Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 6/27/18 Zak Goldstein 6/27/18

PA Superior Court Affirms Denial of Motion to Suppress Identification

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Milburn, finding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s Motion to Suppress identification. In Milburn, the court ultimately concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, thereby defeating his Fourth Amendment suppression claim. They also found that police did not conduct an improperly suggestive “show up” procedure, and so the trial court properly rejected his due process claim.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Milburn

On May 4, 2015, the complainant was robbed at gunpoint on North Broad Street in Philadelphia. The robber took the complainant’s iPhone and a backpack containing clothing and medication. This incident took place under a streetlight that was approximately five feet away from the complainant, and he alleged that he was able to see the assailant clearly. After the incident, the assailant instructed the complainant to walk away, which he did. However, he did see the assailant leave the scene in a vehicle with another individual.

The complainant immediately called 9-1-1 and gave the dispatcher a description of his assailant as African American, with a muscular build, medium complexion, and facial hair, and the complainant noted that the robber was wearing black jeans or sweat pants and a gray hoodie sweatshirt. Police arrived on scene and spoke with the complainant. The officers then began to survey the neighborhood while accompanied by the complainant. They utilized the complainant’s “Find My iPhone” application and attempted to locate his phone. However, they were not immediately successful.

A short time later, the officers tried using the “Find My iPhone” application again. This time, they received a notification that the complainant’s phone was in the area of 5th and Erie Avenue in Philadelphia. The officers proceeded to that area and found an A-Plus Mini market. The officers saw a van driving northbound through the gas station parking lot, but there were not any individuals on foot in that area. The van proceeded to exit the lot, but the officers felt that it was driving erratically. The officers then activated their lights. When the van stopped, the officers exited their vehicles and approached with their guns drawn.

As the officers approached the vehicle, they ordered the driver and front seat passenger, the defendant, to place their hands on the steering wheel and dashboard. The driver complied, but the defendant did not. One of the officers claimed that he saw the defendant place a small semiautomatic handgun under his seat. The officers retrieved the gun and placed the defendant in handcuffs. Inside the vehicle, the officer saw a backpack, medication, clothing, and three additional occupants.

As the officers walked the defendant towards the back of the van, the complainant began jumping in his seat in the police car, pointing at the defendant, and nodding his head to indicate that he recognized the defendant as the perpetrator. Police arrested the defendant, conducted a search incident to arrest, and found the complainant’s phone in the defendant’s pocket. The defendant claimed that he had just purchased the phone for ten dollars. The complainant also identified one of the backseat passengers as the second robber. The police obtained a search warrant for the van, and in the van, they found the complainant’s work uniform and name tag. Prosecutors charged the defendant with Robbery, various gun charges, Possession of an Instrument of Crime (“PIC”), Conspiracy, and related charges.

The Motion to Suppress

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence as well as the complainant’s post-incident identification. The trial court denied both the motion to suppress the physical evidence and the complainant’s identification. The defendant elected to proceed by way of jury trial, and the jury found him guilty of Robbery, Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License, Carrying a Firearm in Public in Philadelphia, and PIC. The court sentenced him to 7 ½ to 20 years’ incarceration. He appealed to the Superior Court.

What is a Motion to Suppress an Identification?

Although not as common as motions to suppress physical evidence or statements, a motion to suppress a post-incident identification may be an important tactic in the defense of a criminal case, particularly cases involving Robbery and Burglary charges. However, over the years, Pennsylvania appellate courts have made these motions difficult to win. In general, there are two types of motion to suppress identification. First, the defense may move to exclude a post-incident identification if the circumstances of the identification are such that the identification is so unreliable that the witness should not be allowed to testify to it. These types of motions typically involve unduly suggestive police procedures and complainants who did not have a great opportunity to observe the perpetrator of the crime. Second, the defense may also move to exclude an identification where the police illegally stopped or arrested the defendant and the identification procedure only took place because the defendant was unlawfully in custody. In this situation, the identification would violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights as it would be the fruit of the poisonous tree of the unlawful stop. The court would then exclude the out-of-court identification and conduct a separate analysis of whether there is an independent basis for the witness to make an in-court identification of the defendant.

