PA Supreme Court: Concerns About Officer Safety Do Not Justify Suspicionless Seizure of Motorist

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

It should go without saying that the police cannot stop, search, and interrogate people without a warrant or some prior observation of potential ongoing criminal activity. Nonetheless, trial and appellate courts throughout the state  state of Pennsylvania often attempt to justify coercive police detentions which occurred without reasonable suspicion or probable cause by finding that the police did not actually “stop” the defendant for Fourth Amendment purposes.

If the court can find that the police conducted a mere encounter and had to take some common sense steps to ensure officer safety, the court may try to justify a decision denying a motion to suppress. Unfortunately, many of these opinions ignore the fact that when a police officer approaches a person and begins asking questions or issuing commands, that person would never reasonably feel free to terminate the encounter and leave without following the orders of the officer.

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Adams, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated once again that police cannot conduct a stop without reasonable suspicion, and a stop occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave due to some action taken by the officer. Further, there is no reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop when the suspect has done nothing more than park his or her car in a commercial parking lot late at night despite the fact that it may be a little bit unusual to park there. Instead, police must have specific, articulable facts from which they can conclude that criminal activity may be afoot, and those facts must be based on more than mere speculation. Only then may police conduct a stop and potentially take actions related to officer safety such as frisking the defendant or limiting the defendant’s freedom of movement in some way.

Commonwealth v. Adams

In the case of Commonwealth v. Adams, a Pleasant Hills, PA police officer was on routine patrol at around 3 am. He observed a white Dodge Dart enter a parking lot that served two closed businesses - a hobby store and a pizza shop. The car drove behind the buildings. The officer waited to see if the car came back and left the lot, but it did not. The officer then drove behind the parking lot to locate the vehicle because he wanted to “simply check why a car drove behind two dark, closed businesses” at 3 am. He testified at a motion to suppress hearing that he recognized the potential for drug activity or an attempted burglary.

After driving behind the buildings, the officer saw the car parked behind the pizza shop. The car was off. There were no “no parking signs” behind the building, but there were also no marked parking spaces. The officer did not believe that this area would generally be used as public parking. Instead, he believed that it could be an area for deliveries and employee parking.

Despite having seen nothing more than a car parking in a parking lot early in the morning, the officer pulled his marked police cruiser behind the car. He did not activate his lights or sirens, but he did call for backup. Prior to backup arriving, he exited his police car and walked up to the parked vehicle. He shined his flashlight into the vehicle as he approached. When he reached the driver’s side door, he knocked on the window. The defendant, who was seated in the driver’s seat, opened the car door. The officer physically closed the car door himself, preventing the defendant from getting out of the car. He instructed the defendant to lower the window, and the defendant explained that he could not do so because he did not have the keys to the car. The officer, however, could see the keys on the floor in the back of the car. The officer then remained outside of the car until backup arrived, which was approximately a minute later.

Once backup arrived, the officer opened the defendant’s door and began to speak with him. The defendant told him that he owned the pizza shop and had just come from inside. Obviously, this was not true. The officer smelled alcohol on the defendant’s breath and asked the defendant to perform field sobriety tests. The defendant complied and “failed.” From there, things deteriorated until the defendant was eventually formally arrested and charged with DUI.

The Motion to Suppress

Following the filing of DUI charges against him, the defendant filed a motion to suppress. He argued that the police officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by stopping him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The trial court heard the motion to suppress and denied it, finding that the interaction between the defendant and the officer was only a mere encounter which did not require any level of suspicion. The court found that the officer was justified in preventing the defendant from opening the door by concerns about officer safety because the officer was alone, it was late at night, and the defendant was physically bigger than the officer. With the motion to suppress denied, the court found the defendant guilty at a bench trial of DUI and sentenced him to six months of probation.

The defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and the Superior Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The Court agreed with the trial court, essentially finding that the police officer conducted only a mere encounter with the defendant and that even if it was a Terry stop, the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the defendant’s behavior and statements. The defendant filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agreed to accept the case.

What is a Petition for Allowance of Appeal?

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not hear most cases. When a defendant is convicted and wishes to appeal, the defendant’s appeal is generally to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Superior Court is required to consider all timely-filed appeals and address issues which were not waived in the trial court. If the Superior Court denies the appeal, then the defendant may then file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Unlike Superior Court, the Supreme Court does not have to hear every case. Instead, the court chooses a limited number of cases in which it feels that there is an important or novel issue of law in question or where it believes the Superior Court has made a significant error. Thus, when a defendant loses in the Superior Court, the defendant may file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asking that court to review the ruling of the Superior Court. Most of these Petitions are denied, but in this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to accept the appeal.

The Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that both the trial court and Superior Court erred in finding that the police officer did not “stop” the defendant for Fourth Amendment purposes and that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. First, the Court explained the standards for the three types of encounters between police officers and members of the public. The lowest level of interaction is a mere encounter. A mere encounter does not require a warrant or any level of suspicion, and police may simply walk up to any person and try to talk to them. The police may not do anything to restrict the person’s freedom of movement or require compliance during a mere encounter, but nothing stops an officer from trying to talk to someone.

The second level of interaction is an investigative detention or Terry stop. This type of encounter is something less than an arrest, but it allows police to investigate potential criminal activity. A Terry stop occurs when the police do something to indicate that the person would not be free to leave. For example, telling someone to stop, frisking them, or restricting their freedom of movement could result in a Terry stop. A Terry stop must be relatively brief or it could turn into a full blown arrest and require probable cause. During a Terry stop, police may sometimes take precautions to ensure their own safety such as frisking a suspect or requiring the suspect to remain in his or her vehicle. However, police may not engage in a Terry stop or take these safety precautions unless they have reasonable suspicion for the stop. The reasonable suspicion standard requires police to show that they have specific, articulable facts which would indicate to a reasonable officer that criminal activity is afoot.

The most restrictive level of interaction is a custodial detention. A custodial detention is the functional equivalent of an arrest and must be supported by probable cause. A custodial detention also constitutes a seizure. A police encounter is more likely to be considered a custodial detention if it is prolonged, takes place at the police station, involves handcuffs, or if the police tell the suspect that he or she is under arrest.

In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts made a mistake in finding that the interaction between the officer and the defendant was only a mere encounter. Instead, the Court concluded that the defendant would not have felt free to leave, and in fact could not leave, when the officer parked behind him, exited his car, shined his flash light into the defendant’s car, and physically closed the defendant’s door when the defendant attempted to get out of the car. Thus, in addition to not feeling free to leave, the defendant physically could not leave because the officer prevented him from doing so.

Because the Court concluded that the officer conducted an investigative detention by seizing the defendant and preventing him from exiting the car, the subsequent observations of the officer would be admissible as evidence at trial only if the officer had reasonable suspicion to conclude that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity prior to the officer’s decision to shut the defendant’s car door. The Court concluded that there was no reasonable suspicion because the officer had seen the defendant do nothing more than park in a public parking lot. While it was slightly unusual that the defendant chose to park in an empty lot behind two buildings at 3 am, it was not necessarily criminal. There was no evidence in the record that the parking lot was closed to members of the public at that time, and so the officer was not justified in believing that the defendant was going to commit a crime such as engage in a drug transaction or commit a burglary. Therefore, the Court ruled that the lower courts should have granted the motion to suppress.

This decision is particularly important because the Court stressed the fact that not every police action can be justified by merely reciting the magic words “officer safety.” If the officer had reasonable suspicion for the stop, then the officer might have been justified in physically closing the door and restricting the defendant to his car. But the officer safety issue only comes into play after it has been determined that police have reasonable suspicion. Concerns about officer safety do not transform an otherwise illegal stop into a legal one. Thus, whether police may frisk a defendant or take other steps out of concerns for officer safety is a two-part test. First, the police must actually have reasonable suspicion. Second, they must reasonably believe that some action like a frisk or closing the car door is necessary for safety reasons. If they cannot satisfy both parts of this test, then the subsequently-obtained evidence should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. This is a great opinion for privacy rights because it establishes that police cannot just stop and detain people on a whim or a mere hunch. They must be able to point to actual evidence of criminal activity, and simply reciting the phrase officer safety does not transform a constitutional violation into a legitimate stop.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. In just the past few months, we have won motions to suppress in cases involving drug possession, gun possession, and Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). We have also successfully obtained full acquittals, dismissals, and other successful results in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Homicide. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today. 

Motion to Suppress Granted: Attorney Goldstein Wins Dismissal of Possession with the Intent to Deliver Charges

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney Zak Goldstein recently won a motion to suppress for a client charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver a large amount of marijuana and related charges. Because the suppression of the evidence resulted in all of the marijuana and paraphernalia being excluded from introduction at trial, the Commonwealth was then forced to dismiss all of the charges against the client without obtaining any convictions.

