Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 11/10/18 Zak Goldstein 11/10/18

PA Supreme Court: "I'm done talking" invokes right to remain silent

The Right to Remain Silent

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lukach, holding that the defendant unambiguously asserted his right to remain silent by telling police that he was done talking and had nothing else to talk about. This decision is significant because it makes it easier for a defendant to invoke the right to remain silent during a police interrogation. Specifically, prosecutors will be less successful when they argue that the defendant was “ambiguous” when asserting their right to remain silent.

Commonwealth v. Lukach

On August 6, 2015 at approximately 5:00 AM, a Pottsville Police Officer received a call from another officer requesting his presence at the scene of a homicide. Upon arrival, the officer observed blood on the roadway and was informed by other officers that they found the body of the victim lying in the street. During their preliminary investigation, officers became aware that the defendant and a Mr. Thomas had been involved in a prior crime at the victim’s house. They quickly became persons of interest in the homicide investigation. Other Pottsville Officers reported seeing the defendant and Mr. Thomas walking together on the day on which the victim’s body was found, and police later encountered both individuals at 12th Street and Market Street, which is in close proximity to where they found the decedent’s body.

During a discussion with an officer, the defendant stated he was in the area to see what was happening. He further stated that he had been with Mr. Thomas for the entire previous evening and had previously visited an A-Plus store at approximately 5:00 AM. The officers then went to the A-Plus store and determined that the defendant had not been at the A-Plus store at that time. Later that day, an officer went to his house, advised his mother of the homicide, and stated that he wished to speak to the defendant. The defendant was not home, but his mother consented to a search of the property. During the search of the property, officers recovered box cutters and work gloves, both of which were similar to items found at the crime scene.

The next day, police detained the defendant based on two non-related warrants. After arresting him, they put him in an interrogation room. A detective officer turned on an audio and visual recorder, read the defendant his Miranda rights, and began to interview the defendant regarding the homicide of the victim. Prior to incriminating himself, the defendant told the officer: “Yeah. I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” The police officer then immediately replied, “You don’t have to say anything, I told you that you could stop.” The officer, however, continued to ask the defendant questions and talk to him. At some point, the officer left the room for approximately eight minutes. Another officer then entered the room, asked for the defendant’s shoes, and the defendant turned them over. The original officer then re-entered the room and discussed with the defendant the types of evidence that could be found on shoes. The defendant continued to deny involvement in the homicide.

Later, the defendant foolishly asked the officer if he could ask him a quick question off camera. After their off-the-record conversation, the officer turned the camera back on, re-advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, and the defendant asked to speak with someone from the Schuylkill County District Attorney’s Office in regards to whether he could receive a deal in exchange for his cooperation. An Assistant District Attorney arrived shortly thereafter. The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and he subsequently confessed to participating in the victim’s murder.

As part of his confession, the defendant told the police that he used one of the victim’s credit cards to access an ATM and then placed it in a storm drain. Officers subsequently recovered the credit card, a pair of sunglasses, a t-shirt and a hat in a storm drain. Based on the confession and the recovery of the credit card, officers were able to retrieve video which showed the defendant accessing an ATM around the time of the homicide. They arrested him and charged him with murder and related criminal charges.

The Motion to Suppress the Statement for a Miranda Violation

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress any statements made to the police after he stated “yeah. I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” The motion further requested that the defendant’s shoes and any other evidence recovered as a result of those statements, including the items found in the storm drain and the ATM video, also be suppressed because they were all recovered in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial court agreed with the defense. It found that the confession was coerced because the continuing interrogation was “meant to pressure the defendant into relinquishing his right and the statements he thereafter made were the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.”

The Superior Court Appeal

The Commonwealth then filed an interlocutory appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the suppression order. The Superior Court found that the officer violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights as he failed to scrupulously honor the defendant’s request to remain silent, and the defendant’s subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights before speaking to the Assistant District Attorney did not cure that violation or render his confession voluntary. The Superior Court also agreed that the physical evidence that was obtained as a result of Appellee’s confession was illegally obtained and affirmed the suppression’s court order. The Commonwealth then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Court granted allocatur.

