Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 11/10/20 Zak Goldstein 11/10/20

Challenging a State Court Conviction in Federal Court in Pennsylvania

28 U.S. Code § 2254 provides one last chance for appealing a wrongful state court conviction by filing a petition in federal court. This type of petition would typically be filed once all other appeals have been exhausted. This means we may be able to help you even if the appeals courts have upheld a conviction on direct appeal and a post-conviction relief act petition filed in state court has been denied.

A criminal defendant who received the ineffective assistance of counsel in their state court trial, on direct appeal, or in the first round of state court PCRA proceedings may be eligible for relief in federal court. It is important to note that federal habeas petitions are extremely complicated and that the deadlines for filing them are very strict, so it is important to consult with an experienced defense attorney as soon as possible if you are considering filing one for your case. This article does not discuss all of the potential issues that a defendant may face in filing a successful federal habeas petition.

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Zak Goldstein 10/29/20 Zak Goldstein 10/29/20

PA Supreme Court: Police Can't Search Your Phone Just Because You're Near Drugs and Guns

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson, holding that a defendant’s proximity to drugs and guns is not sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant for a defendant’s cell phone. This decision is significant because cell phones often contain very private and intimate details about our lives. Additionally, they can also obtain very incriminating details that prosecutors will use against defendants at trial. Thankfully, Johnson places a higher burden on the government to access these details, and so this is a big win for both privacy advocates and criminal defendants.

Commonwealth v. Johnson

In 2014, Pittsburgh police officers received a 911 call from an anonymous caller. The call stated that shots were fired inside an apartment. The officers subsequently went to this apartment and as they approached the apartment, they smelled a strong odor of burning marijuana coming from inside of the apartment and could hear people talking, too. The officers then knocked on the door and announced their presence. They continued knocking for several minutes with no response.

Eventually, a woman opened the door and the officers entered the apartment and conducted a protective sweep and detained five individuals, one of them being the defendant. During their sweep, the officers observed in plain view two bricks of heroin on a shelf. They also recovered three stolen firearms hidden together above the apartment’s hot water tank. The five detained individuals were placed under arrest. Officers then secured the apartment and obtained a search warrant. When they searched the defendant, they found two cell phones on his person. During their search of the apartment, the officers recovered an additional 717 bags of heroin and three cell phones. Four months after they recovered the cell phones, the officers requested and obtained an additional search warrant for the cell phones that they recovered, including the phones found on the defendant.

The defendant was charged with Possession with the Intent to Deliver (“PWID”), VUFA § 6105, Knowing and Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance (“K/I”), and Small Amount of Marijuana (“SAM”). The defendant then filed a motion to suppress the drugs, cell phones, and firearms that were recovered in the apartment because he argued they were illegally obtained. This motion was denied. After this motion was litigated, the Commonwealth turned over additional discovery to the defendant. Specifically, they provided him with text messages that were recovered from his phone that “referenced stamp bags of heroin which had the same stamp as [the] bags recovered from the apartment.”

The defendant filed a subsequent motion to suppress these text messages, arguing that the search warrant should never have been granted given that the officers lacked probable cause to search his phone. The defendant argued that the police were going through his phone to figure out who the guns and drugs belonged to and that this was an improper attempt to ascertain that information. Unfortunately for the defendant, the suppression court did not agree with him and denied this motion to suppress too.

The defendant then elected to proceed by a bench trial. He was found guilty of PWID and K/I, but was found not guilty of VUFA 6105, and SAM. He then filed an appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court which was denied. According to the Superior Court, the fact that the defendant “was found ‘in close proximity to firearms and evidence of the distribution of heroin’ established a probable cause to believe more evidence relating to narcotics distribution would be found on his cell phone.” The defendant then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who agreed to hear his case. For purposes of this blog, only the search warrant pertaining to the defendant’s cell phones will be addressed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and remanded the defendant’s case for a new trial. In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the notion that because there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for constructively possessing the drugs and guns that that there was also probable cause to search his cell phone for evidence of those same offenses. The Court stated that there must be a link or some facts to show that the cell phone contains evidence of criminality.

In the instant case, the Court found that there was no such link. There was nothing in the affidavit to suggest that the defendant was personally in possession of the drugs or that he was even aware they were in the apartment. Additionally, because the police originally went to the apartment on the basis of an alleged emergency, the police did not have the support of a long-term drug trafficking investigation to bolster their affidavit. The only thing that the affidavit of probable cause established was that the defendant was present in a place where illegal contraband happened to be found. This was not sufficient to get a search warrant for a cell phone. Therefore, the defendant should receive a new trial without the illegally seized evidence.

