham and Miller apply retroactively (in other words, if someone was sentenced to LWOP prior to the Court’s rulings in Graham and Miller, then they would be entitled to a new sentencing hearing).

It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court never held that a juvenile cannot be sentenced to LWOP for a homicide offense. However, the bar was set very high to impose such a sentence. As the Grant court stated in its opinion “[o]nly those who are permanently incorrigible may receive such a sentence.” This logic is part of the reason why the defendant in this case challenged his sentence. The trial court essentially sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole.

Third Circuit Rejects Effective Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Offenders as Unconstitutional  

The defendant appealed, arguing that because he would not be eligible for parole until he was 72 years old and that his life expectancy was also 72 years, he had been sentenced to a de facto life without parole sentence. Remember, the sentencing court previously found that he was not incorrigible, and thus, under the logic of Miller, he should receive a parole hearing before he is expected to die. The Third Circuit agreed with the Defendant.

In its decision, the Third Circuit focused on the Miller ruling which held that juvenile life without parole is only for incorrigible juveniles. Further, the Court extrapolated from the previously mentioned Supreme Court decisions that de-facto life without parole cannot be reconciled with Graham and Miller’s holdings that sentencing judges most provide non-incorrigible juvenile offenders “with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on their demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” and that LWOP has “diminished penological justification.” The Third Circuit also looked to other circuit court decisions (i.e. the 7th, 9th and 10th) which held that term-of-years sentences, in those respective cases, violated the holdings of Graham and Miller.

Ultimately, the Third Circuit established new requirements for a sentencing court before it imposes a term-of-years sentence on a non-incorrigible juvenile offender. First, the sentencing judge must conduct an individualized evidentiary hearing to determine the non-incorrigible juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy before sentencing him to a term-of-years sentence. Next, the sentencing court must “shape a sentence that properly accounts for a meaningful opportunity to be released.” The Third Circuit concluded that this is before the age of retirement. The Court chose retirement because “society accepts the age of retirement as a transitional life stage where an individual permanently leaves the work force after having contributed to society over the course of his or her working life.” The Court said that juvenile offenders should have an opportunity to “reconcile with society and achieve fulfillment outside prison walls.” Nonetheless, the sentencing court must also consider the § 3553(a) factors (i.e. the seriousness of the offense, public safety, deterrence, etc.) too, and though a non-incorrigible juvenile offender should be presumptively sentenced below the age of retirement, there may be legitimate reasons why a juvenile offender should not be released before the age of retirement.

Facing Criminal Charges or Considering an Appeal? We Can Help. 

Criminal Defense Attorneys Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing , we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief act petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

Commonwealth Court Limits Government’s Ability to Seize Property under the Forfeiture Provision of the Controlled Substances Act

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has announced its decision in Commonwealth v. $301,360.00 U.S. Currency and one 2011 Lexus, RX 350, Vin# 2T2BK1BA48C081250. The Court’s decision dramatically restricts the government’s ability to seize, through civil forfeiture, property it claims was used to facilitate violations of the Controlled Substances Act (hereinafter “CSA”).

Commonwealth v. $301,360.00 U.S. Currency and one 2011 Lexus, RX 350, Vin# 2T2BK1BA48C081250 

On June 11, 2014, two individuals were driving the Lexus in question on Interstate 80 in Monroe County, Pennsylvania when it was pulled over for tailgating. Interstate 80 is a major highway that runs from California to New Jersey. The Lexus was not owned or registered to either of the two occupants inside the car. Both occupants of the car and its owner were from the state of New York. The car was also registered in New York.  

During the stop, the Pennsylvania State Trooper noticed numerous indicators of what he believed to be criminal activity. Specifically, he said that prayer cards, the driver’s tattoos, a strong smell of air fresheners, the vehicle traveling on a known drug route, the occupants’ criminal histories, and their inconsistent stories to the officer caused him to believe that the two individuals were engaged in narcotics trafficking. Because of these suspicions, the Officer requested permission to search the Lexus. The occupants consented to the search.

During the search of the Lexus, the officer recovered $301,360 in vacuum-sealed bags in a hidden compartment. No drugs or paraphernalia were recovered during the search. The police then seized the cash and the Lexus and the driver received a warning for tailgating. A week after the stop, the police performed an ion scan on the cash and the compartment where the money was found. This scan showed trace amounts of cocaine, heroin, THC, and procaine on the cash and trace amounts of heroin and THC in the compartment. However, there was no evidence that this money had ever been circulated in Pennsylvania, a fact that the Commonwealth would later concede.  