When do the Police Have to Give You Your Miranda Warnings?

The police do not always have to provide a suspect or arrestee with Miranda warnings. Instead, police are required to provide Miranda warnings only if they want to use the results of a custodial interrogation in court. Thus, whether Miranda warnings are required depends on two factors – 1) you must be in custody, typically meaning under arrest, and 2) the police must ask questions which are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating statements. If police fail to provide Miranda warnings prior to conducting a custodial interrogation, they usually may not use the statements made during the interrogation in court. Police do not, however, have to provide Miranda warnings if they are not going to question you. Generally, a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes when the defendant is deprived of his physical freedom in a significant way, or when the defendant reasonably believes that his or her freedom of action is restricted by the interrogation. In addition to providing Miranda warnings, police must also honor a defendant’s invocation of his or her rights. This means that if you ask to speak with a lawyer or tell the police that you wish to remain silent, then they cannot continue to question you without first taking a substantial break. Instead, the interrogation must cease immediately. If the police continue questioning after an invocation of the right to remain silent or consult with an attorney and obtain statements because of this questioning, the trial court should bar the Commonwealth from using the statements at trial because this evidence was illegally obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

This rule seems simple, but it can become complicated when it is not totally clear whether a defendant actually seek to exercise his or her rights. Various appellate courts have held that the invocation of the right to remain silent or speak with a lawyer must be unambiguous. Obviously, most suspects, when questioned by the police, do not say “I am invoking my Fifth Amendment Rights against self-incrimination.” Rather, they say something that is similar to what the defendant said in his case. As such, suppression courts must then decide whether this was an unambiguous invocation of one’s right to remain silent. If the invocation of the right to remain silent was ambiguous, then the police may continue to question the suspect.

What is an Unambiguous Invocation of Your Right to Remain Silent?

Appellate courts have held that when an individual is given his Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease. The problem, as mentioned above, is that a defendant typically does not speak in legalese and will attempt to invoke their right to remain silent in ways that are not always the most articulate. Over the years, most appellate have acknowledged this problem, so courts do not always require a suspect to explicitly reference the Fifth Amendment or the right to remain silent. However, the courts do require that a defendant’s request be “unambiguous.” Ironically, the decisions on this issue are quite ambiguous. Nonetheless, the courts will employ an objective inquiry into determining whether the defendant’s request to remain silent was “unambiguous.”

One issue that frequently arises, as in the case here, is whether the invocation was prefaced by some qualifying phrase. In Lukach, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions that addressed this issue. In these jurisdictions, the courts found that when a defendant prefaced his “invocation” by a phrase such as “I don’t know” or “I don’t know [about x crime],” then the defendant was not invoking his right to remain silent. As such, if you are being interrogated for a crime, you should try to be as clear as possible when you invoke your right to remain silent.

The Defendant’s Invocation Was Unambiguous

Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts and affirmed the order granting the suppression of the defendant’s statement. The Court found that the defendant unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights when he stated “I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” Therefore, the Court held that the defendant’s statements were properly suppressed. The Court also affirmed the suppression of the physical evidence, finding that police had coerced the statement. This part of the Court’s decision is a little bit unusual because the law typically does not require suppression of the derivative evidence of a Miranda violation, meaning that if you confess and tell the police where to find other evidence, the confession may be suppressed, but the other evidence usually will not. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted an appeal in a different case to evaluate whether the derivative evidence should also be suppressed. It is possible the justices are leaning in favor of changing that rule to require the suppression of the derivative evidence given the decision to suppress the physical evidence in this case

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/16/18 Zak Goldstein 10/16/18

PA Superior Court: Defendant’s Involuntary Absence During Taking of Verdict Requires New Trial

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. DeCosta, holding that the trial court erred in continuing jury deliberations and taking the jury’s verdict in the defendant’s absence because the absence was not the defendant’s fault. DeCosta re-affirms the fact that criminal defendants in Pennsylvania have a fundamental right to be present for their trials. Although that right may be waived by a defendant, a court obviously may not continue proceedings where the defendant is absent involuntarily.

