Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
Appealing PA Megan's Law Retroactivity Provisions
PA Megan's Law Retroactivity
As Attorney Zak Goldstein previously wrote, Pennsylvania has seen significant changes in the laws governing sex offender registration. Specifically, recent cases have provided some hope for a limited number of Megan's Law and SORNA registrants to downgrade from Tier III lifetime offenders to lower tiers depending on the circumstances of their cases and pleas. Registrants who meet very specific conditions may have the possibility of obtaining a reduced Tier if they can show that they either committed multiple Tier I or Tier II offenses as part of the same case or, in limited circumstances, that the Commonwealth has violated a plea bargain by retroactively requiring the offender to register at a higher tier.
Potential Ways to Lower Megan's Law Tier in PA
Aside from the issues written about in that previous post, there are other ways for a person, required to register under SORNA, to downgrade their registration status or even remove it completely, and that is to enforce the plea that was bargained for at the time of sentencing. It isn't unusual for us to see cases where a defendant has specifically bargained for Tier I registration as part of an agreement to plead guilty. Pennsylvania courts have upheld that such agreements are governed by contract law and enforceable under contract law. This means that, while the offense pleaded guilty to may require higher registration, even lifetime registration the agreement, made at the time of the plea, will often be the deciding factor on how long a someone will have to register. But we've often found when someone is released from prison or from supervision they've been told their registration status has been changed to lifetime registration or from Tier I to Tier III. It may be possible to challenge such a change to one's SORNA registration requirements. However, it can be expensive and difficult, and success is never guaranteed.
information on the Adam Walsh Act (SORNA)
As of 2012, Pennsylvania substantially implemented Title I of the Adam Walsh Act, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA requires that offenders register for a duration of time based on the tier of the offense of conviction. Specifically, SORNA requires Tier I offenders register for 15 years, Tier II offenders register for 25 years, and Tier III offenders register for life.
SORNA requires that offenders make in-person appearances at the registering agency based on the tier of the offense of conviction. Specifically, this Act requires that Tier I offenders appear once a year, that SORNA Tier II offenders appear every six months, and Tier III offenders appear every three months. SORNA requires that each jurisdiction maintain a public sex offender registry website and publish certain registration information on that website.
PENNSYLVANIA MEGAN'S LAW REGISTRATION TIERS
Pennsylvania has three categories of registrants for purposes of duration of registration requirements and frequency of reporting to law enforcement for verification:
Tier I offenders, who are required to appear annually to verify registration information and register for a period of 15 years.
Tier II offenders, who are required to appear every 180 days to verify registration information and register for a period of 25 years.
Tier III offenders, who are required to appear every 90 days to verify registration information and register for life.
SORNA Tier I requires offenders to register for a minimum of 15 years and annually verify registration information. The following offenses listed in Pennsylvania Statutes would require, at a minimum, Tier I registration requirements under SORNA:
18 Pa. C.S. § 2902 – Unlawful restraint (non-parental, victim under 18)
18 Pa. C.S. § 2903 – False imprisonment (non-parental, victim under 18)
18 Pa. C.S. § 2904 – Interference with custody of children (non-parental, victim under 18)
18 Pa. C.S. § 2910 – Luring a child into a motor vehicle or structure
18 Pa. C.S. § 3124.2 – Institutional sexual assault (adult victim)
18 Pa. C.S. § 3126 – Indecent assault where the offense is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher (if punishment less than one year)
18 Pa. C.S. § 6312[d] – Sexual abuse of children (possession of child pornography)
18 Pa. C.S. § 7507.1 – Invasion of privacy
SORNA Tier II requires offenders register for a minimum of 25 years and semiannually verify registration information. The following offenses listed in Pennsylvania Statutes would require, at a minimum, Tier II registration:
18 Pa. C.S. § 3124.2 – Institutional sexual assault (victim age 16-17)
18 Pa. C.S. § 3126 – Indecent assault where the offense is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher (if recidivist or punishment greater than one year)
