Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog
PA Superior Court Reverses Order Granting Motion to Suppress For Lack of Specificity in Grounds
What is a Motion to Suppress?
The Motion to Suppress is one of the first lines of defense in any case in which the defendant is charged with possessing some kind of contraband. For a defendant who is charged with the possession of guns or drugs, it may be possible to have the evidence excluded from trial and the charges dismissed if the defendant was subject to an illegal search or seizure. In cases where the prosecution is unable to show that police or other law enforcement officers found the evidence in a manner that complies with the requirements of the United Sates and Pennsylvania Constitutions, the evidence could be suppressed by filing a Motion to Suppress. However, Pennsylvania appellate courts have increasingly required defendants to be very specific when asserting the grounds for the Motion to Suppress in the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Banks
In the case of Commonwealth v. Banks, the Superior Court has reversed an order suppressing a firearm and K2 (synthetic marijuana) whichallegedly belonged to the defendant. The Court concluded that although the trial court found that a constitutional violation had occurred, the defendant’s attorney failed to specifically allege that particular constitutional violation either in his written Motion to Suppress or oral statement of the grounds for the Motion which was made prior to the hearing. Accordingly, the Court found that the Commonwealth did not have a fair opportunity to respond to the alleged constitutional violation, and therefore the suppression order should be reversed.
Banks involved a parole search by Pennsylvania State Parole Agents. According to the agents involved, the Parole Board received an anonymous tip that Banks was violating his parole. Based on the tip, two agents went to Banks’ house and knocked on the door. When Banks emerged from the house, the parole agents questioned him on the front porch. They did not see any contraband in the house when the door was open, and they did not enter the house until after they spoke with Banks. Of course, when the agents asked whether Banks had anything in his house which would violate his parole, Banks freely told them that he had a gun and some synthetic marijuana in the house. Following Banks admissions, the agents entered the house and found the contraband. They then called the police. The police obtained a search warrant and recovered the items.
Standards for Probation Searches and Parole Searches
In Pennsylvania, probation officers and parole agents may conduct two types of searches. They may always make routine home visits in order to check on the probationer or parolee and look for any obvious parole violations. Home visits are limited to a plain-view inspection of a residence. Additionally, if they have reasonable suspicion of a parole violation, then parole agents may conduct a full search of the parolee’s residence. In general, anonymous tips do not provide reasonable suspicion because there is no basis for believing them to be trustworthy. Therefore, Banks’ attorneys filed a Motion to Suppress alleging that the firearm and K2 should be suppressed because the parole agents conducted a home search without reasonable suspicion. They further argued that the search was not part of a routine home visit because the agents went out to the house specifically to investigate the anonymous tip.
The trial court disagreed with Banks’ lawyers in part. The court found that the agents violated Banks’ rights, but for different reasons than those alleged in the Motion to Suppress. It found that the agents did not conduct a home search until after Banks confessed to having a gun and synthetic marijuana, and once Banks confessed, the officers clearly had reasonable suspicion to enter the house. However, the court found that the officers conducted the equivalent of a “Terry” stop on Banks by ordering him to come out of the house and submit to their questions. Therefore, the officers were required to have reasonable suspicion for the stop. Because the stop was based entirely on an anonymous tip, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion, and the contraband that they found was the fruit of the poisonous tree and should be suppressed.
Specificity in Motions to Suppress
On appeal, the Superior Court reversed. The Superior Court found that Banks’ lawyers had failed to comply with Rule 581(D) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the rules, the defense must “state specifically and with particularity the evidence sought to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts and events in support thereof.” In their written motion and subsequent oral grounds, the lawyers mentioned only the suspicion-less search of the residence. They never made any allegation that the interrogation on the porch was conducted without the requisite level of reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the Superior Court held that the Commonwealth was not properly on notice of the grounds for the motion and did not have a fair opportunity to respond. The Court reversed the granting of the motion and remanded the case for trial. It is unclear whether Banks will be able to amend the grounds and re-litigate the motion in the trial court. However, his lawyers will almost certainly try.
