Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 5/23/23 Zak Goldstein 5/23/23

PA Superior Court: No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in IP Address or Google Search History

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Kurtz, allowing police to use a very general warrant to obtain a defendant’s IP address and Google search history in order to solve an alleged rape. The Court also approved of the use of cell tower data dumps in order to connect suspects to potential locations. In this case, the Court found both that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information which he shared with Google as well as his cell carrier, and it also found that the search warrants obtained by the police were acceptable even though they had very little reason to believe the defendant would have used Google as part of committing the crime.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Kurtz

In July 2016, a woman went to sleep and awoke to her dogs barking. When she went to investigate, a man jumped out, tied her up, and dragged her to his van. The man raped her and then released her into a field by her house. She eventually found help and called 911, and emergency personnel took her to the hospital. The medical staff at the hospital collected DNA samples. The police conducted a very thorough investigation; they executed a search warrant on Google demanding all of the IP addresses of anyone who had searched the victim’s name or address during the week leading up to the attack. Google disclosed that someone with a particular IP address had conducted two searches for the victims’ address hours before the incident.

Police identified the IP address as belonging to the defendant, who was actually the woman’s husband’s co-worker at the prison, and conducted surveillance. During the surveillance, police recovered the defendant’s used cigarette butts and obtained DNA from them. The officers compared the DNA collected from the victim and the defendant and found a match. The police arrested him, and he admitted to the rape as well as numerous other incidents involving other victims. All four of the other incidents had similar characteristics. In two cases, the defendant had also raped the victims, and the DNA collected in those cases matched the defendant.

The Defendant’s Pre-Trial Motions

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the Google searches of the victim’s residence. He also filed a motion in limine to preclude the Google searches, alleging that the Commonwealth’s mishandling of the evidence prevented him from verifying its authenticity. He filed a second motion in limine to suppress the “tower dump” evidence obtained from AT&T. The motion alleged that the Commonwealth illegally obtained the records because the court order used the “Wiretap Act” instead of a warrant supported by probable cause and individualized suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The trial court denied all three motions. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all charges. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate sentence of 59 to 280 years’ imprisonment.

The defendant raised various issues for appeal including the issues regarding the Google searches and cell phone tower dumps. First, he challenged whether the trial court erred in allowing the admission of unauthenticated, illegally obtained evidence because the investigatory search warrant lacked probable cause, and second, he challenged whether the trial court erred by allowing the admission of cell tower evidence that was the product of an invalid search warrant.

The Google Searches

The Superior Court rejected a number of challenges to the Google Search evidence. First, the court approved of the search warrant even though there was no direct evidence showing that the attacker had conducted a Google search prior to the execution of the warrant. The Court reasoned that the details of the attack made it likely that someone had searched for the victim’s address online in order to plan the attack and that most people use Google for internet searches. Police do not need an absolute certainty that they will find evidence for a search warrant to be valid; they just need probable cause, and here, the Court found probable cause to believe the attacher could have conducted a Google search.

Second, the Court also found that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Google search history or IP address because both of those things are shared with third parties. An IP address is an address assigned by the internet provider that identifies which internet account accessed another network. Therefore, it is always shared with a thirty party. Similarly, a Google search by definition has been shared with Google. Things that are shared with third parties often have less protection under the 4th Amendment than things that someone has kept private. In this case, the defendant chose to share his searches and IP address with Google, so they were not kept private. Therefore, police did not need a warrant to get that information. Courts have held that police need a search warrant to track someone’s real-time location through GPS data, but that is because such a search is so intrusive that even though data has been shared with a third party, society would generally recognize that it should be private.

Finally, the defendant argued that the data should be suppressed because the police had accidentally destroyed some of the metadata that accompanied the Google search results. Metadata might have shown that the data was tampered with or fabricated, but in this case, the defendant had no reason to believe that it was. Google certified that the data was correct, and so without some evidence of bad faith, the defendant was not entitled to the suppression of the evidence.