18 Pa. C.S. § 5902[b] – Prostitution and related offenses, where the actor promotes the prostitution of a minor
18 Pa. C.S. § 5903[a] [3], [4], [5], or [6] – Obscene and other sexual materials and performances, where the victim is a minor
18 Pa. C.S. § 6312[b], [c] – Sexual abuse of children (production/distribution of child pornography)
18 Pa. C.S. § 6318 – Unlawful contact with minor
18 Pa. C.S. § 6320 – Sexual exploitation of children SORNA
Tier III Offenses requires lifetime registration and quarterly verifications. The following offenses listed in Pennsylvania Statutes would require, at a minimum, Tier III registration requirements under SORNA:
18 Pa. C.S. § 2901 – Kidnapping, where the victim is a minor (non-parental)
18 Pa. C.S. § 3121 – Rape • 18 Pa. C.S. § 3122.1 – Statutory sexual assault
18 Pa. C.S. § 3123 – Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
18 Pa. C.S. § 3124.1 – Sexual assault • 18 Pa. C.S. § 3124.2 – Institutional sexual assault (victim under 16)
18 Pa. C.S. § 3125 – Aggravated indecent assault
18 Pa. C.S. § 3126 – Indecent assault where the offense is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher (if victim under 13 and punishment greater than one year)
18 Pa. C.S. § 4302 – Incest (victim under 13, or victim 13-18 years old, and offender more than 4 years older)
HOW OUR PENNSYLVANIA MEGAN'S LAW LAWYERS CAN HELP
Demetra Mehta, Esq. - PA Megan's Law Attorney
If you think you have been required to register for the wrong tier, please contact us to discuss your case. After a brief consultation, we may be able to advise you how to best move forward. If we think we can be of assistance we will investigate your case and offer an opinion on if a challenge to your registration requirements will be successful. We offer a free phone consultation in these matters, and if further investigation is warranted, we typically charge a reasonable initial fee to obtain court records and transcripts, investigate the case, and determine the likelihood of success.
Charged with a crime? Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of cases. Call 267-225-2545 for a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session.
Recent Court Decisions Create More Problems for Blood Testing in PA DUI Cases
PA DUI Update: Even New, Revised Blood Test Warnings May Be Unconstitutional
Pennsylvania courts have already found that large chunks of Pennsylvania’s DUI laws are unconstitutional. Recently, judges on both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Philadelphia Municipal Court have found that even police warnings which do not explicitly mention increased criminal penalties for refusing a blood draw could be unconstitutionally coercive and require the suppression of the test results. As written, the state’s DUI law creates an enhanced criminal penalty for motorists who refuse blood testing and are subsequently convicted of DUI. In DUI cases where the defendant is convicted both of driving under the influence and refusing to consent to blood testing, the defendant would be sentenced as a Tier III offender instead of a Tier I offender.
Differences in Sentencing for DUI Tiers
The differences between the mandatory minimums for Tier I DUIs and Tier III DUIs are enormous. For example, a first offense, Tier I DUI requires the court to impose a sentence of six months of probation, fines, classes, and other conditions. However, there is no mandatory minimum jail sentence, and there is no required PennDOT driver’s license suspension. On the other hand, a first offense, Tier III DUI conviction requires the court to impose 72 hours of incarceration and a one year driver’s license suspension in addition to enhanced fines and other conditions. Thus, the difference between a Tier I and a Tier III can be real time in jail and a significant driver’s license suspension which could lead to the defendant losing his or her employment.
Recent Court Decisions in Pennsylvania DUI Cases
Demetra Mehta, Esq - DUI Lawyer in Philadelphia
Recently, courts have begun to strike down the enhanced criminal penalties for refusing a blood test. First, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court held that states may not penalize a motorist for refusing a blood test in cases where the police have not obtained a search warrant for the motorist’s blood. This is because the blood test is an intrusive search of the defendant’s body which falls under the Fourth Amendment and requires a search warrant. According to the Supreme Court, breath tests do not pose the same privacy concerns because the use of a breathalyzer is far less intrusive than a blood test. Of course, this is a problem for DUI enforcement because a breathalyzer cannot detect the use of drugs.
