Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 8/21/24 Zak Goldstein 8/21/24

Attorney Goldstein Wins Sentencing Appeal in Corrupt Organizations Case

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won a sentencing appeal for a client in the case of Commonwealth v. S.G. In S.G., the defendant was convicted at trial in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas of corrupt organizations, conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations, washing vehicle titles, and related charges for an alleged car title washing scheme. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences on the corrupt organizations and conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations charges.

S.G. retained Attorney Goldstein for his appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Attorney Goldstein filed post-sentence motions and eventually an appeal. On appeal, Attorney Goldstein challenged whether the trial court could properly sentence S.G. to consecutive time on the conspiracy and corrupt organizations charges because S.G. had been convicted of the subsection of corrupt organizations that specifically requires participation in a conspiracy.

The corrupt organizations statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 911, provides:

(b) Prohibited activities.--
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity in which such person participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise: Provided, however, That a purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issue held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity after such purchase, do not amount in the aggregate to 1% of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer: Provided, further, That if, in any proceeding involving an alleged investment in violation of this subsection, it is established that over half of the defendant's aggregate income for a period of two or more years immediately preceding such investment was derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that such investment included income derived from such pattern of racketeering activity.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.

S.G. was convicted of subsection 4, which specifically makes it illegal to conspire to violate any of the other provisions.

At the same time, the conspiracy statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, makes the following conduct illegal:

(a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

Here, the trial court sentenced S.G. to consecutive time on both conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations and corrupt organizations - conspiracy. Attorney Goldstein argued that such a sentence was illegal because the two offenses merged for sentencing purposes.

When do offenses merge for sentencing?

The Superior Court agreed with the defense’s merger argument on appeal. It recognized that under § 9765 of the sentencing code,

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765

The Superior Court’s Ruling

In order to impose consecutive sentences, a sentencing court must find either that each statute contains an element that the other does not or that there was more than one criminal act involved in the violations of the statutes. In this case, conspiracy and corrupt organizations - conspiracy involve the exact same elements. That is, they both require an agreement to violate sections 1 - 3 of the corrupt organizations statute. Further, the Commonwealth introduced no evidence that S.G. entered into more than one conspiracy. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes, making it illegal for the court to impose consecutive sentences.

The Superior Court remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing in the Court of Common Pleas. Attorney Goldstein represented S.G. at the new sentencing hearing and obtained a reduced sentence which made him immediately eligible for parole.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 8/12/24 Zak Goldstein 8/12/24

PA Superior Court: Causing Fatal Accident While Drunk Driving May Be Third Degree Murder

Commonwealth v. Peters

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Kevin Peters, holding that the trial court properly convicted the defendant of third degree murder for killing two people while driving drunk. The holding in this case conflicts with numerous cases of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in which the Court has held that drunk driving normally does not show the malice necessary to sustain a third degree murder conviction. Nonetheless, an en banc panel of the Superior Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction in this case.

The Facts of Peters

The evidence at trial showed that on December 6, 2019, after an evening of heavy drinking, the defendant decided to drive home from Philadelphia, despite being significantly impaired. He had attended an open-bar event at Ruth’s Chris Steak House, followed by visits to two other bars, where he continued to consume alcohol. The defendant rejected offers for alternative transportation from co-workers and chose to drive, even though he was visibly intoxicated.

The Commonwealth’s evidence suggested that the defendant was very drunk. He appears to have exhibited highly dangerous driving behavior, including speeding, swerving, and making abrupt lane changes without signaling on Interstate 95. He even had trouble paying to exit the parking garage and instead pushed the gate up himself, damaging it. Multiple drivers reported his erratic driving to 911. At approximately 1:00 AM, while traveling at a speed of 115 miles per hour, Peters rear-ended a van on I-95, causing it to catch fire. Two passengers in the van were killed. Two other occupants of the van survived but suffered serious injuries.

The Trial

The defendant was arrested and charged with murder, homicide by DUI, and related charges. The jury convicted him of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and other charges. His defense had focused primarily on the idea that he should not be convicted of murder because ordinary drunk driving, without more, even when it results in a fatal accident, does not show the mens rea of malice necessary for a third degree murder conviction. Myriad other serious charges would apply, but murder arguably would not. The jury rejected that defense and convicted him, and he received a lengthy state sentence. He appealed.