In Commonwealth v. E.C., Philadelphia Police Officers pulled E.C. over in Southwest Philadelphia after allegedly observing him making an abrupt left turn without using his turn signal. Although E.C. stopped right away, police searched his car shortly after pulling him over. They claimed that they could smell marijuana coming from the car. This claim, if believed by a judge, would result in police having probable cause to search the car for marijuana despite the fact that Philadelphia no longer prosecutes most marijuana-related offenses.

Officers claimed that after they obtained E.C.’s paperwork for the car, they told him that they were going to search the car due to the odor of marijuana. In response, E.C. told the police that he had weed in his pants. Police then searched him and found a small amount of weed. When they searched the rest of the car, they found more marijuana, drug paraphernalia indicative of an intent to sell the marijuana such as scales and new and unused packaging, and a significant amount of cash. Police arrested E.C., and prosecutors charged him with Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Knowing and Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance, Possession of Marijuana, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

Fortunately, E.C. retained criminal defense attorney Zak Goldstein shortly after the preliminary hearing. Attorney Goldstein reviewed the discovery and the notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing and quickly realized that because of the amount of marijuana and paraphernalia found in the car, the defense to these charges would have to be a motion to suppress. Further, because the officers claimed in their paperwork to have smelled marijuana, Attorney Goldstein realized that he would have to convince the trial judge that the officers had not actually smelled marijuana and instead had conducted a warrantless search without probable cause. Attorney Goldstein filed a motion to suppress, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion.

At the motions hearing, the Commonwealth called one of the police officers to testify to the circumstances of the vehicle stop and the search. That officer testified mostly consistently with the paperwork. However, Attorney Goldstein was able to show through cross-examination that it was unlikely that the officers would have smelled marijuana because of the way in which the weed was packaged. Additionally, when the Commonwealth rested, Mr. Goldstein then called the officer’s partner to testify to see whether her version of events matched her partner’s version. On cross-examination, the partner testified that although she had also participated in the vehicle stop and search of the car, she had not smelled the marijuana that her partner had claimed to smell. Faced with this conflicting testimony about whether there was an actual odor of marijuana which would justify the officers’ subsequent commands and search, the trial judge found the officers not credible and granted the motion to suppress. The prosecution moved to withdraw the charges, and E.C. will be eligible to have his record expunged.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Criminal Defense Lawyers Demetra Mehta and Zak Goldstein

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today. 

PA Superior Court Limits Collateral Estoppel Defense

Zak Goldstein - Criminal Defense Lawyer

Pennsylvania law provides a potential defense to some criminal charges called collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel may apply to bar a second trial in limited circumstances where the defendant has been acquitted of closely related charges in a first trial. The doctrine is somewhat limited in Pennsylvania because juries are not asked to provide an explanation for what they think happened; instead, jurors simply find a defendant guilty or not guilty of charges. The defense may then argue that a re-trial should be barred because a defendant has been acquitted of charges which required the same conduct with which the defendant is again charged in order for the jury to find the defendant guilty in a second trial.

The recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Commonwealth v. Winchester provides an example of this potential defense. In Commonwealth v. Winchester, the PA Superior Court found that the Commonwealth was not collaterally estopped from retrying a defendant for human trafficking charges after an acquittal for related robbery and theft charges because the human trafficking charges were significantly different from the related robbery and theft charges.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Winchester

In Winchester, prosecutors alleged that the defendant contacted the complainant on backpage.com. The complainant offered sexual services through an advertisement on this website. The defendant then also contacted the complainant through text messages to set up an appointment. When the defendant arrived at the complainant’s apartment, he was let inside. The complainant was wearing a robe when she answered the door.

When the complainant went to take off her robe, the defendant pulled out a gun and pointed it at her face. The defendant then threatened her with a weapon, zip-tied her, and stole $2,700 from her. The defendant then told her that she could have her money back if she worked for him. The defendant then left her residence and told her he would return by 11:30. After he left, the complainant was able to free herself, and she called the police. The defendant then returned and was promptly arrested. When he was arrested, zip ties were found in his car matching those used to restrain the victim.

The Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging the defendant with robbery, theft by unlawful taking, terroristic threats, trafficking in individuals, and attempted involuntary servitude. At the trial, the complainant testified to the above-stated facts. The defendant also testified. He testified that he and the complainant had a prior relationship and that his communications with her, after finding her on the website, was an effort to confirm his own suspicion that the complainant was prostituting herself. The defendant testified that he called her a “whore,” which upset the complainant. This, arguably, was the reason why the complainant made up these allegations against him. The defendant denied binding her, robbing her, or telling her that he would “pimp” her out. He also testified that the zip ties in his car were related to his construction work.