Prior to Birchfield, various Pennsylvania appellate court opinions and laws required police officers to provide DUI suspects with O’Connell warnings prior to requesting a blood draw. The O’Connell warnings inform the motorist that the motorist will face an increased criminal penalty for refusing the test should the motorist be convicted of both the DUI and refusal. More recently, in Commonwealth v. Evans, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the O’Connell warnings as implemented prior to Birchfield could be unconstitutionally coercive because the state can no longer punish blood test refusals with additional criminal sanctions. Accordingly, Evans held that defendants who were read the O’Connell warnings prior to consenting to a blood test may be entitled to have the results of the blood test excluded from evidence.
Now, in Commonwealth v. Gaetano and Commonwealth v. Bush, judges of the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Philadelphia Municipal Court have ruled that even warnings which do not explicitly reference criminal penalties could be unconstitutionally coercive and require suppression of the evidence. Last week, in Gaetano, the court addressed a situation in which a police officer informed a DUI suspect that the suspect would face a license suspension and “enhanced penalties through PennDOT” if the suspect refused to consent to a blood draw during a DUI stop. Mr. Gaetano consented to the blood test, and the test results showed the presence of a controlled substance in Gaetano’s blood.
Motions to Suppress in DUI Blood Test Cases
Gaetano’s criminal defense attorneys filed a motion to suppress the blood results prior to the Birchfield decision. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Because the case was pre-Birchfield, the trial court did not consider whether the warnings were unconstitutionally coercive as the law at the time did not support such an argument. After denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found Gaetano guilty of DUI, and Gaetano appealed.
On appeal, Gaetano was permitted to raise the issue of whether the warnings were unconstitutionally coercive because of the change in constitutional law brought about by Birchfield. Birchfield had not been decided at the time of the motion to suppress, so there were no findings on the record by the trial judge as to whether the warnings provided by the officer were unconstitutionally coercive. Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the coercive effect of the warnings. The court noted that whether consent is voluntarily obtained depends on the totality of the circumstances. The court opined:
In this case, a crucial component of the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding Gaetano’s consent is the warning given by Sergeant Watkins concerning the consequences of refusal. Unlike the warning we recently addressed in Evans, Sergeant Watkins did not expressly state that Gaetano would face enhanced criminal penalties if he refused consent. Instead, he referenced “enhanced penalties through PennDOT.” The record does not reveal what those enhanced penalties might be, beyond license suspension. In Evans, after concluding that the more explicit warning there was “partially inaccurate,” we “remand[ed] the case to the trial court to ‘reevaluate [Appellant’s] consent . . . [, based on] the totality of all the circumstances . . . [and] given the partial inaccuracy of the officer’s advisory.’” Here, we must do the same, recognizing that Sergeant Watkin’s warning was less blatantly inaccurate than the warning in Evans.
Therefore, although the Superior Court did not find that the warnings of enhanced penalties through PennDOT were definitively illegal, the Court did recognize that under the totality of the circumstances, they could have rendered Gaetano’s consent involuntary and therefore require suppression of the incriminating blood result evidence.
As Gaetano illustrates, police departments throughout the state of Pennsylvania began revising their warnings following the Birchfield decision. For example, the Philadelphia Police currently read two sets of warnings. First, Philadelphia Police Officers read a standard set of warnings which have been created by the State Police. The State Police warnings read:
It is my duty as a police officer to inform you of the following:
You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code.
I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of blood.
If you refuse to submit to the blood test, your operating privilege will be suspended for at least 12 months. If you previously refused a chemical test or were previously convicted of driving under the influence, you will be suspended for up to 18 months.
You have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before deciding whether to submit to testing. If you request to speak with an attorney or anyone else after being provided these warnings or you remain silent when asked to submit to a blood test, you will have refused the test.
Second, the Philadelphia Police have created their own set of warnings which they provide in conjunction with the State Police warnings. The Philadelphia Police warnings provide:
It is my duty as a police officer to inform you of the following:
You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, and I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of your blood.
You have the right to refuse to submit to a chemical test of your blood. If you refuse to submit to a chemical test of your blood, your operating privilege will be suspended for at least 12 months. If you previously refused a chemical test or were previously convicted of driving under the influence, you will be suspended for up to 18 months.
