Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 10/13/25 Zak Goldstein 10/13/25

PA Superior Court holds both that “hey fellas” is not a stop and that probation officers may assist police with catching fleeing suspect.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Stoney, holding that the police did not illegally stop the defendant by saying “hey fellas” as they pulled up to him and that there was nothing illegal about a probation officer helping the police capture the defendant once he fled from them.

The Facts of the Case

The incident began when a Harrisburg police officer and several county probation officers were patrolling a high-crime area near North 6th and Seneca Streets. The police officer observed two men, later identified as the defendant and another individual, standing on a corner. The officer testified that the second man appeared to be concealing a firearm with a drum magazine and that the defendant made a “security tap” on his waistband consistent with carrying a gun.

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

When the officers circled the block and approached on foot, the officer called out, “Hey fellas.” Both men looked back and immediately fled in opposite directions. A probation officer pursued the defendant and saw him remove a gun from his waistband and throw it onto a roof. The officers recovered the firearm and arrested him.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was unlawfully seized when the officer said “hey fellas,” that his flight was provoked by a show of authority, and that the probation officers exceeded their statutory authority because the defendant was not under county supervision. He was, however, on federal supervised release. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion and that the probation officers acted lawfully in assisting the police. The defendant appealed, arguing both that the police stopped him without reasonable suspicion and that the probation officers did not have the authority to stop him at the direction of the police.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Superior Court affirmed on appeal. The Court held that a police officer saying “hey fellas” did not amount to a seizure under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Because the phrase was casual and non-coercive, it would not communicate to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave. At that point, the encounter was merely a consensual interaction, not an investigative detention requiring reasonable suspicion.

The Court held that the seizure occurred only once the officers began to pursue the defendant and his companion after they fled. By that time, the officers already had reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances: a high-crime location, the officer’s observation of what appeared to be a firearm, the defendant’s “security check,” and unprovoked flight, which the Court has long held can justify a Terry stop.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that county probation officers acted outside their statutory authority. Relying on Commonwealth v. Gibson (2025) and Commonwealth v. Mathis (2017), the panel held that probation officers may assist police in the field as part of their public-safety duties. The “stalking horse” doctrine did not apply because the police already had reasonable suspicion before the probation officers helped with the physical apprehension. The probation officers did not initiate the investigation or stop. Instead, they merely helped the police officers.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the firearm was not discarded as part of a “forced abandonment,” that the detention was lawful, and that the trial court properly denied the motion.

The Takeaway

The decision reinforces that a brief, informal greeting such as “hey fellas” or “what’s up” does not constitute a seizure under Pennsylvania law. A stop begins only when police restrain a person’s movement or communicate that they are not free to walk away. “Stop” is a stop, but other, more casual greetings may not be. And once someone flees for no real reason, police often have at least reasonable suspicion to chase them. Further, although Pennsylvania recognizes forced abandonment and still allows for the suppression of a gun that someone discards while fleeing if the flight was triggered by an illegal stop, federal law does not. Thus, even if the state courts had suppressed the gun, the defendant could have been prosecuted in federal court.

This case also illustrates that courts continue to treat unprovoked flight in a high-crime area as a major factor supporting reasonable suspicion even when the behavior itself is ambiguous. It further confirms that probation officers working with police may lawfully assist in arrests when officers already have reasonable suspicion. The defense was unable to cite any cases which held that the probation officers could not assist the police once the police themselves had reasonable suspicion. The probation officers may not have been able to conduct the investigation alone, but because they were acting at the direction of the police, the Superior Court affirmed.

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Zak Goldstein 10/4/25 Zak Goldstein 10/4/25

PA Superior Court Rejects Request for Hearing on Juror Misconduct Allegations in Commonwealth v. Hall

In Commonwealth v. Wakeem Hall, No. 1399 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. Sept. 15, 2025), the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered whether a defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on allegations that the jury foreperson, who was an attorney, may have told other jurors that the defendant’s failure to call character witnesses at trial must have meant he had a prior criminal record. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief and decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s claim, holding that the defendant’s proffer was speculative and insufficient to overcome the rule prohibiting inquiry into jury deliberations.

The Facts of the Case

Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) with a child, endangering the welfare of a child, corruption of a minor, and unlawful contact with a minor. The criminal charges stemmed from allegations that he repeatedly abused his biological daughter in 2015 when she was nine and ten years old. He was found guilty and sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years in prison followed by 10 years of probation.