The Superior Court Appeal

Peters appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Court went en banc to hear the case, meaning that nine judges decided to hear it instead of a normal panel of three. On appeal, Peters challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the finding of "malice" necessary to sustain the convictions for third-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Superior Court affirmed. The court rejected Peters’s arguments, finding that his conduct demonstrated malice, which is a "conscious disregard for an unjustified and extremely high risk" to human life. The court highlighted the following aggravating factors:

The defendant's high level of intoxication, with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.151%.
His decision to drive at extreme speeds, peaking at 115 miles per hour, despite being aware of his impairment.
His failure to brake until less than half a second before impact.
The extended period of reckless driving leading up to the crash, during which Peters nearly collided with other vehicles, was offered a ride home before he began to drive, and had trouble exiting the parking garage.

The court distinguished this case from other DUI-related cases by emphasizing that the defendant had multiple opportunities to recognize the risk he was creating but chose to continue his dangerous behavior. The court concluded that the defendant’s sustained recklessness and the extreme danger he posed justified the jury's finding of malice.

Notably, the lead opinion drew a dissent in which multiple judges joined. The dissent opined that the Commonwealth had shown no behavior which was not inherent in the crime of homicide by DUI or driving drunk in general, and so the Commonwealth had failed to show malice. Peters had also not been warned by anyone else - although other motorists had called 911, he did not know that they had called 911. The dissent also emphasized that as dangerous as drunk driving may be, the Supreme Court has generally held that drunk driving does not provide the evidence of malice necessary for murder. Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may well grant review of this decision.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 8/4/24 Zak Goldstein 8/4/24

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Second Amendment Does Not Provide Right to Possess Firearm While on Federal Supervised Release

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has just decided the case of United States v. Moore, holding that the Second Amendment does not provide an individual with the right to possess a firearm while on federal supervised release. Although recent federal case law has expanded some of the protections provided by the Second Amendment, the federal courts have now begun to walk that case law back and re-impose limits which historically appeared to be settled.

The Facts of Moore

Moore had previous federal convictions for distributing cocaine and possessing a firearm as a felon. Nonetheless, in 2021, while on federal supervised release, he ended up in possession of a firearm. After a night out celebrating his birthday, Moore and his fiancée returned to their Pittsburgh residence, where they discovered two intruders breaking into a car parked near their home.

Moore's fiancée retrieved a handgun from a safe and handed it to Moore before leaving the house with her children. Moore, now armed, confronted the intruders and fired three shots, striking one of them in the leg. A few days later, Moore’s fiancée turned the firearm in to the police and told them what happened. Moore called his federal probation officer and reported the incident, as well. After the police investigated, federal prosecutors decided to charge Moore with possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The Issue

Moore pleaded guilty to the charge, but as part of the plea deal, he reserved the right to argue on appeal that the federal firearms statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The district court sentenced him to 84 months’ incarceration followed by three years of supervised release. Moore appealed to the Third Circuit, and on appeal, he argued that he still had a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm while on supervised release. The defense argued that the right was particularly strong in this case because he was engaged in the protection of his home when the incident occurred.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit rejected this argument, holding that Moore, as a convicted felon on active federal supervised release, did not have the constitutional right to possess a firearm. The court's decision was based on historical precedents, which have consistently allowed the disarmament of convicts as part of their sentences. Indeed, many statutes historically allowed the government to seize all of an individual’s possessions following a conviction. If the government may seize everything, then they may seize just firearms, as well. The court noted that the disarmament is not permanent. Instead, it is a temporary measure taken solely during the period of the sentence, and supervised release is part of the sentence.

The court emphasized that supervised release is an integral component of the criminal sentence, similar to imprisonment. Thus, restricting firearm possession during this time aligns with the government's interests in ensuring public safety and aiding the defendant’s rehabilitation.

The Takeaway

The court’s ruling reaffirms the government's authority to impose firearm restrictions on individuals with felony convictions, even after their release from prison, as long as they are still under supervision. There have been some successful challenges to whether an individual may be permanently barred from possessing a firearm due to a felony conviction, and the law is still not settled in that area. The Pennsylvania state appellate courts, for example, have found that individuals with prior felony convictions may not possess firearms, while the Third Circuit has found that an individual with an old non-violent theft offense may not be barred from possessing a gun for life. This case makes it clear, however, that a court may prohibit a defendant from possessing a gun at least while they are on probation, parole, or federal supervised release.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 7/27/24 Zak Goldstein 7/27/24

PA Superior Court: Evidence of Subsequent Shooting Too Prejudicial to Admit to Prove Consciousness of Guilt in Murder Case

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Carter, holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that the defendant shot someone else who was potentially involved in the murder with which he was charged. The Superior Court found that the trial court properly excluded the evidence because although it was relevant, its admission would have been too unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. At the same time, the Superior Court held that the trial court erred in precluding evidence that the defendant left Pennsylvania and went to Atlanta shortly after the murder.

