Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 3/21/24 Zak Goldstein 3/21/24

PA Superior Court: Police Do Not Need a Search Warrant to Get Parolee’s GPS Monitoring Data

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Rosendary, holding that the police do not need a search warrant to get a parolee’s GPS monitoring data from parole agents so long as the parolee was already on GPS monitoring for reasons unrelated to the investigation of the new crime. In this case, the defendant’s GPS monitor put him at the scene of the crime, but the police had obtained that data without getting a search warrant for it. The Superior Court, however, rejected Rosendary’s arguments that the evidence should be suppressed, finding that police do not need a search warrant to get this type of data from parole agents and that the police did not use the parole agents as “stalking horses” for the police investigation.

The Facts of Rosendary

The defendant was on parole for a robbery conviction. As part of his parole, he was eventually placed on GPS monitoring. He signed a consent form agreeing to the monitoring. He did not have much of a choice, though, as the alternative to GPS monitoring would have been incarceration. The police subsequently arrested him and charged him with another robbery. At his trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence from his parole GPS ankle monitor which incriminated him by putting him at the crime scene.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the GPS data. He argued that the police should have obtained a search warrant in order to get the GPS information from his parole agent and that alternatively, the parole agent had worked as a “stalking horse” for the police in order to evade the warrant requirement. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Superior Court denied the appeal. First, it rejected the defendant’s argument that the police violated the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement by getting the GPS data without a search warrant. Although the police ordinarily need a search warrant in order to get GPS location data for a suspect, the Court held that they did not need to get a search warrant in this case. Specifically, the defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in his GPS data because he was on parole, he had agreed to wear the monitor in lieu of incarceration, and he knew that the data would be shared with his parole agent. Thus, he had no reasonable expectation that the data would be kept private, and he had agreed to wear the ankle monitor. Therefore, law enforcement did not need a search warrant to get the data. Further, the parole agent had not shared unlimited data with the police. Instead, the parole agent had shared only the location data for where the defendant was at the time of his suspected involvement in the robbery. The Court found that this was not a significant intrusion into his privacy because the data shared was limited in time and scope.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s stalking horse challenge. Under the stalking horse doctrine, the police may not take advantage of a suspect’s status as a probationer or parolee to avoid the warrant requirement. In other words, the police may not ask probation or parole to conduct a warrantless search for the purpose of finding evidence related to a police investigation. Instead, the police should get a warrant. For example, if a defendant could show that the police had asked a probation officer to conduct a search of the defendant’s house to look for evidence because the police suspected the defendant of a crime, then that search could potentially violate the stalking horse doctrine and require suppression of the evidence. Here, however, the defendant introduced no evidence that the police had directed the search or directed parole to put the defendant on GPS monitoring. He was already on GPS monitoring, and the police simply requested the data from his parole agent. As he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data, the parole agent was free to share this information with the police.

The Takeaway

This result is not particularly surprising. It is usually not possible to suppress evidence that was shared with the public as suppression requires a reasonable expectation of privacy. A probationer or parolee who is subject to GPS monitoring has no real reason to believe that the evidence would be kept private, so courts are generally not going to suppress it.

As a general rule, it’s best not to commit new crimes while wearing a probation or parole GPS tracking device. The evidence will likely be admissible in court, and the police will not be required to get a search warrant for the evidence. There is still the possibility of challenging the collection of this type of evidence should the defendant be able to show that probation or parole improperly conducted a search at the request of the police and that the police may not have otherwise had the authority to conduct such a search, but that type of violation is often difficult to prove.

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Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 3/20/24 Zak Goldstein 3/20/24

PA Superior Court: Hearsay from Confidential Informant Admissible at Preliminary Hearing if Commonwealth Asserts CI Will Testify at Trial

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

JUNE 6, 2024 UPDATE: The validity of this case is questionable following the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Harris. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the Commonwealth must introduce at least some non-hearsay evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of an offense in order to meet its burden at a preliminary hearing. It is hard to see how the police department’s decision to use a confidential informant or a desire to protect the identity of a CI would allow the Commonwealth to distinguish the clear holding of Harris and rely entirely on the hearsay of a CI in order to meet its burden at a preliminary hearing.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Sutton, holding that the Commonwealth may introduce hearsay evidence as to what a confidential informant (“CI”) told the police at the preliminary hearing so long as the Commonwealth certifies that the CI will be available to testify at trial. This case presents two major issues: 1) the Commonwealth almost never actually calls a CI to testify at trial, and there is no mechanism in place to ensure that the Commonwealth does not simply say the CI will be available to testify and then that they have changed their minds about that when the case gets to the trial level, and 2) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clearly held that hearsay may not be used to establish a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt at the preliminary hearing. Nonetheless, the Superior Court dismissed these concerns and reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the case against the defendant.

