Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 7/22/21 Zak Goldstein 7/22/21

Can you get your money back if the police take it illegally in Pennsylvania?

Return of Property Petitions in Pennsylvania

Following a recent ruling of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, it is now clear that people who have had their money or other items seized by police officers who did not have probable cause may file a motion to suppress in the Court of Common Pleas and ask that a Common Pleas Judge order the police to return the property. This is called filing a return of property petition. Previously, it was clear that if the police filed criminal charges in conjunction with taking the property, then the defendant could file a motion to suppress and would be entitled to a return of the property if the motion to success was successful in the criminal case. It was unclear, however, what remedy existed for a person who has had his or her cash taken by the police but where the police have not filed charges or an actual forfeiture action.

The Commonwealth Court has now clearly ruled that a person who has had property stolen by the police may file a return of property petition in the Court of Common Pleas and move to suppress the evidence if the police did not have probable cause to take the property or engage in the search that led to the forfeiture. If the judge finds that the police acted illegally, then the Commonwealth must return the money or other property. This rule obviously does not apply to pure contraband like drugs or illegal guns. The Commonwealth Court reached this conclusion in the case of In Re: $300,000 U.S. Currency.

What is a Return of Property Petition?

In Pennsylvania, a Return of Property Petition may be filed when law enforcement officers have seized money or other valuable personal property like cars and watches on the suspicion that the property may be related to criminal activity. If the police do not file criminal charges or a defendant wins a related criminal case, then the return of property petition allows the defendant to ask a judge to order that the property be returned. Return of property litigation is very similar to a forfeiture action. In a forfeiture action, the government moves for a court order directing that it be allowed to keep seized property because the property was obtained through some illegal means. Forfeiture actions often accompany criminal charges. For example, if police officers find a large quantity of money while conducting a search that results in the discovery of drugs, the police will likely keep the money. Prosecutors should then file a forfeiture action if they do not plan to return the money. In many cases, however, the government does not necessarily file the separate forfeiture case. The forfeiture order could come along with a criminal sentence, or the government may simply keep the money.

If there is no criminal conviction, however, or the money is really unrelated to the conviction, then the person who had the money taken by the police can file to have that money returned. Prior to the Commonwealth Court’s recent decision, it was clear that a defendant in a forfeiture action or criminal case could file a motion to suppress and challenge the procedures by which the police recovered the property. If the police acted illegally, then the property should be returned. It was unclear whether a motion to suppress could be filed in a return of property case where the defendant initiated the litigation and the government never filed criminal charges or a forfeiture action.

Rule 588

Rule 588. Motion for Return of Property.
(A)  A person aggrieved by a search and seizure, whether or not executed pursuant to a warrant, may move for the return of the property on the ground that he or she is entitled to lawful possession thereof. Such motion shall be filed in the court of common pleas for the judicial district in which the property was seized.
(B)  The judge hearing such motion shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision thereon. If the motion is granted, the property shall be restored unless the court determines that such property is contraband, in which case the court may order the property to be forfeited.
(C)  A motion to suppress evidence under Rule 581 may be joined with a motion under this rule.

In Re: $300,000

An individual was stopped in Union County, Pennsylvania by a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper while he was driving his vehicle. During the search, the Trooper found $300,000 and seized the money. Despite this seizure, the individual was not charged with any crimes. Approximately a month after he was stopped and had his money taken from him, the individual brought a stand-alone return of property action in Union County Court of Common Pleas seeking the return of his property. A few weeks after this filing, the individual then filed a motion to suppress, seeking suppression of the property found in his car and all statements that were made to the police.

The Commonwealth opposed the Individual’s motion to suppress. The government argued that the individual could not bring a stand-alone motion to suppress in a return of property action prior to the Commonwealth filing criminal charges or initiating a forfeiture action. The trial court denied the individual’s motion to suppress arguing that a motion to suppress was “premature.”

The individual then filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal with the Commonwealth Court. In his petition, he asked for the Commonwealth Court to decide whether an individual aggrieved by the seizure of property could file a motion to suppress in conjunction with a motion to return property when the Commonwealth has not filed a forfeiture petition and no criminal charges have been filed. The Commonwealth Court agreed to hear his appeal. It should be noted that approximately six months after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, the Commonwealth filed a forfeiture petition against the individual. Consequently, the Commonwealth argued that the individual’s appeal was now moot because he now had the ability to file a motion to suppress evidence. In response, the individual argued that it was not moot because the Commonwealth could just “sit” on evidence it seizes “until the Commonwealth decides to provide an opportunity to the aggrieved individual to suppress the evidence.”

