Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 3/4/21 Zak Goldstein 3/4/21

PA Superior Court: No Probable Cause from Marijuana Odor to Search Parked Car

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The Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Grooms, holding that the smell of marijuana alone does not establish probable cause to search a parked automobile. This decision is significant because it adds to a growing list of appellate decisions that restrict the police’s authority to search a person’s property because the police smelled the odor of marijuana. Hopefully, this trend persists and the Superior Court continues producing opinions similar to Grooms.

Commonwealth v. Grooms

Swatara Township police officers were on routine patrol at the Harrisburg Mall. According to the officers, the Harrisburg Mall parking lot is a high-drug area and they frequently make narcotics arrests there. The officers were walking through the parking lot where they came across an unrelated individual who they subsequently arrested for possession of marijuana. They arrested this individual about three rows away from the defendant’s vehicle.

After they were done with that arrest, they continued their patrol where they detected an odor of marijuana coming from the defendant’s vehicle. The officers then approached the vehicle and confirmed that they were smelling “fresh” marijuana emanating from the defendant’s vehicle. They then shined their flashlights into the vehicle to observe any contraband in plain view, but did not see any contraband. The police then tried to open the defendant’s car door, but it was locked. The officers then retrieved their lockout tool to unlock the vehicle. Once inside the vehicle, they said the odor of marijuana was stronger. While searching the vehicle they located two bags of marijuana, a marijuana-filled cigar, crack cocaine and some ecstasy. At no point did the police obtain a search warrant. Shortly after they finished their search, they saw the defendant and a woman walking up to the vehicle. The defendant then told the police that “anything found in the car was his.” The defendant was arrested and charged with criminal use of a communication facility, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of cocaine and methamphetamine.

The defendant then filed a motion to suppress alleging that the police lacked probable cause to search his car. At the hearing, the above facts were placed on the record. During cross-examination, the officers conceded that they searched the defendant’s vehicle solely because they smelled marijuana coming from the defendant’s vehicle. The officers also conceded that they only waited a few minutes before they began searching the defendant’s car because their shift was going to end soon. Finally, the officers acknowledged that dry-leaf marijuana was legal for medical purposes in Pennsylvania.

At the conclusion of arguments, the trial court denied his motion to suppress. The trial court justified this by stating that the “odor of marijuana alone may establish probable cause.” The defendant then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial where the defendant was found guilty of the aforementioned crimes. He was then sentenced to 30 to 60 months’ imprisonment. The defendant then filed a timely appeal.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. In its decision, the Superior Court held that the odor of marijuana alone does not establish probable cause, but instead is a factor that may contribute to a finding of probable cause when assessed under the totality-of-the circumstances.

The reason for this is because of the passage of the Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”) which legalized dry leaf marijuana for medicinal purposes. The Superior Court acknowledged that because of the MMA there would be “hundreds of thousands of Pennsylvanians” who could potentially be emitters of marijuana odor. Thus, it would be improper to subject law-abiding citizens to police detention solely on the basis of the odor of marijuana.

This was the logic in Commonwealth v. Barr. In that case, the police conducted a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped vehicle after they detected an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. In Barr, the Superior Court held that the odor of marijuana alone, absent any other circumstances, could not establish probable cause because so many Pennsylvanians lawfully possess marijuana. Thus, applying the logic of Barr, the Superior Court held that the trial court erred when it applied a per se rule that the smell of marijuana establishes probable cause. As such, the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed and his conviction is vacated.

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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 3/2/21 Zak Goldstein 3/2/21

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein Wins Full Dismissal of First Degree Murder Charges

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, recently won the full dismissal of first-degree murder charges in the case of Commonwealth v. DH. Prosecutors had charged DH with first degree murder, conspiracy, and firearms charges for a shooting incident which occurred in Philadelphia. The incident resulted in the death of one man and injuries to a surviving complainant.

DH retained Attorney Goldstein immediately upon learning that there were charges pending. Attorney Goldstein was able to help DH turn himself in safely and then moved for the charges to be dismissed at the preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence that DH was present while one of his friends got into a physical altercation with the surviving complainant. DH watched the fight, and during the fight, one of the men even dropped a cell phone. DH picked it back up and handed it to him. The fight ended, and the two groups separated.

Video evidence then showed that DH and the two co-defendants both got into the same car and began to drive away. The decedent and the surviving complainant began to walk away on foot. The video then showed the car, which DH was allegedly driving, parking near where the two victims were walking. Video then showed the two co-defendants following closely behind the two victims while DH walked even further behind. At some point, the two victims turned around, began to argue with the two co-defendants, and one of the co-defendants allegedly pulled a gun and began firing. Those shots killed the decedent and injured the surviving complainant. The video showed that the three men then fled the scene.