Generally, an unlawfully obtained pretrial identification will only be excluded from trial if it was obtained by a procedure so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification or if it was tainted by illegal police conduct as to deny the accused due process of law. If a defendant challenges the identification by filing a motion to suppress, the Commonwealth must prove that the identification procedure did not violate the accused’s right to due process or the right to counsel.

In determining whether to admit contested identification evidence when the issue is not whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, the trial court must consider: 1) the opportunity of the witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime; 2) the witness’ degree of attention; 3) the accuracy of his prior description of the perpetrator at the confrontation; 4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation; and 5) the time between the crime and confrontation. Suggestiveness in the identification process is a factor to be considered, but it is not dispositive. In other words, courts often will not prohibit a post-incident identification merely because it was suggestive. As noted in Milburn, the most important factor in addressing the reliability of an identification is the witness’s opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the time of the crime.

To give an extreme example of an impermissible post-incident identification, let’s assume that a defendant is accused of punching a complainant in the back of the head and stealing her purse. This is a robbery. The incident happens in a matter of seconds and the complainant was only able to see the back of her assailant and determine that he was Caucasian, wearing a white shirt and blue jeans. The police then, two hours later, bring two people, but only one is in handcuffs. One is a Caucasian wearing a white shirt and blue jeans, while the other is also a Caucasian man, and is wearing a white shirt, but instead of blue jeans is wearing gym shorts. The one wearing blue jeans is in handcuffs. Neither of these individuals have the complainant’s purse on them. The officer then proceeds to tell the complainant that one of these two is the perpetrator. Consequently, the complainant proceeds to pick the one wearing blue jeans and in handcuffs.

In this hypothetical, the defendant would have a very good chance of suppressing the post-incident identification. Why? First, the defendant has a strong argument that there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop him. A Caucasian man wearing a white t-shirt and blue jeans is not very descriptive and arguably lots of people who would match that description. As such, the defendant in this hypothetical would have a good chance of suppressing the identification on these grounds alone.

However, this is not his only ground to exclude the identification. The defendant could also argue that it should be suppressed because it was suggestive and the complainant had a limited opportunity to observe the assailant. The whole incident only lasted a matter of seconds. Additionally, the hypothetical complainant was not able to see her assailant’s face and was able to give, at best, a very vague description. Finally, the tactics used by the police were highly suggestive. The officer only brought two people to the identification, and only one fit the general description of the assailant. Further, only one of them was in handcuffs. Additionally, the officer told the complainant that one of these people was the one who robbed her and thus suggested that it was the one wearing handcuffs. Thus, this defendant would have strong grounds for suppressing the identification both on Fourth Amendment and Due Process grounds.

Most cases, however, are not this egregious. And over the years the Pennsylvania Superior Court has rarely ruled in favor of the defense. The Superior Court has given great deference to the witness’s supposed opportunity to observe, while ignoring very relevant facts that can skew and taint that person’s memory. For example, if a suspect is in handcuffs during the identification, that does not make it per se impermissibly suggestive even though a reasonable person may believe that because the suspect is in handcuffs, that must be the person who committed the crime.

The Court’s Analysis in Milburn

In Milburn, the Superior Court held that the post-incident identification was not unduly suggestive. The court focused on the complainant’s ability to observe the defendant during the incident. Specifically, the court found that the complainant had ample opportunity to view the defendant’s face during the commission of the crime. The court also focused on the close proximity between the defendant and the complainant, the time between the incident and when Appellant was arrested (three minutes), and how the complainant reacted when he first saw Appellant. The court gave little significance to the fact that Appellant was the only person handcuffed during the identification. Thus, the court found that the identification was not unduly suggestive. Likewise, the Court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the van. The police received information from Find my iPhone, which they had successfully used before on numerous occasions, traveled to the area, which was a high crime area, and saw the van driving erratically as if the driver was not focused on the road. Given the close proximity to the scene of the crime, this gave the police reasonable suspicion to stop the van, and once they stopped the van, they had probable cause to arrest the defendant because they saw the gun in plain view. Therefore, the court also denied the motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, as well.