Additionally, the fact that you refused to submit a chemical test of your blood may be admitted into evidence in subsequent legal proceedings.
You have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before deciding whether to submit to testing. If you request to speak with an attorney or anyone else after being provided these warnings or you remain silent when asked to submit to a blood test, you will have refused the test.
The Philadelphia Police warnings are very similar, but they also include the critical provision that the refusal may be submitted into evidence in subsequent legal proceedings.
Motions to Suppress in Philadelphia Municipal Court DUI Cases
In Bush, which actually consolidated four DUI cases, the defendants argued that even the revised warnings were unduly coercive and that the admission of the refusal into evidence against the defendant as evidence of a guilty conscience violates due process. The Municipal Court mostly agreed. The court recognized that “the base of information necessary to make a knowing refusal requires an awareness· of the consequences of that refusal.” This requires giving the suspect both accurate information and adequate information regarding the consequences of a refusal. Therefore, the Municipal Court was concerned that both the Philadelphia Police warnings and State Police warnings do not contain adequate information because they do not inform the defendant that the defendant will not face enhanced criminal penalties. This is particularly problematic because the statute which codified the O’Connell warnings requires the police to inform the motorist of the enhanced criminal penalties which are now unconstitutional following the Birchfield decision. Thus, a defendant who has actually read the law would believe that he or she would face additional criminal penalties for a refusal. Likewise, the fact that the warnings do not indicate whether silence could be used in civil or criminal proceedings but simply says subsequent legal proceedings is confusing and vague. Therefore, the court concluded that both the Philadelphia and State Police warnings are not sufficiently adequate or accurate and could lead to an unconstitutional level of coercion.
Finally, the Municipal Court also expressed concerns that the use of silence against the defendant at a subsequent criminal prosecution could violate due process and the Fifth Amendment. Both the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions provide protections against self-incrimination – meaning that a defendant cannot be compelled to say incriminating things. However, the warnings inform the defendant that silence will constitute a refusal, and a refusal will be used as evidence against the defendant. Therefore, the Municipal Court also found that this provision of the warnings could violate due process because it essentially compels the defendant to give evidence against himself or herself.
Clearly, the court found a number of potential problems with the warnings which could lead to a successful motion to suppress. However, like the court in Gaetano, the Municipal Court concluded that the coercive effect of the warnings must be evaluated on a case-by-case using a totality of the circumstances test. Therefore, the trial court which hears the motion to suppress must look at the warnings which are actually given to the defendant and whether the defendant understood the warnings or believed that the defendant would face criminal penalties for refusing testing or remaining silent.
A Philadelphia DUI Defense Lawyer Can Help
It is clear from these opinions that Pennsylvania DUI law with respect to blood testing is a mess. Unfortunately, Gaetano is not entirely binding on lower courts because it is currently an unpublished opinion. However, it may be cited for its persuasive value. Likewise, Bush is not binding on other courts because it is only a trial court opinion. However, it is clear that there are serious issues to be raised in any case where the police have obtained a blood draw. In many cases where police do not obtain a search warrant prior to seeking a blood test, there may be strong grounds for a motion to suppress the results of the test. A successful motion to suppress in a DUI case will often lead to the dismissal of the charges or a strong chance for an acquittal at trial. If you or a loved one are facing DUI charges in Pennsylvania, it is critical that you retain an experienced criminal defense attorney who is aware of these recent decisions and changes in the law and able to use them to your advantage. Call 267-225-2545 for a free, 15-minute criminal defense strategy session.
Zak T. Goldstein, Esq. - DUI Defense Lawyer
PA Superior Court Rejects Search Warrant Issued on Word of Unproven Confidential Informant
The Use of Confidential Informants in Drug Cases
It is not a secret that the police often use confidential informants in the investigation of narcotics offenses. However, even when police make arrests and prosecutors bring charges based on evidence obtained by confidential informants, the identity of the confidential informant and extent to which police have used the CI in the past often remain a secret. The use of confidential informants is particularly prone to abuse. In cases where courts do not require prosectors to provide information about the identity of the confidential informant and proof of the CI's reliability, the defense is left with few options for challenging or verifying the testimony of the police officer about the evidence allegedly obtained by the CI.