The Facts of Sutton

The Commonwealth charged the defendant with two counts of possession with the intent to deliver. At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth called one witness, Detective Michael Lamana of the Bradford County Drug Taskforce. Detective Lamana testified that on two dates in February and March of 2022, he worked with a confidential informant to purchase drugs from someone inside of the defendant’s house. Specifically, he went to the house with a CI, searched the CI for drugs and money, and after finding nothing on the CI, gave the CI pre-recorded buy money. He then sent the CI into the house to buy drugs. He could not see inside the house, so he obviously had no way of seeing what occurred inside, if the defendant was even present at the time, or if someone else could have sold drugs to the CI. The CI then returned with methamphetmaine and no money, suggesting the CI had purchased drugs inside.

The problem with this evidence, however, is that it establishes only that the CI probably bought drugs at the defendant’s house; it does not establish that the defendant in fact sold the drugs. Accordingly, this evidence would be insufficient to hold the defendant for court at a preliminary hearing. Recognizing this fact, the magisterial district justice allowed the detective to testify that the CI told him that they had bought the drugs from the defendant. With this hearsay testimony in evidence, the district justice was able to hold the case for court and send it to the Court of Common Pleas.

The Motion to Quash

The defendant filed a motion to quash (also known as a petition for writ of habeas corpus outside of Philadelphia) and asked the Court of Common Pleas to dismiss the charges because the Commonwealth improperly relied entirely on hearsay in getting the case held for court. Ultimately, the evidence that the CI bought drugs from inside of the defendant’s house was not enough to identify the defendant as actually selling the drugs. Someone else could have been living there or selling drugs from that location. And the hearsay obviously should not have been admitted given that the Supreme Court held in McClelland and the Superior Court held in Harris that prima facie case may not be established solely through hearsay. The Court of Common Pleas followed this binding precedent and dismissed the charges.

The Appeal

The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's decision. On appeal, the prosecution argued that it had presented some non-hearsay evidence in the form of the detective’s actual observations, it had certified that the CI would be available to testify at trial, and the rules limiting the use of hearsay at a preliminary hearing only prevent the Commonwealth from getting a case held for court based solely on hearsay. They do not prevent the Commonwealth from using some hearsay to get the case held for court or require the Commonwealth to disclose the identity of a CI by putting the CI on the witness stand at such an early stage in the proceedings. Therefore, the Commonwealth essentially argued for an exception to the rule that hearsay alone may not be used to establish the identity of the perpetrator of a crime at the preliminary hearing.

Superior Court's Decision

The Superior Court reinstated the charges on appeal. A divided panel of the Superior Court agreed. One judge concurred only in the result, opining that the evidence that drugs have been sold to the CI from the defendant’s home on two occasions was enough to establish a prima facie case for preliminary hearing purposes even without the hearsay from the CI. The other two judges, however, ruled that the Commonwealth may properly introduce the hearsay statements of a confidential informant at a preliminary hearing without violating the decisions in McClelland and Harris so long as the Commonwealth agrees to make the CI available for trial.

The court emphasized that the preliminary hearing’s purpose is to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed to trial, not to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It highlighted that the Commonwealth's use of the CI’s statements through Detective Lamana’s testimony, alongside direct evidence of the controlled buys, sufficed to establish a prima facie case for the charges to proceed to trial.

Moreover, the court addressed the qualified privilege to protect the CI's identity, noting that disclosure at the preliminary hearing stage was not mandated. The ruling underscored that the CI's identity and the details of their statements could be protected, provided that the CI would be available to testify at trial. In the court’s view, this would balance the interests of law enforcement in prosecuting drug crimes and the defendant's right to a fair defense. Therefore, the court reinstated the charges.

Conclusion and Implications

This case is a disaster for maintaining due process protections at the preliminary hearing level. Those protections were only recently re-established by the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. McClelland. For years, the Superior Court had ruled that the Commonwealth need not present any non-hearsay evidence at a preliminary hearing at all. The Supreme Court eventually reversed that line of cases in McClelland, holding that the rule against hearsay does apply at the preliminary hearing with limited exceptions, and the Superior Court went even further in Harris by holding that even where the Commonwealth establishes that a crime occurred through non-hearsay evidence, it must introduce real evidence to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. These protections are absolutely critical. The preliminary hearing happens early in the proceedings - generally within a few weeks or months of a defendant’s arrest. And in a serious case such as a shooting, homicide, or drug or gun case where a defendant is on probation or parole, the defendant is likely in custody and may remain in custody until the case is resolved. The final resolution of a case may not occur for years in some instances. Therefore, the right to a meaningful preliminary hearing is critical as it prevents people from being held for years based on cases that the Commonwealth will never be able to actually prove in court with real evidence.