Milburn is an illustration of the type of case in which the defendant is unlikely to win a motion to suppress identification. However, it is likely that the law in this area may shift back at least somewhat in the favor of the defense given the rise in police body cameras. Prior to the advent of body worn cameras, the trial court could simply take a witness’s word for it that the witness had a great view of the perpetrator and was certain that he or she had picked out the right person. As the witness tells the story and testifies numerous times ranging from the statements to police to the preliminary hearing to the motions hearing, the witness becomes more and more certain that he or she has in fact picked out the right person. The body cameras, however, often show that at the time of the incident, the witness was not so sure. For example, the witness may not have been able to give a detailed or accurate description to police. Or the camera could show that the police were not particularly neutral in asking the witness to make an identification. In these cases, appellate courts may begin to show less deference to a witness’s claim of certainty when the witness is on video stating something different. Therefore, this is an area of law that is extremely likely to be affected as police increasingly wear body cameras.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense attorneys have successfully defended thousands of clients. We have litigated all types of pre-trial motions to suppress and litigated cases involving charges such as Robbery, Burglary, Aggravated Assault and Attempted murder to verdict before judges and juries throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/23/18 Zak Goldstein 6/23/18

US Supreme Court: Police Must Obtain Search Warrant for Cell Phone Location Data

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Carpenter v. United States, holding that police must obtain a search warrant based on probable cause prior to getting cell phone location data from a cell phone provider. In Carpenter, law enforcement officers had obtained cell phone location data for the defendant which linked the defendant to various gunpoint robberies without a search warrant. Therefore, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

The Facts of Carpenter v. United States

In 2011, police arrested four men for robbing a number of Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in Detroit. One of the men confessed that over the previous four months, the group (along with other individuals) had robbed nine different stories in Michigan and Ohio. The suspect identified 15 other people who had participated in the robberies. He gave the FBI some of their cell phone numbers. The FBI then reviewed his call records to identify additional numbers that he had called around the time of the robberies.

Based on this information, the FBI began to suspect Timothy Carpenter, the defendant, of participating in some of the robberies. The FBI obtained court orders under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone records for Carpenter and other suspects. That statute permitted the FBI to compel the disclosure of cell phone records from the cell phone provider based on a showing of specific and articulable facts that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the records sought are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. These court orders are not the same as a search warrant, and the showing necessary to obtain one is much lower than the probable cause standard which law enforcement officers must meet when seeking a search warrant.

The FBI agents obtained two orders from federal magistrate judges directing MetroPCS and Sprint to disclose cell site location data for Carpenter’s phones. The first order sought 152 days of cell-site records from MetroPCS, and MetroPCS produced 127 days worth of records. The second order directed Sprint to produce two days of records for when Carpenter’s phone was roaming in Ohio, and Sprint produced the two days worth of records. In total, the FBI obtained 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements – an average of 101 data points per day.

The Criminal Charges Against Carpenter

The Government eventually charged Carpenter in federal court with six counts of robbery and six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) and 1951(a). Prior to trial, Carpenter’s defense attorneys filed a motion to suppress the cell phone location data, arguing that the FBI violated the Fourth Amendment when it obtained the location data without a search warrant supported by probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Carpenter proceeded to trial, and seven of his co-conspirators testified against him. They indicated that he was the leader of the robbery operation. In addition, an FBI agent offered expert testimony regarding the cell phone data. The agent explained that each time a cell phone taps into a wireless network, the carrier logs a time-stamped record of the cell site and the particular sector that were used. With this information, the FBI agent was able to produce maps that placed Carpenter’s phone near the scene of four of the charged robberies. According to the Government, this data showed that Carpenter was right where the robbery occurred at the exact time of the robbery. The jury found Carpenter guilty of all of the charges except one of the gun charges, and the trial court sentenced him to more than 100 years in prison.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress. It held that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone location data because the information had been shared with his wireless carriers. Given that cell phone users voluntarily convey cell-site data to their carriers in order to use the phone, the court concluded that the business records produced by the carriers are not subject to Fourth Amendment protection on the basis that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in something that a person has shared with someone else.