Instead, officers are routinely permitted to testify, often without specifics, that the confidential informant has provided reliable information in the past and should therefore be trusted now. Likewise, despite the constitutional right to cross-examine one’s accusers in a criminal case afforded by the Confrontation Clause, Pennsylvania courts have increasingly accepted police and prosecution arguments that revealing the identity of the confidential informant in any case would jeopardize the safety of the confidential informant. Therefore, courts often deny defense attempts to learn any information about the confidential informant and deny motions to reveal the CI's identity.
Confidential Informants Must Be Reliable In Order to Provide Probable Cause
In Commonwealth v. Charles Manuel (likely no relation to the World Series-winning Phillies manager), the Pennsylvania Superior Court appears to have reached its limit. In many cases, judges take an officer’s word for it on whether the CI has been reliable and whether the CI’s safety would be jeopardized by disclosure to the defense. In Manuel, the Superior Court held that the fact that the CI provided information on one prior occasion which led to an arrest did not sufficiently establish that the CI was reliable enough for police to obtain a search warrant based on the CI’s word alone.
In Manuel, police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s house based solely on the word of a confidential informant. The confidential informant told officers that he or she had been to the defendant’s house and observed a marijuana grow operation. Police had also used the CI on one prior occasion, and the prior use of the CI led to an arrest. At the time of the investigation, however, the charges stemming from the prior investigation were still pending and had not been adjudicated. Accordingly, officers could not establish that the CI’s prior information was reliable enough to lead to an actual conviction. Finally, officers asserted that they had corroborated the CI's allegations because the CI told the officers the names of the occupants of the house.
After officers checked real estate records and confirmed that the CI had correctly identified the owner of the house, officers applied for a search warrant. In the warrant, the officers indicated that the CI was reliable because the CI’s prior information had led to an arrest and that the public records check provided corroboration of the CI’s allegation that officers would find a grow operation. Because officers wrote that the CI observed the alleged marijuana grow operation, a magistrate granted a search warrant for the property. Of course, when officers executed the search warrant, they did find a marijuana grow operation. The trial judge denied the ensuing motion to suppress, and the defendants were convicted of Possession with the Intent to Deliver marijuana.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the defendants’ convictions. The Court ruled that the trial judge should have granted the motion to suppress because the warrant was lacking in probable cause. In many cases, the word of a confidential informant may be enough to obtain a search warrant. The court noted, for example, that an informant’s tip may constitute probable cause where police independently corroborate the tip, or where the informant has provided accurate information of criminal activity in the past, or where the informant himself participated in the criminal activity. However, there must be some real basis for believing the CI’s information to be reliable. In many cases, the police will use the CI to conduct controlled buys or conduct some other investigation of the defendant in order to corroborate the CI’s allegations. Once the allegations have been corroborated, the officers may obtain a valid search warrant.
Here, however, the officers simply failed to corroborate the allegations of the confidential informant, and there was nothing to suggest that the CI was in fact reliable. Although there is no magic number of arrests or convictions for which a CI must have previously provided information in order to be deemed reliable, it is clear that one prior arrest is not enough. The court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances, but in the absence of some corroboration, one prior arrest is likely insufficient. Because the information from the CI failed to establish probable cause, the warrant was defective. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the defendants’ convictions and the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress.
Our Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers Can Help With Drug Charges
Goldstein Mehta LLC - Philadelphia Drug Lawyers
If you or a loved one are under investigation or facing drug charges, we can help. Contact the Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC today. Our defense attorneys have extensive experience fighting drug charges in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have obtained successful results in cases involving alleged observed drug transactions, expert witnesses, and controlled buys involving confidential informants. Call 267-225-2545 for a free, 15-minute criminal defense strategy session.
Contact a Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Today
Pa Superior Court Finds Merely Paying Witness Not to Testify Does Not Qualify as Witness Intimidation
Witness Intimidation Charges in Pennsylvania
Witness intimidation is a significant problem in criminal court and in Philadelphia specifically. Potential witnesses in criminal cases are often afraid that they could be threatened or harmed for testifying against someone, and that includes witnesses for both the prosecution and defense. For this reason, witness intimidation may be punished very severely upon conviction.
