Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 9/3/25 Zak Goldstein 9/3/25

Pennsylvania Superior Court Affirms Suppression of Cell Phone Evidence in Drug Case Because Police Looked at Phone Screen Without Warrant

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Carter, holding that the trial court properly suppressed a cell phone where the police looked at the cell phone’s screen during the execution of a search warrant for drugs without getting a warrant to look at the cell phone itself.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was under investigation by the Lycoming County Narcotics Enforcement Unit (“LCNEU”) for alleged crack cocaine sales. The officers allegedly conducted several controlled buys in June, July, and November 2023. The controlled buys involved using confidential informants to purchase drugs near the defendant’s residence in Williamsport, PA. Based on the information obtained from these controlled buys, the officers obtained search warrants for his home.

During the execution of one of the search warrants, the officers claimed that they saw the defendant’s cell phone screen light up. It apparently displayed a partial text message from a woman allegedly involved in some of the drug deals. An officer photographed the message and later used it to obtain another warrant to seize and search the phone itself. The initial warrant did not authorize searching or seizing the phone. The defendant was then charged with drug delivery offenses such as possession with the intent to deliver.

The Motion to Suppress

The defense attorney filed a motion to suppress the cell phone evidence, arguing that police conducted an unlawful search by looking at and photographing the phone’s screen without first obtaining a search warrant. The trial court agreed, finding that even a “small” intrusion into a cell phone, such as reading a text message notification, counts as a search under both Pennsylvania and U.S. Supreme Court law.

The court also doubted the police explanation, suggesting that the officers were not totally credible. The court was skeptical that the phone screen “lit up on its own” to reveal a six-hour-old message, concluding it was more likely that officers manipulated the phone given the age of the message. Because the phone evidence was unlawfully obtained in that police likely manipulated the phone before obtaining a warrant, the court ruled that the evidence from the phone was “fruit of the poisonous tree” and had to be suppressed. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that simply observing the phone screen fell within the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement. The police had the right to be in the house based on the first warrant, so there was no reason they could not look at the phone given that the phone was in plain view. The Superior Court rejected this argument. Relying on Riley v. California and Commonwealth v. Fulton, the court reaffirmed that cell phones are constitutionally protected spaces. Even minimal intrusions, like reading a text message, require a warrant.

The Superior Court also concluded that the trial court acted within its authority to question the credibility of the assertions contained in the affidavit and concluded that the “plain view” doctrine did not apply. As a result, the Court affirmed the suppression of the defendant’s phone and all evidence derived from it.

The Takeaway

This decision highlights how strongly Pennsylvania courts protect privacy interests in cell phones. Police cannot sidestep the warrant requirement by claiming that a text message or notification appeared in plain view. If officers want to read or use information from a phone, they must get a warrant.

For defendants, this ruling is a reminder that evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches may be excluded, which may significantly weaken the prosecution’s case. For anyone facing drug charges in Pennsylvania, especially cases involving phones, texts, or social media, it is critical to have a defense lawyer who understands the latest case law and knows how to fight unlawful searches.

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Zak Goldstein 8/5/25 Zak Goldstein 8/5/25

Pennsylvania Superior Court Rules Non-Violent Felon Gun Ban Constitutional in Commonwealth v. Randolph

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

On July 31, 2025, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued a new decision in Commonwealth v. Randolph, upholding the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s felon-in-possession statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). The Court rejected Randolph’s Second Amendment challenge to the law, finding that individuals with felony drug convictions such as PWID (Possession With Intent to Deliver) can still be lawfully prohibited from owning or carrying firearms even though PWID is generally a non-violent offense.

This ruling adds to the growing body of appellate decisions in Pennsylvania that interpret how the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark gun rights cases (Bruen, Heller, and Rahimi) apply to state gun control laws. If you or a loved one are facing a charge under § 6105 or any other firearm offense in Pennsylvania, it is important to understand the implications of this ruling and how it might affect your defense. Additionally, the Superior Court may not have the last word on the constitutionality of these statutes as the PA Supreme Court has granted review in a number of these cases.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Randolph?

The defendant was convicted in Allegheny County of two firearm charges:

Persons Not to Possess a Firearm under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), and
Carrying a Firearm Without a License under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a).

The charges stemmed from an incident in which the defendant was seen with a handgun inside a bar. At the time, he was prohibited from possessing firearms due to prior felony drug convictions. specifically, he had two 2005 convictions for PWID.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the § 6105 charge, arguing that the statute violated his Second Amendment rights, both facially and as applied to him. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted him on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to four to eight years in state prison and appealed.

The Constitutional Challenge: Can Nonviolent Felons Possess Guns?

On appeal, the defendant argued that § 6105 is unconstitutional in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, in which the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that gun laws must be rooted in the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. He also cited Range v. Attorney General, where the Third Circuit struck down the federal felon-in-possession statute as applied to a nonviolent offender convicted of food stamp fraud.

The defendant claimed that his prior convictions for nonviolent drug offenses should not disqualify him from owning a firearm and that the Commonwealth failed to prove a historical tradition of disarming people like him.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected Randolph’s arguments and upheld his conviction. Applying the Bruen two-step test, the Court first held that Randolph was part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment even as a convicted felon. However, the Court went on to conclude that Pennsylvania’s firearm ban for even non-violent felons is constitutional because:

There is a long-standing historical tradition of disarming individuals considered dangerous or a threat to public safety.
Drug trafficking is inherently dangerous and often associated with the use of firearms.
The statute does not impose a lifetime ban without recourse. Individuals convicted under § 6105 can, in some cases, petition the court for restoration of their firearm rights.

The Court emphasized that Bruen does not require a "historical twin" to justify modern firearm laws. Instead, it only requires a sufficiently analogous tradition. Citing colonial laws that disarmed vagrants, outlaws, and those deemed threats to public order, the Court found § 6105 to be consistent with that historical framework.

What This Means for People Facing Gun Charges in Pennsylvania

This case makes clear that Pennsylvania courts are continuing to uphold the constitutionality of § 6105 even after federal decisions such as Bruen, Rahimi, and Range. This is particularly true in cases involving felony convictions for drug offenses or violence. While there is ongoing litigation in both state and federal courts challenging the law (and defendants have done better in federal court than in state court), defendants with serious prior convictions may still be prohibited from possessing firearms under current Pennsylvania law. The Supreme Court has also granted review in at least two cases, and that litigation is still ongoing.

However, these constitutional issues are evolving, and every case is fact-specific. There are still strong constitutional arguments available in many cases, particularly where the prior conviction is nonviolent, less serious than PWID, and remote in time.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein 4/3/25 Zak Goldstein 4/3/25

PA Superior Court Reverses Rule 600 Dismissal in Commonwealth v. Farlow, Holds Rule 1013 Exclusively Governs Speedy Trial in Philadelphia Municipal Court

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In Commonwealth v. Farlow, 2025 PA Super 76, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed an order dismissing charges on Rule 600 speedy trial grounds, holding instead that Rule 1013—not Rule 600—governs speedy trial calculations in cases tried in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Court held that pre-arrest delay is essentially not an issue in a misdemeanor case in Philadelphia because Rule 1013’s speedy trial requirement runs from preliminary arraignment (which typically occurs when the defendant is arrested) rather than when the police file a criminal complaint (which may happen long before the arrest).

Background

The defendant was charged on September 20, 2021, with simple assault and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”) based on conduct which allegedly occurred on August 22, 2021. The police promptly obtained an arrest warrant, but they did not arrest the defendant until March 21, 2023, which was over eighteen months later. The defendant was also originally charged with a felony aggravated assault charge, so the defendant was entitled to a preliminary hearing in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The Municipal Court judge dismissed the aggravated assault charge at that hearing, and so the remaining misdemeanor charges were remanded for trial in the Philadelphia Municipal Court.

On the scheduled trial date of May 23, 2023, the defendant argued a motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, arguing that Commonwealth had not acted with due diligence during the pre-arrest period in locating the defendant and arresting her. The Commonwealth was ready for trial on that date, but if the time between the filing of the complaint and the arrest counted for speedy trial purposes, then the Commonwealth would have already violated Rule 600. Rule 1013 requires a defendant in a Municipal Court case to be brought to trial within 180 days of preliminary arraignment, but Rule 600, which applies to all Common Pleas cases, requires a defendant to be brought to trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal complaint. Thus, if Rule 600 also applied, then the Commonwealth violated the defendant’s speedy trial rights.

