Third Circuit Rejects De Facto Life Sentences for Most Juvenile Offenders

The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals has just announced its decision in United States v. Grant, rejecting effective life imprisonment sentences for most juveniles as unconstitutional. Although other federal circuits had already addressed this issue, this was a case of first impression for the Third Circuit which will have dramatic consequences for juvenile offenders who are tried as adults in Pennsylvania and those who are already serving what would effectively be life sentences without parole. 

United States v. Grant

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

In March 1987, local law enforcement in Elizabeth, New Jersey became aware of an organized group of teenagers that referred to themselves as The E-Port Posse (“The Posse”). The Defendant was a member of The Posse. The Posse operated a narcotics network that sold cocaine in Elizabeth and would routinely use threats and physical violence to further its enterprise.  

An example of this is occurred in August 1989. The defendant, who was 16 years old at the time, encountered a group of rival drug dealers while delivering drugs for The Posse. The defendant spoke to one of these dealers and told him not to be in the Posse’s territory. The rival drug dealer refused to leave. In response, The defendant struck him in the head with a gun while another Posse member assaulted him. The rival drug dealer fled and the defendant and his associate shot him in the leg. The rival drug dealer survived the incident.

Later that month, the defendant encountered the rival drug dealer’s brother, who was also a drug dealer. The defendant warned the brother not to sell in Posse territory. The defendant confronted the brother in an apartment courtyard where he tried to get the brother to go into an apartment. The brother escaped, but the defendant ordered his associate to shoot the brother to prevent said escape. The associate killed the brother. 

In 1991, a superseding indictment charged the defendant with RICO offenses; Racketeering; Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Distribute cocaine; two counts of Possession with the Intent to Distribute cocaine; and two counts of Possession of a Weapon in Relation to a Crime of Violence or Drug Trafficking. Although the defendant was not specifically charged with murder, the attempted murder of the rival drug dealer and the actual murder of his brother were the predicate offenses for the racketeering charge.   

The defendant was tried as an adult even though he was under the age of 18 when these crimes were committed. A jury came back with a split verdict, but found the defendant guilty of RICO, racketeering, and drug and gun possession counts. The jury found that the defendant attempted to murder the rival drug dealer, and murdered his brother. At sentencing, the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory sentencing guidelines of life without parole (hereinafter “LWOP”) on the RICO counts, as well as a concurrent forty-year term of imprisonment on the drug-trafficking counts, and a five-year consecutive term of imprisonment on the gun possession count. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

The defendant caught a break with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory Life Without Parole (LWOP) sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Consequently, the defendant received a new sentencing hearing.

At the resentencing hearing, the District Court determined that because of the defendant’s upbringing, debilitating characteristics of youth, and post-conviction record, he was not incorrigible, and thus an LWOP sentence was not appropriate. However, the District Court imposed a term of sixty years imprisonment to run concurrently with the drug charges which resulted in a new effective sentence of sixty-five years without parole. Based on this sentencing, the defendant would have been eligible for release when he reached the age of 72 years old. He appealed again. 

Adolescent Development and the Supreme Court

Over the past two decades, adolescent brain development has been an important issue in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. This began with its decision in Roper v. Simmons which banned the death penalty for juvenile offenders. In its decision, the Roper Court utilized science and social science to reason that juveniles lack maturity, have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures. In other words, the United States Supreme Court has found that children’s brains are not as developed as those of an adult and thus they should not be held to the same moral standard when addressing criminal conduct and sentencing. 

The United States Supreme Court further expanded on its jurisprudence in the subsequent years. In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life without parole is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders who commit crimes other than homicide. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that that mandatory LWOP even in homicide cases is unconstitutional. Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court held that Graham and Miller apply retroactively (in other words, if someone was sentenced to LWOP prior to the Court’s rulings in Graham and Miller, then they would be entitled to a new sentencing hearing).

It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court never held that a juvenile cannot be sentenced to LWOP for a homicide offense. However, the bar was set very high to impose such a sentence. As the Grant court stated in its opinion “[o]nly those who are permanently incorrigible may receive such a sentence.” This logic is part of the reason why the defendant in this case challenged his sentence. The trial court essentially sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole.