Banks is highly illustrative of the fact that the Superior Court is not currently very sympathetic to criminal defendants. The case also shows the importance of litigating in the trial court with a careful focus on the Rules of Criminal Procedure and an eye on making sure that the defendant’s rights are protected in the event of an appeal by either side. If an appellate court can avoid a difficult issue such as whether a gun was properly suppressed by finding waiver on the part of the defense, an appellate court will often do so. Judges do not want to suppress guns, and they will look for ways to avoid doing so. Therefore, it is important to make sure that all possible grounds for a motion to suppress are covered both in the written motion and orally prior to trial. It is also critically important to take all possible steps to protect the record for appeal, which means making appropriate objections and motions so that they are not waived in the event the defendant is convicted at trial.
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If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully represented thousands of clients in both trial and post-trial proceedings. We have won motions to suppress guns, drugs, and other contraband. We will do everything we can to fight for you and obtain the best possible result at trial or on appeal. Call 267-225-2545 for a free criminal defense strategy session today.
PA Superior Court: Police May Not Use Pretext to Stop Defendant One Month After Drug Sales
Superior Court Enforces Limits on Police Stops
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just held that in the absence of more recent criminal activity, police may not conduct a Terry stop of a defendant for selling drugs one month after the defendant sold the drugs. In Commonwealth v. Parker, police officers in Lancaster County investigated drug sales in June and July of 2014. During that investigation, the defendant, who police knew only by the street name “Heart,” allegedly sold drugs to an undercover police officer. The officers recorded a description of Heart’s appearance and that he walked with a limp, but they did not attempt to stop or arrest him at that time.
In August, one of the officers from the drug surveillance operation saw the defendant near a local McDonald’s. The officer testified that he was 100% sure that the defendant was “Heart,” meaning he was the same person who had sold drugs to the undercover officer. The officer then made the decision to stop the defendant in order to find out his real name. The officer, however, did not observe the defendant doing anything illegal that day.
Despite the fact that the defendant had not done anything illegal that day, two officers stopped the defendant as he was walking away from the McDonald’s. One of the officers who stopped him told him that there had been a disturbance at the McDonald’s and that he believed the defendant was part of the disturbance. He asked the defendant for his name, date of birth, address, telephone number, and social security number because the defendant did not have identification on him. After the officers confirmed the defendant’s identity, they released him. The officers agreed at the motion to suppress that the only reason they stopped him was to identify him for purposes of their drug investigation, and one of the officers specifically testified that the stop was part of a “ruse.”
Even Identifying Information Can Be Incriminating
Although the information obtained by police during the stop may seem relatively harmless, it turned out to be very incriminating. Police had used the phone number given by the defendant during the stop to set up the narcotics transactions earlier in the summer. Accordingly, despite learning only relatively basic identifying information, the phone number turned out to be very incriminating because it connected the defendant to the drug sales and increased the likelihood that the police were correct in believing him to be "Heart."
The Motion to Suppress
Eventually, police arrested defendant Parker and charged him with Possession with the Intent to Deliver and Criminal Use of a Communications Facility. Prior to trial, Parker moved to suppress the information obtained by police during the pretextual stop, including the incriminating phone number. Parker’s attorneys argued that the police did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Parker on the day of the incident. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial judge found that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant because they had seen him sell drugs in June and July. The defendant was eventually convicted of drug charges following a jury trial, and he appealed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Types of Police Encounters at Issue on Appeal
On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The court noted that there are three types of police encounters. The most restrictive encounter is a “mere encounter.” A mere encounter does not require any level of reasonable suspicion or probable cause because the suspect is not compelled to stop or searched. Thus, if police had merely encountered defendant Parker, then the information they obtained could not be suppressed because police may conduct a mere encounter without any level of suspicion.