The Municipal Court judge agreed with the defendant that both rules applied and dismissed the case. The Commonwealth appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, and the Common Pleas judge affirmed. That judge reasoned that Rule 600 governed the case with respect to the lengthy pre-arrest delay and Rule 1013’s silence on that issue. More than a year had passed from the filing of the criminal complaint, so the Common Pleas judge affirmed the dismissal of the charges.

The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that Rule 1013 should apply to cases remanded for trial in Municipal Court and that, under Rule 1013’s timeline, no violation had occurred because Rule 1013 does not include pre-arrest delay in the calculation. Instead, time begins running under Rule 1013 essentially at arrest.

The Superior Court’s Analysis

The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth and clarified that Rule 1013—not Rule 600—governs speedy trial rights in cases ordered to be tried in the Philadelphia Municipal Court even if the case was initially filed as a felony. The Court held that Rule 1013(A)(3) explicitly provides for a 180-day deadline starting from the date of preliminary arraignment or the order transferring the case, whichever is greater.

Because the defendant was preliminarily arraigned on March 22, 2023, and the charges were dismissed before the 180-day period expired, the Superior Court found no Rule 1013 violation and reversed the dismissal.

The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that Rule 600 should apply to pre-arrest delay in such cases under Rule 1000(B). While acknowledging the potential due process concerns created by prolonged pre-arrest delay, the Court emphasized that neither Rule 600 nor Rule 1013 includes language covering that specific issue in this context. Notably, the Court found that while Rule 1013 accounts for pre-arrest delay when a defendant appears by summons, it intentionally begins the trial clock at arraignment in arrest warrant cases, signaling a deliberate drafting choice.

Takeaway

Interpreting the rules in this matter leads to a bizarre result. If the defendant had waived the preliminary hearing and agreed to have the felony charges tried in the Court of Common Pleas, then Rule 600 would have applied, and the case should have been dismissed. But because the defendant was successful at the preliminary hearing in having the felony dismissed and the case remanded, the defendant gave up the speedy trial defense available under Rule 600. That makes no sense as the defendant should not have to waive the preliminary hearing in order to then have a more serious case dismissed. Further, this interpretation of the rules means that the Commonwealth has no obligation to find and arrest a defendant for a less serious misdemeanor case, but the Commonwealth must promptly arrest a defendant for a felony case or the felony could be dismissed. Essentially, it makes it more likely that a more serious case will be dismissed on speedy trial grounds rather than a less serious case. Further, the rules are simply silent on whether Rule 600 applies in the absence of a specific provision in Rule 1013 to the contrary. Hopefully, the defendant will seek reargument or petition the Supreme Court.

This decision serves as a crucial reminder that in Philadelphia, once a felony charge is dismissed and the case is remanded to the Municipal Court for trial on remaining misdemeanor charges, Rule 1013 governs the speedy trial timeline. While Rule 600 begins the clock at the filing of the complaint and covers pre-arrest delay, Rule 1013 begins at the preliminary arraignment—effectively excluding pre-arrest periods from its calculus.

Defense attorneys handling cases where the charges may get remanded must now decide whether it may make sense to actually waive the preliminary hearing in order to retain stronger speedy trial protections rather than contesting the charges at the preliminary hearing and giving up the protections of Rule 600 in a case involving a lengthy pre-arrest delay. This is a difficult decision to make as the defense may not have discovery which shows the reason for the pre-arrest delay at the time of the preliminary hearing. Alternatively, the Court left open the possibility of challenging pre-arrest delays under constitutional due process principles.

Citation: Commonwealth v. Farlow, 2025 PA Super 76 (Mar. 28, 2025).

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Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 4/1/25 Zak Goldstein 4/1/25

PA Superior Court: Shining Flashlight Into Small Opening of Shoebox Violates Plain View Doctrine

Pennsylvania Superior Court Reverses Conviction Based on Warrantless Shoebox Search

Zak Goldstein Criminal Defense Lawyer — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In Commonwealth v. Herlth, 2025 PA Super 73, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a drug conviction after concluding that a warrantless search of a shoebox violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The ruling serves as a clear reaffirmation of privacy rights in closed containers within the home—even during police responses to medical emergencies.