After trial, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing. He argued that the jury foreperson, who was a lawyer, may have told the rest of the jury that the defendant’s failure to call character witnesses indicated he had a prior record. This allegation arose from questions jurors asked defense counsel after the verdict had already been returned and the jurors discharged. The trial court denied the motion, finding the allegations supporting it to be speculative. Because of a court system error that prevented him from filing a timely appeal, the defendant’s appellate rights were later reinstated nunc pro tunc through PCRA proceedings, and he appealed to the Superior Court.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Ruling

On appeal, the defendant argued that he should have been granted an evidentiary hearing to question jurors about whether they considered improper information during deliberations. The Superior Court rejected the claim and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion. The Court explained that trial courts should only grant such hearings when there is actual evidence that jurors received information from outside the trial — for example, when someone testifies that jurors asked friends or relatives for advice or looked up information on their own. Here, however, there was no solid evidence of that. At most, defense counsel speculated that the foreperson might have suggested something about character witnesses, and even that was not clearly established.

The Court emphasized that jurors are allowed to bring their own life experiences and common sense into deliberations. This is true even if the juror is a lawyer, and the defense or prosecution could have struck that juror using a peremptory strike or for cause if there was evidence that the juror could not be fair. It is not unusual for jurors to wonder why a defendant did not call certain witnesses, and the law does not permit attorneys to question jurors after the fact about such speculation. Because the defendant’s claim relied only on assumptions and not on actual evidence of outside influence, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying his request.

Pa.R.E. 606 governs a juror’s competency as a witness (or their availability to be called as a witness), and it generally holds that they cannot testify. There are limited exceptions, but the Court did not find that exceptions applied here. The rule provides:

Rule 606. Juror’s Competency as a Witness.
(a)  At the Trial. A juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial. If a juror is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the jury’s presence.
(b)  During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict
   (1)  Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.
   (2)  Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:
       (A)   prejudicial information not of record and beyond common knowledge and experience was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; or
       (B)   an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.

Here, the Court found that none of the exceptions applied due to the speculative nature of the defendant’s allegations.

The Takeaway

This case shows how difficult it is to challenge a jury verdict based on what may have been said in the jury room. Pennsylvania law strictly limits any inquiry into jury deliberations, and courts require solid proof of outside influence or improper information before allowing a hearing. Mere speculation about what jurors may have thought or said is not enough to overturn a conviction or obtain a new trial or even an evidentiary hearing.

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Zak Goldstein 10/2/25 Zak Goldstein 10/2/25

PA Supreme Court: Time Spent in Custody on Probation Detainer Should Apply to New Case Even if Bail Paid

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Phillips, holding that the defendant should have received credit for time served on a new case where he was held in custody only on a probation detainer on a prior case because he had paid bail on the new case. Therefore, he would have been released but for the detainer. Generally, defendants are only entitled to time credit on the cases that are actually holding them in custody, so under prior statutory interpretations, he would not have been entitled to time credit on the new case because that case was not holding him in custody once he paid bail. The time credit statute, however, deals with conduct rather than cases, and the conduct that led to the new case also triggered the probation detainer. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that he was entitled to time credit on the new case even though he had posted bail.

The Facts of Phillips

The defendant was serving a probationary sentence from a 2015 case involving DUI and resisting arrest when he was arrested in 2018 for aggravated assault. Although his mother posted his bail for the 2018 case, he remained incarcerated because a probation detainer was lodged against him in connection with the earlier case. He was still on probation at the time of his arrest for the assault, leading to the detainer.

The defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in the 2018 case and received a sentence of 27 to 72 months’ incarceration in state prison. At the same time, the sentencing court revoked his probation in the 2015 DUI case and imposed a consecutive two-year probationary sentence, meaning that he did not need any time credit from the time spent in prison to go to that case because he received a non-incarceration sentence. Nonetheless, because he had posted bail on the case, the trial court did not award him credit for the nearly eight months he spent incarcerated on the probation detainer between May 2018 and January 2019 before his sentencing on the assault.

The defendant ultimately sought relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), arguing that under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1), he was entitled to credit for all of that time spent in custody. The PCRA court gave him partial credit of 237 days, but it refused to credit the time he spent incarcerated solely on the probation detainer. The Superior Court affirmed on appeal, reasoning that because he was held only on the detainer during that period, the credit could not be applied to the assault case. The defendant sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. Justice Mundy, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that Section 9760(1) requires credit for “all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.”

The Court found that the defendant’s detention on the probation detainer was directly triggered by the same conduct, the assault, that led to the aggravated assault conviction. Because the detainer would not have been lodged but for the new charges, the time he spent incarcerated from May 2018 to January 2019 was “a result of the conduct” underlying the assault.