The Cell Tower DATA

In this case, police had also conducted cell tower dumps. A cell tower dump is where the police determine every device that connected to a cell tower during a particular period and then see if there are any devices of interest. In this case, they had done that for the towers closest to some of the crime scenes and found that the defendant’s phone had been nearby. The defendant challenged this procedure because the police had not obtained search warrants for the cell site data. Instead, they had issued court orders which did not contain explicit findings of probable cause. The Superior Court rejected the argument, however, finding that the orders asked for information only from a single tower and for a limited period of time. They did not ask for ongoing, real-time monitoring of a defendant’s individual cell phone, so the privacy concerns involved were not as strong. Therefore, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the searches. The defendant’s conviction will stand.

Some of these issues deserve further review and consideration. For example, allowing the police to obtain a defendant’s Google search history without a warrant raises major privacy concerns. Pennsylvania courts have often rejected warrantless searches even of things shared with third parties like bank records and cell phone records. But bad cases often make bad law - in this case, the defendant was charged with horrific rapes, and the evidence against him was overwhelming, so it becomes very difficult for a court to seriously entertain suppressing the evidence or granting him a new trial. Nonetheless, it has become almost impossible to function in society without conducting a Google search, using Google Maps, storing data on Google drive, or communicating with a Google email account, so a rule that allows the police to obtain Google data without a warrant seems unreasonable. Hopefully, the defendant will seek further review, or a case with less horrible facts will warrant the courts to reconsider.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/21/23 Zak Goldstein 5/21/23

PA Supreme Court: Adult May Be Prosecuted for Decades Old Crime Committed While Juvenile

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Lawyer

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Armolt, holding that an adult defendant may be prosecuted in adult court for a crime he committed twenty years earlier as a juvenile. This case illustrates a serious problem with the criminal justice system. Had the defendant been prosecuted in juvenile court twenty years earlier, he likely would have received probation and some kind of treatment program. But because prosecutors did not file charges until twenty years later, he received a permanent, adult record, and the judge sentenced him to state prison. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld this procedure and concluded that only the legislature could address the issue.

The Facts of Armolt

In Armolt, the defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his step-sister while he was a minor. He, his brothers, and his mother moved in with the complainant and her father when he was a minor in the 1980s. According to the complainant, he and his brothers began sexually assaulting her while she was between the ages of seven and sixteen. She reported the abuse to the State Police at some point in 1996, but the police did not file charges, and she remained in the home. She did not alert any other authorities for another three decades.

In 2016, the complainant called the State Police to discuss a dispute with the defendant and his brothers over the inheritance of property from her father, who had recently died. This conversation led to her disclosing the abuse to a state trooper. The state trooper conducted an investigation, interviewed a number of witnesses, and recommended that prosecutors file charges. The Commonwealth eventually filed charges in 2018. Accordingly, the police arrested the defendant in 2018 and charged him as an adult with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, and indecent assault for crimes he committed thirty years earlier when he was a minor.

The trial court denied various pre-trial motions. The defendant proceeded by way of jury trial, and the jury found him guilty. The trial court sentenced him to 4 - 8 years’ incarceration in state prison.

The Appeal

The defendant appealed, arguing that he should not have been prosecuted as an adult because he committed the crimes when he was a juvenile. Specifically, in the trial court and on direct appeal to the Superior Court, he argued only that the juvenile court had jurisdiction because he committed the crimes as a minor. The Superior Court affirmed, and the defendant sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed to review the issue and granted his petition for allowance of appeal.

The Supreme Court, however, also affirmed. It found that the defendant was properly tried in adult court under the applicable statutes and that although his constitutional claims were interesting, he had waived those claims on appeal by failing to raise them in the trial court and Superior Court.

With respect to the statutory claim, the Supreme Court found that Pennsylvania law clearly directs that an adult who is prosecuted for crimes committed while a juvenile should be prosecuted as an adult in the Court of Common Pleas. The Court noted that the Juvenile Act conveyed limited jurisdiction to juvenile courts, the scope of which applies “exclusively to . . . [p]roceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent.” 42 Pa.C.S. §6303(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Act explicitly defines a “child” as an individual who “is under the age of 18 years” or “is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years.” Id. § 6302.10

Thus, the Act plainly extends juvenile jurisdiction to offenders who committed an offense while under the age of eighteen only if they are prosecuted before turning twenty-one. Because the Court found no ambiguity in this definition, it found itself bound to abide by the letter of the statute. See 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(b). Further, the statutes provide that the juvenile court loses jurisdiction when a defendant turns 21. Accordingly, if the defendant’s argument were correct, then he could not be prosecuted at all because the juvenile court would not have jurisdiction, either.

