Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 11/10/18 Zak Goldstein 11/10/18

PA Supreme Court: "I'm done talking" invokes right to remain silent

The Right to Remain Silent

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lukach, holding that the defendant unambiguously asserted his right to remain silent by telling police that he was done talking and had nothing else to talk about. This decision is significant because it makes it easier for a defendant to invoke the right to remain silent during a police interrogation. Specifically, prosecutors will be less successful when they argue that the defendant was “ambiguous” when asserting their right to remain silent.

Commonwealth v. Lukach

On August 6, 2015 at approximately 5:00 AM, a Pottsville Police Officer received a call from another officer requesting his presence at the scene of a homicide. Upon arrival, the officer observed blood on the roadway and was informed by other officers that they found the body of the victim lying in the street. During their preliminary investigation, officers became aware that the defendant and a Mr. Thomas had been involved in a prior crime at the victim’s house. They quickly became persons of interest in the homicide investigation. Other Pottsville Officers reported seeing the defendant and Mr. Thomas walking together on the day on which the victim’s body was found, and police later encountered both individuals at 12th Street and Market Street, which is in close proximity to where they found the decedent’s body.

During a discussion with an officer, the defendant stated he was in the area to see what was happening. He further stated that he had been with Mr. Thomas for the entire previous evening and had previously visited an A-Plus store at approximately 5:00 AM. The officers then went to the A-Plus store and determined that the defendant had not been at the A-Plus store at that time. Later that day, an officer went to his house, advised his mother of the homicide, and stated that he wished to speak to the defendant. The defendant was not home, but his mother consented to a search of the property. During the search of the property, officers recovered box cutters and work gloves, both of which were similar to items found at the crime scene.

The next day, police detained the defendant based on two non-related warrants. After arresting him, they put him in an interrogation room. A detective officer turned on an audio and visual recorder, read the defendant his Miranda rights, and began to interview the defendant regarding the homicide of the victim. Prior to incriminating himself, the defendant told the officer: “Yeah. I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” The police officer then immediately replied, “You don’t have to say anything, I told you that you could stop.” The officer, however, continued to ask the defendant questions and talk to him. At some point, the officer left the room for approximately eight minutes. Another officer then entered the room, asked for the defendant’s shoes, and the defendant turned them over. The original officer then re-entered the room and discussed with the defendant the types of evidence that could be found on shoes. The defendant continued to deny involvement in the homicide.

Later, the defendant foolishly asked the officer if he could ask him a quick question off camera. After their off-the-record conversation, the officer turned the camera back on, re-advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, and the defendant asked to speak with someone from the Schuylkill County District Attorney’s Office in regards to whether he could receive a deal in exchange for his cooperation. An Assistant District Attorney arrived shortly thereafter. The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and he subsequently confessed to participating in the victim’s murder.

As part of his confession, the defendant told the police that he used one of the victim’s credit cards to access an ATM and then placed it in a storm drain. Officers subsequently recovered the credit card, a pair of sunglasses, a t-shirt and a hat in a storm drain. Based on the confession and the recovery of the credit card, officers were able to retrieve video which showed the defendant accessing an ATM around the time of the homicide. They arrested him and charged him with murder and related criminal charges.

The Motion to Suppress the Statement for a Miranda Violation

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress any statements made to the police after he stated “yeah. I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” The motion further requested that the defendant’s shoes and any other evidence recovered as a result of those statements, including the items found in the storm drain and the ATM video, also be suppressed because they were all recovered in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial court agreed with the defense. It found that the confession was coerced because the continuing interrogation was “meant to pressure the defendant into relinquishing his right and the statements he thereafter made were the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.”

The Superior Court Appeal

The Commonwealth then filed an interlocutory appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the suppression order. The Superior Court found that the officer violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights as he failed to scrupulously honor the defendant’s request to remain silent, and the defendant’s subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights before speaking to the Assistant District Attorney did not cure that violation or render his confession voluntary. The Superior Court also agreed that the physical evidence that was obtained as a result of Appellee’s confession was illegally obtained and affirmed the suppression’s court order. The Commonwealth then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Court granted allocatur.

When do the Police Have to Give You Your Miranda Warnings?