The Supreme Court Appeal

Carpenter’s defense lawyers appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the case. In what it described as a narrow opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress the cell phone location data. The court noted a number of recent opinions in which the Fourth Amendment has been applied to protect not just places, but also other types of information that people would expect to be private. For example, in Kyllo v. United States, the court held that police could not use a thermal imager to detect heat radiating from the side a defendant’s home (as part of searching for a marijuana grow operation) without a search warrant. Likewise, in Riley v. United States, the court found that law enforcement generally must obtain a search warrant prior to searching a suspect’s cell phone and that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to a cell phone. Finally, in United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that police must obtain a search warrant prior to secretly planting a GPS tracker underneath a suspect’s car and monitoring the tracker for 28 days.

At the same time, the court noted that the third-party doctrine would normally defeat Carpenter’s claim. The third-party doctrine provides that police are not required to obtain a search warrant in order to obtain information which a person has voluntarily shared with third parties. Thus, police may obtain bank records via subpoena without obtaining a search warrant because a person has voluntarily shared their financial information with the bank. Likewise, police need not obtain a search warrant in order to obtain a list of outgoing phone numbers dialed on a landline telephone because the information provided by such a pen register is limited and the numbers are used by the telephone company for a variety of legitimate business purposes.

After analyzing these various cases, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the FBI should have obtained a search warrant for the cell phone data. Although the third-party doctrine has typically applied in cases such as this, where the defendant shared all of the information voluntarily with the cell phone companies, there is something different about a system that creates such a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s movements. Accordingly, given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. The court therefore held that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his or her physical movements as captured by the cell phone companies.

Although the court reversed the conviction in this case, it did note that the decision is meant to be a narrow one. It does not necessarily apply to real-time cell phone location data or “tower dumps” (a download of information on all of the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval). It should also not call into question the prior opinions on bank records and pen registers or prevent the use of evidence obtained from security cameras. Finally, it does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security, and there may also be situations in which exigent circumstances eliminate the need for a search warrant.

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Criminal Defense Attorneys Demetra Mehta and Zak Goldstein

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients. We are experienced and understanding defense attorneys with the skill and expertise to fight even the most serious cases at trial, on appeal, and in Post-Conviction Relief Act litigation. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with a defense lawyer today.

Zak Goldstein 6/3/18 Zak Goldstein 6/3/18

PA Supreme Court: Obvious Typo in Search Warrant Affidavit Does Not Invalidate Otherwise Legitimate Search Warrant

Philadelphia Criminal Lawyer Zak Goldstein

What happens if a search warrant has a mistake in it?

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Leed. In Leed, the Court held that a statement contained in one paragraph of a search warrant affidavit, which when read in context of the entire affidavit appears to be an inadvertent error, does not render the affiant’s information stale and therefore lacking in probable cause.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Leed

Leed involved the use of confidential informants. A detective with the Lancaster County Drug Task Force spoke with a confidential informant who claimed that the defendant was selling large quantities of cocaine and marijuana in Lancaster. The CI claimed to have recently purchased cocaine from the defendant and that the defendant lived at a certain address in Lancaster.

Some time later, a different detective met with a second CI who also claimed that the defendant was selling powder cocaine and marijuana. Both CIs identified the defendant from driver’s license photos. Later, a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Agent spoke with a third individual, who told them that the defendant had been using a storage locker at a storage facility in Lancaster. The DEA agents confirmed that the defendant had rented that storage locker and recently visited it. One of the detectives then requested that a K9 unit conduct a sweep of the storage locker, and the dog gave a positive response to the locker.

Based on this information, the Lancaster County detectives obtained a search warrant for the storage unit. When detectives executed the search warrant, they found 15 pounds of marijuana, $9,900 in cash, plastic bags, a scale, a bank statement, income tax return, and other personal documents in the locker. They then obtained an additional search warrant for the defendant’s bank records.

Police charged the defendant with Possession with the Intent to Deliver and arrested him. While he was in custody in the county prison, the defendant made a phone call to his mother and said incriminating things in the phone call. Prison phone calls are obviously recorded. Based on the confessions in the phone call, police obtained a third search warrant for the defendant’s mother’s home, where they found more money and a cell phone.

The Motion to Suppress

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the information in the search warrant application was stale and therefore lacking in probable cause. Specifically, the defendant focused on a mistake in the warrant's accompanying Affidavit of Probable Cause. In the warrant, the detective mistakenly wrote that the police conducted the K9 sniff of the storage locker on March 21, 2013 instead of March 21, 2014, meaning that the sniff would have taken place more than a year before the search warrant was executed. This would arguably have made the information stale as the fact that the locker may have contained drugs in it a year earlier does not really mean that it is likely to still contain drugs a year later.

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth called the detective to testify that the March 21, 2013 date was an error and he really meant March 21, 2014. The defendant objected on the basis that extrinsic testimony should not have been permitted because challenges to search warrants are usually limited to the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit. Nonetheless, the court permitted the detective to testify that he had made a drafting mistake.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court agreed that it could not consider the detective’s testimony because the only thing that mattered was the actual text of the affidavit. The court, however, found that a common sense reading of the affidavit as a whole suggested that the date was a typo and that the canine sniff had taken place more recently. Therefore, the court concluded that the information was not stale and that there was probable cause to issue the warrant for the storage unit. The defendant ultimately proceeded to trial on the drug charges and was found guilty of Possession with the Intent to Deliver. The court sentenced him to 20 to 60 months’ imprisonment, and the defendant appealed.

The Criminal Appeal

The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately agreed to review the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth and upheld the trial court’s decision. It recognized that search warrants may only be issued based on probable cause. The magistrate or judge who signs off on the warrant may consider only the affidavit of probable cause provided by the detective who applies for the warrant. The Court also noted that the age of the information supporting a warrant application is a factor in determining probable cause. If the information relied upon is too old, then the information is stale, and probable cause may no longer exist. However, staleness is not determined by age alone. Instead, the magistrate (and subsequently the suppression court) must consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether information is stale and probable cause exists. Finally, when a defendant in Pennsylvania challenges a search by arguing that the search warrant lacked probable cause, the only evidence that the suppression court may consider is the affidavit which was prepared in support of the search warrant application. The suppression court should provide deference to the magistrate’s decision, but if the warrant was clearly lacking in probable cause, then the results of the search should be suppressed.

The Court ultimately concluded that the typo with respect to the date of the K9 search did not invalidate the rest of the warrant. The purpose of requiring a search warrant to be based on probable cause is to ensure that police do not act arbitrarily or without sufficient information to justify intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. At the same time, where police clearly have probable cause, obtained a warrant, and simply made a typo which appears to be an obvious mistake based on the other information contained in the warrant, the police should not be punished for the typo. Otherwise, police will respond by being as vague as possible so that they cannot be punished later for typos and other drafting mistakes.

Therefore, the Court held that where the substance of an affidavit, read as a whole, evidences that there is a substantial likelihood that a specific paragraph contains an error, such that any reasonable possibility that the police will act without the requisite probable cause is eliminated, the error will not be viewed in isolation and the warrant will be deemed valid, so long as the probable cause affidavit is otherwise sufficient. Accordingly, an obvious typo will not be enough to defeat an otherwise valid search warrant. At the same time, major mistakes in a warrant or mistakes which are not obviously typos could still lead to a successful challenge to a search. Here, the court found that it was obvious that the detectives made a mistake because the warrant was otherwise in chronological order. Therefore, the court ruled against the defendant.

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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We are experienced and understanding defense attorenys who will fight for you. We offer a free 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to each potential client. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/31/18 Zak Goldstein 5/31/18

US Supreme Court: Police Need Warrant to Search Car Parked in Driveway

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Collins v. Virginia, holding that police must obtain a search warrant prior to searching a car or other automobile that is parked in a person’s driveway.

