Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 5/26/21 Zak Goldstein 5/26/21

PA Supreme Court: Rape Shield Law Bars Evidence of Complainant's Prostitution Conviction

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Rogers, holding that a defendant may not introduce evidence of a complainant’s prior conviction for prostitution to corroborate his testimony that he did not sexually assault the complainant, but rather merely engaged in paid sexual encounter. This decision addresses Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield Law, which is a powerful law that restricts a defendant’s ability to cross-examine complainants and introduce evidence to show that the challenged sex act may have been consensual. The law shields otherwise relevant evidence from the juries and often makes it difficult to defend against rape allegations even from those who have made false allegations before.

Commonwealth v. Rogers

The defendant physically and sexually assaulted five women over the course of a ten-month period in Philadelphia. The defendant was charged with dozens of crimes, including rape, robbery, and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. The charges were consolidated for trial. In a pretrial motion in limine, the defendant sought permission to introduce evidence that two of his victims had a history of convictions for prostitution in the general area where the incidents occurred. The defendant wanted to use these convictions to show that his encounters, with these particular women, were consensual acts of prostitution.

In his filings, the defendant acknowledged that the existence of the Rape Shield Law (which generally prohibits the introduction of a complainant’s past sexual history), but argued that the Rape Shield Law did not prohibit the introduction of this evidence. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion because “none of the convictions related to encounters with [the defendant].” The defendant then elected to proceed with a waiver trial. The complainants testified in detail about their assaults and how he also stole personal property from them. The defendant also testified. He testified that he had sexual relations with all the victims, but that all of them were consensual. For two of the victims, he stated that these were sex-for-money transactions. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found him guilty of the aforementioned charges.

A sexually-violent predator hearing was subsequently held and the trial court determined that he qualified as such. At his sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to a term of 55-170 years’ incarceration. The defendant then filed a post-sentence motion which was denied. The defendant then filed an appeal. On appeal, the defendant challenged his sentence, the weight of the evidence, and the denial of his motion in limine.

The Superior Court’s Decision

A three-judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed the defendant’s sentence. The Superior Court also denied the defendant’s appeal regarding his Rape Shield Law motion. Undeterred, the defendant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the defendant’s appeal. For purposes of this blog, only the issue concerning the defendant’s motion in limine will be addressed.

What is the Rape Shield Law?

The Rape Shield Law prohibits the introduction of an alleged victims “past sexual conduct, past sexual victimization, allegations of past sexual victimization, opinion evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct.” The purpose of the Rape Shield Law is to prevent a trial from shifting its focus from whether the defendant committed the crimes he is accused of “to the virtue and chastity of the victim.” Nonetheless, it cannot be applied in a manner that violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial, including his right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

As such, courts have sought to balance the defendant’s right to a fair trial, including his right to confront his accuser, against the state’s interests embodied in the Rape Shield Law. Consequently, courts have found the Rape Shield Law unconstitutional as applied in circumstances where the defendant seeks to introduce evidence for reasons unrelated to impugning the complainant’s character and when the probative value of that evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Each case is very fact specific and courts across the country have decided analogous issues differently. For example, an appellate court in Massachusetts has held that a defendant can introduce evidence of a complainant’s prior prostitution convictions in some cases. However, the last Pennsylvania case to address this issue held that the Rape Shield Law barred the introduction of this type of evidence.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the defendant’s appeal. In its decision, the Supreme Court held that the Rape Shield Law typically only allows the introduction of a complainant’s prior sexual encounters to “demonstrate factual premises other than consent” i.e. that someone else committed the crime, the complainant was biased towards the defendant, or that the complainant had a motive to fabricate the charges. Consequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that “there is little doubt that the proofs offered by [the defendant] were statutorily precluded.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the evidence the defendant sought to introduce was the very type of evidence that the Rape Shield Law is designed to preclude. Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that the lower court’s ruling did nothing to prohibit the defendant from establishing a consent defense. As such, the defendant will not get relief on this claim. However, he was successful on his other claim and his case was remanded back to the Superior Court to see if he is entitled to relief there.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/24/21 Zak Goldstein 5/24/21

PA Superior Court: Defense Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Call Impeachment Witness in Rape Case

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein - Philadelphia, PA

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Orner, holding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness in a rape case. The defense witness would have testified that the complainant admitted to the witness that she fabricated the claims against the defendant and that the sexual acts between them were consensual. This case really is not surprising given the crucial nature of this type of testimony, but it is a reminder that defense attorneys need to be diligent in investigating their cases and presenting witnesses that are helpful to their defense at trial.

