Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 6/3/18 Zak Goldstein 6/3/18

PA Supreme Court: Obvious Typo in Search Warrant Affidavit Does Not Invalidate Otherwise Legitimate Search Warrant

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

What happens if a search warrant has a mistake in it?

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Leed. In Leed, the Court held that a statement contained in one paragraph of a search warrant affidavit, which when read in context of the entire affidavit appears to be an inadvertent error, does not render the affiant’s information stale and therefore lacking in probable cause.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Leed

Leed involved the use of confidential informants. A detective with the Lancaster County Drug Task Force spoke with a confidential informant who claimed that the defendant was selling large quantities of cocaine and marijuana in Lancaster. The CI claimed to have recently purchased cocaine from the defendant and that the defendant lived at a certain address in Lancaster.

Some time later, a different detective met with a second CI who also claimed that the defendant was selling powder cocaine and marijuana. Both CIs identified the defendant from driver’s license photos. Later, a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Agent spoke with a third individual, who told them that the defendant had been using a storage locker at a storage facility in Lancaster. The DEA agents confirmed that the defendant had rented that storage locker and recently visited it. One of the detectives then requested that a K9 unit conduct a sweep of the storage locker, and the dog gave a positive response to the locker.

Based on this information, the Lancaster County detectives obtained a search warrant for the storage unit. When detectives executed the search warrant, they found 15 pounds of marijuana, $9,900 in cash, plastic bags, a scale, a bank statement, income tax return, and other personal documents in the locker. They then obtained an additional search warrant for the defendant’s bank records.

Police charged the defendant with Possession with the Intent to Deliver and arrested him. While he was in custody in the county prison, the defendant made a phone call to his mother and said incriminating things in the phone call. Prison phone calls are obviously recorded. Based on the confessions in the phone call, police obtained a third search warrant for the defendant’s mother’s home, where they found more money and a cell phone.

The Motion to Suppress

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the information in the search warrant application was stale and therefore lacking in probable cause. Specifically, the defendant focused on a mistake in the warrant's accompanying Affidavit of Probable Cause. In the warrant, the detective mistakenly wrote that the police conducted the K9 sniff of the storage locker on March 21, 2013 instead of March 21, 2014, meaning that the sniff would have taken place more than a year before the search warrant was executed. This would arguably have made the information stale as the fact that the locker may have contained drugs in it a year earlier does not really mean that it is likely to still contain drugs a year later.

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth called the detective to testify that the March 21, 2013 date was an error and he really meant March 21, 2014. The defendant objected on the basis that extrinsic testimony should not have been permitted because challenges to search warrants are usually limited to the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit. Nonetheless, the court permitted the detective to testify that he had made a drafting mistake.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court agreed that it could not consider the detective’s testimony because the only thing that mattered was the actual text of the affidavit. The court, however, found that a common sense reading of the affidavit as a whole suggested that the date was a typo and that the canine sniff had taken place more recently. Therefore, the court concluded that the information was not stale and that there was probable cause to issue the warrant for the storage unit. The defendant ultimately proceeded to trial on the drug charges and was found guilty of Possession with the Intent to Deliver. The court sentenced him to 20 to 60 months’ imprisonment, and the defendant appealed.

The Criminal Appeal

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately agreed to review the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth and upheld the trial court’s decision. It recognized that search warrants may only be issued based on probable cause. The magistrate or judge who signs off on the warrant may consider only the affidavit of probable cause provided by the detective who applies for the warrant. The Court also noted that the age of the information supporting a warrant application is a factor in determining probable cause. If the information relied upon is too old, then the information is stale, and probable cause may no longer exist. However, staleness is not determined by age alone. Instead, the magistrate (and subsequently the suppression court) must consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether information is stale and probable cause exists. Finally, when a defendant in Pennsylvania challenges a search by arguing that the search warrant lacked probable cause, the only evidence that the suppression court may consider is the affidavit which was prepared in support of the search warrant application. The suppression court should provide deference to the magistrate’s decision, but if the warrant was clearly lacking in probable cause, then the results of the search should be suppressed.

