Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 3/27/26 Zak Goldstein 3/27/26

PA Supreme Court Finds Mandatory Life Without Parole for Second Degree Murder Unconstitutional

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just issued what may be the most significant criminal sentencing decision in decades. In Commonwealth v. Lee, No. 3 WAP 2024 (Pa. March 26, 2026), the Court held that Pennsylvania’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for all second-degree murder (felony murder) convictions violates Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The decision means that every person currently serving a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for felony murder may be entitled to resentencing, and going forward, sentencing courts must conduct an individualized assessment of culpability before imposing a life sentence for felony murder. This is a landmark ruling that will affect potentially thousands of inmates across the Commonwealth. The Court, however, did not clearly rule whether the decision is retroactive. It also stayed the decision for 120 days to give the legislature time to respond and decide whether some other lesser mandatory minimum should apply.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Lee

The case arose from a 2014 home invasion robbery in the Elliott neighborhood of Pittsburgh. Leonard Butler and Tina Chapple shared a residence with their nine-year-old son. On October 14, 2014, two men, later identified as Derek Lee and Paul Durham, entered the home armed with guns and with partially covered faces. They forced Butler and Chapple into the basement, demanded money, and used a taser on Butler. Lee, described by Chapple as “the meaner one,” pistol-whipped Butler in the face and took his watch before running upstairs. Durham remained with the couple. Butler then began to struggle with Durham over the gun, and during that struggle, a shot was fired that killed Butler.

Lee was charged with homicide, burglary, robbery, and criminal conspiracy. At trial, the jury found Lee guilty of second-degree murder (felony murder), robbery, and conspiracy. Critically, the jury found Lee not guilty of first-degree murder. In other words, the jury specifically rejected the idea that Lee had the intent to kill. Lee was not the shooter; according to the Court’s summary, the fatal shot was fired by Durham during a struggle with the victim while Lee was on a different floor of the house.

Despite the jury’s finding that Lee did not intend to kill anyone, the trial court was required by statute to sentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b), a conviction for second-degree murder carries a mandatory sentence of life in prison, and under 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1), a person serving a life sentence is ineligible for parole. The sentencing judge had no discretion, meaning they had no ability to consider Lee’s individual role in the crime, his lack of intent to kill, or any other mitigating factors.

What Is Felony Murder?

Under Pennsylvania law, second-degree murder, commonly known as felony murder, is defined as a criminal homicide committed while the defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b). The qualifying felonies include robbery, rape, arson, burglary, and kidnapping. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d). Unlike first-degree murder, the Commonwealth does not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill anyone. The only intent required is the intent to commit the underlying felony. The malice necessary to support a murder conviction is constructively inferred from the act of committing the dangerous felony.

This means a person can be convicted of murder and sentenced to die in prison even if they did not pull the trigger, did not intend for anyone to be hurt, and were not even in the same room when the killing occurred. At the time of this decision, only four other states, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina, imposed a similar mandatory life-without-parole sentence for felony murder without exceptions, making Pennsylvania an outlier even among the minority of states that still use the felony murder rule aggressively. This case addressed whether such a sentence would be constitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

The Eighth Amendment Claim

The Court first addressed whether mandatory life without parole for felony murder violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The Court concluded that it does not, at least under current United States Supreme Court precedent. The majority explained that the high Court’s categorical approach, which has been used to bar the death penalty for non-homicide offenses in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), and to bar mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), has not been extended to adult defendants convicted of felony murder. While the appellant relied on cases like Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (barring the death penalty for felony murder defendants who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill), the Court found that this line of cases involved capital punishment specifically and has not been applied to life-without-parole sentences for adults.

The Court also considered whether a national consensus has emerged against mandatory life without parole for felony murder under the categorical approach. Noting that the number of states with similar mandatory sentencing schemes is disputed but at least a handful of states still impose such sentences, the Court concluded that a sufficient national consensus has not yet developed to support an Eighth Amendment categorical bar.

The Article I, Section 13 Claim: A Broader State Constitutional Protection

This is where the decision breaks new and critical ground. The Court conducted an independent analysis under Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, applying the four-factor test from Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991), which governs when state constitutional provisions provide broader protections than their federal counterparts. And the Court concluded that Section 13 does provide broader protection in this context.