The Facts of Carter

In 2021, the defendant and three others were drinking and hanging out in New Castle, PA. They spent some time at one of their girlfriend’s houses, and then they decided to drive to Pittsburgh. There had been an argument between the defendant and the victim prior to the trip to Pittsburgh, but it seemed like they had resolved the issue. Nonetheless, on the way to Pittsburgh, the defendant shot the victim three times, killing him. The group then fled the scene, and a different girlfriend picked them up. The defendant told her that he did the shooting. The next day, the defendant and one of the others flew from Philadelphia to Atlanta, Georgia. While in Atlanta, the defendant shot that man in the head while they were in an Uber, but the man survived that shooting.

The 404(b) “Other Bad Acts” Motion

The Commonwealth moved to introduce evidence of the Georgia shooting under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b), arguing it demonstrated the defendant’s consciousness of guilt, flight, and a common scheme or plan.

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) sometimes permits the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes other than to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Rule 404(b) provides:

(b)  Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
   (1)  Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
   (2)  Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
   (3)  Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case the prosecutor must provide reasonable written notice in advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the specific nature, permitted use, and reasoning for the use of any such evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial.

In this case, the Commonwealth argued the evidence should be admitted to show:

Consciousness of Guilt: Evidence of the defendant’s flight to Georgia could arguably be admitted to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt. Pennsylvania courts generally recognize that flight from the area can indicate a defendant's consciousness of guilt.

Res Gestae: Evidence of the Georgia shooting could be considered part of the res gestae (or complete story). That exception allows the admission of other acts that are part of the natural development of the facts and help to tell the complete story of the case.

Common Scheme, Plan, or Design: The similarities between the shootings of the decedent and the other man in Atlanta, both involving victims shot in the head in moving vehicles, could be found to establish a common scheme or plan.

Notably, Rule 404(b) only allows the admission of prior bad acts evidence “if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” This part was key to the defendant’s success in this appeal.

Although the evidence of the Georgia shooting was relevant under these exceptions, it was ultimately excluded by the trial court under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 due to the risk of unfair prejudice outweighing its probative value. The Superior Court affirmed this exclusion for the Georgia shooting but allowed the evidence of flight to come in under Rule 404(b)(2).

The trial court held a hearing on the Commonwealth’s pre-trial motion in liming and excluded this evidence. The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Superior Court ruled that the trial court should have allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the defendant fled to Georgia as this flight would show consciousness of guilt, but it agreed that the evidence of the subsequent shooting was too unfairly prejudicial to admit in his Pennsylvania murder trial.

The Superior Court recognized that the shooting evidence was relevant. It agreed with the Commonwealth that the evidence of Carter shooting the other man who had been present for the first murder in Atlanta was relevant for proving consciousness of guilt and as part of the res gestae (or showing the complete story). The Court also found the similarities between the two shootings (both occurring in moving vehicles and targeting victims seated in the front passenger seats) justified admitting the evidence to establish a common scheme or plan.

At the same time, the Court recognized that relevance is not the only issue in terms of whether evidence of some other crime is admissible under Pa.R.Crim.P. 404(b). Instead, a court must also evaluate whether the unfair prejudice of admitting the other bad act outweighs the relevance that the evidence relating to the other crime may have. Here, the allegation that the defendant shot someone else in Atlanta was about as prejudicial as it could get, and it did not add a lot to the Commonwealth’s case in terms of proving that he committed the murder in Pennsylvania. Thus, despite the potential relevance of the Georgia shooting, the Superior Court upheld the trial court's decision to exclude it due to its potential to unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant. The Court noted the risk of the jury convicting Carter on an improper basis rather than impartially weighing the evidence related to the decedent’s murder.

Accordingly, when the Commonwealth files a motion to admit evidence of some other crime or bad act, it is important for the defense attorney to argue not just that the evidence is not relevant, but also that even if it is relevant, the unfair prejudice of telling the jury the defendant committed another serious crime outweighs any relevance the other bad act may have.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers — Goldstein Mehta LLC Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers