Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 9/11/24 Zak Goldstein 9/11/24

PA Superior Court: Warrantless Search of Car Requires Suppression of Gun in Illegal Firearm Possession Case

Commonwealth v. Camacho

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently decided the case of Commonwealth v. Camacho, reversing the trial court’s order denying the defendant's motion to suppress an illegal gun which was found in his car during a warrantless search of the car. The case illustrates the strict requirements police must follow in order to conduct a warrantless search of a car in Pennsylvania following the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Alexander.

The Facts of Camacho

On October 9, 2020, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers pulled over the defendant, Camacho, after observing him driving erratically in nearby Bucks County. Camacho pulled over on command. After the police stopped the car and approached it, the troopers noticed the smell of alcohol and marijuana. The defendant admitted he did not have a driver’s license. The troopers conducted a frisk of the defendant and found marijuana. The troopers also noticed an empty gun holster strapped to the defendant’s ankle. Naturally, they asked Camacho if he had a gun on him. He denied it. Despite Camacho's denial of having a firearm, the officers forcibly detained him after he briefly resisted. They forced him to the ground and handcuffed him.

With Camacho handcuffed and secured, the officers searched his vehicle without a warrant and found a loaded firearm under the driver's seat. The police formally arrested the defendant, and prosecutors charged him with:

Persons Not to Possess Firearms (VUFA § 6105)
Firearms Not to Be Carried Without a License (VUFA § 6106)
Resisting Arrest or Other Law Enforcement
Simple Assault
Recklessly Endangering Another Person
Possession of a Small Amount of Marijuana for Personal Use
Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
Various Traffic Offenses

The Suppression Hearing and Trial

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the warrantless search of his car violated his rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Federal law does not require the police to get a search warrant prior to searching a car, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that law enforcement officers must obtain a search warrant prior to searching a car unless an exception applies. In this case, the defendant argued that there were no “exigent circumstances” to justify the search because he and his passenger were restrained and in handcuffs at the time of the search.

The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the Commonwealth that the presence of the empty holster and Camacho's earlier resistance justified the search. Camacho was convicted and sentenced to 4½ to 10 years in prison followed by a period of probation.

Superior Court Appeal

The defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On appeal, Camacho argued that the police did not have any exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of his car. The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed and reversed the denial of the motion to suppress.

The Superior Court emphasized that under Pennsylvania law, a warrantless search of a vehicle is only permissible when both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. In this case, while the officers had probable cause to suspect criminal activity, the Court found that the Commonwealth failed to show exigent circumstances to justify the failure to get a warrant.

The Superior Court's Reasoning:

At the time of the search, Camacho was handcuffed, lying on the ground, and surrounded by multiple officers.
His passenger, Ms. Clark, was also handcuffed and secured in the police vehicle.
The car was parked on the side of a wide shoulder, away from traffic, and posed no immediate threat to the public or officers.
The Court determined that, with both Camacho and his passenger fully restrained, there was no risk that either one of them could access the vehicle or destroy evidence.
Additionally, the Court noted that there were at least six officers present at the scene, and they had discussed towing the vehicle. This indicated that they had sufficient time and personnel to secure the car and obtain a warrant.

Based on these factors, the Superior Court found that the situation no longer posed an immediate danger to officer safety or a threat of evidence destruction, meaning there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search. As a result, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling, vacated Camacho’s conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Commonwealth will likely be unable to proceed with the case on remand.

The Takeaway

The Camacho case highlights the importance of challenging unlawful searches and seizures when the police search a car without a warrant. Even when the police believe they have probable cause, they must still obtain a search warrant or demonstrate that exigent circumstances justify an exception. This decision reinforces that without a valid justification, evidence obtained through warrantless searches should be suppressed.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 8/21/24 Zak Goldstein 8/21/24

Attorney Goldstein Wins Sentencing Appeal in Corrupt Organizations Case

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won a sentencing appeal for a client in the case of Commonwealth v. S.G. In S.G., the defendant was convicted at trial in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas of corrupt organizations, conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations, washing vehicle titles, and related charges for an alleged car title washing scheme. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences on the corrupt organizations and conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations charges.