The police do not always have to provide a suspect or arrestee with Miranda warnings. Instead, police are required to provide Miranda warnings only if they want to use the results of a custodial interrogation in court. Thus, whether Miranda warnings are required depends on two factors – 1) you must be in custody, typically meaning under arrest, and 2) the police must ask questions which are reasonably likely to elicit incriminating statements. If police fail to provide Miranda warnings prior to conducting a custodial interrogation, they usually may not use the statements made during the interrogation in court. Police do not, however, have to provide Miranda warnings if they are not going to question you. Generally, a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes when the defendant is deprived of his physical freedom in a significant way, or when the defendant reasonably believes that his or her freedom of action is restricted by the interrogation. In addition to providing Miranda warnings, police must also honor a defendant’s invocation of his or her rights. This means that if you ask to speak with a lawyer or tell the police that you wish to remain silent, then they cannot continue to question you without first taking a substantial break. Instead, the interrogation must cease immediately. If the police continue questioning after an invocation of the right to remain silent or consult with an attorney and obtain statements because of this questioning, the trial court should bar the Commonwealth from using the statements at trial because this evidence was illegally obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

This rule seems simple, but it can become complicated when it is not totally clear whether a defendant actually seek to exercise his or her rights. Various appellate courts have held that the invocation of the right to remain silent or speak with a lawyer must be unambiguous. Obviously, most suspects, when questioned by the police, do not say “I am invoking my Fifth Amendment Rights against self-incrimination.” Rather, they say something that is similar to what the defendant said in his case. As such, suppression courts must then decide whether this was an unambiguous invocation of one’s right to remain silent. If the invocation of the right to remain silent was ambiguous, then the police may continue to question the suspect.

What is an Unambiguous Invocation of Your Right to Remain Silent?

Appellate courts have held that when an individual is given his Miranda warnings, all interrogation must cease. The problem, as mentioned above, is that a defendant typically does not speak in legalese and will attempt to invoke their right to remain silent in ways that are not always the most articulate. Over the years, most appellate have acknowledged this problem, so courts do not always require a suspect to explicitly reference the Fifth Amendment or the right to remain silent. However, the courts do require that a defendant’s request be “unambiguous.” Ironically, the decisions on this issue are quite ambiguous. Nonetheless, the courts will employ an objective inquiry into determining whether the defendant’s request to remain silent was “unambiguous.”

One issue that frequently arises, as in the case here, is whether the invocation was prefaced by some qualifying phrase. In Lukach, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions that addressed this issue. In these jurisdictions, the courts found that when a defendant prefaced his “invocation” by a phrase such as “I don’t know” or “I don’t know [about x crime],” then the defendant was not invoking his right to remain silent. As such, if you are being interrogated for a crime, you should try to be as clear as possible when you invoke your right to remain silent.

The Defendant’s Invocation Was Unambiguous

Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts and affirmed the order granting the suppression of the defendant’s statement. The Court found that the defendant unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights when he stated “I don’t know just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about.” Therefore, the Court held that the defendant’s statements were properly suppressed. The Court also affirmed the suppression of the physical evidence, finding that police had coerced the statement. This part of the Court’s decision is a little bit unusual because the law typically does not require suppression of the derivative evidence of a Miranda violation, meaning that if you confess and tell the police where to find other evidence, the confession may be suppressed, but the other evidence usually will not. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted an appeal in a different case to evaluate whether the derivative evidence should also be suppressed. It is possible the justices are leaning in favor of changing that rule to require the suppression of the derivative evidence given the decision to suppress the physical evidence in this case

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/18/18 Zak Goldstein 10/18/18

PA Supreme Court: Consent to Search Car Does Not Necessarily Include Consent to K9 Search

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Valdivia, holding that a motorist’s consent to a police search of his car does not automatically include the consent to detain the motorist for 40 minutes and then conduct a canine search. Instead, the scope of the search by the police should have been limited to that for which a reasonable person expected he or she had provided consent.

The facts of Valdivia

In Valdivia, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers were on patrol in a marked police cruiser on Interstate 80 in Centre county, PA. At some point, they drove behind the defendant, who was driving a white minivan with Michigan plates. After two miles, they saw the van change lanes without using a turn signal. They decided to pull the defendant over. The defendant complied and pulled over to the side of the road.

The troopers both approached the vehicle. One of the troopers asked for the defendant’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. The defendant responded that he was about to run out of gas, but he provided the trooper with his Florida driver’s license and a rental agreement for the van. As troopers so often do, the trooper testified that the defendant seemed nervous and that his hands were shaking when he provided the documentation.

The troopers then began asking the defendant about his travel plans. He explained that he was on his way to New Jersey to visit family and provided an elaborate story about how he ended up renting a minivan instead of flying from Florida. From outside of the van, the trooper was able to see two large boxes wrapped in Christmas paper in the back of the van. The trooper found it odd that the gifts had no markings from an airline and that they were not banged up. He also later testified that drug traffickers often wrap up containers of drugs in Christmas paper during the holidays. The trooper also had concerns about the fact that the van had been rented thirty miles away from the airport for a one-way trip. He then ran the defendant’s record and found that he had priors for possession with the intent to deliver.