The Commonwealth then filed a forfeiture petition on the cash and Lexus. Their petition alleged the money and Lexus was used to “facilitate a violation of the Drug Act.”  The actual owner of the Lexus filed a response claiming lawful ownership of the cash and Lexus and requested that her property be returned to her.

A non-jury trial was held on April 6, 2016. Prior to the trial, the owner filed a Motion in Limine to preclude any evidence concerning the ion scan because the expert who conducted the ion scan only compared the levels of narcotics to Pennsylvania standards. This is significant because there was no evidence that showed the money had ever been circulated in Pennsylvania. For unknown reasons, the trial court did not decide the Motion in Limine.

At the trial, the Commonwealth called multiple witnesses including the Trooper who stopped the Lexus and Staff Sergeant Marshall who performed the ion tests on the cash and the compartment. The owner of the Lexus did not present any evidence. Following the trial, the court granted the Commonwealth’s petition and found that the Commonwealth established a substantial nexus between the property and criminal activity. Specifically, the trial court found 27 indicators of criminal activity, including the ion scan evidence, in making its determination that the cash and Lexus were used to facilitate a violation of the CSA. The trial court also found that the owner failed to rebut the presumption of forfeiture by proving the innocent owner defense. The owner then filed an appeal.

What is Forfeiture for a Violation of the CSA?

The logic behind Civil Forfeiture for violations of the CSA is to eliminate the economic incentives of drug trafficking. These forfeiture statutes allow the government to take property away when they prove that there is a nexus between the property and a violation of the CSA. The government does not need a criminal conviction to obtain the property. Worse, an acquittal does not prevent the government from seizing one’s property via civil forfeiture.

All sorts of property can be subject to forfeiture including: cars, money, homes, and other property that the government can link to drug trafficking. It is likely one has heard anecdotal stories about people whose homes were seized by the government under these forfeiture statutes because a family member used the home in some nefarious way. Courts are mindful of this and consequently are not in favor of forfeiture. Thus, the courts will strictly construe the forfeiture statutes. Nonetheless, a person who was not engaged in drug trafficking can lose their home because of the actions of a family member or someone else living in their home. If the government files a forfeiture petition against you it is imperative you speak to an attorney immediately because you can lose your property, including your home.   

As a preliminary matter, the Pennsylvania General Assembly repealed and replaced the provisions of the Forfeiture Act that were used in this case. Nonetheless, this case will still be relevant in future litigation. The current and relevant forfeiture laws concerning the CSA are codified under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5802, § 5803, and § 5805. § 5805 lays out the procedure that the Commonwealth must follow to seize property that is allegedly connected to a violation of the CSA. § 5802 is specifically titled “Controlled Substances Forfeiture,” however § 5803(b)(4) also addresses forfeiture when there is probable cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be used in violation of the CSA.  

At the trial, the Commonwealth does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the property in question was used or intended to be used in violation of the CSA. Rather, the standard is the preponderance of the evidence standard which is the lowest standard available. In essence, the Commonwealth must show that it is more likely than not that a nexus exists between the property and the criminal activity.

If the Commonwealth meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the claimant to prove that 1) he/she is the owner of the property, 2) the property was acquired lawfully, and 3) the property was not used/or intended to be used unlawfully. The claimant can also allege that they are entitled to the innocent owner defense which requires that the owner lacked either knowledge or consent to the use of the property to facilitate a violation of the CSA.

The Commonwealth Court Demands More Convincing Evidence to Seize One’s Property Under CSA Forfeiture

In Commonwealth v. $301,360.00 U.S. Currency and one 2011 Lexus, RX 350, Vin# 2T2BK1BA48C081250, the Commonwealth Court found that the evidence in the case was not sufficient to form a substantial nexus to a violation of the CSA. First, the Court attacked the ion scan evidence. The Court focused on the fact that the Commonwealth failed to show that the money was ever circulated in Pennsylvania. This is significant because money can have traces of narcotics on it through casual contact. However, the levels of these narcotics vary depending on the geographic area of where the money was circulated. In other words, the levels of narcotics found on currency in Pennsylvania are different than those found in New York.

 Pennsylvania courts have made clear that ion scan evidence is irrelevant if it cannot be determined where the money was circulated. Because the Commonwealth could not establish that the money was ever circulated in Pennsylvania and its expert only used casual contact levels for Pennsylvania, and not other states (i.e. New York) the Commonwealth Court held that this evidence was not relevant and thus could not be used to establish whether there was a substantial nexus between the property and violations of the CSA.