The Commonwealth Court’s Decision

The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s decision. Regarding the Commonwealth’s argument that the individual’s appeal was moot, the Commonwealth Court found that this issue was capable of repetition, yet likely to evade appellate review. Further, this issue involved an issue important to the public interest and consequently the Commonwealth Court declined to deny the individual’s appeal because of mootness.

Turning to the merits of his appeal, the Commonwealth Court held that an individual can file a motion to suppress regardless of whether or not the Commonwealth has filed criminal charges or a forfeiture action. In making its decision, the Commonwealth Court first emphasized that though forfeiture hearings are “civil in form,” they are also “in their nature criminal.” As such, even though an individual is not entitled to all the rights that criminal defendants receive, they do have some rights. One of those rights is that they are entitled to the exclusionary rule of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore individuals can file motions to suppress when their property has been unlawfully seized by the government. The United States Supreme Court has also weighed in on this issue and has held that “the Commonwealth may not permanently acquire derivative contraband which it has initially seized unconstitutionally.”

The Commonwealth Court then analyzed the relevant statutes at issue. Specifically, it looked at Rules 581and 588 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. In its analysis of these rules it found that motions to suppress were intended to be used by individuals to reclaim their property. Further, the Commonwealth Court also held that a person does not have to be a criminal defendant to initiate the proceedings. Instead, the Commonwealth Court found that it was the intent of the Pennsylvania General Assembly to allow any person who has had their property unlawfully seized be allowed to file a motion to suppress to regain their property. The reason is because if an individual was forced to wait until a criminal complaint or forfeiture petition was filed then the Commonwealth could hold someone’s unconstitutionally seized evidence in perpetuity. This was not acceptable to the Commonwealth Court and therefore it held that, in the future, individuals can file motions to suppress in conjunction with their motions to return property, regardless if a criminal proceeding or a forfeiture action has been initiated against them.

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 7/12/21 Zak Goldstein 7/12/21

PA Superior Court: Police May Not Prolong Traffic Stop by Asking Unrelated Questions About Guns

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Malloy, holding that the police may not prolong a traffic stop to go on a fishing expedition regarding whether the passenger in the vehicle has a license to carry a firearm. This case is significant because police officers will routinely extend traffic stops to see if they can find evidence of additional crimes. The decision in Malloy provides a powerful check to this intrusive process by the police.

Commonwealth v. Malloy

A Philadelphia Police officer was on routine patrol when he noticed an automobile that did not have a license plate. The officer activated his lights and sirens and pulled the vehicle over. As he walked towards the vehicle, he noticed that there was a license tag on the car’s rear windshield, but it was not properly displayed and secured. This was a violation of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code. The officer also noticed that there were several occupants within the car, including the defendant, who was seated in the rear behind the driver. The officer approached the driver and told him that he did not have a license plate on the back, to which the driver responded that he just got the car two days prior and still needed to get screws for the license plate. The officer seemed satisfied with this explanation and did not issue the driver a citation.

The officer then asked the defendant to roll down the passenger window. He asked the defendant for identification, and the defendant responded by pulling a lanyard out from his hooded sweatshirt. When the officer saw the lanyard, which suggested the defendant worked as a security guard, he immediately asked the defendant if he had a firearm on him. In the officer’s experience, it was common for people who worked in armed security positions at local bars to keep their identification badges in lanyards. The defendant responded that he did have a firearm because he worked in a security position at a local bar. The officer then asked where the firearm was, to which the defendant responded that it was on his right hip.

At that point, the officer asked the defendant to give him the firearm and to exit the vehicle so that he could secure the firearm before continuing his investigation. The defendant was then asked for his “identification documents.” The defendant gave him his “Act 235” card, but the card had expired. The defendant then told the officer that he had another card at his home. The officer then proceeded to contact the Pennsylvania State Police where it was determined that the defendant’s certification had actually expired. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of a firearm without a license and carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress to suppress the firearms and the statements made to the officer. At his suppression hearing, the above facts were entered into the record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The defendant then entered into a stipulated trial where he was found guilty of both charges. At his sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to five years of reporting probation. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that his statements and firearm should have been suppressed because the police illegally prolonged a routine traffic stop to conduct an unrelated investigation into whether he was legally allowed to carry a firearm.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. In making its decision, the Superior Court reviewed prior appellate decisions including United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”) decisions. Specifically, the Superior Court reviewed Rodriguez v. United States, where SCOTUS held that when the police stop a vehicle for a motor vehicle violation, the stop may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.” In Rodriguez, SCOTUS did say that police officers are also allowed to ask a driver for his driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance, and other questions that are “aimed at ensuring the safe and responsible operation of vehicles on the highway.”