Prosecutors identified DH from the video evidence and charged him with first degree murder and related charges, arguing that he had conspired with the shooter to commit the murder because they were friends, had driven away in the same car, and had come back to the area together. Attorney Goldstein argued for a full dismissal at the preliminary hearing on the basis of the mere presence doctrine. Mere presence is a defense to a criminal conspiracy charge. Mere presence is the idea that just because someone is present at the scene of the crime or friendly with someone else who commits a crime does not mean that they are responsible for the actions of the other person.

Here, there was no evidence that DH actually knew or in any way encouraged the shooter to commit the homicide. Instead, the evidence showed only that they were friends and that DH was nearby when the co-defendant began shooting. Accordingly, the Municipal Court judge dismissed all charges except the firearms charge. DH was then released on bail. Attorney Goldstein subsequently filed a motion to quash the firearms charge, and the Court of Common Pleas granted that motion. Accordingly, all charges were dismissed, and DH is a free man.

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Criminal Defense Lawyers Zak Goldstein and Demetra Mehta

Zak Goldstein 2/8/21 Zak Goldstein 2/8/21

PA Superior Court Overturns PFA Contempt Conviction for Failure to Give Adequate Notice of Allegations in Complaint

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Reitz v. Flower, holding that a defendant may not be convicted of indirect criminal contempt based on conduct that was not specifically charged in the criminal complaint. The holding here should have been obvious - a criminal defense has the right to know what they’re accused of doing so that they can prepare a defense. But courts often allow variances from the allegations in a complaint and uphold convictions anyway. Fortunately, the Superior Court here recognized that the defendant was improperly convicted entirely based on conduct for which he was not actually charged. Therefore, it reversed the conviction.

Reitz v. Flower

The defendant’s ex-wife obtained a protection from abuse (“PFA”) against the defendant. The PFA order prohibited the defendant from contacting his ex-wife directly or indirectly. Additionally, the PFA order prohibited the defendant from possessing any firearms. These restrictions were put in place due to the defendant’s past conduct towards his ex-wife, specifically because of allegations of prior physical abuse and harassment.

After this order was entered, the ex-wife filed a private criminal complaint against the defendant alleging that he violated the PFA order by possessing firearms. She did not make any other allegations against the defendant. Specifically, she alleged that he posted a photo of himself armed at a rally in Harrisburg on Facebook. Consequently, a contempt hearing was scheduled to address this charge.

After this hearing was scheduled, the defendant posted on Facebook that he would not wear a mask when he appeared at his next court date because he believed it was “a form of tyranny.” It should be noted this incident occurred during the global COVID-19 pandemic. Further, the defendant wrote that he was willing to turn the court proceeding into a circus and that the contempt proceeding was “[p]etty nonsense from a vindictive woman with no legal basis.”

During the hearing, the defendant’s Facebook post alleging that his ex-wife’s claim was “petty nonsense” was introduced. Defense counsel objected to it and argued that it was irrelevant and did not relate to her sole allegation of the contempt claim which was his illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court allowed it to be introduced into evidence. At the conclusion of the contempt hearing, the trial court found that the defendant violated the PFA on two occasions. First, he violated it by not turning in his firearms and the second by making contact with his ex-wife through his Facebook post. In regards to the latter, the trial court found that the reason it found him in contempt was because “he called her a vindictive woman and called her PFA contempt petty nonsense with no legal basis.”

At sentencing, the trial court modified its adjudication to reflect a single PFA violation of harassing his ex-wife in the Facebook post. It was determined that the defendant had only been photographed brandishing a replica rifle and not an operable weapon. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to six months’ probation that was to run consecutive to any other sentences that the defendant was currently serving. Further, the PFA was extended by an additional six months. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court violated his due process rights by finding him in violation of an uncharged offense.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the defendant’s conviction. The Superior Court first cited the United States Constitution which guarantees the accused to the right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusations against him. The Superior Court also noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution has similar protections. Specifically, the court held that defendants must have must adequate notice to allow them to prepare any available defenses should he exercise his right to a trial. Further, in a criminal complaint, each charged offense must have a sufficient summary of the facts so the defendant is advised of the nature of the offenses charged against him.

In this case, the Superior Court found that the private criminal complaint only alleged a violation based on the defendant’s illegal possession of a firearm. There was no mention of any allegation that the defendant illegally contacted her. As such, the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the defendant because he did not have proper notice of the charges against him. Therefore, the Superior Court vacated the defendant’s conviction for contempt. However, it stressed that this decision did not bar future prosecution against him for any alleged future violations of the PFA order. This is an important case because it reigns the Commonwealth in in terms of prosecuting criminal defendants for conduct in variance with what they’re charged in the criminal complaint.