Third Circuit Rejects Effective Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Offenders as Unconstitutional  

The defendant appealed, arguing that because he would not be eligible for parole until he was 72 years old and that his life expectancy was also 72 years, he had been sentenced to a de facto life without parole sentence. Remember, the sentencing court previously found that he was not incorrigible, and thus, under the logic of Miller, he should receive a parole hearing before he is expected to die. The Third Circuit agreed with the Defendant.

In its decision, the Third Circuit focused on the Miller ruling which held that juvenile life without parole is only for incorrigible juveniles. Further, the Court extrapolated from the previously mentioned Supreme Court decisions that de-facto life without parole cannot be reconciled with Graham and Miller’s holdings that sentencing judges most provide non-incorrigible juvenile offenders “with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on their demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” and that LWOP has “diminished penological justification.” The Third Circuit also looked to other circuit court decisions (i.e. the 7th, 9th and 10th) which held that term-of-years sentences, in those respective cases, violated the holdings of Graham and Miller.

Ultimately, the Third Circuit established new requirements for a sentencing court before it imposes a term-of-years sentence on a non-incorrigible juvenile offender. First, the sentencing judge must conduct an individualized evidentiary hearing to determine the non-incorrigible juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy before sentencing him to a term-of-years sentence. Next, the sentencing court must “shape a sentence that properly accounts for a meaningful opportunity to be released.” The Third Circuit concluded that this is before the age of retirement. The Court chose retirement because “society accepts the age of retirement as a transitional life stage where an individual permanently leaves the work force after having contributed to society over the course of his or her working life.” The Court said that juvenile offenders should have an opportunity to “reconcile with society and achieve fulfillment outside prison walls.” Nonetheless, the sentencing court must also consider the § 3553(a) factors (i.e. the seriousness of the offense, public safety, deterrence, etc.) too, and though a non-incorrigible juvenile offender should be presumptively sentenced below the age of retirement, there may be legitimate reasons why a juvenile offender should not be released before the age of retirement.

Facing Criminal Charges or Considering an Appeal? We Can Help. 

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If you are facing criminal charges or deciding whether to appeal a conviction or sentencing , we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients in jurisdictions throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We can also provide advice on the merits of pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief act petition. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

PA Superior Court: Prosecution May Not Introduce Facebook Posts Without Proving Defendant Authored Posts

When can the prosecution use Facebook messages against the defendant?

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mangel. In Mangel, the Superior Court held that the trial court properly denied the Commonwealth’s motion to admit supposedly incriminating Facebook messages against the defendant because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the defendant wrote the messages. 

Commonwealth v. Mangel

Mangel involved the assault of a man at a graduation party.  Prosecutors charged the defendant with Aggravated Assault, Simple Assault, and Harassment after the complainant told police that several fights ensued as a result of multiple people arriving uninvited at the party. The complainant stated that as he was walking away from the fights, he was struck in the back of the head, knocked to the ground, and repeatedly punched and kicked by the defendant and a co-defendant. The complainant did not know either defendant and had not spoken with them during the party, but he was able to identify them after family members showed him Facebook photos of the defendants. The complainant suffered facial lacerations, broken bones, and lost several of his teeth during the assault. 

The Admission of Facebook Evidence

In order to prove the case against Mangel, the prosecution sought to obtain his Facebook records. The prosecution obtained a court order directing Facebook to provide records to them. The Commonwealth then filed a Motion in Limine asking the trial court to permit the introduction of screenshots of certain pages of a Facebook account for a “Tyler Mangel.” The screenshots showed various online and mobile device Facebook messenger messages. The Commonwealth also sought to introduce a photograph from the Facebook account of bloody hands which had been posted by a different individual on the Tyler Mangel page.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the Motion in Limine. At the hearing, an Erie County Detective attempted to authenticate the messages and photos for the Commonwealth. After being qualified as an expert witness in computer forensics, the detective testified that she had been asked to determine the owner of the Tyler Mangel profile page by the prosecution. In order to do so, she searched Facebook for the name Tyler Mangel. She testified that only one result appeared. She then compared that page to the screenshots that the prosecutors had given to her. She determined that both the screenshots and the page that she found bore the name Tyler Mangel, listed the account holder as living in Meadville, PA, and that some of the photographs on both the screenshots and the Facebook page were the same. The about section of the page also provided that the individual attended Meadville High School and that the username associated with the Facebook account was Mangel17.