However, the Superior Court found that asking for a passenger’s documented authority to carry a firearm was not a permitted incidental inquiry during a traffic stop. Further, the Superior Court held that just because the defendant admitted to possessing a firearm did not mean that the officer was justified in prolonging the traffic stop to detain and investigate the defendant. The Superior Court cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision Commonwealth v. Hicks, in which the PA Supreme Court held that the police cannot detain and investigate an individual simply because he is possessing a firearm. Further, the record at the defendant’s motion to suppress did not show any evidence that he was involved in any criminal activities or had engaged in any furtive movements. As such, the officer was not lawfully justified in detaining and investigating the defendant. Therefore, the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress is vacated as well as his conviction. The defendant will get a new trial where the Commonwealth will not be allowed to use the firearm or the statements made to the police against him.

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Zak Goldstein 4/27/21 Zak Goldstein 4/27/21

Third Circuit Court of Appeals: Brady Violation Does Not Bar Re-Trial in Federal Court

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided the case of United States v. Brown, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution does not bar a subsequent prosecution when a prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to provide exculpatory evidence prior to the first trial.

United States v. Brown

In 1995, firefighters responded to a fire at the defendant’s residence. At the time, the defendant was 17 years old, and he lived there with his mother and several family members. After arriving on scene, six firefighters entered the basement where the fire had originated. Several of the firefighters became trapped and died when a staircase collapsed. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) opened an investigation. Chemical samples from the basement confirmed the presence of gasoline and investigators located a gas can close to what an expert testified was the fire’s origin. ATF concluded that the fire was intentionally set and offered a $15,000 reward for information leading to arrest and conviction. The police suspected the defendant started the fire at his mother’s direction to collect on a renter’s insurance policy.

The defendant was subsequently charged with three counts of second-degree murder, two counts of arson, and one count of insurance fraud in state court. Local, state, and federal authorities formed a joint prosecution team which consisted of an Assistant District Attorney for Allegheny County and an Assistant U.S. Attorney. At trial, the defendant argued that he could not have set the fire because he had been shopping with his mother when the fire started. However, the prosecutors called witnesses who came forward with testimony undermining the defendant’s alibi. During the trial, the witnesses denied receiving payment and that they were promised payment in exchange for their testimony. The jury found the defendant guilty of the aforementioned charges and he was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment for each murder conviction and a consecutive term of 7.5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the arson conviction.

A few months after the trial, the defendant filed post-sentence motions arguing that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the ATF agents had offered money to potential witnesses. The trial court denied this request. The defendant also filed various appeals with the Pennsylvania Superior Court. He was able to get one of his murder convictions vacated, but he was unsuccessful in obtaining relief for his other convictions. The defendant then filed a habeas petition claiming that the prosecution failed to disclose that it had paid witnesses to testify against him. At the hearing, the Commonwealth’s attorney said that he had reviewed ATF records and contacted the prosecutors and had not seen any record of witness payment. The habeas court denied the defendant’s petition and request for an evidentiary hearing.

Nearly a decade later, the defendant filed a petition in state court under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) alleging that newly discovered evidence based on an expert opinion about the cause of the fire. Additionally, a non-profit organization filed a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request with the ATF seeking all recordings relating to the payment of reward money in the defendant’s case. The ATF provided two canceled checks showing that it had made payments of $5,000 and $10,000 relating to the fire. The non-profit then contacted one of the witnesses who said he had received $5,000 from an ATF agent after the defendant’s trial.

Armed with this information, the defendant filed a new PCRA petition alleging newly discovered facts in the form of a Brady violation. The PCRA court found that the defendant’s claim about the prosecution’s nondisclosure of the witnesses’ rewards satisfied the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar and granted the defendant a new trial. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed this decision. Upon remand to the state trial court, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges on double-jeopardy grounds. While that motion was pending, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant, charging him with destruction of property by fire resulting in death. The Commonwealth then filed a motion to nolle pros the state charges. The state court granted the motion to dismiss the state charges.

The defendant then moved to dismiss the federal indictment on Double Jeopardy grounds. Specifically, the defendant argued that his state prosecution was “a tool of the federal authorities.” The Government argued that the dual-sovereignty principle applied. That rule allows the federal and state governments to charge a defendant for the same crime. After hearing arguments, the federal District Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that the dual-sovereignty principle allowed the defendant’s case to go forward in federal court. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

The Third Circuit’s Decision

The Third Circuit denied the defendant’s appeal. The Double Jeopardy Clause says that no personal shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” However, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against a second prosecution for the same offense is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. One, obviously, is the dual-sovereignty principle. Another exception is that a prosecutor can retry a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack. This is referred to as the “trial-error rule.” In the instant case, the Third Circuit said the dual-sovereignty principle was not applicable to the defendant’s case, but rather the trial-error rule.