Next, the Court focused on the fact that no drugs or drug paraphernalia were recovered in the Lexus and no drug charges were filed against either of the occupants. This omission, the Commonwealth Court stated, makes establishing a nexus to illegal activity “difficult.” Further, the fact that the occupants gave inconsistent stories is not indicative of illegal activity because they were under no obligation to speak to the officer. Additionally, the Commonwealth offered no support as to why tattoos and prayer cards are indicative of criminal activity. Finally, Pennsylvania court precedents hold that a large amount of cash that is bundled and driving on a known drug highway does not establish the requisite nexus for forfeiture. As such, the Commonwealth Court found that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden and reversed the trial court.

Facing Criminal Charges or Forfeiture Proceedings? We Can Help. 

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

If the government is attempting to seize your property using a civil or criminal forfeiture statute, you need an attorney who has experience with this complicated area of law. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

PA Superior Court Finds Police-Created Exigent Circumstances Support Warrantless Blood Draw in Homicide by DUI Case

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Trahey. In Trahey, the Court held that because Philadelphia Police were understaffed, failed to respond to the incident in a timely manner, and did not have procedures in place for quickly obtaining a warrant by electronic means, officers were justified in conducting a warrantless blood draw of a suspect who had been arrested on suspicion of Homicide by DUI. The opinion is an absurdity which suggests that because the Philadelphia Police have not taken adequate steps to investigate cases and create procedures for quickly obtaining search warrants even in potential homicide cases, they can ignore the United States Supreme Court's holding in Birchfield that drawing a suspect's blood in a DUI case requires voluntary, uncoerced consent or a search warrant. 

Commonwealth v. Trahey

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

On September 4, 2015, which was Labor Day weekend, 911 dispatchers received a report that a car had struck a cyclist on the 4900 block of Wynnewood Avenue in Philadelphia. Despite the call about someone being struck, police were not dispatched to the scene until approximately 45 minutes after receiving the call. Officers testified that this was “due to the lower priority of auto accidents on the hierarchy of circumstances in which Philadelphia Police Officers are dispatched to emergency situations.” The 911 call did not mention that this may be a DUI-related crash or that someone had been seriously injured. 

Upon arrival, police officers observed a smashed bicycle and a pickup truck that was partially on the sidewalk. The police testified that the truck’s hood and grill were damaged, its windshield was shattered, and there was blood on the street. The officers spoke to a group of bystanders who informed them that the defendant had been driving the truck and the cyclist, who he had hit, had been transported to the hospital. Unfortunately, the cyclist died as a result of this incident.

The defendant told one of the officers that he was the driver of the truck that struck the cyclist. While speaking with the defendant, the officer noticed that the defendant had a strong odor of alcohol on his person, his speech was slow and slurred, his eyes were glassy, and he had an unsteady gait. Based on these observations, the officer believed that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. The officer arrested the defendant for DUI. It does not appear that any field sobriety tests were performed despite the fact that the officers were on the scene for approximately 45 minutes before they arrested the defendant. They then left the scene to transport the defendant to police headquarters for booking and presumably for a blood test.            

While en route to police headquarters, the officers were called back to the scene by the Accident Investigation District (AID). AID is a unit that investigates car accidents and DUI cases. One of the AID officers examined the defendant and also noticed signs of intoxication. The AID officer learned that nearly ninety minutes had already passed since the crash. This is significant because police have two hours to do a blood test or a breathalyzer after they arrest someone on suspicion of DUI. After two hours, the results of the test become significantly less accurate. The rules therefore suggest that a court should not allow prosecutors to use the results of an untimely test. Consequently, one of the AID officers sent the defendant back to the police headquarters for a blood test and/or breathalyzer.

When the defendant arrived at police headquarters, he gave verbal consent to the blood testing, and he signed a 75-439 form which is the written version of these warnings. However, on this form, he did not check the box that consented to blood testing. After all of this, the defendant had blood taken from his arm. It was two hours and five minutes after the accident occurred. The defendant was subsequently charged with homicide by vehicle, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, involuntary manslaughter, and DUI. He then filed a pre-trial suppression motion in which he argued that the police subjected him to an unlawful search by taking his blood without a search warrant. 

The Motion to Suppress 

Several police officers testified at the hearing. They generally testified that officers would not have had sufficient time to seek a warrant for the chemical testing of the defendant’s blood within two hours of the accident. They also testified that a significant amount of time had elapsed before the officers were able to respond to the accident scene and that they did not know this was potentially a DUI related accident. It is important to remember that the 911 call did mention that someone had been struck by an automobile, yet apparently this had no effect on the promptness of the Philadelphia police’s response time to the scene of the accident.