The detective requested subscriber records from Facebook. Using those records, she determined that when the owner of the account created it, that person provided the name Tyler Mangel and email addresses with the name Mangel in them. The account was also linked to a specific cell phone number. The detective obtained a court order for Verizon records and traced the cell phone number to Stacy Mangel and a specific address in Meadville, PA. The court took judicial notice that this was the same address listed as the address for the defendant in the Criminal Complaint.

The detective concluded that the screenshots the Commonwealth wanted to introduce must have come from that account because both accounts 1) had the same name, 2) listed the account holder as living in Meadville, 3) listed the account holder as having attended the same high school, and 4) displayed photographs of the same individual. The trial court, however, asked the detective if she could provide that opinion to a reasonable degree of computer and scientific certainty that the account belonged to the defendant and whether the detective could testify that no one else accessed and posted things on the account. The detective testified that she could not provide that opinion with any certainty.

In addition to not being certain that no one else could have owned or used the Facebook account, the detective also confirmed that she did not obtain an IP address for the Facebook account. The defense lawyer also searched for the same name on his own phone and found five listings for Tyler Mangel. Finally, the detective did not link the cell phone information which she had obtained to the defendant.

The trial court denied the Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to admit the Facebook evidence, and the prosecution appealed. The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court found that the prosecution had simply failed to prove that the account belonged to the defendant, that the defendant had sent the messages in question or posted the pictures, and that the account could not have been used by someone else to do so. The Court also dismissed the Commonwealth's argument that the detective should not have been required to testify to a reasonable degree of certainty, noting that it is well-settled that all expert witnesses must be able to provide their opinions to a reasonable degree of certainty in the relevant field of study. 

The Authentication of Facebook Messages in a Criminal Case

The Superior Court noted that there is relatively little case law in Pennsylvania on authenticating Facebook evidence and text messages in criminal cases. In general, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 provides that authentication is required prior to the admission of evidence. The party that seeks to introduce evidence must show to the court that the evidence is what it purports to be. In some cases, that can be shown through the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge. For example, had a friend testified that they had watched the defendant access the Facebook account, that could have been sufficient to show that it was the defendant’s account. Here, the prosecution had no direct evidence or witnesses with personal knowledge that could link the account to the defendant.

When the party seeking to admit the evidence does not have a witness with personal knowledge, the evidence may be authenticated through circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence involves the appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances surrounding it.

Here, the circumstantial evidence simply did not prove to a sufficient degree of reliability that the account belonged to the defendant or that the defendant had posted the information which the prosecution sought to introduce. Facebook accounts, like email and messaging accounts, can be accessed from any computer or smart phone with the appropriate user identification and password. The Court noted that social media presents unique challenges because of the great ease with which a social media account may be falsified. A legitimate account may also be accessed by an imposter.

In some cases, there may be sufficient circumstantial evidence with which to authenticate a social media account. Therefore, the Court ruled that social media evidence must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or not there has been an adequate foundational showing both of its relevance and its authenticity. The proponent of the evidence must show either direct or circumstantial evidence that tends to corroborate the identity of the author of the message or post. This could include testimony from the person who sent or received the communication, or contextual clues in the communication tending to reveal the identity of the sender. For example, if a message from the defendant's account arranged a meeting with a witness and then the defendant showed up to the meeting, the circumstantial evidnece would suggest that it was the defendant's account. However, social media can easily be hacked and forged, so the mere fact that an account has a person’s name or photo on it is simply insufficient to show that the account belongs to that person. The party introducing the evidence must be able to show more than that. 

Here, the trial court properly prohibited the admission of the evidence because the prosecution showed only that the account appeared to belong to the defendant. The defendant never admitted ownership of it, and the prosecution did not call any witnesses to testify that they had communicated with the defendant using that account. Anyone could have created the account, added photos, and claimed that they went to Meadville High School and were Tyler Mangel. The prosecution also failed to provide date and time stamps to show when the posts were created, and the posts were ambiguous and did not clearly reference the allegations in the case. Accordingly, the Superior Court agreed with the defense attorney that the evidence was not sufficiently relevant and authentic. Therefore, it upheld the trial court’s ruling excluding the Facebook screenshots.