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak Goldstein

The United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Collins v. Virginia, holding that police need a search warrant to search a person’s automobile when it is parked in the driveway or other “curtilage” of a person’s home. This is an important decision that limits the ability of police to search your house and the surrounding areas without a search warrant pursuant to the “Automobile Exception” to the Fourth Amendment.

The Facts of Collins v. Virginia

On an unspecified date, an Albemarle County, VA Police Officer observed the driver of an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame committing a traffic infraction. This driver eluded the officer’s attempt to stop him. A few weeks later, a different officer within the same department encountered an individual operating a similar motorcycle traveling above the speed limit. This officer was also not able to stop this individual.

The officers subsequently compared notes and concluded that it was the same individual who got away on each date. Additionally, the officers were able to determine that the motorcycle was stolen and in the possession of the defendant. The police then searched the defendant’s Facebook account and saw pictures of the motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house. Through additional investigation, the officers were able to determine the address of the house and that the house belonged to the defendant’s girlfriend.

One of the officers then went to this house and saw what appeared to be a motorcycle under a white tarp. The officer did not have a search warrant, but he exited his car and went to the house. From there, he then went onto the driveway, lifted the tarp, and saw what appeared to be the motorcycle that had escaped police on the two previous occasions. The officer ran the license plate and VIN for the motorcycle and found that it had been reported stolen. The officer took a photograph of the motorcycle and then put the tarp back on the motorcycle. The officer then left the property and returned to his car to wait for the defendant. The defendant returned home shortly thereafter. The officer then walked up to the house and knocked on the door. The defendant answered the door and agreed to speak with the officer. The defendant promptly admitted that the motorcycle belonged to him and that he had purchased it without a title. The officer arrested him.

State prosecutors charged the defendant with receiving stolen property. The defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress to suppress the evidence that the officer obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the motorcycle. The defendant argued that the officer had trespassed on the curtilage of his property in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. The defendant then appealed. Both the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision on the Automobile Exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The defendant then petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear the case which the Court granted certiorari.

What is the Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement of the Fourth Amendment?

The Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment has existed for nearly a hundred years. In essence, the Automobile Exception is judge-made law that allows police to search an automobile without a search warrant, so long as there was probable cause to justify the search. This exception was first articulated in Carroll v. United States, a 1925 Supreme Court decision that upheld a warrantless search and seizure of an automobile.

In Carroll, the Supreme Court reasoned that law enforcement should not be required to obtain a search warrant in order to search a car because a car is mobile and could leave the scene by the time an officer obtained a warrant. In subsequent years, the Supreme Court solidified the Automobile Exception, but it also adopted additional rationales to justify these warrantless searches. Specifically, the Court has also held that because automobiles are so highly regulated, a warrant is not needed. This was the Court’s justification for approving of the police acting without a warrant in cases such as California v. Carney and South Dakota v. Opperman. For a long time, Pennsylvania did not permit the Automobile Exception. However, this changed in 2014, when a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the case of Commonwealth v. Gary. Gary eliminated the requirement that police obtain a search warrant before searching an automobile in order for evidence obtained from the vehicle to be admissible in state court criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the Automobile Exception does not apply when the automobile is on the curtilage of one’s property. Curtilage is the property connected to one’s home, i.e. a driveway. The United States Supreme Court has defined it as “an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of home life extends.” Therefore, the Court stated that “[w]hen a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred…[s]uch conduct thus is presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant.”

As such, the Court found that the officer invaded the defendant’s Fourth Amendment interest in his home. The home is one of the most protected interests in Fourth Amendment law and there is nothing in Automobile Exception jurisprudence that allows the police search one’s home. The Court further expressed a concern that police, under the guise of the Automobile Exception, would search individual’s homes. The Court put it very simply “[i]t is, after all, an exception for automobiles” and held that the police needed a warrant to search the defendant’s motorcycle in his driveway.

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