The Court ultimately concluded that the typo with respect to the date of the K9 search did not invalidate the rest of the warrant. The purpose of requiring a search warrant to be based on probable cause is to ensure that police do not act arbitrarily or without sufficient information to justify intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. At the same time, where police clearly have probable cause, obtained a warrant, and simply made a typo which appears to be an obvious mistake based on the other information contained in the warrant, the police should not be punished for the typo. Otherwise, police will respond by being as vague as possible so that they cannot be punished later for typos and other drafting mistakes.

Therefore, the Court held that where the substance of an affidavit, read as a whole, evidences that there is a substantial likelihood that a specific paragraph contains an error, such that any reasonable possibility that the police will act without the requisite probable cause is eliminated, the error will not be viewed in isolation and the warrant will be deemed valid, so long as the probable cause affidavit is otherwise sufficient. Accordingly, an obvious typo will not be enough to defeat an otherwise valid search warrant. At the same time, major mistakes in a warrant or mistakes which are not obviously typos could still lead to a successful challenge to a search. Here, the court found that it was obvious that the detectives made a mistake because the warrant was otherwise in chronological order. Therefore, the court ruled against the defendant.

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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We are experienced and understanding defense attorenys who will fight for you. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/31/18 Zak Goldstein 5/31/18

US Supreme Court: Police Need Warrant to Search Car Parked in Driveway

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Collins v. Virginia, holding that police must obtain a search warrant prior to searching a car or other automobile that is parked in a person’s driveway.

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Collins v. Virginia, holding that police need a search warrant to search a person’s automobile when it is parked in the driveway or other “curtilage” of a person’s home. This is an important decision that limits the ability of police to search your house and the surrounding areas without a search warrant pursuant to the “Automobile Exception” to the Fourth Amendment.

The Facts of Collins v. Virginia

On an unspecified date, an Albemarle County, VA Police Officer observed the driver of an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame committing a traffic infraction. This driver eluded the officer’s attempt to stop him. A few weeks later, a different officer within the same department encountered an individual operating a similar motorcycle traveling above the speed limit. This officer was also not able to stop this individual.

The officers subsequently compared notes and concluded that it was the same individual who got away on each date. Additionally, the officers were able to determine that the motorcycle was stolen and in the possession of the defendant. The police then searched the defendant’s Facebook account and saw pictures of the motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house. Through additional investigation, the officers were able to determine the address of the house and that the house belonged to the defendant’s girlfriend.

One of the officers then went to this house and saw what appeared to be a motorcycle under a white tarp. The officer did not have a search warrant, but he exited his car and went to the house. From there, he then went onto the driveway, lifted the tarp, and saw what appeared to be the motorcycle that had escaped police on the two previous occasions. The officer ran the license plate and VIN for the motorcycle and found that it had been reported stolen. The officer took a photograph of the motorcycle and then put the tarp back on the motorcycle. The officer then left the property and returned to his car to wait for the defendant. The defendant returned home shortly thereafter. The officer then walked up to the house and knocked on the door. The defendant answered the door and agreed to speak with the officer. The defendant promptly admitted that the motorcycle belonged to him and that he had purchased it without a title. The officer arrested him.

State prosecutors charged the defendant with receiving stolen property. The defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress to suppress the evidence that the officer obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the motorcycle. The defendant argued that the officer had trespassed on the curtilage of his property in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. The defendant then appealed. Both the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision on the Automobile Exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The defendant then petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear the case which the Court granted certiorari.

What is the Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement of the Fourth Amendment?

The Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment has existed for nearly a hundred years. In essence, the Automobile Exception is judge-made law that allows police to search an automobile without a search warrant, so long as there was probable cause to justify the search. This exception was first articulated in Carroll v. United States, a 1925 Supreme Court decision that upheld a warrantless search and seizure of an automobile.

In Carroll, the Supreme Court reasoned that law enforcement should not be required to obtain a search warrant in order to search a car because a car is mobile and could leave the scene by the time an officer obtained a warrant. In subsequent years, the Supreme Court solidified the Automobile Exception, but it also adopted additional rationales to justify these warrantless searches. Specifically, the Court has also held that because automobiles are so highly regulated, a warrant is not needed. This was the Court’s justification for approving of the police acting without a warrant in cases such as California v. Carney and South Dakota v. Opperman. For a long time, Pennsylvania did not permit the Automobile Exception. However, this changed in 2014, when a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the case of Commonwealth v. Gary. Gary eliminated the requirement that police obtain a search warrant before searching an automobile in order for evidence obtained from the vehicle to be admissible in state court criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the Automobile Exception does not apply when the automobile is on the curtilage of one’s property. Curtilage is the property connected to one’s home, i.e. a driveway. The United States Supreme Court has defined it as “an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of home life extends.” Therefore, the Court stated that “[w]hen a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred…[s]uch conduct thus is presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant.”