The key textual distinction is significant: the Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments,” while Article I, Section 13 prohibits “cruel punishments,” without the word “unusual.” This is not merely a semantic difference. The Court reasoned that under the Eighth Amendment’s framework, a punishment must be both cruel and unusual to be unconstitutional. A punishment that is common or widespread among the states, and therefore not “unusual,” may survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny even if it is harsh. But under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the sole question is whether the punishment is “cruel,” regardless of how many other states impose it.

The Court held that imposing a mandatory sentence of life without parole on all felony murder defendants, without any assessment of individual culpability, constitutes a cruel punishment under Article I, Section 13. The statutory scheme treats the person who planned and carried out a killing identically to the person who served as a lookout during a robbery in which an unplanned death occurred. This one-size-fits-all approach is inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution’s protection against cruel punishments.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court traced the history of both the felony murder doctrine and Pennsylvania’s tradition of proportionate sentencing, going back to Pennsylvania’s landmark 1794 statute, the first in the country to divide murder into degrees, which was rooted in Enlightenment-era principles of proportionality promoted by figures like Cesare Beccaria and Benjamin Rush. The Court found that mandatory life without parole for all felony murder offenders, without any opportunity for an individualized assessment of culpability, is fundamentally at odds with this tradition.

The Remedy

The Court vacated Lee’s judgment of sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. However, the Court also stayed its order for 120 days to give the General Assembly an opportunity to enact remedial legislation establishing a new sentencing framework for second-degree murder. This is the same approach the Court has used in other cases where it has struck down a sentencing scheme, such as the juvenile lifer cases following Miller v. Alabama.

The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

All seven justices participated in the decision, and while the result was unanimous as to the Pennsylvania constitutional holding, several justices wrote separately to elaborate on various points.

Justice Wecht wrote a concurrence providing extensive scholarly analysis of the differences in culpability between first-degree and second-degree murder, emphasizing that the felony murder rule punishes defendants who lack any intent to kill with the same severity as those who deliberately take a life. Justice Wecht also argued that foreign law should be irrelevant to the Pennsylvania constitutional analysis. This was a point of departure from the majority’s broader survey approach.

Justice Dougherty, joined by Justice McCaffery, wrote a concurrence further developing the textual analysis of why Section 13 provides broader protection than the Eighth Amendment. Justice Dougherty emphasized that because mandatory life without parole for felony murder is not “unusual” in that several states still impose it, it cannot violate the Eighth Amendment under current doctrine. But the absence of the word “unusual” from Section 13 means the Pennsylvania Constitution asks a different and more protective question.

Justice Mundy wrote separately to emphasize the limited scope of the holding: it applies only to defendants who did not kill, did not attempt to kill, and did not intend to kill. The decision does not disturb life-without-parole sentences for second-degree murder defendants who were the actual killer or who intended that someone die.

Justice Brobson concurred in the majority’s Edmunds analysis and the holding that mandatory life without parole for all felony murder offenders is unconstitutional under Section 13. However, he dissented in part from the remedy, expressing reservations about the 120-day stay and arguing that the Court should provide more specific guidance to sentencing courts on remand.

The Takeaway

This decision has enormous practical implications for criminal defendants in Pennsylvania. For those currently serving mandatory life-without-parole sentences for second-degree murder, particularly those who were not the actual killer and did not intend to kill, this decision may open the door to resentencing proceedings. Certainly, defendants will most likely want to file PCRA petitions in 120 days when the decision takes effect. It is not yet clear exactly how many inmates will be affected, but it is likely in the thousands, as Pennsylvania has one of the largest populations of people serving life without parole in the country, and a significant number of those individuals were convicted under the felony murder rule. It is not yet clear, however, whether the decision is retroactive to those whose convictions are already final, and this may be the subject of litigation. The Governor, however, has already commented that he supports the decision.

Going forward, the General Assembly will need to establish a new sentencing framework for second-degree murder that allows for individualized consideration of a defendant’s culpability. If the legislature does not act within 120 days, the courts may begin resentencing felony murder defendants without a new statutory framework in place.