The Facts of DeCosta

In DeCosta, the defendant was arrested for threatening two strangers with a knife in front of a Pathmark store. One of the strangers drew a gun and warned the defendant to stop, but the defendant ignored the warning. The stranger shot the defendant in the groin as the defendant charged him with the knife, causing serious injury. Despite the significant injuries to the defendant, prosecutors charged the defendant with two counts each of Aggravated Assault, Terroristic Threats, Simple Assault, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person. They also charged him with one count of possessing an instrument of crime for the knife.

The defendant proceeded to trial by way of jury trial. The jury began its deliberations on a Friday. The jury did not reach a verdict that Friday and was scheduled to reconvene on the following Monday. As deliberations were set to resume, the defendant’s attorney informed the judge that the defendant had been hospitalized over the weekend with sepsis. The defense attorney informed the court that the defendant was sedated and on a ventilator and therefore could not attend the trial. The defense attorney provided documentation confirming the defendant’s medical problems and refused the court’s request that he waive his client’s presence for any questions from the jury.

Despite the defense attorney’s refusal to waive his client’s presence, the court decided to proceed in absentia. The court found that no prejudice would result from the defendant’s absence and that defense counsel could address any questions from the jury without his client there. Defense counsel objected and asked either that the judge stay the proceedings or declare a mistrial. The judge refused, and the jury subsequently requested instructions on the definitions of certain criminal charges. The defense attorney again objected to proceeding in absentia, but the court overruled the objection and re-instructed the jury on the definition of the charges. Shortly thereafter, the jury found the defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault but guilty of possessing an instrument of crime and one count of terroristic threats. Once the defendant recovered from sepsis, the trial judge sentenced him to 4-10 years’ incarceration for these misdemeanor convictions.

The Appeal of the Criminal Case

The defendant appealed his conviction to the Superior Court, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial judge improperly continued the proceedings without him. He argued that he had both a statutory and constitutional right to be present in court for the jury’s questions and the taking of the verdict. Ultimately, the Superior Court found that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because he did have a statutory right to be present. It noted that Rule 602(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the defendant with the right to be present at every stage of a trial. Specifically, the rule provides:

The defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. The defendant’s absence without cause at the time scheduled for the start of trial or during trial shall not preclude proceeding with the trial, including the return of the verdict and the imposition of sentence.

Given the clear language of the rule, the court concluded that the defendant had the right to be there for the return of the verdict by the jury unless the defendant had waived that right through his own actions. In the trial court’s opinion, the judge had tried to argue that the defendant waived that right because the defendant had pretended to be in more pain from his shooting injury than he really was, had faked the need for a wheelchair in front of the jury, and had possibly tried to commit suicide because he was found to have pain medication and anxiety medication in his blood when he went to the hospital for the sepsis.

The Superior Court, however, rejected the trial court’s opinion. It found that the trial court overstepped its role and became an advocate for the prosecution instead of a neutral fact finder. The burden of showing that a defendant has voluntarily chosen not to appear for court rests with the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth introduced no concrete evidence that the defendant had either tried to commit suicide or that he did not really need to go to the hospital. Instead, the trial judge had improperly assumed the role of prosecutor and relied on speculation in finding that the defendant chose not to be present for trial. Therefore, the Superior Court awarded the defendant a new trial.

Notably, the Superior Court found that the defendant was only entitled to the new trial due to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Constitution did not require that he receive a new trial. Although the Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires the defendant’s presence for a trial to proceed, there are exceptions for minor parts of the proceedings where the defendant would not suffer prejudice from not being present. The defendant may not have suffered prejudice from his failure to be there, so the Superior Court relied entirely on the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure in reaching its decision. Nonetheless, this is a good decision from the Superior Court which confirms what should be obvious – that a trial court cannot proceed with a trial where the defendant has fallen ill with a life-threatening condition through no fault of his or her own.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 9/29/18 Zak Goldstein 9/29/18

Indicting Grand Juries in Philadelphia State Court

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esq.