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Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of cases in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client who is facing criminal charges or who may be under investigation by law enforcement. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today. 

PA Superior Court: Commonwealth May Not Rebut Claim of Self-Defense by Showing Defendant Has Prior Conviction for Violent Offense

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Superior Court just announced its decision in Commonwealth v. Crosley, holding that the Commonwealth cannot use a defendant’s prior conviction for a violent offense in order to rebut a defendant’s claim that the complainant was a violent person who started the altercation. Instead, testimony to this effect by a criminal defendant in an assault or homicide trial would open the door only to evidence of the defendant’s reputation for violence. This decision limits the Commonwealth’s ability to rebut claims of self-defense in that the Commonwealth may not tell a judge or jury that the defendant has a prior conviction for assault or some other violent crime.

Commonwealth v. Crosley

This case had an unusual set of the facts. It is unclear how the defendant and the decedent met, but at some point the decedent gave the defendant permission to live in his shed. The defendant was not allowed inside the house without permission. When it was cold, the decedent would permit the defendant to live in the basement of the house. Additionally, the decedent was married and had a child living at the residence.

Eventually, the decedent’s wife tired of this arrangement. She wanted the defendant off of the property, so the decedent went and told the defendant that he would have to move out. The decedent’s wife testified that the decedent was unarmed when he went to speak with the defendant.

While she was in the shower, the decedent’s wife heard what she believed to be a gun shot. She instructed her daughter to go check on the decedent. The daughter then went to the basement where she observed the decedent and the defendant struggling for a gun. Upon seeing this, the daughter ran upstairs and told her mother what she saw. The decedent’s wife then went to her window where she observed the defendant chasing the victim and shooting at him. She yelled at the defendant to stop, and the defendant replied that the decedent “takes me for a fool.”  The wife went outside and found the decedent lying on the sidewalk with a bullet hole in his chest. He was alive at this point and taken to a local hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries.   

Police arrested the defendant and questioned him. He waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement to the police. He claimed that he had shot the decedent in self-defense. He further told the police about prior incidents in which the decedent had possessed a gun and threatened the defendant with the gun. He mentioned one specific instance where he had disarmed the decedent and hid the decedent’s gun. He took the police to the location where he had hidden the gun. The police recovered the gun and some ammunition.

Prior Bad Acts in Self-Defense Cases

After the decedent died, prosecutors charged the defendant with Murder, gun charges, and possession of an instrument of a crime. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a Motion in Limine asking the trial court to allow the introduction of the defendant’s existing Aggravated Assault conviction. The trial court held a hearing, and the court ruled that the Commonwealth could introduce evidence of the Aggravated Assault conviction if the defendant took the stand and told the jury that the decedent was a violent person and that he had acted in self-defense. Undeterred, the defendant took the stand and testified that the decedent was a violent person who had attacked him first. The defendant also testified that he, the defendant, never carried a weapon and was not a violent person. The jury convicted the defendant of third-degree murder and the gun charges. The Court sentenced him to a lengthy period of state incarceration followed by a period of probation and also ordered him to pay $7,864.72 in restitution to the Pennsylvania Victim’s Compensation Fund. The defendant appealed.  

What is Character Evidence?

The defendant raised several issues on appeal. First, he argued that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of his prior Aggravated Assault conviction in order to rebut his assertion that the complainant was the violent aggressor. In general, character evidence is extremely important in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania law permits criminal defendants to introduce character evidence to show that they are not the type of person who would commit the crime charged. In other words, a defendant who has no prior record may introduce evidence about his or her law abidingness, truthfulness, and non-violence to show that he or she would not have committed a crime. Under Pennsylvania law, the jury will then be instructed that character evidence alone may be enough for the jury to find reasonable doubt. Typically, in Philadelphia, if a defendant has good character, meaning no prior record, the Commonwealth will stipulate to it and the defendant may not have to call live witnesses to testify to the character evidence. When the defense does call character witnesses, the witnesses must testify only about the defendant’s good reputation for the relevant character traits; the witness may not testify about specific good things that the defendant has done or the witness’s own personal opinion.   