For defendants facing felony murder charges now, this decision is critical. Defense attorneys should be raising the issue of individualized sentencing at every stage and arguing that a mandatory life-without-parole sentence cannot be imposed without consideration of the defendant’s specific role in the offense, intent, and other mitigating factors.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Fraud, and Murder. We have also successfully challenged convictions for murder, firearms charges, rape, and other serious convictions on direct appeal in state and federal court as well as through post-conviction relief act litigation. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. We can also help you navigate your response to the Court’s decision if you have a loved one serving life without parole as a result of a second degree murder conviction. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 3/17/26 Zak Goldstein 3/17/26

PA Superior Court Vacates Life Sentence and Orders New Trial in Franklin County Murder Case After Attorney Goldstein Wins PCRA Appeal

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Attorney Goldstein recently won a major victory in the Pennsylvania Superior Court as the Court reversed the denial of his client’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, vacated the judgment of sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Attorney Goldstein’s client had been convicted following a ten-day jury trial in Franklin County of second-degree murder, burglary, robbery, and three counts of conspiracy. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and a consecutive aggregate sentence of 28 to 56 years’ imprisonment on the remaining charges. Attorney Goldstein entered his appearance as PCRA counsel, filed an amended PCRA petition, and represented the client through the PCRA evidentiary hearing and subsequent appeal to the Superior Court.

The central issue on appeal involved trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence obtained from a cell phone that police had searched without a warrant. After the client’s arrest, law enforcement directed Maryland State Police to power on the client’s iPhone and call a suspected phone number to confirm the phone’s connection to that number — all before obtaining a search warrant. The evidence obtained from the phone, including text messages, photographs, rap lyrics, and data linking the client to a co-defendant, formed the backbone of the Commonwealth’s case.

Attorney Goldstein argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the cell phone evidence under Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), which categorically requires police to obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone. The Superior Court agreed on all three prongs of the ineffectiveness test. First, the Court found the underlying suppression claim had arguable merit, holding that the police’s actions of powering on the iPhone and calling the suspected number constituted a warrantless search under the law as it existed at the time of trial without relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s later decision in Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2018). The Court further found that the warrant subsequently obtained for the phone was tainted because probable cause to search the phone depended entirely on the information unlawfully obtained through the initial warrantless search.

Second, the Court found trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to file the suppression motion. At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified he had no recollection of even considering the suppression issue and was unaware of Riley or any other relevant caselaw.

Third, the Court found prejudice, concluding the cell phone evidence was a critical factor in the Commonwealth’s case. The Court noted that of the six testifying eyewitnesses, only one cooperator unequivocally identified the client at trial, the lead investigator acknowledged that no forensic evidence linked the client to the crime scene, and the investigator described the iPhone as the only physical evidence connecting the client to the robbery and murder. Without the cell phone evidence, the Commonwealth’s case was, in the Court’s words, only weakly supported by the record.

This is an important decision addressing warrantless cell phone searches under Riley and the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in PCRA proceedings, and the Court issued a published opinion in this case.

Facing Criminal Charges or a Wrongful Conviction?

If you or a loved one has been wrongfully convicted or believes that the prosecution withheld evidence in your case, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our experienced criminal defense lawyers are typically available for same-day phone consultations and in-person meetings so that we can begin investigating your case, obtaining exculpatory evidence, and planning your defense. Call 267-225-2545 for a free criminal defense strategy session.

Zak Goldstein 2/28/26 Zak Goldstein 2/28/26

PA Supreme Court: Resentencing Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Object to Prejudicial “Serial Killer” Evidence in Death Penalty Case

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 815 CAP (Pa. Feb. 26, 2026), holding that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately object to the Commonwealth’s evidence and argument portraying the defendant as an aspiring serial killer during a capital resentencing hearing. The Court reversed the PCRA court’s order and remanded the matter for a new penalty-phase hearing. The unanimous decision was authored by Justice Brobson.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Smith

In November 1994, Eileen Jones and the appellant, Wayne Smith, left together in a car borrowed from Smith’s nephew. Smith returned the car later that evening, and the next day, he told his brother that he had murdered Jones by choking her in a nearby park. Jones’s body was discovered on November 22, 1994, and the county medical examiner concluded the cause of death was strangulation. Police also recovered newspaper articles about the recovery of Jones’s body from Smith’s home.