The trial-error rule allows the prosecution to retry a defendant where the conviction is reversed due to trial error such as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence or incorrect jury instructions. Paradoxically, the Third Circuit also categorizes prosecutorial misconduct as a “trial-error.” In other words, according to the Third Circuit, a prosecutor can commit some type of misconduct (i.e. withhold exculpatory evidence) and that will not necessarily bar them from retrying a defendant. However, there is an exception to this rule that if the prosecutor attempted to goad a defendant into asking for a mistrial because they feared an acquittal and the mistrial was granted, then Double Jeopardy could apply. According to the Third Circuit, “the Fifth Amendment does not permit such gamesmanship.”

The Third Circuit found that this exception did not apply in this case. Although the prosecution had failed to provide the defense with discovery, the prosecution had not done so with the intent to prove a mistrial. Therefore, the mistrial exception did not apply in this case. The government will therefore be able to try the defendant in federal court.

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Zak Goldstein 4/9/21 Zak Goldstein 4/9/21

PA Supreme Court: Separate Conviction for Related Traffic Ticket Bars Prosecution for All Other Charges

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson, holding that a defendant cannot be tried for a felony case if his traffic offense that arose out of the same criminal transaction was adjudicated. This decision is significant and it could result in hundreds of felony cases being dismissed. As a practical matter, it is unclear on how much of an effect it will have on future cases because the Philadelphia Police Department no longer issues a traffic citation when they also arrest a defendant for a non-traffic offense. Nonetheless, this will have a positive impact on many individuals who have outstanding felony cases in Philadelphia.

Commonwealth v. Johnson

The defendant was stopped for a traffic stop and was charged with driving with a suspended license, possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), and the knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance (“K/I”). The defendant was subsequently found guilty, in absentia, of the summary traffic offense. His other charges were not adjudicated. The defendant then subsequently filed a motion to dismiss arguing that 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (“Section 110”) requires that the government bring all known charges against a defendant arising out of a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district in a single proceeding. In other words, the defendant argued that when he was found guilty of the traffic offense, he could no longer be prosecuted because he had already been found guilty of a criminal offense that arose from this transaction. The trial court was not persuaded and denied his motion. The defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal.

Some insight into how Philadelphia Courts operate is necessary to understand this decision. First, Philadelphia Traffic Court was merged into Municipal Court in 2013 and thus became the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court. Next, in Philadelphia, the Municipal Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal offenses that are punishable up to five years. As an example, a defendant cannot plead guilty to an F1 Robbery in front of a Municipal Court judge because the court does not have jurisdiction to accept that guilty plea. Further, a defendant cannot have a trial for F1 Robbery for the same reason. In the instant case, the defendant was charged with PWID and because he was accused of distributing heroin, the maximum sentence (assuming it was his first PWID conviction) was fifteen years’ incarceration. Consequently, the Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s PWID charge at the trial stage. However, the Municipal Court did have jurisdiction to adjudicate his K/I charge because the maximum sentence he could have received was three years’ incarceration (assuming he had a prior K/I conviction) and thus that charge fell within the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction.

On appeal at the Superior Court, the Commonwealth acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto held that Section 110 generally prohibits the government from proceeding with a prosecution subject to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Commonwealth conceded that they could not prosecute the defendant for the K/I charge because it fell within the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction. However, the Commonwealth argued that because the Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over the PWID, then the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss for that claim. In defense of this position, the Commonwealth invoked Section 112(1) of the Crimes Code which states “[a] prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of [Section 110] under any of the following circumstances…(1) [t]he former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant of the offense.” In other words, their argument was that Section 112 applied to the defendant’s case because Municipal Court could not adjudicate the defendant’s PWID charge and it was irrelevant that his traffic case had already been adjudicated.

The Superior Court was persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision with respect to the PWID charge. The defendant then lodged an application for re-argument which was denied by the Superior Court. The defendant then subsequently filed a petition for allowance of appeal to have the Pennsylvania Supreme Court hear the case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The issue for this decision is which offense applies for Section 112. Is it the first offense (in this case the traffic charge) or the subsequent offense (the PWID charge)? The defendant argued that Section 112 bars subsequent prosecutions when the previous court had jurisdiction over the first case whereas the Commonwealth argued that prosecution should not be barred if the original court does not have jurisdiction over the subsequent offense.

In making its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked at the legislative history of Sections 110 and 112, appellate decisions that addressed these rules, and it analyzed the Model Penal Code which Section 112 was derived from. Based on this analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and determined that Section 112 was not applicable to the PWID charge because the Traffic Division did have jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s traffic case. As such, because Section 112 did not apply to his case, Section 110 did apply to the defendant’s PWID charge and therefore his case will be remanded back to the trial court for formal dismissal.