Following the trial, the jury found the defendant not guilty of robbery, theft by unlawful taking, and terroristic threats. The jury did not reach a verdict on trafficking in individuals and attempted involuntary servitude. On June 5, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for dismissal, arguing that the Commonwealth intended to retry him on the charges of trafficking in individuals and attempted involuntary servitude, but the trial court should apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel and dismiss the remaining charges. A hearing was held on June 26, 2017. On August 14, 2017, the court issued an order granting the defendant’s dismissal motion. The Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal.

What is Collateral Estoppel?

The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a part of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against Double Jeopardy. It is important to note that the collateral estoppel clause does not automatically bar subsequent prosecution of a defendant. It only bars the re-litigation of a particular issue that has already been decided by a court. What this means is that if an issue of law, fact, or evidentiary ruling has already been decided by a prior court order, the issue cannot be re-litigated in a future lawsuit.

In Pennsylvania, courts will apply the collateral estoppel doctrine if the following threshold requirements were met: 1) the issues in the two actions are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material to justify invoking the doctrine; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; and 3) a final judgment on the specific issue in question was issued in the first action. For collateral estoppel purposes, a final judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. If the previous adjudication was based on a resolution of an issue in a manner favorable to the defendant with respect to a remaining charge, the Commonwealth is precluded from attempting to re-litigate that issue in an effort to resolve it in a contrary way at a future trial.

This sounds confusing, and it can be. To give a simple example of how collateral estoppel would prevent the Commonwealth from retrying a defendant, let’s assume that a defendant is charged with murder, aggravated assault, and simple assault. The facts of this hypothetical case are that a defendant beats a victim to death with his bare hands. Let’s further assume that after a trial, the jury is unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge, but finds the defendant not guilty of the simple assault charge. Because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Commonwealth would be precluded from prosecuting the defendant on the murder charge because he was found not guilty of the simple assault charge. The reason is because the simple assault was a constituent element of the homicide charge. As such, there was already a finding that the defendant did not assault the victim and consequently the Commonwealth would be precluded from retrying the defendant on the homicide charge.

PA Superior Court Rejects Collateral Estoppel Defense Because of Differences in Statutes

Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Superior Court concluded that the defendant’s acquittal of the robbery and theft charges did not negate the necessary elements to potentially convict him of the involuntary servitude or trafficking charges. In other words, a jury could believe that the defendant did not rob the complainant, but he did intend to force her into the sex trade. In making its decision, the Superior Court reviewed the trafficking and involuntary servitude statutes. Based on this review, the Superior Court held that the defendant’s acquittal of the robbery and theft charges did not preclude a subsequent prosecution of the trafficking and involuntary servitude offenses because robbing or stealing from her were not predicate elements of these respective charges. In other words, the defendant could have been trafficking her without robbing her or stealing from her. Therefore, the Commonwealth can retry the defendant on these remaining charges.   

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today. 

PA Superior Court: Defendant Not In Custody Despite Reading of Miranda Warnings During Police Station Interrogation

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Coleman, holding that a defendant is not in custody for purposes of Miranda just because the police read him his Miranda warnings in a police station. This case rejects the fundamental right to counsel as well as the obvious reality that a suspect in a murder/arson investigation who has been escorted to the police station and given his Miranda warnings would assume that he or she is not free to leave and is instead under arrest.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Coleman

On March 30, 2017, the Farrell Police Department was investigating an arson that caused the death of a woman. The police suspected that the defendant was involved. Based on these suspicions, the police went to the defendant’s mother’s home in Farrell, Pennsylvania. The police arrived at the residence armed, but they were not wearing their uniforms. After they identified themselves as police officers, they asked the defendant if he could talk, and the defendant allowed the officers to inside the home. Once inside, the officers told the defendant they wanted to speak with him at the nearby police station, which was about 150 yards away. The defendant responded that he would come to the police station later when he could get a ride because it was raining at the time. When the officers offered him a ride, the defendant agreed and grabbed his insulin kit.

The defendant entered the officers’ unmarked car without being handcuffed. He was not frisked, handcuffed, or restrained when he entered the car. After the two-minute drive, they arrived at the police station. The two officers, along with the defendant, walked inside the building which also contained a regional lockup facility. While walking through the facility, they walked past jail cells and eventually entered an interview room. When the defendant entered the room he was still not restrained. The officers subsequently informed him that he was free to leave at any time and permitted him to keep and use his overcoat, hat, and insulin kit.