This decision, however, completely eliminates those protections for any defendant who is charged with a drug or gun offense based on an investigation involving a confidential informant. The Supreme Court’s case law and the Superior Court’s other case law does not support such a broad holding, so hopefully the defendant will appeal further and ask the Superior Court for re-argument or the Supreme Court to grant allocatur. Finally, at least in Philadelphia, the Commonwealth never actually makes the CI available for trial. Indeed, the Commonwealth will typically withdraw charges if they lose a motion to reveal the identity of the confidential informant rather than actually allow the defense to call that person to testify. Therefore, the case may be of limited impact in many places. It nonetheless poses a huge risk of the exception swallowing the general rule and reverse significant progress that has occurred over the last few years in terms of making sure that the preliminary hearing is a meaningful hearing and opportunity to test the evidence so that an innocent or over-charged defendant does not remain in custody for years waiting for trial without any chance to challenge the evidence.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys in Philadelphia

Zak Goldstein 3/19/24 Zak Goldstein 3/19/24

Attorney Goldstein Obtains Dismissal of Bucks County Felony Charges for Making a Materially False Statement in Connection with a Firearm Purchase

Philadelphia criminal defense lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, obtained the full dismissal of felony charges at the preliminary hearing for a client who was charged in Bucks County with allegedly making a materially false statement on the background check application that he filled out in an attempt to buy a firearm.

In the case of Commonwealth v. M.S., prosecutors alleged that M.S. went to a gun show in Bucks County to try to buy a gun and provided false information about his criminal record on the form.

How does the background check process work when buying a gun in Pennsylvania?

Every purchase of a firearm in Pennsylvania requires the purchaser to fill out two background check forms – one for the Pennsylvania State Police and one for the ATF. The state police form asks a number of questions such as whether the purchaser is ineligible to buy a gun due to certain prior convictions (generally those enumerated in the felon in possession of a firearm statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105) as well as questions about prior 302 mental health commitments and convictions for domestic violence.

The ATF form asks whether the purchaser has ever been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in jail. For state court misdemeanors, the definitions section on the back of the form clarifies that the question only applies to a state court misdemeanor punishable by more than two years in jail, meaning that a non-domestic violence misdemeanor of the second degree in Pennsylvania is not a problem, but a first degree misdemeanor is. Notably, the forms also require the purchaser to confirm that they are purchasing the gun for themselves rather than someone else. There is an exception where the purchaser seeks to purchase it for a close family member who is legally eligible to own a firearm (such as a spouse or child).

In this case, the police claimed that M.S. lied on the form by checking off that he did not have a conviction for a crime punishable by more than a year because he had a misdemeanor of the first degree theft conviction from more than thirty years ago. Technically, according to the language of the form and the federal law (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)), this M1 theft conviction made M.S. ineligible to possess a firearm.

What happens if you fail the background check when trying to buy a gun?

The gun seller ran M.S. through the State Police background check system, the system recognized his old conviction, and he was not permitted to purchase the firearm. Most people do not realize, however, that the system then notifies the state police about the attempted purchase, and the state police frequently file felony charges under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111. The ATF could also file federal charges along with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. § 6111 makes it a felony to make a materially false statement on either the state police or ATF background check forms. In order to prove a violation of the statute, however, the Commonwealth has to show 1) that the defendant was the person who actually filled out the form, 2) that the statement was in fact false, 3) that the statement was material, meaning important, and 4) that the defendant knew it was false and did not just make a mistake.

Obviously, the questions are confusing. The state form asks about crimes listed in § 6105, and people often do not know exactly of what they were convicted, particularly where the conviction is older. For someone who has a prior robbery or aggravated assault, there is probably not going to be a strong argument that the person was confused. But where someone has an old misdemeanor or a few DUIs, they may well have not realized that they were ineligible to possess a firearm.