The troopers contacted a State Police K9 officer who was not currently on duty and asked him to come to the scene. While they waited for him, they told the defendant to get out of the van. They explained that they were going to provide him with a written warning for failing to use his turn signal when changing lanes. After returning his documentation, the trooper asked the defendant if he would answer a few more questions. The defendant said that he needed to get gas, but he would answer a few more questions. The troopers then continued to grill him about his travel plans and the paperwork for the van. The defendant’s story changed a little bit, the troopers became increasingly suspicious, and they then asked for consent to search the van. The defendant gave verbal consent first and then signed a written consent form, two things which you should virtually never do. The troopers had not told the defendant that a K9 officer was on the way.

Because it was cold, the troopers generously asked the defendant if he would like to wait in the back of the patrol car while they searched the minivan. The troopers then waited for the K9 officer; they did not start searching the minivan in the meantime. When the K9 arrived, the troopers removed the Christmas boxes from the minivan and had the K9 sniff them. The K9 “alerted",” suggesting that they were drugs in one of the boxes. The troopers opened the boxes and found lots of marijuana. They seized the marijuana, a mobile smartphone, and a tablet, and they arrested the defendant. Prosecutors charged him with possession of a controlled substance, possession with the intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

The Motion to Suppress - Were there limits to the consent to search?

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the marijuana, arguing that although he had consented to a normal search of the minivan, he had not agreed to wait for 40 minutes and then allow a K9 search. The trial court denied the motion. It found that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search and that it was not the product of police coercion. Further, it found that the defendant consented to the K9 search because he had not placed any limits on the scope of the search when he authorized the troopers to search his car. The court reasoned that because he was engaged in the transportation of drugs, he should have realized that troopers may use a dog for the search. The defendant then proceeded by way of bench trial, was found guilty of all charges, and sentenced to 11.5 to 23 months in jail followed by 30 days of probation.

The defendant appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court agreed with the trial court and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Superior Court found it to be a close case, but ultimately ruled against the defendant. The Superior Court concluded that there is nothing about a K9 search which differentiates it from a human search when it comes to the issue of consent to search. The defendant then filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Court accepted the case.

Consent to search does not automatically include consent to a K9 sniff

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the suppression court’s decision. It found that the consent to search provided by the defendant did not automatically include the consent to wait 40 minutes and then be subjected to a K9 sniff. In Pennsylvania, police typically need a search warrant or probable cause in order to search a motor vehicle. However, one exception to the probable cause requirement is that police may conduct a search without any level of reasonable suspicion or probable cause when the defendant agrees to it. Notably, New Jersey has a different rule in which police must have reasonable suspicion in order to request consent to search.

When is consent to search valid?

Although police need not have any level of suspicion in order to legally conduct a consensual search, there are some limitations with which they must comply even during a consent search. For example, they must have obtained the consent voluntarily. If the police obtained the consent by threatening to shoot the defendant, then that would probably not be voluntary consent. Additionally, the search must be limited to the scope provided by the suspect. This means that if the suspect agrees to a search of one room but not another, police cannot search that other room without obtaining a warrant or unless some other exception applies. When there is some ambiguity to the valid scope of the search, the scope is determined by what would be objectively reasonable. This means the court does not look to what the defendant actually intended or what the officer understood, but instead what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person.

Given the scope limitations on consent searches, the issue became whether the defendant should have reasonably expected that police would detain him for nearly an hour and then conduct a K9 search. The Supreme Court ultimately found that he should not have reasonably expected such police behavior. Courts have long held that a K9 search is different from a regular search, and the police did not mention to the defendant that they had a K9 on the way or that he would have to wait for such an extended period of time. The defendant gave two human officers permission to search his car. There was no K9 or K9 handler present at the time, and nothing about the interaction suggested that one was on his or her way. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have anticipated a K9 search of the boxes. Accordingly, the troopers exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent, and the trial court should have granted the Motion to Suppress.

FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES? WE CAN HELP.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Aggravated Assault, Sexual Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/13/18 Zak Goldstein 10/13/18

PA Superior Court: Villanova University Campus Safety Officers Can Search Your Room

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Yim, holding that the Villanova Public Safety Officers are not state agents for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. This is a significant decision for those who attend private universities which do not have police forces because it means that campus safety officers may be able to search a dorm room without a search warrant.