The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that credit should not apply because the detainer related to his earlier resisting arrest conviction. It emphasized that the statute does not require the conduct to be the sole cause of confinement. Reading the statute narrowly, as the Commonwealth urged, would improperly insert limitations not found in the statutory text.

Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to have all of his pre-sentence confinement credited toward his 2018 assault sentence. Although it appeared he had already completed that sentence, the Court remanded for a determination of whether relief could still be awarded.

The Takeaway

This decision clarifies that defendants are entitled to credit for all pre-sentence confinement when that custody results from the same conduct that led to the new charges, even if they were technically held on a probation detainer rather than bail. The ruling ensures that defendants are not punished twice by losing credit simply because a probation violation and new charges arise from the same incident. In general, it is best to avoid situations like this by not posting bail when a probation detainer is in place, but now this is one less trap for defense attorneys to have to worry about.

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Zak Goldstein 9/30/25 Zak Goldstein 9/30/25

PA Supreme Court: Defendant Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence to Require Voir Dire Question on Whether Jurors Will Always Believe Alleged Child Abuse Victims

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Smith, affirming a trial court's broad discretion in refusing a specific jury selection question about a juror’s potential for bias in favor of the truthfulness of alleged child sexual assault victims. The Court concluded that based on the record presented to the trial judge, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the proposed inquiry because the defendant failed to show that jurors tend to believe child abuse complainants more than other potential witnesses. Had the defense presented more evidence to the trial court, however, the question may well have been required.

The Issue in Smith

The defendant, who had been convicted of child sexual assault charges, challenged the trial court's refusal to ask prospective jurors the following specific question during voir dire (jury selection):

Are you more likely to believe the testimony of a child alleging sexual abuse because you do not believe a child could lie about sexual abuse?

The defendant argued that in a case where the uncorroborated testimony of the child complainants was central to the Commonwealth’s case, his right to an impartial jury required a specific inquiry into a potential "fixed bias" that children do not lie about sexual abuse.

The Court's Ruling: Insufficient Evidence to Support the Question

The Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court’s ruling and rejected the defendant’s challenge as follows:

No Foundation at Trial: The Court noted that the defendant’s argument for the existence of this fixed bias was a "bald assumption" before the trial court as he "offered no support for the proposition that the inquiry addressed a fixed bias or prejudice.” Because the Court must review the trial court's decision based on the information it had at the time, the defense's later, more detailed arguments on appeal were not helpful in terms of retroactively showing that the trial court erred.

Adequate General Inquiry: The trial court had conducted extensive general and individual voir dire. This included informing the panel of the nature of the charges and asking if anything would prevent them from being

fair and impartial, as well as inquiring if they or anyone close to them had been victims of sexual assault or child abuse. The trial court also excused multiple jurors for cause who claimed an inability to be fair.

Fixed Bias vs. Credibility: The Court clarified that inquiries designed to uncover a fixed bias, such as one related to a certain category of witnesses, are not the same as instructions on general witness credibility. A fixed bias precludes an impartial determination of credibility. However, based on the lack of a foundation supporting the existence of this particular bias due to the defendant’s failure to develop the record at the trial level, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The Court's decision essentially provides a roadmap for future cases: a trial court is only free to refuse this line of inquiry if the party requesting it fails to present a developed, evidence-based argument for the existence of a fixed bias. Here, the defendant presented strong evidence of the bias to the Supreme Court such that the Court may well have reversed had the evidence been presented to the trial court, but because the trial court could only make a ruling based on the evidence presented at the time, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s challenge.

Unlawful Contact Remand: Reconsideration in Light of Strunk

The Court also addressed the defendant’s challenge to his convictions for unlawful contact with a minor (18 Pa.C.S. § 6318).

Commonwealth v. Strunk: Subsequent to the Superior Court's decision affirming in this case, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the unlawful contact statute in Commonwealth v. Strunk.

Strunk held that Section 6318 is an "anti-grooming statute" intended to criminalize and punish “communication designed to induce or otherwise further the sexual exploitation of children.”

The Outcome: Given the significant clarification in the law, specifically, the refinement of the sufficiency of the evidence required for convictions under Section 6318—the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment on this issue and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Strunk. The Superior Court will now have to apply the statute’s narrower focus on "communicative behavior” in this case on remand.

Ultimately, although the result is bad for this particular defendant, the case is good for defendants in general in that it shows that should a defendant make an adequate record, they might be entitled to ask potential jurors about whether they will always believe alleged child abuse victims. Similarly, the Court continues to hold that the unlawful contact statute is not nearly as broad as prosecutors typically claim.