As such, the Court found that the officer invaded the defendant’s Fourth Amendment interest in his home. The home is one of the most protected interests in Fourth Amendment law and there is nothing in Automobile Exception jurisprudence that allows the police search one’s home. The Court further expressed a concern that police, under the guise of the Automobile Exception, would search individual’s homes. The Court put it very simply “[i]t is, after all, an exception for automobiles” and held that the police needed a warrant to search the defendant’s motorcycle in his driveway.

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Zak Goldstein 5/19/18 Zak Goldstein 5/19/18

PA Superior Court Continues to Undermine US Supreme Court's Birchfield Ruling

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Moser. In Moser, the Superior Court concluded that police lawfully obtained the defendant’s blood sample without a search warrant because the defendant consented to the blood draw before police read him defective and coercive O’Connell warnings. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the results of the blood test.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Moser

Moser was charged with Homicide by vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (Homicide by DUI), three counts of DUI, homicide by vehicle, and related traffic offenses. Moser filed a motion to suppress, arguing that police coerced him into submitting to warrantless blood testing by reading him defective O’Connell warnings which informed him that if he refused the blood testing, he would be subjected to stricter criminal penalties. The United States Supreme Court has previously held in Birchfield v. North Dakota that a state cannot impose criminal penalties on a defendant who refuses to submit to a warrantless blood draw, and Pennsylvania courts have suppressed blood testing in which defendants were told they would face criminal penalties if they refused prior to the testing.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress. It found that the behavior of the police was unlawfully coercive and violated Moser’s rights because the police told him that he would face criminal penalties if he refused the testing. By granting the motion to suppress, the court ordered that the prosecution could not use the results of the blood testing at the homicide trial.

The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that Moser had actually agreed to the blood testing while in the back of the police car on the way to the hospital. The police who were investigating the case did not read him the defective warnings until he arrived at the hospital. Therefore, the prosecution argued that he had already agreed to the blood draw prior to hearing anything coercive. Because the warnings were not provided until later, they could not have coerced him into giving up his right to insist on a search warrant prior to a blood test.

The Superior Court agreed. It found that although the warnings were improper and could have been coercive, the warnings did not coerce the defendant in this case because they were not given until after he had already consented to the blood draw in the back of the police car. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered that the blood test results may be introduced at trial going forward.

This case continues a recent trend in the Sueprior Court of rejecting these Birchfield challenges and allowing the Commonwealth to use evidence even where the police gave improper warnings. A number of Birchfield cases are still on appeal, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted review in at least one of them. Therefore, although this is a significant set back for the defendant in this case, it is possible that the rules surrounding blood testing in DUI cases will continue to change and that the Superior Court could be overturned. For the time being, the Superior Court continues to regularly undermine the basic holding of Birchfield that states may not impose criminal penalties on a defendant for refusing blood testing when police have not obtained a search warrant. Obviously, the constitution requires search warrants, but the appellate courts continue to allow police to ignore this requirement and forgives their basic refusal to set up electronic or telephonic warrant application systems for DUI cases.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or may be under investigation, we can help. We are experienced and understanding Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers who will fight for you. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in trial courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey as well as on appeal and in Post-Conviction Relief Act Petitions. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an award-winning defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/14/18 Zak Goldstein 5/14/18

US Supreme Court: An Unauthorized Rental Car Driver Can Probably Litigate a Motion to Suppress

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Byrd v. United States, holding that the defendant probably held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car he was driving despite the fact that the car had been rented by his girlfriend and she had not listed him as an authorized driver in the rental agreement.

The Facts of Byrd

Byrd dealt with a traffic stop in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania State Police pulled over a rental car driven by the defendant. The defendant was the only person in the car. During the course of the traffic stop, the troopers learned that the car was a rental and that the defendant was not listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver. The troopers told the defendant that they were going to search the car and that they did not need his permission because he was not an authorized driver. They then searched the car, including the trunk. They found body armor and 49 bricks of heroin.