Commonwealth v. Yim

On February 13, 2016, Villanova University’s Public Safety Officers became engaged in violent confrontations with two resident students and a female visitor who later admitted to ingesting LSD. These three individuals were restrained by the public safety officers until Radnor Police Officers arrived on scene. One of the residents lived at Good Counsel Hall, which is located on Villanova’s campus, with the defendant. It is important to note that although Villanova has now established an actual police force, at the time, its officers were not police. They did not have arrest powers or carry weapons or handcuffs. Further, Villanova is a private university.

As a condition of living at Good Counsel Hall, the defendant had signed a housing contract in which he consented to a search of a dorm room where it has been determined by public safety officers that items or individuals in a particular room pose a possible safety or health risk to the community. Later that day, the Villanova University Director of Public Safety was advised of the events that transpired involving the defendant’s roommate. The administration subsequently ordered a search of the defendant’s room.

Prior to searching the room, the administrators unsuccessfully attempted to contact the defendant by telephone. The Director of Public Safety, along with two Public Safety Officers, unlocked and entered the dorm room. Once inside, they observed contraband and cash strewn throughout the room. They saw a syringe in plain view on top of a desk. The defendant’s passport, cash, LSD “stamps”, marijuana, $8,865.00, and other drug paraphernalia was also found on and in the defendant’s desk.

After the contraband was recovered, the Director of Public Safety called the Villanova University dispatcher and asked him to contact the Radnor Police Department to report the discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia. The Radnor Police arrived on scene, but they remained in the hall outside the room. The police officers never entered the room nor did they participate in the search. After the public safety officers searched the room, they turned over the contraband and other items to the Radnor Police. The Public Safety Officers also provided an investigative report, which included photographs, for future use in University administrative proceedings. The police then obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant. He was eventually arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession with the intent to deliver (“PWID”).

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his person and the dorm room. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the public safety officers did not need a search warrant to search the dorm room because they were not law enforcement officers and Villanova was not a public university. The trial court found the defendant guilty after a non-jury trial and sentenced him to a term of three to 23 months’ incarceration plus four years probation.

What is the Fourth Amendment?

The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Fourth Amendment often provides a defense to criminal charges relating to drug possession, illegal gun possession, or the possession of other contraband because it prevents the prosecution from introducing evidence at trial if the evidence was seized illegally. However, one significant limit on the Fourth Amendment is that it does not apply to searches and seizures conducted by other private citizens. It only protects citizens from the government; it does not protect them from private actors. Thus, the Fourth Amendment may be invoked as part of a motion to suppress evidence when the when a government actor like a police officer enters an individual’s home without a search warrant or stops someone without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. In this case, however, the officers who seized the contraband from the dorm room did not work for the government. They were not police officers performing a government function and Villanova is a private school.

Can the Fourth Amendment Apply to Non-State Actors?

In some circumstances, the Fourth Amendment can apply even to non-government employees. For example, the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures do apply to non-state actors when private individuals act as an instrument or agent of a state. Here, the defendant argued at the motion to suppress that Villanova’s public safety department had assumed a governmental function and essentially acted as the police. Accordingly, the defense argued that the public safety officers should be treated as state actors. Unfortunately, cooperation with the authorities alone does not constitute state action. The mere fact that the police and prosecutors use the results of a private actor’s search does not transform the private action into a state action. Instead, it must be shown that the relationship between the person committing the wrongful acts and the state is such that those acts can be viewed as emanating from the authority of the state. This means that if a college or university forms an actual police department with certified officers who have arrest powers, then the Fourth Amendment should apply to those officers. Likewise, the Fourth Amendment may apply to the public safety department of a public university because the officers would be government employees. Here, however, the officers were not actual police officers or government employees.

Can Campus Safety Officers Search a Dorm Room Without a Warrant?

Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the suppression court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. The Superior Court found that the University conducted the search on its own terms and in accordance with its own policies aimed at preserving student safety. The public safety department did not act jointly with the police or at the behest of the police in carrying out the search. Additionally, the public safety department had not assumed a governmental function such that it should be subject to the Fourth Amendment because the Radnor Township Police Department still served as the actual police force on university property. The court denied the appeal, and the defendant will not receive a new trial.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Possession with the Intent to Deliver, Aggravated Assault, and Attempted Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/11/18 Zak Goldstein 7/11/18

PA Superior Court: Violation of Philadelphia Police Directives Does Not Require Suppression of Drugs

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. McCleary, holding that suppression of the evidence is not required when Philadelphia Police Officers violate their own police department’s directives. In McCleary, the Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that drugs recovered by the police officers may be admissible at trial even though police did not follow department protocol related to obtaining consent to a search of a private home.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. McCleary

In McCleary, Philadelphia police officers responded to a radio call for a burglary in progress at a certain address. When they arrived at that address, they walked into the eventual-defendant’s house through an open door. In the living room, they found the defendant speaking with two other police officers. The arriving officers relieved the two who had already arrived and tried to figure out what was going on.