The next level of encounter is an “investigative detention.” An investigative detention, often called a Terry stop, requires police to have reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion means that the police have specific, articulable facts leading the officer to believe that criminal activity is afoot. Here, the Commonwealth certainly argued that police would have had reasonable suspicion from observing the defendant engaged in drug sales earlier in the summer. Parker's attorneys, however, argued that the police did not have reasonable suspicion because the drugs sales did not take place that day.
Finally, the most restrictive type of seizure, which was not really at issue in this case, is a full-blown arrest. An arrest requires probable cause, which means the officer is aware of facts making it objectively more likely than not that the defendant committed a crime. Whether or not an arrest has occurred typically involves an analysis of whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe themselves to be under arrest. Some of the many factors in whether a stop is an arrest could include whether police used handcuffs, displayed weapons, told the suspect he or she was under arrest, gave Miranda warnings, or transported the suspect to the police station.
Investigative Detention
The Superior Court agreed with the trial court that the defendant was subject only to an investigate detention. He was stopped and asked for information, but he was not handcuffed, transported, interrogated for a lengthy period of time, or told he was under arrest. However, he was not free to leave because he was stopped by two uniformed officers who told him that he was suspected of criminal activity and demanded information from him. Although the request for identification alone does not convert a mere encounter into an investigatory detention, the request for identification coupled with the police officers telling the defendant that they suspected him of wrongdoing would lead a reasonable person in his position to feel that he was not free to leave. Therefore, police were required to at least have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot in order to stop him.
Police Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion
The Superior Court found that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Parker because although he may have engaged in criminal activity in June, they had not seen him do anything at all on the day that they stopped him. He was simply walking down the street, and his lack of criminal activity prompted the police to invent a pretext that he had been part of a disturbance at the McDonald’s. Accordingly, the results of the illegal stop must be suppressed. Therefore, Parker will receive a new trial in the lower court at which the illegally obtained evidence cannot be introduced.
Although the opinion is certainly of benefit to Parker and others in similar situations, the Superior Court's reasoning is unclear. The opinion focused almost entirely on whether the stop was a mere encounter or a Terry stop, and the Superior Court failed to fully explain why the police no longer had reasonable suspicion. Clearly, if Parker had sold drugs to the police earlier in the summer, then the police would have had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop and/or arrest Parker at that time. Probable cause, however, can become "stale." If police do not act on information quickly enough, then they may no longer be able to act on it. Police may have been able to obtain an arrest warrant for him, but they did not have the right to stop Parker without a warrant more than a month after the prior sales. Further, the court could have been concerned about the police use of lies to justify the stop and interrogation.
We Can Help With Criminal Charges
If you are charged with selling or possessing illegal drugs, you need an experienced drug charges attorney who can investigate and evaluate your case, determine if your rights have been violated, and provide you with all of the options and a strong defense. You do not have to plead guilty just because the police found drugs on or near you or in a vehicle. The prosecution must prove that the search was legal and that the drugs were yours. We have the experience to challenge them every step of the way. Call 267-225-2545 for a confidential criminal defense strategy session.
PA Superior Court: If Police Have Probable Cause to Search a Car, They May Search All Containers In the Car
Police May Search Bags and Purses in a Car If They Have Probable Cause to Search the Car
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Runyan, 2017 PA Super 114. In Runyan, the Commonwealth sought reversal of a suppression order which found that police could not automatically search the purse of a passenger in an automobile even where police had probable cause to search the car itself. The Superior Court held that if police have probable cause to search a car, they may search all containers within the car in which they could reasonably expect to find the object of their search. Accordingly, police in Pennsylvania no longer need a search warrant in order to search bags or other containers in a car if they have probable cause for the search of the car. This is true regardless of whether there is any link between the container being searched and the driver of the car. In other words, police may search the purses and luggage of passengers in the car.
The Car Search
In Runyan, local police officers in Mercer County observed a sedan parked with four occupants in it. Police observed the sedan in an area that the officers described as a high crime, high drug area. The vehicle was parked there late at night, so officers approached the vehicle to see what was going on.