A jury found Smith guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Smith’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Smith, 694 A.2d 1086 (Pa. 1997). Smith then filed a PCRA petition, and the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing after finding that counsel had provided ineffective assistance. Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2010).

At the 2012 resentencing hearing, the jury again sentenced Smith to death after finding the aggravating circumstance of a prior voluntary manslaughter conviction outweighed the mitigating circumstances of emotional distress and an abusive childhood. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on direct appeal in Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467 (Pa. 2015), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.Smith v. Pennsylvania, 580 U.S. 830 (2016).

The “Serial Killer” Evidence at the Resentencing Hearing

At the center of this appeal was highly inflammatory evidence the Commonwealth introduced at the 2012 resentencing hearing. Prior to the original trial, Smith had actually filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to his alleged interest in being a serial killer, and the defense had successfully precluded the Commonwealth from pursuing that theory at the original trial and sentencing in 1995.

However, at the 2012 resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth sought to introduce testimony from Sonya Rollins, Smith’s ex-girlfriend, about Smith’s reading habits. The prosecution also asked the resentencing court to allow Rollins to testify that Smith read books about murder and crime, including titles such as “The Perfect Crime” and “How to Get Away with the Perfect Crime.” The Commonwealth argued this evidence was relevant to show intent and to rebut Smith’s anticipated mitigation evidence regarding mental illness and an abusive childhood.

Resentencing counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, arguing that evidence about reading habits was inadmissible character evidence that amounted to nothing more than smearing his client. However, the resentencing court permitted the testimony. Critically, resentencing counsel did not renew his objection when Rollins actually took the stand and testified, did not object to testimony from Smith’s brother Jeffrey about Smith’s alleged interest in serial killers, did not object to a police detective reading from Smith’s statement about fantasizing about being a serial killer, and did not object to the prosecutor’s repeated references to the serial-killer theme in both opening and closing arguments.

The prosecutor made this evidence the centerpiece of her case for death, arguing in her opening that Smith had been planning the murder for 14 years and comparing him to Ted Bundy. In closing, the prosecutor urged the jury to give Smith “his recognition” and “his attention” — referring to his alleged desire for the notoriety of a serial killer.

The PCRA Proceedings

Smith timely filed a PCRA petition in 2017 arguing that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the serial-killer evidence. The PCRA court ultimately dismissed the petition after a hearing, finding that counsel’s decision not to continue objecting after the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine was a reasonable tactical decision. The PCRA court also concluded that Smith had not established prejudice because the serial-killer evidence was only a small part of the Commonwealth’s overall case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, finding that Smith had satisfied all three prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard under Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2007).

Arguable Merit: The Court agreed with Smith that the reading-material and serial-killer evidence were irrelevant to the resentencing proceedings. The Court noted that the sole issue for the jury was whether to sentence Smith to death or life imprisonment, and that Smith’s intent to kill Jones, which the Commonwealth claimed the reading evidence proved, had already been established by his first-degree murder conviction. As to the Commonwealth’s second justification, that the evidence rebutted Smith’s mitigation evidence regarding mental illness and an abusive childhood, the Court found it unclear how reading books about murder would undermine evidence that Smith was abused as a child, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, or was substantially impaired. Whatever minimal probative value the evidence may have had was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Pa.R.E. 403.

Reasonable Basis: The Court rejected the argument that resentencing counsel acted reasonably by not continuing to object after the motion in limine was granted. The Court highlighted two important factors: first, the Supreme Court itself had previously determined in Smith III that resentencing counsel failed to properly object to the reading-material evidence and had therefore waived the issue on direct appeal. Second, the Commonwealth’s motion in limine did not address Smith’s alleged desire to be a serial killer. The resentencing court never actually ruled on that evidence, and yet counsel failed to object to any of the serial-killer testimony or the prosecutor’s inflammatory use of it in opening and closing arguments.

Prejudice: The Court found that the PCRA court had improperly applied a “harmless error” standard rather than the correct prejudice standard for ineffective assistance claims. Under the proper standard, Smith needed to show a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have concluded that the aggravating circumstance did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The Court concluded that this standard was met, noting that the Commonwealth had made the serial-killer evidence the central theme of its case for death, repeatedly referring to it throughout the proceedings. The Court also noted that the resentencing jury had initially reported that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict before ultimately sentencing Smith to death, which further bolstered the finding of prejudice. The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that because the original jury (which did not hear the serial-killer evidence) also sentenced Smith to death, the evidence could not have been prejudicial, explaining that the two sentencing hearings were not comparable; the first lasted one day with a 39-page transcript, while the resentencing hearing spanned four days with hundreds of pages of testimony.

The Takeaway

This decision is significant for several reasons. First, it reinforces the principle that evidence admitted at a penalty-phase hearing must actually be relevant to the issues the jury is deciding, namely, whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. Evidence that serves primarily to paint a defendant in a negative light without bearing on the actual sentencing determination is inadmissible, particularly where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs any probative value under Pa.R.E. 403.

Second, the decision clarifies the obligations of counsel at a resentencing hearing. The Court made clear that an attorney cannot simply stop objecting to inadmissible evidence after an initial objection is overruled. Counsel must preserve objections when evidence is actually introduced and must object to improper arguments by the prosecution.

Third, the Court’s analysis of the prejudice prong is noteworthy. The Court distinguished between the “harmless error” standard applicable on direct appeal and the “prejudice” standard applicable to ineffective assistance claims under the PCRA, noting that the PCRA court had improperly conflated the two. In a capital case, the proper question is whether there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have reached a different conclusion on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Conviction? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein 2/19/26 Zak Goldstein 2/19/26

PA Supreme Court: Majority of Justices Agree Police Opinions on Guilt and Accusations of Lying Must Be Excluded from Interrogation Videos Played at Trial

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Malcolm, No. 46 EAP 2024 (Pa. 2026), addressing whether accusatory statements and opinions of guilt made by police detectives during a videotaped interrogation must be excluded when the video is played for the jury at trial. Although the Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, the decision actually reinforces the principle that these types of statements should not come in. The case resulted in a split decision and no opinion commanded a majority, but five of the seven justices agreed that the trial court erred in admitting the detectives’ statements. The two concurring justices found the error to be harmless, resulting in a 4-3 vote to affirm the conviction, but the key takeaway is that a strong majority of the Court has concluded that police opinions about a defendant’s guilt and accusations of lying should be redacted from interrogation videos before they are played for a jury. Defense attorneys should continue to file motions in limine to exclude such statements, and this case shows why doing so is critical.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Malcolm

On December 22, 2018, the victim was fatally shot outside of Kif's Bar on Market Street in Philadelphia after a birthday party. He was shot once in the head and once in the chest. Another individual was also shot but survived. Police recovered eleven fired cartridge casings from two different firearms and obtained surveillance footage from nearby cameras. The footage depicted an individual in a gray zipper hoodie, black boots, black pants, and white earbuds circling the block before approaching the victim from behind and shooting him twice at close range.

Detective James Burns of the Philadelphia Police Homicide Unit was assigned to the case. Unable to identify the shooter, he sent out a patrol alert with a screenshot from the surveillance footage. The defendant was brought in for questioning. During the interrogation, the defendant consented to a search of his bedroom, where officers recovered a gray hoodie, black boots, and white corded headphones consistent with what the shooter was wearing in the surveillance video. The gray hoodie tested positive for gunshot residue on the right sleeve. DNA testing on the hoodie and other items was inconclusive.

About a month after the defendant’s interview, Officer Robert Lamanna identified the defendant as the suspect in the patrol alert. Officer Lamanna was familiar with the defendant because the defendant frequented his assigned police district and the officer had also viewed the defendant on social media. Officer Lamanna was the only witness who would identify the defendant from the surveillance footage at trial.

The Interrogation Video

At trial, the Commonwealth played portions of the defendant’s videotaped police interrogation for the jury. Throughout the interrogation, Detectives Burns and Harkins made numerous accusatory statements, including telling the defendant “I don't believe that we have the wrong guy,” “I'm telling you that I know that this is you,” “We're quite confident we have the right person here,” and “Do you know how absurd that sounds.” The defendant challenged thirteen specific statements on appeal. Throughout the interrogation, the defendant repeatedly and steadfastly maintained his innocence.