Although the defense may introduce character evidence, the Commonwealth generally may not introduce evidence of a defendant’s bad character or prior criminal history for the purposes of proving that the defendant is a bad person who would commit the crimes charged. The logic behind the rule is that just because an individual committed a crime at some point in their life, it does not necessarily follow that they committed this particular crime. However, there are exceptions to the rule. The Commonwealth may try to introduce evidence of prior convictions through Pa.R.Crim.P. 404(b).   

What is a 404(b) motion?

Although the Commonwealth may not introduce character evidence to show that a defendant committed a crime because he has a character for criminality, the Commonwealth can introduce prior criminal contacts to rebut certain defenses. The rules permit the Commonwealth to file a 404(b) Motion. A 404(b) motion is commonly referred to as a “Prior Bad Acts Motion,” and prosecutors file them to rebut certain defenses such as mistake, fabrication, lack of knowledge. The Commonwealth may also introduce these “bad acts” to show that it was part of the defendant’s Modus Operandi or was part of a common scheme.

Let’s do an example of common scheme. Suppose that an individual is charged with Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance, or selling drugs. More specifically, let’s say that he is accused of selling heroin with an X stamp on the package on the southwest corner of D and Allegheny Streets. Let’s also assume that he has a prior conviction for selling heroin with an X stamp on the package on the southwest corner of D and Allegheny Streets from a month prior to the arrest of his current case. If the Commonwealth were to file a 404(b) motion to introduce that prior conviction, they would have a decent argument that the defendant is engaged in a common scheme to sell heroin with X stamps on the package at the southwest corner of D and Allegheny Streets. Technically, this example did not address the defendant’s character. However, if a judge or a jury hears that a defendant has a prior conviction for selling drugs and is currently on trial for selling drugs, it is much more likely that he will be found guilty of the current offense because juries have a very hard time disregarding the fact that the defendant has a prior conviction. Accordingly, these 404(b) motions can make or break a case.    

The Pennsylvania Superior Court Limits the Commonwealth’s Introduction of Character Evidence to Rebut a Claim of Self-Defense

In cases involving crimes of violence, however, the Commonwealth may sometimes introduce character evidence when the defendant raises the issue of self-defense. The prosecution may not introduce this evidence as part of its case-in-chief, but if the defendant introduces evidence that the complainant was the aggressor and a violent person, it opens the door for the prosecution to attack the defendant’s character.

As previously explained, there are different rules for the Commonwealth and defendants when it comes to introducing character evidence. The rule governing character evidence is Rule 405. Typically, as the Crosley court explained, only defendants can introduce specific instances of conduct and this can only be done for alleged victims. As such, a defendant cannot introduce specific instances of conduct to show his character for non-violence. He would need a witness to discuss his reputation for non-violence. However, if a defendant is attacking a victim’s character, he can then use specific examples (i.e. a prior conviction of the witness for assault) to show that the witness was a violent person.

In rebuttal, the Commonwealth may only attack the defendant’s character through reputation evidence. The Commonwealth cannot bring in specific instances (i.e. a prior conviction) to rebut his claim. Therefore, in Crosley, the lower court erred in admitting Mr. Crosley’s prior aggravated assault conviction to rebut his self-defense claim. The Commonwealth would have had to call someone who knew the defendant to speak about his reputation for violence to rebut his self-defense claim.

Unfortunately for the defendant, the Superior Court held that the trial court did not completely err in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce the conviction. The defendant testified at his trial that “[he] never [carries] a weapon.” The problem with this statement is that his prior conviction involved a weapon. Therefore, the Superior Court held that the Commonwealth was allowed to introduce this conviction (which was a guilty plea) to impeach him. The defendant’s other grounds for appeal were also denied. Specifically, there was sufficient evidence to show that he committed third degree murder (as stated above, there was a witness who saw him shooting at the victim) and that the record supported a factual finding that there were costs incurred in trying to save the victim’s life and ultimately the  disposition of his remains.

Call the Award-Winning Criminal Law Office of Goldstein Mehta LLC if You Are Charged with a Crime of Violence

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The rules of evidence can be complicated. If you are facing serious criminal charges, you need a defense attorney who will use them to your advantage. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today. 