If you get arrested for a felony charge in Philadelphia, you will usually go through preliminary arraignment within 12-24 hours and then receive a court date for a preliminary hearing. A preliminary hearing is a short hearing at which some of the Commonwealth’s main witnesses in the case will testify subject to cross-examination, and a Philadelphia Municipal Court Judge will then rule whether the Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence to show that a crime occurred and that the defendant probably committed it. Recently, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure to give prosecutors the ability to dispense with the requirement of presenting live testimony at a preliminary hearing. Instead, prosecutors in cases in which there is a risk of witness intimidation may try to proceed by indicting grand jury. Indicting grand juries are usually used in cases involving violent crimes such as Attempted Murder, Aggravated Assault, and Witness Intimidation. In Philadelphia, they are often used to prosecute non-fatal shootings.

What is an Indicting Grand Jury?

The indicting grand jury process is a secretive process which allows the prosecution to avoid presenting its witnesses in open court at a preliminary hearing where they would be subject to cross-examination. Instead, Rule 556 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a Court of Common Pleas may proceed by using an indicting grand jury in cases in which witness intimidation has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur.

Instead of presenting its case at a preliminary hearing following the defendant’s arrest, the prosecution may file a motion to move forward by way of indicting grand jury. The motion must allege facts asserting that witness intimidation has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur. The defense does not get an opportunity to contest the allegations in the motion. Instead the president judge or a designee of the president judge for the judicial district reviews the motion ex parte (meaning without the defense present) and decides whether or not the Commonwealth has met its burden of alleging some risk of witness intimidation.

If the judge rules that the Commonwealth has met that low burden, then the court will cancel the preliminary hearing and schedule the case for a hearing in the Court of Common Pleas. The Commonwealth will then have 21 days to present its case to the grand jury for indictment unless the defendant waives his or her right to an indictment by grand jury or the Commonwealth chooses not to proceed. If the Commonwealth chooses not to proceed, then the defendant should receive a preliminary hearing in front of a Court of Common Pleas Judge.

In Pennsylvania, an indicting grand jury is made up of 23 legally qualified jurors and between 7 and 15 alternates. The supervising judge examines the grand jurors to determine whether or not they can be fair when hearing cases, but the defense has no ability to challenge grand jurors for cause as the defense would in a criminal trial prior to an indictment. Fifteen members of the grand jury constitute a quorum, and an affirmative vote of twelve members of the grand jury will be enough to indict a defendant on felony charges.

Once the grand jury has been selected, the Commonwealth may present its case to the grand jury. This means that the Commonwealth may call some of the witnesses or victims in the case and often the assigned police detective to testify. The grand jurors hear that testimony and then decide whether or not they should indict the defendant. This testimony is recorded and eventually turned over to the defense, but there is no defense attorney in the room to make evidentiary objections, cross-examine witnesses, or make argument to a judge or the grand jurors that the evidence does not support the charges.

What happens if I get indicted?

If the grand jury votes to indict the defendant, then the Commonwealth notifies the defense and the supervising judge at a status hearing in the Court of Common Pleas. The judge will then schedule the case for a scheduling conference before the judge who will hear the trial. That judge will then set two court dates – a first date on which the Commonwealth must turn over discovery, and a second date for trial which will be sixty days after the discovery date. In many cases, the trial date may not be for eight months or more, so a defendant could be incarcerated due to a high bail or a probation detainer for up to six months or more without any access to the discovery or without even knowing the specific allegations against him or her. A defendant who has a preliminary hearing has the opportunity to move for dismissal of the charges just a few weeks after arrest, but a defendant who is indicted may not be able to challenge the charges for months or even years. Grand jury cases, however, are supposed to receive priority on the trial date, meaning that they should go forward even if other cases on the judge’s docket are older or more serious.

Will I still get a preliminary hearing?

No, if the Commonwealth chooses to proceed by way of indicting grand jury, then you will not receive a preliminary hearing even if you are facing felony charges. Instead, the Commonwealth will conduct the secret grand jury hearing. If the grand jury chooses to indict, then you will be indicted without ever having had an opportunity to challenge the evidence against you in open court. You do, however, retain the right to file pre-trial motions to dismiss/quash the charges just as you would if a preliminary hearing occurred.

