Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 4/3/22 Zak Goldstein 4/3/22

PA Superior Court: Phone Call About Possible Drunk Driving Did Not Justify Warrantless Search of Suspect's Home

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Edgin, holding that police officers illegally entered a defendant’s home under the guise of exigent circumstances. The officer’s based the warrantless search on the fact that bystanders had reported that the defendant may have been driving drunk prior to arriving home. It seems obvious that the officers should have obtained a search warrant prior to breaking into his home, and fortunately, the Superior Court agreed.

Commonwealth v. Edgin

A police officer in Centre County was dispatched to investigate a call about a possible intoxicated driver. Multiple 911 calls came in to dispatch concerning the driver. One of the 911 callers reported observing the individual driving a truck that was swerving in and out of its designated lane. The caller followed the truck and then observed the defendant exiting the vehicle and entering a residence through a garage door. When an officer arrived on scene, he observed a truck that matched the description given by the callers. This truck had some damage to it. Specifically, it had dents and scrapes, and it was missing a mirror. There was also a piece of wood shoved between the rim and the tire.

The officers attempted to make contact with the defendant. They went to the door of the house and announced themselves as officers. They knocked loudly on the front door and the rear sliding door multiple times with no response. The officers would later testify that they were concerned about the man’s well being and inquired about making entry into the residence. Additionally, although it is unclear from the opinion, one of the officers believed that the individual may have been diabetic, and this officer had prior experience with diabetic emergencies. Claiming a this prior experience and a purported belief that the individual may have needed medical assistance due to the damage on the truck, the officers decided to break into the house without a search warrant.

While inside the residence, the officers again announced themselves loudly and searched the house for the driver. They then came across the defendant asleep in a bedroom on the second floor of the residence. The officer testified that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and had to shake the male several times to wake up him. The officers then called for an ambulance. The defendant was taken back to the back of an ambulance where one of the 911 callers identified him as the driver. Additionally, the defendant was then advised of his Miranda rights, and he was subsequently interrogated. The defendant denied driving and that his truck was ever downtown. Police also took the defendant to the hospital for a blood draw.

Police arrested the defendant and charged him with DUI. The defendant then filed a motion to suppress, arguing that all evidence recovered from the defendant’s home and any evidence that resulted from the entry into his home should be suppressed because the officers entered his home without a warrant. At the motion to suppress hearing, the above facts were placed into the record. The trial court concluded that the there were exigent circumstances that justified the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home. Specifically, the trial court focused on the fact that the defendant was a known diabetic and that there were multiple 911 calls concerning this incident. Further, one of the 911 callers specifically witnessed the defendant exiting his truck and entering his residence. According the trial court, there were valid exigent circumstances present to justify the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s home.

After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant proceeded by way of a non-jury trial. He was subsequently found guilty and he then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the officers entered his house without a warrant and that there were not valid exigent circumstances that allowed them to circumvent the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

When do exigent circumstances allow the police to enter a home without a warrant?

Police generally may not enter a home without a search warrant or exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances are basically an emergency. In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, a court should consider a number of factors. Those factors include:

1) the gravity of the offense;

2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;

3) whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause;

4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered;

5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended;

6) whether the entry was peaceable;

7) the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was made at night;

8) whether this involves a hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 9) whether evidence is likely to be destroyed without a warrant; and

9) whether there is a anger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.

These factors are to be balanced against one another in determining whether a warrantless intrusion was justified. Police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court. In making its decision the Superior Court analyzed the above-mentioned factors. First, the trial court found that because DUI is a misdemeanor offense, this severely weakened the officers’ right to enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant was armed, the defendant would have escaped if he had not been apprehended, or any injuries or property damage. Further, the Superior Court rejected the argument that the dissipation of alcohol in the defendant’s bloodstream constituted a “per se exigency” that permitted the officers to enter his home without a warrant.

Finally, the Superior Court also rejected the argument that the officers could enter the defendant’s house under the guise that they needed to provide medical assistance to him. The Superior Court noted that the defendant was able to drive himself home and then enter his home without assistance. The Superior Court specifically rejected the argument that a high degree of intoxication can create a medical emergency that allows the officers to enter a home without a warrant. As such, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the officers had a legitimate reason to enter his home to provide medical assistance. Therefore, the Superior Court held that there were no real exigencies that permitted the officers to enter the defendant’s home without a warrant. Consequently, his conviction will be vacated and the defendant will receive a new trial. The Commonwealth will also not be able to use the evidence it obtained from the illegal entry of the defendant’s residence at this trial.