The defendant told the police officers that a woman who was present on the scene had tried to break into his home and that he had a valid Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order against her. The woman responded that she lived there, had the right to be present in the home, and that she had belongings in the second-floor bedroom which would prove that she lived there. The officers did not take any steps to verify if the defendant in fact had a valid PFA.

Instead, the officers asked the defendant if they could see if the woman had belongings in the second-floor bedroom. The defendant twice told them that they could. The officers then walked upstairs to the bedroom. In the bedroom, they found in plain view a scale, a sandwich bag with marijuana, a box of unused drug packaging, eleven bags of crack cocaine, and clear plastic Ziploc bags. The defendant told the officers that the drugs belonged to him. The officers arrested him and charged him with Possession with the Intent to Deliver.

Motion to Suppress the Drugs

The defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress his statements and the drugs. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress and ultimately granted the motion to suppress. The trial judge found that police violated with Philadelphia Police Department Directive 5.7, Sections 12 through 16, which address the procedure by which Philadelphia Police Officers are expected to obtain valid consent to search a home. The court found that the officers violated their own police directives by failing to obtain signed consent, failing to inform the defendant of his right to refuse consent, failing to consult with a supervisor, and failing to verify the defendant’s valid PFA and arrest the woman who was alleged violating it. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and ruled that the evidence would be inadmissible at trial, thereby essentially excluding the Commonwealth’s entire case.

The Commonwealth’s Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court. In the appeal, the Commonwealth argued that Philadelphia Police Directives do not have the force of law. The Commonwealth argued that because police are not required by law or the constitution to follow them, the remedy for a violation of the directives should not be suppression of the evidence.

The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth’s arguments. It found that exclusion of the evidence via a successful Motion to Suppress is only required where the Government has violated a person’s right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure as provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Exclusion is not automatically warranted simply because the police failed to comply with a Rule of Criminal Procedure or the police department’s directives or regulations. Instead, suppression is only required when the police violate the constitution or certain statutes.

When can police search a home without a warrant?

The Superior Court held that the question was not whether police violated their directives; instead, the question which the trial court should have addressed was whether the police obtained constitutionally valid consent to search the property. Although law enforcement officers must ordinary obtain a search warrant prior to searching a home, there are some exceptions to this rule. One of the main exceptions to the warrant requirement is consent. If you tell the police that they can search your house, then they do not have to get a warrant prior to doing so.

How will a court decide if police voluntarily obtained consent to search a home?

In evaluating consent, previous appellate decisions have suggested that courts consider the following factors:

the presence or absence of police excesses;
whether there was physical contact;
whether police directed the citizen’s movements;
police demeanor and manner of expression;
the location and time of the interdiction;
the content of the questions and statements
the existence and character of the initial investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness;
the degree to which the transition between the traffic stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter can be viewed as seamless, thus suggesting to a citizen that his movements may remain subject to police restraint; and
whether there was an express admonition to the effect that the citizen-subject is free to depart, which is a potent, objective factor.

Here, the Court evaluated the factors and found that there was nothing coercive about the police request to see the rest of the home. Certainly, they should have followed their directives, but their failure to do so did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that the drugs may be admissible in the prosecution for Possession with the Intent to Deliver.

Notably, one of the three judges on this panel dissented, arguing that the trial court had in fact found that the police officers simply were not credible on the issue of whether they truly obtained consent. The trial court simply considered the violation of the directives as part of analyzing whether the police were telling the truth. This is important because once the defense files a motion to suppress in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth must produce sufficient evidence to show that it is more likely than not that the police complied with the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions during the search and/or interrogation. If the trial judge finds that the police are not credible, then the judge may grant the motion to suppress for that reason even if what the police claim they did was legal. Thus, on remand, the defense may still argue that the judge found that the police were not credible and that the judge should clarify his or her opinion. However, it is clear that as a matter of law, a violation of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Directives does not automatically result in suppression of the evidence.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients at the trial and appellate level in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We know the law and the defenses that will work in your case, and we recognize the types of defenses and arguments that are going to withstand appellate scrutiny. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.