The Facts of Herlth

The case arose out of an incident which occurred on August 31, 2020, when Pennsylvania State Police responded to a report of a drug overdose at a residence in Red Lion, Pennsylvania. EMS personnel were already inside administering care to the defendant when a state police trooper entered the house. The trooper was not there to provide medical assistance, but he wanted to ensure the safety of the EMS responders and “see what [the patient] overdosed on to possibly make an investigation further, anything that’s in plain view that we can see.”

While standing in a small living room near the defendant’s feet, the trooper noticed a closed shoebox next to the defendant’s leg. He then shined his flashlight into a manufacturer’s hole in the box and saw what appeared to be “scramble” capsules which were commonly used to package fentanyl and other drugs. Believing that the defendant had overdosed on these capsules, the trooper opened the box and seized a bag containing 117 capsules.

The defendant was arrested and charged with possession with the intent to deliver. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the trooper conducted an illegal warrantless search of his house and the shoebox. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and allowed the introduction of the evidence at trial. The court reasoned that the drugs were in plain view because the trooper was able to find them without actually opening the shoebox even though the trooper could not see them without using his flashlight. The court found the defendant guilty of PWID and sentenced him to seven to fourteen years’ incarceration. He appealed.

The Legal Issue: Was the Search Justified by the Plain View Doctrine?

On appeal, the defendant challenged the warrantless search and seizure, arguing that the use of a flashlight to examine the interior of a closed shoebox exceeded the scope of any permissible exception to the warrant requirement.

The Superior Court agreed. The Court explained the three essential requirements for the plain view doctrine to apply:

The officer must lawfully be in the vantage point from which the object is viewed;
The incriminating nature of the object must be immediately apparent (i.e., there must be probable cause);
The officer must have lawful access to the object.

While the Court acknowledged that the defendant lawfully entered the home under the “community caretaking” doctrine to ensure EMS safety, it held that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy the other two prongs of the test.

Specifically, the shoebox was a closed, opaque container, not an item whose incriminating character was immediately apparent. There was no way for the trooper to observe the contents without manipulating the container by shining a flashlight into a manufacturer’s hole—an investigative act which itself constituted a search.

Reliance on Key Precedent

The Court drew heavily on Commonwealth v. Graham, 721 A.2d 1075 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Norris, 446 A.2d 246 (Pa. 1982). In both cases, the Pennsylvania courts held that police may not use the plain view doctrine to justify extending a search into containers or concealed areas unless the object is already visible and the officer has lawful access.

In Graham, for example, the officer shined a flashlight into the defendant’s pocket after a Terry frisk had concluded, ultimately discovering contraband. The Supreme Court found that flashlight use in that context transformed an otherwise valid frisk into an unlawful search. Likewise, in Norris, officers were justified in seizing a knife on a nightstand but were not permitted to search under a mattress for a hidden firearm after the emergency had ended.

Why the Flashlight Made the Search Unlawful

Although courts have upheld flashlight use when illuminating objects that would otherwise be visible during the day, that principle did not apply here. The Superior Court emphasized that the scramble pills inside the shoebox were not in plain view; even in full daylight, they would have remained hidden inside the closed box. The use of a flashlight to peer into the hole was not passive illumination—it was a directed, investigative act taken without a warrant or exigent justification.

Outcome

The Superior Court reversed the denial of suppression, vacated the judgment of sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. One judge dissented, so the Commonwealth may file for review by the entire court.

Key Takeaways

The case underscores the robust privacy protections for closed containers inside a residence.
Police officers responding to overdoses or other emergencies must avoid converting caretaking roles into investigative searches unless they obtain a warrant or meet one of the narrow exceptions.
The plain view doctrine does not permit flashlight-aided searches of opaque containers without probable cause and lawful access.

This decision reinforces a critical constitutional limit on police authority and serves as a cautionary tale: even in good-faith responses to public health emergencies, law enforcement must respect established privacy rights.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?