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Zak Goldstein 3/15/22 Zak Goldstein 3/15/22

PA Superior Court Strikes Down Mandatory Minimum For Driving On a DUI Suspended License

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Jackson, holding that the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) (driving on a DUI suspended license) is unconstitutionally vague. This decision is significant because so many individuals, oftentimes unknowingly, violate this law on multiple occasions and therefore are subjected to the mandatory minimum of at least 90 days of imprisonment. This decision holds that this mandatory 90-day sentence is unconstitutional, and therefore countless individuals will no longer be subjected to it.

Commonwealth v. Jackson

The defendant was arrested under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), which makes it a crime to drive while a person’s operating privileges is suspended or revoked as a result of a DUI or chemical testing refusing. The defendant pleaded guilty to this offense, but it was his second time violating this statute. Pursuant to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii), if a person has a prior conviction for this offense, then the person must “undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.” As such, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 90 days of house arrest and imposed a fine of $1,000.00. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the sentencing component of the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the defendant relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Eid, which held that the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i) (which is identical to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)’s sentencing provision) was unconstitutionally vague because it did not provide a statutory maximum sentence for the offense. The defendant argued that this logic should apply to 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)’s sentencing provision and that it should also be held as unconstitutional.

What is 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii)?

75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) provides:

(i) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the person's operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or the former section 3731, because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal) or 3802 or former section 3731 or is suspended under section 1581 (relating to Driver's License Compact) for an offense substantially similar to a violation of section 3802 or former section 3731 shall, upon a first conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days.
(ii) A second violation of this paragraph shall constitute a summary offense and, upon conviction of this paragraph, a person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with the defendant and vacated the sentence. Notably, the trial court had also agreed with the defendant and in its opinion wrote that he received an illegal sentence because of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Eid. The Superior Court held that the sentencing provision that was found to be unconstitutional in Eid was “identical” to the sentencing provision in 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii). Therefore, “because 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(ii) does not provide for a maximum term of incarceration, it is unconstitutionally vague and inoperable for the same reasons expressed in Eid.” Pennsylvania law requires that almost all sentences have both minimum and maximum terms. As this statute does not allow for a maximum sentence that is different from the minimum, it was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court vacated the defendant’s sentence, and he will receive a new hearing at which no mandatory minimum will apply.

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Zak Goldstein 1/31/22 Zak Goldstein 1/31/22

PA Superior Court: Police Officer May Not Offer Plea to Summary in Felony Case Without District Attorney's Permission

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Martinez-Santiago, holding that a plea deal that was negotiated between a police officer and a defendant at the preliminary hearing was invalid due to the officer’s failure to obtain the consent of the district attorney prior to entering into the agreement. This decision is concerning because in counties outside of Philadelphia, defendants and police officers will often negotiate plea deals at the preliminary hearing. This decision holds that the respective district attorney’s offices do not have to honor those plea agreements and can proceed to re-arrest these defendants if the agreement is not to their liking. The defendant in this case thought his felony charges had been resolved with a plea to summaries, but the district attorney was able to reinstate the felony charges despite the fact that the arresting officer and the defendant had resolved the case at the preliminary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Martinez-Santiago

The defendant was arrested by a Pittston Township Police Officer after he allegedly stole a pack of cigarettes from a gas station and physically assaulted the responding officers when he was confronted by them. The defendant was originally charged with two counts of aggravated assault (graded as a felony of the first degree), one count of resisting arrest (graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree), two counts of simple assault (graded as a misdemeanor of the second degree), one count of disorderly conduct (graded as a misdemeanor of the third-degree), and one summary count of retail theft.

About a month after he was arrested, the defendant was scheduled for his preliminary hearing. At his preliminary hearing, the defendant negotiated a plea agreement with one of the officers involved. Specifically, the defendant agreed to withdraw all the charges against the defendant, with the exception of the retail theft charge, and then add two counts disorderly conduct which were graded as summary offenses. Notably, this agreement was not in writing. The defendant immediately agreed to the deal and then was sentenced in front of the Magisterial District Judge.

About a month after the defendant entered into this plea deal, the Commonwealth re-filed the original charges against the defendant. A preliminary hearing was held and the same Magisterial District Judge who accepted the plea held the charges. The case was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County for trial. After his case was held for court, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the re-filed charges. Specifically, the defendant argued that the proceedings were being held in violation of the compulsory joinder pursuant to Pa. C.S. § 110(a)(1) and that they violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, but the court also concluded his motion was “not frivolous.” The defendant then filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the officer was authorized to withdraw the felony and misdemeanor charges without obtaining approval of the District Attorney’s office. The defendant argued that Rule 551 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the officer authority to withdraw charges. Therefore, in the instant case, the officer was the Commonwealth’s “designee” and therefore was acting under the color of his authority when he sua sponte negotiated and implemented the plea agreement.