PA Supreme Court Agrees Police May Not Search Cell Phone Without Warrant

Zak Goldstein - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney

Warrantless Searches of Cell Phones in Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Fulton, agreeing with the United States Supreme Court that law enforcement officers generally may not search a cell phone incident to a defendant’s arrest without first obtaining a search warrant. The Court further concluded that the introduction of the evidence obtained from the illegal search of the defendant’s phone in this homicide case did not amount to harmless error. Therefore, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial.  

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Fulton

On June 15, 2010, Philadelphia police received a call from Michael Toll reporting that he had been shot. Police responded to the call and found Toll in a vehicle on the sidewalk with gunshot wounds on the right side of his body. Toll told the police that Jeff shot him, and he gave them a description of Jeff. Police took Toll to the hospital and searched the car. They recovered a cell phone, and the cell phone showed that Toll had exchanged phone calls with someone listed in the phone as Jeff. Police determined that the number for Jeff was linked to a prepaid phone with no subscriber information.

Toll eventually died from his wounds. On the morning that he died, police received a call concerning drug activity and a man with a gun at a specific address. Police responded to the call and found several individuals in and around a 2002 green Mercury Marquis. The police saw a gun, a gun holster, and cell phones in the vehicle. They arrested the four men who were nearby. One of those men was Fulton, the defendant in this case. Police took a cell phone from Fulton incident to his arrest and obtained a search warrant for the vehicle but not the phone.

The Search of the Phone

The phones were given to Homicide Detectives who were investigating Toll’s death. The detectives opened the phones, turned them on, and examined them in order to determine the phone number associated with each phone. One of the phones turned out to have the same number as the phone number for Jeff that was in the decedent’s phone. Homicide detectives did not obtain a warrant prior to going through the phones. Further, detectives began answering incoming calls to the phone that had been linked to Jeff.

One person called and eventually told detectives that the phone number belonged to Fulton and that she regularly purchased heroin from him. Armed with this information, detectives interrogated Fulton, and Fulton promptly incriminated himself in the shooting. Police obtained a search warrant for Fulton’s residence and found ammunition which was the same as that used in the fatal shooting. Police also interviewed some of the other men who they had arrested along with Fulton and obtained statements from them which implicated Fulton in the murder. Accordingly, police charged Fulton with murder.

The Motion to Suppress

Prior to trial, Fulton moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search and use of the cell phone. The trial court denied the motion, but the trial court made its decision prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California holding that police must obtain a warrant prior to searching a cell phone. Fulton went to trial and was eventually convicted of third-degree murder and sentenced to 15-30 years of incarceration. Fulton appealed to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court denied the appeal.

By the time of the Superior Court’s decision, the United States Supreme Court had held that police may not search a phone without a warrant. The Superior Court recognized that police should have obtained a search warrant for the phone, but it held that the intrusion into the phone was minimal because police did not review personal data or social media located on the phone. Therefore, the Superior Court held that Riley did not apply. It also found that to the extent that the police violated Fulton’s rights, the introduction of the illegal evidence amounted to harmless error which would not justify overturning the third-degree murder conviction.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

Fulton filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately overturned the defendant’s conviction. The Court concluded that there was really no dispute. Riley’s holding could not be clearer: in order to access any information on a cell phone, police must first obtain a warrant. The Supreme Court did not create an exception for what police or courts may deem a minimally invasive search of a cell phone. The Court specifically rejected a case-by-case test for searches of phones. Instead, it held that police simply must get a warrant or they cannot use the results of the search of a cell phone in court. Any search of a cell phone requires a warrant.

The Court concluded that homicide detectives conducted three separate searches of the phone without a warrant. First, they searched the phone by powering it on. Second, they searched the phone by going into it and obtaining its phone number. Third, they searched the phone by monitoring incoming calls and text messages.

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Having concluded that the police violated Fulton’s rights by searching the phone without a warrant, the Court next found that the constitutional violation did not amount to harmless error. The Court ruled that all of the evidence that was found due to the searches of the phone must be suppressed. This included the existence of the woman who identified Fulton as a drug dealer, her statement, and the evidence that the phone number was the same number as that for Jeff. Given the extensive use of this evidence against the defendant at trial and the fact that much of the evidence was contradicted and inconsistent, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the conviction could stand under the harmless error doctrine. Accordingly, the Court vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial for Fulton without the illegally seized evidence.