In a limited number of cases, the Commonwealth may file the motion to proceed by way of indicting grand jury and later change its mind and schedule the case for a preliminary hearing. In that situation, you would have a preliminary hearing before a Court of Common Pleas judge instead of with a Municipal Court judge. This is a significant disadvantage for the defense because this procedure prevents the defendant from litigating a Motion to Quash. When the defendant is erroneously held for court at a preliminary hearing by a Municipal Court judge, the defendant may file a Motion to Quash (also called a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the suburban counties) and ask a higher-ranking Common Pleas Judge to review the charges. A defendant who has been held for court by a Common Pleas judge, however, cannot really litigate a Motion to Quash because a Common Pleas judge has already ruled on whether the Commonwealth presented a prima facie case. A Common Pleas judge cannot overrule the first judge’s decision because they have the same level of authority.

What is the difference between an Indicting Grand Jury and a Preliminary Hearing?

A Philadelphia preliminary hearing takes place in open court and proceeds in a similar manner to a criminal trial. The prosecution calls a number of witnesses to testify as to what happened in order to try to establish a prima facie case of each criminal charge, and the defendant’s lawyer then has the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. The defense may also present evidence after the Commonwealth has rested. Once both sides have rested, the lawyers may make argument to the Municipal Court judge on why certain charges should be dismissed or the gradation of charges should be reduced. The judge will then decide whether to hold the defendant for court on the felony charges, remand the case to Municipal Court for trial on misdemeanor charges, or dismiss the case altogether. The defense may also make a bail motion or a motion for a lineup at a preliminary hearing.

The indicting grand jury process, however, is secretive and provides the defendant with few rights. The defendant is typically arrested, held on a high bail due to the allegations of witness intimidation, and not provided with any opportunity to challenge the case until shortly before trial or at trial. The witnesses may testify to the grand jury, but they are not subject to cross-examination, and the defense may not present evidence to the grand jury. The rules of evidence are often enforced to some extent at a preliminary hearing, meaning that a hearing cannot proceed entirely on hearsay, but the defense is not present to make evidentiary objections at a grand jury hearing. The defense lawyer also may not argue to the grand jury that the Commonwealth has failed to prove a prima facie case of the charges. Therefore, the Commonwealth can usually get the grand jury to indict on whatever charges it wants.

Can I still file a Motion to Quash the charges?

Yes, despite the significant disadvantages to a defendant who has been charged by way of indicting grand jury, there are still opportunities to challenge the charges prior to trial. For example, a defendant may still file a motion to quash the charges and argue to the Common Pleas judge that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of establishing that a crime occurred and that the defendant probably committed it. The defense may also file motions challenging the jurisdiction of the grand jury, asserting an expiration of the statute of limitations, or an objection to a grand juror’s qualifications. The defense may also file any other pre-trial motions such as a motion to suppress evidence which was illegally seized or motions in limine.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Although a defendant who has been charged by way of grand jury in Philadelphia is at a disadvantage due to the lack of a preliminary hearing, there are still often ways to challenge the case through pre-trial motions. Additionally, the defendant is still entitled to a trial before a judge or jury at which the Commonwealth must prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation, we can help. Our experienced and understanding Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an award-winning defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 9/27/18 Zak Goldstein 9/27/18

PA Supreme Court Permits Filing of Second PCRA Where Attorney Filed First Petition Too Late

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Peterson. In Peterson, the Court held that where a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) Petitioner’s lawyer files the petition late, thereby resulting in the dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with the Act’s procedural requirements, the Petitioner may file a second PCRA Petition even outside of the one-year deadline for filing a PCRA. This is a great decision by the Court. It recognizes that a criminal defendant should not lose the ability to file a PCRA solely because a defense attorney, without telling the defendant, provided the ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a PCRA Petition on time.

The Facts of Peterson

In Peterson, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder in 1993 and received two consecutive life sentences. In 1995, the General Assembly enacted major amendments to Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, including an amendment which required that all petitions be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. The amendments included three exceptions to the one-year deadline. The relevant exception in this case provides: “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”

These amendments gave Peterson the right to file a PCRA by January 16, 1997. Peterson’s family retained a private attorney to file a PCRA. The attorney drafted the PCRA but filed it one day late on January 17, 1997. The petition alleged that Peterson was not competent to plead guilty and therefore his plea was not a knowing, intentional, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights because Peterson had suffered a gunshot wound to his head that damaged the frontal lobes of his brain.