At some point, the officers then activated the audio/video recording system and read the defendant his Miranda rights. The defendant did not sign the officers’ waiver form. The officers then began asking the defendant about the previously-mentioned arson. After about one minute, the defendant explained that he did not have anything to say about the arson. Per the Pennsylvania Superior Court, he “explicitly, clearly, and unequivocally said he did not want to talk to the police.” Despite this clear assertion of his rights, the police officers ignored his statement and continued speaking to him. They reiterated to the defendant that he was not in custody and was free to leave at any time. The officers then advised the defendant that he was a suspect, along with another individual. The officers told the defendant that they wanted to show him some photos “to see if it changed his mind.” They then showed the defendant blown-up photographs of the crime scene and the victim’s body. They also showed video from a local gas station where the defendant and the other suspect obtained gasoline. Finally, they told the defendant “disturbing details about the burnt corpse and emphasized that the victim’s children did not have a mother.”

Despite all of this, the defendant continued to deny involvement in the crime. The officers then produced a photograph of the other suspect and explained that they heard that the defendant had started the fire. They further told the defendant that “you know who did this, and whoever comes in first, that is how the story will be told.” In response to this, the defendant “started to reveal names and information about a vehicle and who the owner of the vehicle was and where that individual lived, and eventually told the police that he pointed out the house that he thought the alleged target lived in and that the [other suspect] lit the place up.” The officers then gave the defendant some paper in case he wanted to make a statement and then left the room for three minutes. While the officers were not in the room, the defendant used his insulin kit. He declined to provide a written statement. After the officers returned to the room they arrested him. He was subsequently charged with second-degree murder, aggravated arson, and other related offenses.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to the police. On October 4, 2017, a hearing was held. The testimony at the motions hearing was consistent with the above-mentioned facts. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court found that he “clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent after he was given his Miranda warnings.” The court observed that the officers ignored his invocation of his right to remain silent so that they could elicit incriminating statements, but the trial court did not find that the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation. The Commonwealth then filed an interlocutory appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

What happens if the police do not give Miranda warnings?

Miranda warnings are a frequently misunderstood issue in criminal law. Many people assume that police are required to read Miranda warnings to a suspect anytime they make an arrest or the case will be dismissed. This is not correct. Instead, Miranda is only relevant in a criminal case when a defendant makes a statement in response to questioning by a government official while the defendant was in custodial detention. If a defendant voluntarily blurts out an incriminating statement, then he or she will not be able to argue that this statement should be suppressed because the police failed to give the Miranda warnings. Further, if the police detain someone for an “investigatory detention,” rather than a custodial detention, then the police are not necessarily required to provide Miranda warnings prior to asking questions. For this reason, police do not typically have to provide Miranda warnings during many routine traffic stops. Traffic stops, however, can rise to the level of an arrest, and at that point, the police would be required to provide warnings.

Determining whether a statement should be suppressed because of the failure to administer Miranda warnings is a very fact intensive analysis. First, a court must look and see whether the question or statement made by the police itself was reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response. Usually, this is the least complicated part of the analysis. If a cop asks a defendant “if they did it” or “why did you do it” then those questions are reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response.

The issue that is more complicated is whether the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. When these motions are litigated, defense attorneys will routinely ask questions such as: whether the defendant was in handcuffs; whether the officers were uniformed; whether the officers’ guns were visible; the length of the interrogation; the method of questioning; whether the door was closed; whether the defendant was offered anything to eat; etc. By doing this, the defense attorney is trying to establish that the defendant’s liberty was so restrained that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court will make a finding based on the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the defendant’s statement should be suppressed. If the court grants a defendant’s motion to suppress it is important to note that this does not necessarily mean that the case will be dismissed. It only means that the Commonwealth cannot use the defendant’s statement in its case-in-chief. For a more detailed analysis on when the police are required to administer Miranda warnings, please see our blog “What Happens if the Police Don’t Give Miranda Warnings?”    

Pennsylvania Superior Court Holds That the Defendant’s Statement Was Not Illegally Obtained.

In a brief analysis, the Pennsylvania Superior Court overturned the lower court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement. The reason was because both the trial court and the Superior Court found that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Specifically, because he was not threatened, was told that he could leave;,was able to bring his insulin with him, and did not go to the police station against his will, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. The fact that he was administered Miranda warnings while in a police station did not transform this into a custodial interrogation. Because he was not in custody, he was not actually entitled to the warnings, and the police therefore did not have to stop questioning him when he said he did not want to make a statement. Accordingly, the Commonwealth will now be able to use his statement against him at his trial.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.