Similarly, the federal form asks whether the person was convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison, and the form then actually defines that as a state court misdemeanor punishable by more than two years in prison. This question is particularly confusing as a non-lawyer is very unlikely to know how much time they could have received for an old, less serious conviction. Again, for a robbery or an aggravated assault, there is not going to be as strong of a mistake defense, but for an old misdemeanor theft conviction, it is not unreasonable to suggest that someone could have been unaware of the gradation of the conviction or how much time that gradation could have carried if they did not actually receive the maximum or any jail time at all.

In this case, M.S.’s old theft conviction carried up to five years in prison, making him ineligible to possess a firearm under federal law. It did not make him ineligible under state law. Accordingly, the police charged him with lying on the ATF form, which is a felony.

M.S. retained Attorney Goldstein for the preliminary hearing. On the day of the hearing, the Commonwealth offered to reduce the charges to a third-degree misdemeanor of unsworn falsification for a one year period of probation. M.S. rejected the offer and decided to have a preliminary hearing. The police officer testified that he received a package from the state police indicating that M.S. had tried to buy a gun, M.S. was ineligible due to the old theft conviction, and that theft conviction was punishable by up to five years. The police officer also confirmed that he spoke with M.S., and M.S. admitted to trying and failing to buy the gun for self-defense purposes. He said he did not realize the theft conviction made him ineligible.

Dismissal of the Charges

Attorney Goldstein then argued for dismissal of the charges. First, under the recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case of Range v. Attorney General, a lifetime prohibition on gun ownership for someone convicted of an old state court misdemeanor appears to be unconstitutional. There, the Third Circuit, in an en banc, opinion, held that Range should be permitted to buy a gun because his only conviction was a nearly thirty year old conviction for M1 food stamp fraud. Given how minor the conviction was, a lifetime prohibition on gun ownership violated the Second Amendment.

This case was extremely similar except the conviction was older and Range had sued for an injunction allowing him to buy a gun rather than argued that he could not be prosecuted. Attorney Goldstein argued that the statement on the form, even if not true, was not material because M.S. would have been eligible to possess a gun under the Range decision.

Second, Attorney Goldstein also argued that M.S. had clearly been confused by the wording on the form. Misdemeanor theft is not a bar to gun ownership under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, and M.S. had not actually received any time in prison. He had also been cooperative with the police and told them he had made a mistake. If he had been trying to buy a gun illegally, he could have purchased it on the street or lied to the police. Accordingly, it was very unlikely that he knew he had been convicted of a state court misdemeanor punishable by more than two years in jail. He did not actually get any jail time, and he did not even receive more than two years of probation.

Fortunately, the Magisterial District Justice agreed with the defense arguments and dismissed all charges. Instead of facing trial on felony charges in the Court of Common Pleas, M.S., who had not been arrested in over thirty years, can return to work and continue being a law-abiding citizen. This case, however, highlights the importance of being very careful when filling out these forms. If you have any doubts about whether you are eligible to possess a firearm, you should not use the form to “test” that eligibility. Instead, you should speak with a lawyer about your prior record. Additionally, if you have filled out the form and made a mistake, you should speak with an attorney right away before the police come calling. An attorney may be able to help you head off the investigation or help you with responding to it in order to avoid charges and prosecution for a felony offense. The form should never be used as a way to test whether or not you are eligible to buy a gun as answering the questions incorrectly can lead to felony charges.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case? We can help.

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Zak Goldstein 3/16/24 Zak Goldstein 3/16/24

PA Superior Court: Police May Drive Defendant’s Car to Secure Location While They Get Warrant

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Floyd, granting the Commonwealth’s appeal and holding that the trial court erred in granting a motion to suppress drugs and guns where a Philadelphia police officer testified that he saw the defendant engage in two hand-to-hand transactions. The Court also held that the officers did not violate the defendant’s rights by driving the defendant’s car to a secure location to await the signing of a search warrant.

The trial court had granted the motion to suppress, finding that the police should not have driven the car themselves before they got the warrant and that the two alleged hand-to-hands did not provide probable cause to arrest the defendant and search the car. The Superior Court disagreed. The crux of the appeal was the admissibility of evidence seized from Floyd's vehicle following his arrest for alleged involvement in illegal narcotics transactions.

A member of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Narcotics Strike Force observed the defendant engage in suspicious transactions on September 9, 2021. The defendant was seen accepting money from two individuals and then handing them small objects. He went in and out of the car in question before each alleged transaction. One of the alleged buyers was not stopped, so the police could not confirm whether that person had purchased drugs. The second person, however, was stopped and searched by police, and she had containers of crack cocaine on her.