When Byrd’s girlfriend rented the car, she signed a rental agreement. The agreement specifically listed the limited number of people people who could drive the car. It also stated:

Permitting an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle is a violation of the rental agreement. This may result in any and all coverage otherwise provided by the rental agreement being void and my being fully responsible for all loss or damage, including liability to third parties.

Byrd’s girlfriend did not list him as an authorized driver. Therefore, they both violated the rental agreement when he drove the car. Of course, there is a difference between technically violating a rental agreement and stealing a car.

The Federal Criminal Case Against Byrd

Due to the significant quantity of drugs recovered by police, federal prosecutors in the Middle District of Pennsylvania assumed the case and prosecuted Mr. Byrd for distribution and possession of heroin with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) as well as possession of body armor by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 931(a)(1). Byrd moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that police had no basis for searching the car and that because his girlfriend had rented the car and loaned it to him, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car despite the fact that he was not part of the rental agreement. The trial court denied the Motion to Suppress, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Both found that he could not challenge the search because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the car due to the fact that he was not on the rental agreement.

The Criminal Appeal

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether a driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car even when the driver is not authorized to drive the vehicle by the rental agreement. The Court held that, as a general rule, someone in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does not list that person as an authorized driver. The Court therefore remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether Byrd was in fact in otherwise lawful possession and control of the rental car and whether the police had probable cause to search the vehicle.

The Supreme Court's Analysis

The Court’s analysis focused on whether Byrd had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. In order to challenge a potentially unconstitutional search in federal court, the person challenging the search must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place that the police searched. For example, a person is going to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own home or the pockets of their pants and therefore would be able to challenge a search of those places. But a person generally does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a neighbor’s home. This means that if you store your drugs in your neighbor’s house, the police could use those drugs against you even if they found them by searching your neighbor’s house illegally without a search warrant. Thus, the case hinged on whether Byrd had the ability to challenge the search or whether he had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he was not authorized to drive the car. His girlfriend, as the person who rented the car, clearly would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy while driving the car if police sought to introduce evidence of a search against her.

The Court noted that one who owns and possesses a car, like one who owns and possesses a house, almost always has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Ownership of property, however, is not the only factor in determining whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Although ownership is not necessarily required, mere presence in the area that was searched also may not be enough to provide a reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, there typically must be some kind of property right or right to exclude other people from the property. A car thief, for example, would not have any property rights in a car or right to exclude other people from the car. Therefore, a car thief would not be able to challenge the search of the car that he or she stole.

The Court concluded that there is a difference between violating an important provision in a car rental agreement and potentially increasing one’s exposure to civil liability in the event of an accident and actually stealing a car. A car thief has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car, but someone who is not on the authorized driver’s list does not automatically stand in the same position as a car thief.

Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further fact-finding by the trial court. The Court ordered the trial court to consider whether Byrd had committed a criminal offense in having his girlfriend rent the car for him knowing that he could not rent it such that he was no better than a car thief. If so, then the trial court could be justified in finding no reasonable expectation of privacy because Byrd would essentially have stolen the car. The Court also permitted the trial court to determine whether State Police had probable cause to search the vehicle. If they did, then the question of whether Byrd had a reasonable expectation of privacy would be irrelevant because federal law permits police to search a vehicle without a search warrant as long as they have probable cause.

Byrd was a unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court. It is an important decision because of its common-sense approach. It seems obvious that someone should not lose all of their rights to be free of an illegal search and seizure solely because they have not properly followed the requirements of a car rental agreement. Instead, courts should use common sense and look at whether the person who was subjected to the search would have reasonably expected to have privacy in the vehicle and whether society would view that expectation as reasonable. Here, unless Byrd was the equivalent of a car thief, he should not be subjected to an illegal search by the police regardless of the technicalities of a complicated car rental agreement which contained all sorts of other provisions.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or considering an appeal, we can help. We are experienced and understanding Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers who have successfully defended thousands of cases. We have the experience, skill, and knowledge of the law to fight for the best possible outcome for you. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an award-winning criminal defense attorney today.