As one of the officers approached the vehicle, he smelled the door of burnt marijuana coming from the area around the vehicle. When he walked up to the passenger side door, he could see a small bag of marijuana on the back seat passenger side floor. Naturally, the officer mentioned the bag of marijuana to the occupants of the car. The driver then attempted to crawl from the front of the car into the back seat and exit the car. At that point, the police officers asked everyone to get out of the car, handcuffed each occupant of the car, and began searching the vehicle.
Upon searching the car, the officer recovered the bag of marijuana which he had seen on the floor. Additionally, he found a number of purses in the car, and the officer searched those purposes. In one of the purses, he found a spoon, syringe, and crack pipe. The spoon had white residue on it, so the officer concluded that he had found drug paraphernalia. In another purse, the officer found a spoon with white residue on it and a number of syringes. That purse, unfortunately, also had the identification card for the defendant, Ms. Runyan.
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
Based on the discovery of the drug paraphernalia in the purse, the officers arrested Ms. Runyan and charged her with possession of drug paraphernalia. Ms. Runyan moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that although police may have had probable cause to search the car, they were required to and did not have independent probable cause to search her purse. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to suppress. The court found that the “warrantless search of purses of passengers of a vehicle is not justified by the search incident to arrest exception.”
Police May Search A Car Without A Warrant – But They Must Have Probable Cause
The Commonwealth appealed, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the drug paraphernalia. The Superior Court cited the recent case of Commonwealth v. Gary in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that police do not need a warrant to search an automobile. Instead, because of the inherent movability of a vehicle and possibility that evidence could be lost during the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant, police may search an automobile whenever they have probable cause to do so. Probable cause means that it is more likely than not that the police will find some sort of contraband or evidence in the car. Obviously, the odor of marijuana, bag of marijuana in plain view, driver’s attempt to flee from the back of the car, and the officer’s extensive experience in making drug and marijuana arrests all combined to establish probable cause that there would be some kind of drugs or more marijuana in the vehicle. Therefore, the Superior Court held that officers could search any container in the car in which the contraband could be concealed, including Ms. Runyan’s purse.
The United States Supreme Court has already held that police may search any containers within a car when police have probable cause to do so. Therefore, following the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision, Pennsylvania and federal courts will now apply the same standard in automobile search cases. Police need only probable cause in order to search any container within the car.
There Are Defenses in Car Search Cases
Despite the Superior Court’s ruling, there are often still defenses in cases involving searches of cars. Although police may search the car and the containers therein when they have probable cause, it is often possible to challenge both the initial stop of the vehicle and whether the police really had the probable cause to conduct the search. First, depending on the type of stop, police must have either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to actually conduct a stop of a vehicle. If the defense can show that the police stopped the car arbitrarily or pretextually, it may be possible to have all of the results of the stop suppressed. Second, if the police did not actually have probable cause to search the car, then the results of the illegal search would be suppressed. Here, police saw drugs in plain view and the driver attempted to flee, but in many cases, the evidence of contraband is not so obvious and can be challenged. Finally, many drug possession and gun possession cases raise issues of constructive possession. In this case, Ms. Runyan made the foolish decision to store her identification card with her drug paraphernalia. However, in most cases, people do not do that. Had her ID not been with the contraband, then police would have had a difficult time establishing to whom the purse belonged without some kind of statement.
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Zak T. Goldstein, Esq - Philadelphia Drug Lawyer
The Philadelphia Criminal Defense and Drug Defense Lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC can help with drug and gun cases in Philadelphia. We have litigated and won countless motions to suppress and possession cases involving vehicle searches and other searches in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Our lawyers will work closely with you to build the strongest possible defense to your charges. Call 267-225-2545 for a complimentary, 15-minute criminal defense strategy session.