Under Pennsylvania law, a defendant is guilty of Intimidation of Witnesses if, "with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct will obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the administration of criminal justice, he intimidates or attempts to intimidate any witness or victim to . . . [a]bsent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been legally summoned." 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(a)(6).
Does paying a witness not to testify count as witness intimidation?
Given the broad language of the statute, an issue arises when the defendant attempts to pay a witness not to show up to court but the offer of payment is not accompanied by any threats. In Commonwealth v. Evans, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a defendant may not be convicted of Witness Intimidation solely for offering to pay or paying a witness not to testify. Instead, there must be some evidence in the record beyond mere speculation that the defendant intended to intimidate the witness. In other words, the offer to pay must at least contain an implied threat that if the witness does not accept the money, there could be consequences.
In Evans, the Appellant was charged with rape and related offenses. While he was incarcerated pending trial, he asked his girlfriend to contact the complainant and offer to pay her not to testify. His girlfriend attempted to call the complainant a number of times, but she was never successful in reaching her. The Commonwealth found out about the Appellant’s activities (likely because prison phone calls are recorded!), and they charged him with Intimidation, Conspiracy, and Solicitation to Commit Witness Intimidation. Following a stipulated bench trial, Appellant was convicted of Solicitation to Commit Witness Intimidation and sentenced to 3.5-10 years consecutive to the 40-80 years he received when he was eventually convicted in the Rape case. Additionally, Appellant’s attempt to pay the complainant was used against him as evidence of a guilty conscience in the Rape trial.
On appeal, the Superior Court reversed Evans’ conviction for Solicitation to Commit Witness Intimidation. The Superior Court noted that in order for the conviction to be upheld, the evidence would have had to show that Evans solicited someone else to commit the crime of Witness Intimidation. A defendant is guilty of Criminal Solicitation to commit a crime if: “with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or which would establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a).
The Superior Court reversed Evans’ conviction for Solicitation because there was no evidence in the record from which the trial judge could have concluded that Evans intended to do anything other than have his girlfriend pay the complainant not to testify. Although he had clearly solicited his girlfriend to do something, he had not solicited her to commit the specific crime of witness intimidation because there was nothing intimidating about the mere offer of money.
Under certain circumstances, there may be other evidence in the record to suggest that an offer of money may amount to witness intimidation. For example, in the case of Commonwealth v. Doughty, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a witness intimidation conviction that stemmed from a defendant’s offer to pay his wife not to testify where there was other evidence that the defendant intimidated the wife. In that case, the defendant had a history of threatening his wife with violence and had also expressed strong invective when he made the offer to pay. Therefore, the jury could properly convict the defendant of witness intimidation.
In Evans, however, the Appellant had not done anything other than ask his girlfriend to offer money to the complainant. Therefore, it was complete speculation for the trial judge to conclude that the complainant would be intimidated based solely on the nature of the allegations in the rape case. The Superior Court noted that there was no evidence of a history of violent interactions between the Appellant and the victim and no invective conversation making the pecuniary offer to the victim. Instead, the only evidence was Appellant’s request that his girlfriend offer money. Because the word “intimidate” involves some sort of attempt to cause fear, simply offering money does not qualify as intimidation, and the Superior Court reversed Evans’ conviction.
Although Evans will receive a slight reduction in his overall sentence due to the technical elements of the Witness Intimidation statute, we must caution that it is still not a good idea to offer to pay witnesses not to show up. There are likely other charges which the Commonwealth could bring in this type of situation but had overlooked in this case, and the attempt to pay would constitute extremely damaging evidence of a consciousness of guilt at trial. However, it is clear from the court’s opinion that simply offering to pay someone not to come to court does not meet the elements of Pennsylvania’s Witness Intimidation statute.
OUR PHILADELPHIA CRIMINAL LAWYERS CAN HELP IN WITNESS INTIMIDATION CASES
If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges in Pennsylvania or New Jersey, you need the services of an experienced criminal defense attorney. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with us today.