The officers provided a number of different reasons for why they could not get a warrant within the two-hour time frame. This included: it would have taken too long to type up the warrant, drive from the accident to the AID headquarters, communicate with the on-call prosecutor for approval of the affidavit, arrange to meet with an available commissioner to consider the warrant application, travel to arraignment court, wait for a commissioner, have the commissioner review the application, and then return to the police headquarters with the approved request. The officer estimated that the entire process could take anywhere from seventy minutes to three hours.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress.  The trial court held that the defendant’s oral consent was invalid because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota (which holds that the government cannot subject you to a penalty by refusing to consent to blood testing). However, the suppression court did not address the exigent circumstances argument posed by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth then filed a timely interlocutory appeal.

What is the “Exigent Circumstances” Exception to the Warrant Requirement?

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Usually, this means that if the government wants to go into your home or take something from your body (i.e. blood) the government needs a warrant to do so. However, throughout the years, both federal and Pennsylvania case law has evolved to include an “exigent circumstances” exception. Typically, this is limited to circumstances where there is a reasonable belief that evidence will be destroyed unless the police take prompt action. Courts use a totality of the circumstances approach to analyze the facts of a particular case in determining whether there were exigent circumstances.     

To give an example of exigent circumstances, let’s say a police officer sees someone engage in a hand-to-hand exchange of drugs for money. The police then approach the defendant, and he runs into a house. The police officer follows him into this house and seizes drugs from his person. At a motion to suppress, the Commonwealth may reasonably be able to argue that there were exigent circumstances because if the police officer had not gone into the house, the defendant would have had time to flush the drugs down the toilet or find some other way to destroy them. Therefore, depending on all of the circumstances, a court could rule that the officer was not required to obtain a search warrant and deny the defendant’s motion to suppress.

The exigent circumstances exception has been applied in DUI cases, as well. This is understandable to some extent because alcohol in a person's blood dissipates relatively quickly.  However, exigent circumstances do not automatically apply in DUI cases solely from the fact that alcohol eventually dissipates. The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in the case of Missouri v. McNeely. The Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in a person’s bloodstream is not a per se (automatic) exigency and held that the police are not free from the requirement of obtaining a search warrant to obtain a DUI suspect’s blood. However, McNeely also did not hold that the police must always get a warrant to take a DUI suspect’s blood. The McNeely court acknowledged that obtaining a warrant is not always practical in DUI cases. Therefore, in cases where the police do not get a warrant, courts must analyze the facts of a given case to determine whether it was objectively reasonable for the police to draw blood without a search warrant.       

The Pennsylvania Superior Court Holds That Easily Resolved Logistical Challenges Qualify as Exigent Circumstances

In Trahey, the suppression court did not address the issue of exigent circumstances.  Nonetheless, instead of remanding the case for the suppression court to consider whether there were exigent circumstances, the Superior Court improperly decided to conduct the analysis itself. Of course, it found that there were exigent circumstances in this case. What is absurd about the Superior Court’s decision is that the exigent circumstances that the Court found in favor of the Commonwealth were entirely created by the Philadelphia Police Department's poor performance in giving the call priority and failure to create electronic or telephonic procedures for obtaining a search warrant. Such procedures for quickly obtaining a search warrant in emergency situations obviously exist in countless jurisdictions both small and large throughout the country, but the Superior Court refused to suggest that a jurisdiction as large as Philadelphia should be expected to implement them. 

The Superior Court gave a slew of reasons as to why there were exigent circumstances in this case. One of the reasons was that that the officers did not arrive on scene until 45 minutes after the accident. However, this was because the emergency dispatch in Philadelphia does not prioritize car accidents for police response (apparently even when the 911 call indicates that someone has been hit). Further, when the police arrived on scene, it took an additional 45 minutes for the officers to determine that the defendant may have been under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. This determination was not because the officers had the defendant engage in any field sobriety tests. Rather, it took this long based on their observations of the defendant and conversations with him and bystanders. Additionally, the Superior Court noted that on this particular night, the Philadelphia police lacked manpower because only 5 AID officers were assigned to Philadelphia on Labor Day weekend.

As such, all of these exigent circumstances were a consequence of the failures of the Philadelphia Police to be adequately prepared. Thus, arguably, the police created the exigent circumstances in this case. Courts have held that if the police create the exigent circumstances, they are not entitled to sidestep the protections of the Pennsylvania and the United States Constitution. However, the Superior Court’s decision in Trahey does exactly that: it incentivizes the police to not be prepared so that they can later claim exigent circumstances and evade the Constitution's search warrant requirement. Trahey will likely be appealed, and hopefully an en banc panel of the Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will reverse it and require law enforcement to comply with the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. 

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