PA Superior Court Rejects Search Warrant Issued on Word of Unproven Confidential Informant
The Use of Confidential Informants in Drug Cases
It is not a secret that the police often use confidential informants in the investigation of narcotics offenses. However, even when police make arrests and prosecutors bring charges based on evidence obtained by confidential informants, the identity of the confidential informant and extent to which police have used the CI in the past often remain a secret. The use of confidential informants is particularly prone to abuse. In cases where courts do not require prosectors to provide information about the identity of the confidential informant and proof of the CI's reliability, the defense is left with few options for challenging or verifying the testimony of the police officer about the evidence allegedly obtained by the CI.
Instead, officers are routinely permitted to testify, often without specifics, that the confidential informant has provided reliable information in the past and should therefore be trusted now. Likewise, despite the constitutional right to cross-examine one’s accusers in a criminal case afforded by the Confrontation Clause, Pennsylvania courts have increasingly accepted police and prosecution arguments that revealing the identity of the confidential informant in any case would jeopardize the safety of the confidential informant. Therefore, courts often deny defense attempts to learn any information about the confidential informant and deny motions to reveal the CI's identity.
Confidential Informants Must Be Reliable In Order to Provide Probable Cause
In Commonwealth v. Charles Manuel (likely no relation to the World Series-winning Phillies manager), the Pennsylvania Superior Court appears to have reached its limit. In many cases, judges take an officer’s word for it on whether the CI has been reliable and whether the CI’s safety would be jeopardized by disclosure to the defense. In Manuel, the Superior Court held that the fact that the CI provided information on one prior occasion which led to an arrest did not sufficiently establish that the CI was reliable enough for police to obtain a search warrant based on the CI’s word alone.
In Manuel, police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s house based solely on the word of a confidential informant. The confidential informant told officers that he or she had been to the defendant’s house and observed a marijuana grow operation. Police had also used the CI on one prior occasion, and the prior use of the CI led to an arrest. At the time of the investigation, however, the charges stemming from the prior investigation were still pending and had not been adjudicated. Accordingly, officers could not establish that the CI’s prior information was reliable enough to lead to an actual conviction. Finally, officers asserted that they had corroborated the CI's allegations because the CI told the officers the names of the occupants of the house.
After officers checked real estate records and confirmed that the CI had correctly identified the owner of the house, officers applied for a search warrant. In the warrant, the officers indicated that the CI was reliable because the CI’s prior information had led to an arrest and that the public records check provided corroboration of the CI’s allegation that officers would find a grow operation. Because officers wrote that the CI observed the alleged marijuana grow operation, a magistrate granted a search warrant for the property. Of course, when officers executed the search warrant, they did find a marijuana grow operation. The trial judge denied the ensuing motion to suppress, and the defendants were convicted of Possession with the Intent to Deliver marijuana.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the defendants’ convictions. The Court ruled that the trial judge should have granted the motion to suppress because the warrant was lacking in probable cause. In many cases, the word of a confidential informant may be enough to obtain a search warrant. The court noted, for example, that an informant’s tip may constitute probable cause where police independently corroborate the tip, or where the informant has provided accurate information of criminal activity in the past, or where the informant himself participated in the criminal activity. However, there must be some real basis for believing the CI’s information to be reliable. In many cases, the police will use the CI to conduct controlled buys or conduct some other investigation of the defendant in order to corroborate the CI’s allegations. Once the allegations have been corroborated, the officers may obtain a valid search warrant.
Here, however, the officers simply failed to corroborate the allegations of the confidential informant, and there was nothing to suggest that the CI was in fact reliable. Although there is no magic number of arrests or convictions for which a CI must have previously provided information in order to be deemed reliable, it is clear that one prior arrest is not enough. The court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances, but in the absence of some corroboration, one prior arrest is likely insufficient. Because the information from the CI failed to establish probable cause, the warrant was defective. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the defendants’ convictions and the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress.
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If you or a loved one are under investigation or facing drug charges, we can help. Contact the Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers of Goldstein Mehta LLC today. Our defense attorneys have extensive experience fighting drug charges in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have obtained successful results in cases involving alleged observed drug transactions, expert witnesses, and controlled buys involving confidential informants. Call 267-225-2545 for a free, 15-minute criminal defense strategy session.