S.G. retained Attorney Goldstein for his appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Attorney Goldstein filed post-sentence motions and eventually an appeal. On appeal, Attorney Goldstein challenged whether the trial court could properly sentence S.G. to consecutive time on the conspiracy and corrupt organizations charges because S.G. had been convicted of the subsection of corrupt organizations that specifically requires participation in a conspiracy.

The corrupt organizations statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 911, provides:

(b) Prohibited activities.--
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such person participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise: Provided, however, That a purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issue held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity after such purchase, do not amount in the aggregate to 1% of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer: Provided, further, That if, in any proceeding involving an alleged investment in violation of this subsection, it is established that over half of the defendant's aggregate income for a period of two or more years immediately preceding such investment was derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that such investment included income derived from such pattern of racketeering activity.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.

S.G. was convicted of subsection 4, which specifically makes it illegal to conspire to violate any of the other provisions.

At the same time, the conspiracy statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, makes the following conduct illegal:

(a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

Here, the trial court sentenced S.G. to consecutive time on both conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations and corrupt organizations - conspiracy. Attorney Goldstein argued that such a sentence was illegal because the two offenses merged for sentencing purposes.

When do offenses merge for sentencing?

The Superior Court agreed with the defense’s merger argument on appeal. It recognized that under § 9765 of the sentencing code,

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765

The Superior Court’s Ruling

In order to impose consecutive sentences, a sentencing court must find either that each statute contains an element that the other does not or that there was more than one criminal act involved in the violations of the statutes. In this case, conspiracy and corrupt organizations - conspiracy involve the exact same elements. That is, they both require an agreement to violate sections 1 - 3 of the corrupt organizations statute. Further, the Commonwealth introduced no evidence that S.G. entered into more than one conspiracy. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes, making it illegal for the court to impose consecutive sentences.

The Superior Court remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing in the Court of Common Pleas. Attorney Goldstein represented S.G. at the new sentencing hearing and obtained a reduced sentence which made him immediately eligible for parole.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein 8/12/24 Zak Goldstein 8/12/24

PA Superior Court: Causing Fatal Accident While Drunk Driving May Be Third Degree Murder

Commonwealth v. Peters

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Kevin Peters, holding that the trial court properly convicted the defendant of third degree murder for killing two people while driving drunk. The holding in this case conflicts with numerous cases of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in which the Court has held that drunk driving normally does not show the malice necessary to sustain a third degree murder conviction. Nonetheless, an en banc panel of the Superior Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction in this case.

The Facts of Peters

The evidence at trial showed that on December 6, 2019, after an evening of heavy drinking, the defendant decided to drive home from Philadelphia, despite being significantly impaired. He had attended an open-bar event at Ruth’s Chris Steak House, followed by visits to two other bars, where he continued to consume alcohol. The defendant rejected offers for alternative transportation from co-workers and chose to drive, even though he was visibly intoxicated.

The Commonwealth’s evidence suggested that the defendant was very drunk. He appears to have exhibited highly dangerous driving behavior, including speeding, swerving, and making abrupt lane changes without signaling on Interstate 95. He even had trouble paying to exit the parking garage and instead pushed the gate up himself, damaging it. Multiple drivers reported his erratic driving to 911. At approximately 1:00 AM, while traveling at a speed of 115 miles per hour, Peters rear-ended a van on I-95, causing it to catch fire. Two passengers in the van were killed. Two other occupants of the van survived but suffered serious injuries.

The Trial

The defendant was arrested and charged with murder, homicide by DUI, and related charges. The jury convicted him of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and other charges. His defense had focused primarily on the idea that he should not be convicted of murder because ordinary drunk driving, without more, even when it results in a fatal accident, does not show the mens rea of malice necessary for a third degree murder conviction. Myriad other serious charges would apply, but murder arguably would not. The jury rejected that defense and convicted him, and he received a lengthy state sentence. He appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

Peters appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Court went en banc to hear the case, meaning that nine judges decided to hear it instead of a normal panel of three. On appeal, Peters challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the finding of "malice" necessary to sustain the convictions for third-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Superior Court affirmed. The court rejected Peters’s arguments, finding that his conduct demonstrated malice, which is a "conscious disregard for an unjustified and extremely high risk" to human life. The court highlighted the following aggravating factors:

The defendant's high level of intoxication, with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.151%.
His decision to drive at extreme speeds, peaking at 115 miles per hour, despite being aware of his impairment.
His failure to brake until less than half a second before impact.
The extended period of reckless driving leading up to the crash, during which Peters nearly collided with other vehicles, was offered a ride home before he began to drive, and had trouble exiting the parking garage.