Based on these observations, the police arrested and searched the defendant. They also obtained a search warrant for his vehicle. Instead of having a tow truck move the car, one of the officers drove the vehicle to a secure location while they obtained the search warrant. They claimed that they did not actually search the vehicle en route to that location or before they got the warrant. The eventual search of the car resulted in the discovery of drugs and a gun with an obliterated serial number.

The defense challenged the seizure and subsequent search of Floyd's vehicle, filing a motion to suppress and arguing that the police's initial warrantless entry into the vehicle, to move it to a secure location pending the approval of a search warrant, violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial court agreed and suppressed the evidence obtained from the car.

On appeal, the Superior Court held that the police action was justified under statutory authority, which allows for the seizure and relocation of a vehicle under certain conditions, such as when the vehicle's owner or user is in police custody, the vehicle is on public property, and there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. The court found that the evidence had an independent source—the observations made by Officer Outterbridge prior to the vehicle's relocation—which validated the search warrant and the subsequent discovery of the narcotics and firearm.

The statute that allows the police to move a car under certain conditions is 75 Pa.C.S. § 3352(c), specifically subsection (c)(3). This provision is part of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code and grants police officers the authority to remove or cause to be removed a vehicle to a place of safety or to the place of business of the operator of a wrecker or a nearby garage under the following circumstances:

The vehicle has been reported stolen or taken without the consent of its owner.
The person or persons in charge of the vehicle are physically unable to provide for its custody or removal.
The person driving or in control of the vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for which the officer is required by law to take the person arrested before an issuing authority without unnecessary delay.
The vehicle is in violation of section 3353 (relating to prohibitions in specified places), except for overtime parking.
The vehicle has been abandoned, as defined in the title.

In this case, subsection (c)(3) was particularly relevant. This subsection applies when the person in control of the vehicle is arrested for an offense requiring that they be brought before an issuing authority without unnecessary delay. The statute gives police the authority to remove the vehicle to ensure its safety and the integrity of potential evidence, especially when the vehicle is on public property and there exists probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime.

Here, the Superior Court reasoned that the courts have held for about 15 years that one observation of a hand-to-hand transaction in a designated enforcement area or high crime area provides experienced narcotics officers with probable cause to stop a suspect and search them. In this case, the officer testified to seeing two hand-to-hand transactions. The first person had not been stopped, and the second person testified at the suppression hearing that she in fact had drugs on her but did not buy them from the defendant. Unfortunately, she did not testify that she did not in fact give anything to receive anything to or from the defendant. She just said she did not get the drugs from him. And the police testified that the defendant went in and out of the car before both alleged transactions. Thus, the Superior Court found probable cause to arrest the defendant and search him as well as to support the search warrant for the car. Based on the above statute, the police then had the right to move the car. Although it is better for them to use a tow truck to move the car, the statute does not explicitly direct that the police may not move it themselves.

This case presents two problems for the defense.

The Takeaway

First, this was really a credibility motion to suppress. The defense strategy was clearly to argue that the officer had not actually seen two drug transactions given that the defense called a witness, one of the alleged buyers, to say that she did not actually buy drugs from the officer. The trial judge, however, did not explicitly say that they were ruling based on credibility. If the trial judge had put a credibility ruling on the record and indicated that they did not believe the officer’s testimony, then it would have been virtually impossible for the Commonwealth to appeal. The judge, however, did not do that.

Second, the defense witness was not asked whether or not she gave anything to the defendant or took anything from him. This allowed the Superior Court to reason on appeal that she may have had an interactions with the defendant that looked like a drug transaction even if her testimony that she did not buy drugs from him was true. Probable cause looks at what a reasonable officer would believe in terms of whether they would find evidence or believe they had observed a crime – it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime actually occurred. Therefore, the Superior Court was able to grant the Commonwealth’s appeal. This ruling therefore highlights the importance of really arguing credibility and asking for a clear ruling on that issue if the basis of the motion is credibility and also making sure that the witnesses are asked the right questions during the hearing.

Finally, the case allows police behavior which is ripe for abuse. It is difficult to believe that narcotics officers, who typically do not wear body cameras in Philadelphia, would not at least look around the car a little bit while driving it to the station, and the next case will probably involve some claim by police that they had to do an inspection to make sure there was nothing that could harm the officer during the drive. The law is clear that police must get a warrant before searching a car absent a limited number of exceptions which did not apply here, but here, the officer drove the defendant’s car before the police got the warrant. To really comply with the rules, they should have had a tow truck tow the car. Hopefully, the defendant will pursue further appeals on this issue.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

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