The Court rejected the defendant’s other arguments. It found that he failed to present any evidence that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith by waiting to charge him, and that although he had raised a number of interesting constitutional challenges in the Supreme Court, he had failed to raise these challenges in the lower courts. Therefore, the Court found that he waived those claims by failing to raise them earlier.

The Court therefore denied the appeal. It did recommend that the legislature consider whether the system is really fair to adults who are prosecuted for crimes committed decades earlier when they were minors, but it found no real dispute that the statutory language directs such a result. The Court did suggest that it may be willing to consider a properly preserved challenge as to whether an adult defendant may be sentenced to prison for crimes committed as a juvenile, but it found that this case was not the right case for deciding that issue.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, VUFA, and Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/4/23 Zak Goldstein 5/4/23

Attorney Clemens’s Client Acquitted of VUFA (Gun) Charges

Philadelphia criminal defense attorney recently won a full acquittal for his client in a case involving firearms charges. In Commonwealth v. A. C.-O., prosecutors charged the client with various offenses under the uniform firearms act (VUFA offenses) for allegedly possessing a firearm in a vehicle without a license to carry. Fortunately, A.C.-O. retained Attorney Clemens, and Attorney Clemens took the case to trial.

In the case, police claimed that the client and multiple other men were in a car in the Frankford section of Philadelphia when the police stopped the car on suspicion of a traffic violation. The client was in the backseat of the car along with three other men, and the officers testified that they saw a gun underneath one of the other occupant’s feet. The police instructed everyone to get out of the car, and as the client was getting out, he took his backpack off and placed it on the floor of the car. The police immediately grabbed the backpack, searched it, and found a gun inside it. Unsurprisingly, they arrested the client and charged him with VUFA offenses for illegal possession of the gun in the backpack.

A.C.-O. retained Attorney Clemens, and Attorney Clemens took the case to trial. During trial, Attorney Clemens cross-examined the police officers on numerous inconsistencies in the various police reports regarding the locations of the various males in the car, as well as the chaotic scene at the time of the arrest. Despite the police officers’ unwavering testimony that A. C.-O. was the individual with the gun in his backpack, Attorney Clemens raised reasonable doubt as to whether A.C.-O. had ever even touched the backpack, and A. C.-O. was eventually acquitted of all charges. Given the full acquittal, A.C.-O. has the right to an expungement of the arrest record, and he will not have to serve any time in prison as a result of the arrest.

Facing criminal charges? We can help.

Zak Goldstein 4/17/23 Zak Goldstein 4/17/23

PA Superior Court: Defendant Has Right to Attorney of Their Choice

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lewis, holding that a trial court has the power to disqualify an attorney from representing a criminal defendant but only in the most extreme circumstances. The Superior Court determined that this was not such a case as the Commonwealth and court failed to show that the alleged misconduct of the attorney could not be remedied or that the Commonwealth could not receive a fair trial.

Therefore, the trial court violated the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel by removing the defendant’s chosen attorney. The Superior Court vacated the defendant’s subsequent conviction which the Commonwealth obtained while he was represented by a different attorney and remanded for a new trial.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Lewis

One evening in 2018, the defendant barricaded himself in his residence. An Emergency Response Team ("ERT") was summoned to the scene and communicated with the defendant to get him to surrender. Shortly after midnight, the defendant began shooting out of his residence. Over the next six hours, the defendant fired at least 30 shots, including several that struck an armored vehicle operated by ERT. Just after 7 a.m., the defendant left his residence and surrendered to ERT members.

The Commonwealth subsequently charged the defendant with 12 counts of attempted homicide, 24 counts of aggravated assault, 21 counts of recklessly endangering another person, two counts of possessing an instrument of crime, and one count of institutional vandalism. The defendant was appointed a public defender but quickly became dissatisfied with them. In 2019, the defendant retained private counsel to represent him. Just before the trial in 2020, the defendant’s attorney allegedly supplied body camera footage from an ERT member to a local newsgroup that aired the footage. The attorney also gave an interview commenting negatively on the lead officer’s professionalism.