The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing and gave defense counsel time to obtain an expert to provide an opinion on Peterson’s mental competency at the time of the guilty plea. The court scheduled a hearing on November 5, 1997. The hearing apparently never took place on that date, and the docket does not indicate the reason why did it did not take place. Nothing happened for nearly fifteen years.

In September 2012, Peterson wrote a letter to the clerk of courts asking about the status of his case. The PCRA court then rescheduled the evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, a doctor testified that Peterson suffered brain damage prior to his plea and that he would not have had the ability to comprehend his position as one accused of murder. The doctor further opined that Peterson would not have been able to cooperate with his criminal defense lawyer and participate in his own defense.

Although not relevant to the disposition of the appeal, It is important to note that PCRA litigation often requires the defense to present actual evidence or expert testimony. It is not enough merely to allege in a Petition that a defense attorney should have retained the services of an expert witness. Instead, the defense attorney generally must retain, identify, and usually provide a report for the expert witness prior to filing the PCRA Petition or the defendant will not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

The Commonwealth did not hire its own expert. Instead, it called Peterson’s trial attorney and probation officer to testify. They both testified that they interviewed Peterson prior to the plea and he understood what was going on. The PCRA Court found the trial attorney and probation officer more credible and denied the Petition.

The Superior Court Appeal

Peterson appealed the denial of the PCRA Petition to the Superior Court. The Superior Court, acting sua sponte (meaning on its own), recognized that the first PCRA Petition had been filed one day beyond the relevant deadline. Therefore, the Superior Court quashed the appeal without reaching the merits of whether the PCRA Court properly denied the petition.

Peterson then filed a second PCRA Petition, asking the trial court to reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc due to the ineffective assistance of counsel provided by the attorney who filed the first petition late. The trial court granted that second petition. It ruled that Peterson did not know of the deadline, did not know that his attorney had missed the deadline, and that Peterson could not have known these facts until he received the Superior Court’s opinion dismissing the direct appeal. Therefore, the trial court reinstated his appellate rights under the previously-mentioned exception to the one-year deadline.

With his appellate rights reinstated, Peterson again appealed the denial of the petition to the Superior Court. The Commonwealth also appealed, arguing that the trial court should not have reinstated Peterson’s right to appeal. The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth and again dismissed the appeal. The Court found that Peterson’s lawyer had not abandoned him but had simply filed a petition late. The Court held that while the PCRA timeliness requirements sometimes require harsh outcomes, the PCRA confers no authority to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.

The Petition for Allowance of Appeal

Peterson filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal and ultimately reversed the decision of the Superior Court.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the complete abandonment of a petitioner by counsel has previously qualified petitioners for the after-discovered evidence time bar. At the same time, the failure of a PCRA lawyer to raise the best possible claims has traditionally not provided petitioners with a basis for filling subsequent petitions beyond the one-year deadline. Thus, the Court recognized that there is a difference between a complete deprivation of a petitioner’s rights, in which the petitioner cannot have any issues addressed at all, and an allegation that a PCRA lawyer should have raised certain claims instead of others.

The Court found that this case resulted in a complete deprivation of rights due to the obvious ineffective assistance of counsel in filing the petition late. Therefore, the Court found that Peterson qualified for the after-discovered evidence exception. Peterson was completely deprived of any consideration of his PCRA Petition. His lawyer’s ineffectiveness was a newly discovered fact, and Peterson did not know of this fact and could not have known of this fact through the exercise of due diligence. He filed his second PCRA Petition within sixty days after he learned that the petition had been filed late. Therefore, the Superior Court erred in dismissing the appeal, and Peterson will be entitled to have the appeal heard on the merits.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges, have been arrested, or are considering an appeal, we can help. Our experienced and understanding criminal defense attorneys have successfully defended thousands of clients. We have won cases involving serious charges like Homicide, Robbery, Rape, as well as appeals and PCRA Petitions. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a defense attorney today.