The court distinguished this case from other DUI-related cases by emphasizing that the defendant had multiple opportunities to recognize the risk he was creating but chose to continue his dangerous behavior. The court concluded that the defendant’s sustained recklessness and the extreme danger he posed justified the jury's finding of malice.

Notably, the lead opinion drew a dissent in which multiple judges joined. The dissent opined that the Commonwealth had shown no behavior which was not inherent in the crime of homicide by DUI or driving drunk in general, and so the Commonwealth had failed to show malice. Peters had also not been warned by anyone else - although other motorists had called 911, he did not know that they had called 911. The dissent also emphasized that as dangerous as drunk driving may be, the Supreme Court has generally held that drunk driving does not provide the evidence of malice necessary for murder. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may well grant review of this decision.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 8/4/24 Zak Goldstein 8/4/24

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Second Amendment Does Not Provide Right to Possess Firearm While on Federal Supervised Release

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has just decided the case of United States v. Moore, holding that the Second Amendment does not provide an individual with the right to possess a firearm while on federal supervised release. Although recent federal case law has expanded some of the protections provided by the Second Amendment, the federal courts have now begun to walk that case law back and re-impose limits which historically appeared to be settled.

The Facts of Moore

Moore had previous federal convictions for distributing cocaine and possessing a firearm as a felon. Nonetheless, in 2021, while on federal supervised release, he ended up in possession of a firearm. After a night out celebrating his birthday, Moore and his fiancée returned to their Pittsburgh residence, where they discovered two intruders breaking into a car parked near their home.

Moore's fiancée retrieved a handgun from a safe and handed it to Moore before leaving the house with her children. Moore, now armed, confronted the intruders and fired three shots, striking one of them in the leg. A few days later, Moore’s fiancée turned the firearm in to the police and told them what happened. Moore called his federal probation officer and reported the incident, as well. After the police investigated, federal prosecutors decided to charge Moore with possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The Issue

Moore pleaded guilty to the charge, but as part of the plea deal, he reserved the right to argue on appeal that the federal firearms statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The district court sentenced him to 84 months’ incarceration followed by three years of supervised release. Moore appealed to the Third Circuit, and on appeal, he argued that he still had a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm while on supervised release. The defense argued that the right was particularly strong in this case because he was engaged in the protection of his home when the incident occurred.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit rejected this argument, holding that Moore, as a convicted felon on active federal supervised release, did not have the constitutional right to possess a firearm. The court's decision was based on historical precedents, which have consistently allowed the disarmament of convicts as part of their sentences. Indeed, many statutes historically allowed the government to seize all of an individual’s possessions following a conviction. If the government may seize everything, then they may seize just firearms, as well. The court noted that the disarmament is not permanent. Instead, it is a temporary measure taken solely during the period of the sentence, and supervised release is part of the sentence.

The court emphasized that supervised release is an integral component of the criminal sentence, similar to imprisonment. Thus, restricting firearm possession during this time aligns with the government's interests in ensuring public safety and aiding the defendant’s rehabilitation.

The Takeaway

The court’s ruling reaffirms the government's authority to impose firearm restrictions on individuals with felony convictions, even after their release from prison, as long as they are still under supervision. There have been some successful challenges to whether an individual may be permanently barred from possessing a firearm due to a felony conviction, and the law is still not settled in that area. The Pennsylvania state appellate courts, for example, have found that individuals with prior felony convictions may not possess firearms, while the Third Circuit has found that an individual with an old non-violent theft offense may not be barred from possessing a gun for life. This case makes it clear, however, that a court may prohibit a defendant from possessing a gun at least while they are on probation, parole, or federal supervised release.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire