PA Supreme Court: Resentencing Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Object to Prejudicial “Serial Killer” Evidence in Death Penalty Case
Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 815 CAP (Pa. Feb. 26, 2026), holding that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately object to the Commonwealth’s evidence and argument portraying the defendant as an aspiring serial killer during a capital resentencing hearing. The Court reversed the PCRA court’s order and remanded the matter for a new penalty-phase hearing. The unanimous decision was authored by Justice Brobson.
The Facts of Commonwealth v. Smith
In November 1994, Eileen Jones and the appellant, Wayne Smith, left together in a car borrowed from Smith’s nephew. Smith returned the car later that evening, and the next day, he told his brother that he had murdered Jones by choking her in a nearby park. Jones’s body was discovered on November 22, 1994, and the county medical examiner concluded the cause of death was strangulation. Police also recovered newspaper articles about the recovery of Jones’s body from Smith’s home.
A jury found Smith guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Smith’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Smith, 694 A.2d 1086 (Pa. 1997). Smith then filed a PCRA petition, and the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing after finding that counsel had provided ineffective assistance. Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2010).
At the 2012 resentencing hearing, the jury again sentenced Smith to death after finding the aggravating circumstance of a prior voluntary manslaughter conviction outweighed the mitigating circumstances of emotional distress and an abusive childhood. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on direct appeal in Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467 (Pa. 2015), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.Smith v. Pennsylvania, 580 U.S. 830 (2016).
The “Serial Killer” Evidence at the Resentencing Hearing
At the center of this appeal was highly inflammatory evidence the Commonwealth introduced at the 2012 resentencing hearing. Prior to the original trial, Smith had actually filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to his alleged interest in being a serial killer, and the defense had successfully precluded the Commonwealth from pursuing that theory at the original trial and sentencing in 1995.
However, at the 2012 resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth sought to introduce testimony from Sonya Rollins, Smith’s ex-girlfriend, about Smith’s reading habits. The prosecution also asked the resentencing court to allow Rollins to testify that Smith read books about murder and crime, including titles such as “The Perfect Crime” and “How to Get Away with the Perfect Crime.” The Commonwealth argued this evidence was relevant to show intent and to rebut Smith’s anticipated mitigation evidence regarding mental illness and an abusive childhood.
Resentencing counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, arguing that evidence about reading habits was inadmissible character evidence that amounted to nothing more than smearing his client. However, the resentencing court permitted the testimony. Critically, resentencing counsel did not renew his objection when Rollins actually took the stand and testified, did not object to testimony from Smith’s brother Jeffrey about Smith’s alleged interest in serial killers, did not object to a police detective reading from Smith’s statement about fantasizing about being a serial killer, and did not object to the prosecutor’s repeated references to the serial-killer theme in both opening and closing arguments.
The prosecutor made this evidence the centerpiece of her case for death, arguing in her opening that Smith had been planning the murder for 14 years and comparing him to Ted Bundy. In closing, the prosecutor urged the jury to give Smith “his recognition” and “his attention” — referring to his alleged desire for the notoriety of a serial killer.
The PCRA Proceedings
Smith timely filed a PCRA petition in 2017 arguing that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the serial-killer evidence. The PCRA court ultimately dismissed the petition after a hearing, finding that counsel’s decision not to continue objecting after the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine was a reasonable tactical decision. The PCRA court also concluded that Smith had not established prejudice because the serial-killer evidence was only a small part of the Commonwealth’s overall case.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, finding that Smith had satisfied all three prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard under Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2007).
Arguable Merit: The Court agreed with Smith that the reading-material and serial-killer evidence were irrelevant to the resentencing proceedings. The Court noted that the sole issue for the jury was whether to sentence Smith to death or life imprisonment, and that Smith’s intent to kill Jones, which the Commonwealth claimed the reading evidence proved, had already been established by his first-degree murder conviction. As to the Commonwealth’s second justification, that the evidence rebutted Smith’s mitigation evidence regarding mental illness and an abusive childhood, the Court found it unclear how reading books about murder would undermine evidence that Smith was abused as a child, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, or was substantially impaired. Whatever minimal probative value the evidence may have had was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Pa.R.E. 403.
Reasonable Basis: The Court rejected the argument that resentencing counsel acted reasonably by not continuing to object after the motion in limine was granted. The Court highlighted two important factors: first, the Supreme Court itself had previously determined in Smith III that resentencing counsel failed to properly object to the reading-material evidence and had therefore waived the issue on direct appeal. Second, the Commonwealth’s motion in limine did not address Smith’s alleged desire to be a serial killer. The resentencing court never actually ruled on that evidence, and yet counsel failed to object to any of the serial-killer testimony or the prosecutor’s inflammatory use of it in opening and closing arguments.
Prejudice: The Court found that the PCRA court had improperly applied a “harmless error” standard rather than the correct prejudice standard for ineffective assistance claims. Under the proper standard, Smith needed to show a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have concluded that the aggravating circumstance did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The Court concluded that this standard was met, noting that the Commonwealth had made the serial-killer evidence the central theme of its case for death, repeatedly referring to it throughout the proceedings. The Court also noted that the resentencing jury had initially reported that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict before ultimately sentencing Smith to death, which further bolstered the finding of prejudice. The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that because the original jury (which did not hear the serial-killer evidence) also sentenced Smith to death, the evidence could not have been prejudicial, explaining that the two sentencing hearings were not comparable; the first lasted one day with a 39-page transcript, while the resentencing hearing spanned four days with hundreds of pages of testimony.
The Takeaway
This decision is significant for several reasons. First, it reinforces the principle that evidence admitted at a penalty-phase hearing must actually be relevant to the issues the jury is deciding, namely, whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. Evidence that serves primarily to paint a defendant in a negative light without bearing on the actual sentencing determination is inadmissible, particularly where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs any probative value under Pa.R.E. 403.
Second, the decision clarifies the obligations of counsel at a resentencing hearing. The Court made clear that an attorney cannot simply stop objecting to inadmissible evidence after an initial objection is overruled. Counsel must preserve objections when evidence is actually introduced and must object to improper arguments by the prosecution.
Third, the Court’s analysis of the prejudice prong is noteworthy. The Court distinguished between the “harmless error” standard applicable on direct appeal and the “prejudice” standard applicable to ineffective assistance claims under the PCRA, noting that the PCRA court had improperly conflated the two. In a capital case, the proper question is whether there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have reached a different conclusion on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Facing Criminal Charges or Appealing a Conviction? We Can Help.
Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense
If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won on appeal. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.