Defense counsel made only two to three broad objections during the video. The trial court paused the video at one point to instruct the jury that only one witness, Officer Lamanna, had identified the defendant, and that the jury should disregard the detective’s references to multiple people having identified him. The trial court also reminded the jury that it was the ultimate finder of fact.

The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and possessing an instrument of crime. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Superior Court affirmed, concluding that the statements were distinguishable from those in Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 730 A.2d 513 (Pa. Super. 1999), because none of them “directly” accused the defendant of lying.

The Supreme Court's Decision

The Supreme Court granted review and issued a fractured decision. The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, authored by Justice Mundy and joined only by Justice Brobson, declined to adopt Kitchen’s categorical rule treating these types of police statements as inadmissible. Instead, the OAJC held that the admissibility of accusatory police statements in interrogation videos should be assessed on a case-by-case basis under Rules 401 and 403. The OAJC found no abuse of discretion in this case, emphasizing that the jury heard the defendant’s repeated denials, the trial court gave curative instructions, and defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the detectives. Only two justices joined this analysis, meaning that is not presidential.

Justice McCaffery, joined by Justice Dougherty, concurred in the result only. This means they agreed to affirm the conviction, but for completely different reasons. The concurrence concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the detectives’ statements. Justice McCaffery found that the statements had at best de minimis relevance, explaining that there is no legal basis under Pennsylvania precedent for the relevance of one witness’s opinion about the credibility of another. He cited the longstanding rule from Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753 (Pa. 2014), that credibility determinations are exclusively for the jury, and noted that Pennsylvania courts have consistently prohibited such opinion testimony even from qualified experts. The concurrence stated that he could see “no circumstances under which such testimony should be considered” and that the statements “should have been excluded.” However, Justice McCaffery found the error to be harmless because the crux of the case was the surveillance video and Officer Lamanna's identification, and the verdict would not have been different without the detectives’ opinions.

Justice Wecht, joined by Chief Justice Todd and Justice Donohue, dissented. The dissent agreed with the concurrence that the statements were erroneously admitted but went further, arguing the error was not harmless. Justice Wecht emphasized that the detectives’ repeated assertions of Malcolm's guilt carried a significant danger of unfair prejudice because of their appearance of authority and their suggestion to the jury that additional inculpatory evidence existed beyond what was presented at trial. The dissent described the detectives’ opinions as coming in through the “Trojan Horse” of the interrogation video, meaning the same opinions that would clearly be inadmissible if offered from the witness stand were allowed in simply because they were on a video. The dissent also found the trial court’s curative instructions insufficient, noting they were directed only at Detective Burns’s false claim that multiple “people” had identified the defendant and did not address the broader pattern of accusatory statements. Where identification was the central issue and the surveillance footage was unclear, the dissent concluded the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Takeaway

Despite the affirmance of the conviction, this is actually a favorable development for defendants even though it does not help the defendant in this case. Five of seven justices agreed that the detectives’ accusatory statements and opinions of guilt were improperly admitted. The existing law has not changed. Trial courts should continue to exclude police opinions about a defendant’s guilt or credibility from interrogation videos played for a jury, and defense attorneys must continue to file motions in limine to make sure that happens. The Kitchen opinion, while not formally adopted by a majority, reflects what five justices on the current Court believe the Rules of Evidence already require.

The practical lesson from this case is the critical importance of filing a detailed pretrial motion challenging specific portions of an interrogation video. In Malcolm, defense counsel did not file a motion in limine directed at the accusatory statements and made only broad, nonspecific objections at trial. That clearly influenced the outcome. Had counsel preserved the issue more carefully, the result may well have been different given that five justices found error. For defendants facing serious charges where the Commonwealth intends to play an interrogation video at trial, this case shows why it is essential to have an experienced defense attorney who will review the video in advance, file the appropriate motions, and make specific objections on the record.

Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Criminal Case? We Can Help.

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Fraud, and Murder. We have also successfully challenged convictions for murder, firearms charges, rape, and other serious convictions on direct appeal in state and federal court as well as through post-conviction relief act litigation. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.