Commonwealth v. Orner

The complainant was celebrating New Years with her boyfriend and their neighbor, the defendant. All three were drinking heavily at the complainant’s house. At approximately 9:00 PM, the complainant reported going to bed while the defendant and her boyfriend left the complainant’s residence to continue drinking at the VFW. The defendant was unable to enter the VFW and parted ways with the boyfriend.

The defendant then returned to the complainant’s residence. The defendant was subsequently questioned by the police where he denied any sexual contact had occurred between him and the complainant. He did eventually concede that he touched the complainant’s vagina when he was confronted with a search warrant for a DNA test. The defendant denied raping the complainant and would later testify that he and the complainant had been engaged in a flirtatious affair and had been “messing around” for about a year. Upon reaching the residence, the defendant claimed that he performed oral sex on the complainant for two minutes, but stopped when she asked him to and left. The defendant asserted that all sexual contact between him and the complainant was consensual.

At trial, the complainant denied that she and the defendant were engaged in a romantic affair. She testified that she had been awoken to the defendant performing oral sex on her. She also testified that the defendant penetrated her with his penis and that the defendant fled the scene after she woke up. After the defendant left, the complainant called her boyfriend, and then she called 911. Officers responded about ten minutes later, and her boyfriend was still present at the house. The boyfriend testified that he was in an insane rage after hearing the allegations, but he did concede that he had previously sent a text message claiming that the defendant and the complainant had been engaged in affair two years prior to the allegations.

The defendant was eventually arrested and charged with numerous crimes including rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, and indecent assault. His first two trials ended in mistrials. During the third trial, defense counsel announced that he had failed to serve subpoenas on a married couple who would have been able to corroborate the defendant’s claims about his relationship with the complainant. A deputy sheriff was able to locate the husband, but the deputy could not locate the wife. The husband testified at trial and stated that the complainant had publicly expressed a desire to have sex with the defendant and had told his wife about her relationship with the defendant on the same day as he had supposedly raped the complainant. At the end of the trial, the defendant was found guilty of the aforementioned charges. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six to fourteen years’ incarceration. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. However, he withdrew his appeal.

The defendant filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition alleging that the trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the wife to testify at his trial. The Court held an evidentiary hearing where both the trial attorney and the wife were called to testify. At this hearing, the wife testified that the defendant and the complainant had intended to rendezvous at the complainant’s residence while her boyfriend was drinking at the VFW. According to the wife, the defendant and the complainant were engaged in consensual sex, but they were interrupted when the boyfriend returned home. The defendant then fled the scene when the boyfriend arrived. The wife also testified that the complainant had given the defendant a key to her home and that she had confessed to her that she lied about the defendant raping her. Finally, the wife testified that had she been subpoenaed by the trial attorney she would have testified at the defendant’s trial.

The PCRA court granted the defendant’s petition and awarded him a new trial on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the wife at trial. Specifically, the PCRA court concluded that the wife’s testimony was “crucial because it would have greatly supported [the defendant’s] defense” that the complainant consented to the sexual acts in question that night and had a motive to fabricate the rape charges. The Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court’s decision. The Superior Court noted that the Commonwealth’s case against the defendant depended entirely upon the credibility of the complainant. If the wife had testified at trial, her testimony would have directly undermined the complainant’s credibility. The Superior Court ruled that the wife’s testimony was “unquestionably beneficial” to the defendant’s trial defense. Consequently, trial counsel’s failure to subpoena the wife deprived the defendant of crucial support for his proffered defense. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction is vacated, and he will get a new trial.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

Zak Goldstein 5/8/21 Zak Goldstein 5/8/21

PA Superior Court: Nervousness and Fidgeting by Driver Do Not Justify Search of Car

Criminal Defense Lawyer.jpg — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Mattis, holding that police cannot search a car during a routine traffic stop solely because the driver exhibited “extraordinary” nervousness and fidgeting. This case continues a recent trend of Pennsylvania appellate courts upholding the privacy rights of the Commonwealth’s citizens and seeking to rein in pretextual searches of people and automobiles, especially in marijuana cases.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and speeding in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. He moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that police had stopped him illegally and searched his car without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. In order to defend the legality of the search, the Commonwealth relied on the affidavit of probable cause for the defendant’s arrest and called the arresting State Trooper to testify.

The affidavit of probable cause indicated that a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper pulled the defendant over for driving 76 mph in a 55 mph zone. The defendant pulled over on command, and the trooper approached the vehicle. He obtained the defendant’s license and paperwork, but he noticed that the defendant was “extraordinarily nervous and fidgeting constantly.” He asked the defendant to get out of the vehicle. The defendant did so, and the Trooper asked for permission to search the car. The defendant gave him permission to search the car. Another Trooper was on scene and assisted with the stop. Police found marijuana, a pipe, and a grinder in the car. Fayette County apparently still prosecutes people for marijuana offenses.