The Motion to Disqualify

The Commonwealth filed pre-trial motions with various requests. The motions included a request to disqualify the defendant’s attorney for supposedly unethical actions that violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The trial court held a hearing to determine if it should disqualify the lawyer. The trial court concluded that the attorney’s conduct placed the fairness and integrity of the defendant's trial in jeopardy. The court claimed that the unethical behavior of the attorney was an attempt to taint the jury pool by putting out irrelevant, inadmissible information that a jury would never see. The judge further opined that the attorney’s actions must have been an attempt to force the Commonwealth into making a better plea offer. The trial court found that the conduct was so outrageous that a fair trial could not take place with the defendant being represented by the current attorney. The court therefore removed the attorney from the case over defense objection. The defendant retained new counsel and proceeded with a jury trial.

In 2021, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of attempted homicide, 13 counts of aggravated assault, seven counts of recklessly endangering another person, two counts of possessing an instrument of crime, two counts of criminal mischief, one count of terroristic threats, and one count of institutional vandalism. In early 2022, the trial court sentenced him to 27.5 to 57 years of incarceration.

The Superior Court Appeal

The defendant filed an appeal raising only one issue: he challenged the disqualification of his original private counsel. The Commonwealth argued that the standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion standard is a difficult standard to meet that gives great deference to the trial court. Only when the law is misapplied or the result is unreasonable can a defendant win with this level of review. The Superior Court determined their review to be plenary, which means they can review the question of law without giving deference to the trial court and make their own conclusion.

The Superior Court began its analysis by reiterating that while the appeal necessarily focuses on the defense attorney’s actions, it is the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel that is at stake. It is unquestioned that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Furthermore, a defendant has a constitutional right to secure counsel of his choice. If the trial court violates the defendant's right to proceed with an attorney of his choosing, he is entitled to a new trial because prejudice is presumed.

At the same time, the trial courts have the power to disqualify a defendant’s attorney. A court may do so only when it is absolutely essential. In determining when such extreme action may be necessary, the courts have used a two-step approach: a court must find that (1) there is no other remedy available for the attorney’s violations, and (2) there is no other way to ensure the Commonwealth's right to a fair trial.

Here, the Superior Court disagreed with the trial court on both counts. First, the Superior Court examined the defense attorney’s conduct. It concluded that the record supported the trial court's factual findings, and the defendant did not challenge those findings. The attorney arguably violated the Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct (“Pa.R.P.C.”) rule 3.6 by making public statements that had a substantial likelihood of causing prejudice to the proceeding. However, a trial court cannot disqualify an attorney solely for a rule violation, and it also may not do so merely to punish the attorney for the violation.

The Superior Court found two errors with the trials court’s ruling. First, the court found that the trial court’s focus on the defense attorney’s past behavior indicated that the disqualification was punitive. Second, the court noted that the trial court focused on the outrageousness of the attorney’s conduct, not on whether it would continue and, in a way, prejudice the Commonwealth at trial. The Superior Court cited testimony showing that there were three pre-trial motions before the one to disqualify the attorney. In those three motions, there was a mutual agreement between the Commonwealth and the defense attorney to stop making public statements and that the body camera footage or officer disciplinary history was irrelevant to trial unless the Commonwealth brought it up themselves. Therefore, the Superior Court concluded there was a remedy to the attorney’s conduct and that the attorney had agreed not to violate any other rules.

Finally, the Superior Court looked at whether or not the prior conduct was enough to taint the jury pool and deny the Commonwealth a fair trial. The court concluded that two local media broadcasts were not pervasive enough to justify a presumption that the jury could not fulfill its duties fairly. The Superior Court also cited testimony from jury selection to emphasize the point. Jury selection showed that during the entire jury voir dire, only one potential juror had previous knowledge of the events, and that knowledge was vague at best.

Therefore, the Commonwealth was able to receive a fair trial, and the violation of the attorney’s actions was able to be remedied. The Superior Court vacated the defendant’s judgment of sentence and remanded for a new trial. This is an important case as it shows that courts should not be quick to interfere with the defendant’s decision of counsel and may do so only when absolutely necessary.