What is Rule 551 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Rule 551 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states: “In any court case pending before an issuing authority, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or his or her designee, may withdraw one or more of the charges. The withdrawal shall be in writing.”

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s order. The Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the officer was an official “designee” of the Commonwealth. The Superior Court held that “a police officer does not become a designee simply by virtue of his mere presence at a proceeding.” According to the Superior Court, there must be “some documentation or corroboration…to establish the existence of such a delegation of authority by the Commonwealth to a [police] officer.” Additionally, the Superior Court held that this plea agreement was not valid under Rule 551 because it was not done in writing as required by the statute. Therefore, because of a lack of corroborating lack of documentation, the defendant’s plea agreement was “unsuccessful and legally insufficient.” Finally, the Superior Court held that the Magisterial District Judge did not have jurisdiction to transform the preliminary hearing into a guilty plea hearing because the felony and misdemeanor charges against the defendant “were never legitimately withdrawn” because the court did not have “proper authorization or documentation.” As such, the defendant will have to face trial on the previously withdrawn felony and misdemeanor charges.

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Zak Goldstein 1/11/22 Zak Goldstein 1/11/22

PA Superior Court: Hearsay Alone Insufficient at Preliminary Hearing to Prove Defendant in Particular Committed Crime

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Harris, holding that the Commonwealth must present admissible non-hearsay evidence at a preliminary hearing to establish that a crime was committed and that the defendant was the actual person who committed the crime. It it is not enough to present some live testimony to show that a crime was committed and then use hearsay to show that the defendant committed the crime. Instead, some live, admissible testimony or evidence must be presented to show that it was the defendant who actually committed the crimes charged. This is an important decision which further recognizes the fact that the preliminary hearing is one of the only safeguards against prolonged detention prior to trial in a case where the Commonwealth has little or no competent evidence.

Commonwealth v. Harris

A Philadelphia Police Officer received a radio call for a gunshot victim in Philadelphia. When he arrived, the officer found the complainant bleeding from gunshot wounds to his right wrists and left thigh. The complainant was then taken to a nearby hospital. A short time later, a Philadelphia Detective obtained a statement from the complainant about what happened. The complainant stated that the defendant and his brother confronted him about stealing drugs from them. During the confrontation, both men pulled out guns and began firing, striking the complainant as he ran away. Based on this information, the detective then went to the crime scene and found multiple projectiles and fired cartridge casings. The detective then returned to the hospital with photographs of the defendant and his brother and the complainant identified them as the men who shot him.

For unknown reasons, the Commonwealth waited two years before finally filing its criminal complaint against the defendant. The defendant was arrested and charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, VUFA offenses, and other related offenses. The complainant would not attend the defendant’s preliminary hearings. As such, the Commonwealth called the detective who testified to the above stated facts. The defense attorney objected to this testimony at his preliminary hearing because it was hearsay evidence. The defendant was then held for court on all charges. After the defendant’s preliminary hearing was decided, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. McCelland, which held that the Commonwealth cannot rely on hearsay alone to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. The defendant then filed a motion to quash the charges against him and the trial court granted his motion.

The Commonwealth then filed an appeal. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that McCelland was not applicable to the defendant’s case because it had presented other non-hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing. According to the Commonwealth, so long as the prosecution presents some direct evidence for one element of a charged offense, then it is allowed to rely on hearsay alone for the other elements of the crime, including the identification of the defendant. The Commonwealth argued that Rule 542 (E) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure permits this.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s order quashing the charges against the defendant. First, the Superior Court stated that the preliminary hearing is not a formality and that its purpose is to “prevent a person from being imprisoned or required to enter bail for a crime...for a crime which there is no evidence of the defendant’s connection.” In making its decision on the Commonwealth’s appeal, the Superior Court analyzed both the relevant statutes and prior case law addressing these issues. First, the Superior Court looked at Rule 542 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that at a preliminary hearing, the court must determine whether there is a prima facie case that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.

Based on these principles, Superior Court held that at the preliminary hearing the Commonwealth must present admissible non-hearsay evidence to establish both whether there is a prima facie case that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed said crime. In other words, the Commonwealth must present admissible non-hearsay evidence to establish the elements of the crime and that the defendant was the perpetrator of said crime. Additionally, the Superior Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that it can establish any element of the charges offenses with hearsay once it adduces non-hearsay evidence as to any element of the crime. The Superior Court opined that hearsay evidence is admissible, but it must be used to either corroborate direct evidence regarding an element of the crime or crimes charged or evidence that has to do with “the value of the property for grading purposes, lab reports and such [that] can be introduced because they do not materially affect the defendant’s due process rights.” Therefore, the trial court’s order to quash the charges against the defendant is granted, and the Commonwealth will have to rearrest him and present admissible non-hearsay evidence at his trial if they wish to proceed with the case against him.