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Zak Goldstein 1/30/21 Zak Goldstein 1/30/21

PA Supreme Court Finds Trial Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Object to Improper Reasonable Doubt Instruction

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Montalvo, holding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper jury instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt. This decision is significant because it shows how important jury instructions are in a trial. Judges are required to properly instruct jurors on the relevant legal principles, and therefore, if they misstate the law, it can have disastrous consequences for the defendant. Thankfully, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized this in Montalvo. As a general rule, the giving of improper jury instructions is one of the issues which is most likely to successfully lead to a new trial on appeal or in post-conviction litigation.

Commonwealth v. Montalvo

The defendant’s brother and his wife moved to York County from Puerto Rico. The couple frequently fought, and eventually, the brother moved out of the couple’s apartment. A few weeks later, the wife was seen at a local bar with a friend. At some point during the evening, the wife and her friend left the bar and walked to the wife’s apartment. Later that evening, the wife’s neighbor was awakened by the sound of breaking glass. The neighbor heard the defendant’s brother yell “open the door” after which he heard additional noises coming from the apartment. The following day, the neighbor looked through the wife’s window and saw a man lying on the floor. After seeing this, he called the police.

When the police arrived at the scene, they observed the one pane of a four-pane window in the door to the apartment was broken. Upon entering the apartment, the officers discovered the friend’s body in the kitchen and the wife’s body in the bedroom. The friend had defensive wounds on his hands and he had lipstick inserted in his mouth. The wife had a broken nose, stab wounds to her eyes, and her head was nearly severed from her body. During their investigation, the police were able to identify traces of human blood that did not belong to either victim. After analysis, the police were able to determine that the blood belonged to the defendant’s brother. The defendant’s brother was subsequently arrested and charged with the murders of his wife and her friend. He was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death.

Two months before the defendant’s brother was arrested, the police sought and obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant as a possible accomplice or participant in the murders. The defendant remained a fugitive for several years until he was arrested in Hudson, New Jersey living under an assumed name. The defendant was then extradited to York County to face trial. At his trial, most of the evidence that was presented at his brother’s trial was also presented. The only evidence presented by the Commonwealth to connect the defendant to the murders was the testimony of a grocery store owner. She testified that the defendant’s brother had used their phone to call his wife. An argument ensued after which the brother hung up the phone. The grocery store owner would testify that after he hung up the phone, he told the defendant that he wanted to kill his wife. In response to this, the defendant said “leave it to him” and that he would kill his wife himself. She also testified that after the murders, the defendant and his brother came to their house. She said she heard the brothers tell her husband in great detail how they killed the wife and her friend.

After the prosecution and the defense rested, the judge charged the jury. During her reading of the jury instructions, the trial court made two significant misstatements. First, while explaining reasonable doubt, she stated “so if the Commonwealth has not sustained its burden to that level, the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then your verdict must be guilty.” The defendant’s attorney did not object to this and would later testify during a PCRA hearing that “he did not recognize the mistake.” Then, a short time later, the judge stated “if you find that the defendant was not involved in this, you should find him guilty of all those charges.” This time, the defendant’s attorney corrected the trial court by saying “Not guilty, judge.” In response to this, the judge said “not guilty. Now that was a Freudian slip.”

After the trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree and second-degree murder. The jury came back with a recommendation of death and the trial court imposed the death sentence for him. The defendant then filed a timely appeal. His appeal was denied and then he filed a PCRA petition arguing that his attorney was ineffective in his representation of him. The defendant’s PCRA hearings lasted three days. At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court granted the defendant a new trial based on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object to the trial court’s error in instructing the jury on the issue of guilt. The Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s decision. In its brief, the Commonwealth did not dispute that the jury instruction was incorrect. However, it argued that it was “one isolated misstatement that occurred during the course of otherwise error-free instructions to the jury.” The Commonwealth further argued that basically everyone is familiar with the requirement that a prosecutor prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not persuaded by the Commonwealth’s arguments. The Court stated that it is the trial court’s sole responsibility to instruct the jury on the law as it pertains to the case before them. Additionally, the Court took issue with the Commonwealth’s characterization of trial court’s performance delivering the jury instructions. The Court highlighted that shortly after this initial mistake, the trial court misstated the law again. To make matters worse, the trial court injected its opinion on the case by saying that it “was a Freudian slip” when she misstated the law. The Court found that the trial court had “conveyed to the jury her belief that [the defendant] was guilty.” This was unacceptable to the Court and held that the defendant had been prejudiced. Consequently, the defendant’s convictions are vacated and he will get a new trial.

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