The Motion to Suppress

The defendant filed a motion to suppress. He argued that the Trooper did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to prolong the stop beyond the initial purpose of investigating the speeding offense and that some nervousness and fidgeting did not justify any further investigation.

The Superior Court agreed. The Court recognized that police may stop a vehicle for a traffic infraction as the Trooper did here. However, once the purpose of the initial, valid, traffic stop has ended and a reasonable person would have believed he was free to leave, a second round of questioning with some official restriction on a person’s freedom of movement requires reasonable suspicion of some other crime for it to be justified. As a general rule, police may order the occupants of a vehicle to exit that vehicle for safety reasons during a legitimate traffic stop. But police may not extend the stop longer than necessary, and nervousness alone does not justify reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention or prolonging a stop.

Here, the Trooper testified that he made contact with the defendant and the defendant was nervous and fidgeting around in the vehicle. He confirmed that the defendant did not have any warrants and that he had valid paperwork for the car.

But without any additional reason, he then ordered the defendant to exit the vehicle. Most importantly, the Trooper retained possession of the defendant’s paperwork. The defendant was not free to leave because he obviously could not leave without his driver’s license. The Trooper, while still in possession of the documents, asked the defendant if he could search the car. The defendant granted permission.

The Court suppressed the resulting evidence because it found that the Trooper had improperly extended the stop. Although the Trooper had the right to ask the defendant to exit the vehicle as a general rule, he did so because of the defendant’s nervousness and not because of anything related to the speeding investigation. Because he held onto the paperwork, the defendant was not free to leave. Therefore, the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, and the Court ruled that the evidence should be suppressed because the consent given was not constitutionally valid.

The Superior Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial without the illeglaly seized evidence. The Commonwealth will likely have to withdraw the charges.

Need a criminal defense lawyer? We can help.

Zak Goldstein 5/6/21 Zak Goldstein 5/6/21

PA Superior Court: DUI With Child In Car Not Automatically Endangering Welfare of Child

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett, holding that evidence that a defendant drove a vehicle with a child in the car while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance is insufficient to support a conviction for endangering the welfare of a child without some evidence of actual reckless driving. The mere act of driving under the influence will no longer support a conviction for this charge. Instead, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant was unable to safely drive. Typically, the Commonwealth would try to show this by introducing evidence that the defendant actually operated the car in an unsafe manner.

Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett

A Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Trooper was patrolling in a marked police cruiser when he observed a white BMW that did not have an inspection sticker on its windshield. The Trooper began following the vehicle and activated his lights. The vehicle pulled over and upon approaching the vehicle, the Trooper smelled a strong odor of marijuana. The defendant was driving the vehicle. The defendant’s girlfriend and their three-month-old baby were also in the vehicle. The Trooper proceeded to search the vehicle. He discovered a digital scale and an “empty twisted corner of a baggie” which, according to the Trooper, often contains some sort of controlled substance. A bag of marijuana was found in the girlfriend’s pants, and the defendant admitted it belonged to him.

The Trooper also performed field sobriety tests on the defendant. According to the Trooper, the field sobriety tests that were performed on the defendant could detect whether someone was under the influence of marijuana. The defendant later admitted to smoking marijuana. The defendant was then arrested. He also consented to a blood draw which showed that he had forty nanograms of the inactive metabolite of marijuana in his system. The defendant was subsequently charged with DUI (a)(1), DUI (d)(2), and EWOC.

The defendant elected to proceed by jury trial. He was acquitted of DUI (a)(1), but was convicted on the other two charges and then sentenced to 42 to 96 months’ incarceration. The defendant then filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied. He filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant raised two issues. Only the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime of EWOC will be addressed in this blog.

What is EWOC?

18 Pa.C.S. § 4304 (a)(1) governs the crime of EWOC as it relates to parents. It states:

“[a] parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or supervises such a person, commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.” It is a specific intent offense which was enacted in broad terms to safeguard the welfare and security of children. To be convicted for EWOC, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant’s actions amounted to a “knowing violation of a duty of care.”

The Superior Court has adopted a three-prong standard to determine whether the Commonwealth has met its burden to convict a defendant of EWOC. First, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant is aware of his/her duty to protect the child. Next, the Commonwealth must show that the child is in circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare. Finally, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant failed to act or has taken action so lame or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child’s welfare.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the defendant’s EWOC conviction. The Superior Court held that just because the defendant was impaired, he did not knowingly place his child in danger by driving with the child in the vehicle. The Superior Court highlighted the fact that the record omitted any allegations of unsafe driving by the defendant. Therefore, the evidence was not sufficient to support the EWOC conviction. Consequently, the defendant’s conviction for EWOC will be vacated and he will get a new sentencing hearing.