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If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, and Murder. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 10/22/20 Zak Goldstein 10/22/20

PA Superior Court: NJ Aggravated Assault Conviction Not a Prior "Strike"

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Johnson, holding that a defendant’s conviction for third-degree aggravated assault in New Jersey does not qualify as a prior “strike” offense under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9714. This decision is significant for people who have convictions in other states because it requires a trial judge to analyze said conviction to determine whether it qualifies as a strike offense in Pennsylvania. As this decision shows, “strike” offenses are very serious and can result in lengthy mandatory minimum sentences at sentencing for subsequent offenses.

Commonwealth v. Johnson

In 2018, the complainant was working as a cashier at a convenience store in Chester County, Pennsylvania. At about 7:45 p.m., a customer approached the counter with a bag of chips. The complainant asked for twenty-five cents to which the man then proceeded to drop the chips and pull a gun on him. The complainant told him not to “play” unless he wanted to go to jail and advised him that there were cameras in the store. The man then left the store with the chips and the complainant followed him demanding payment. The man then re-entered the store, put the chips back on the counter, and told the complainant that he made a mistake and did not want the chips. The man then left the store.

The complainant did not immediately report the robbery. The following day when his manager came into the store, the complainant told him what happened. The two men then viewed the security camera video and saved the video footage of the robbery. Later that day, the man who committed the robbery entered the store. The cashier recognized this man as the robber from the night before. Upon seeing the complainant, the man abruptly left the store. The complainant reviewed the footage and confirmed it was the person who robbed him the night before and called the police.

About five minutes later, an officer with the Chester Police Department arrived at the convenience store. The officer reviewed the footage and sent out a “flash” including a description of the individual and what he was wearing. The officer then left the store and began to search for the suspect himself. About fifteen minutes after he left the store, he came across the defendant. The officer detained the defendant and the complainant made an identification of him. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with robbery and possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”).

The defendant proceeded by way of a jury trial where he was convicted of both charges. He was then sentenced to a term of ten to twenty years of imprisonment. The reason he received that sentence was because the trial court determined that this was a “second strike offense” based on his prior New Jersey conviction for aggravated assault graded as an indictable offense (felony) of the third-degree. Afterwards, the defendant filed a timely appeal raising multiple issues. For purposes of this blog, only his sentencing issue will be addressed.

What is Pennsylvania’s Strike Statute?

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9714 is the statute that governs second and third strike offenses. It states:

(a) Mandatory sentence.--
(1) Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence shall, if at the time of the commission of the current offense the person had previously been convicted of a crime of violence, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least ten years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Upon a second conviction for a crime of violence, the court shall give the person oral and written notice of the penalties under this section for a third conviction for a crime of violence. Failure to provide such notice shall not render the offender ineligible to be sentenced under paragraph (2).
(2) Where the person had at the time of the commission of the current offense previously been convicted of two or more such crimes of violence arising from separate criminal transactions, the person shall be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least 25 years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Proof that the offender received notice of or otherwise knew or should have known of the penalties under this paragraph shall not be required. Upon conviction for a third or subsequent crime of violence the court may, if it determines that 25 years of total confinement is insufficient to protect the public safety, sentence the offender to life imprisonment without parole.

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9714(g) also lists the offenses that qualify as a “strike” offense. It should be noted that not every crime of violence qualifies as a strike offense. For example, only two of the nine subsections of Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute qualify as a “strike” offense. Thus, it can be inferred that these mandatory minimum sentences are only reserved for the most serious crimes.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Superior Court remanded the defendant’s case for a new sentencing hearing. In making its decision, the Court analyzed New Jersey’s aggravated assault statute. New Jersey defines third-degree aggravated assault as when a person “[a]ttempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury. The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defines “significant bodily injury” as: “bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any of the five senses.” This is different from Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault statute which requires “serious bodily injury” which is defined as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.”

This distinction proved to be important for the Pennsylvania Superior Court. It found that the defendant’s New Jersey conviction was not serious enough to warrant a classification as a prior “strike” offense. Therefore, the statutes were not equivalent, and a conviction under the statute did not constitute an equivalent offense. Therefore, the defendant did not qualify for an enhanced sentence under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9714. As such, the Superior Court vacated his sentence, and his case will be remanded for re-sentencing.

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Zak Goldstein 10/11/20 Zak Goldstein 10/11/20

PA Supreme Court Eliminates Public Record Presumption for Newly-Discovered Evidence PCRAs

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Small, eliminating the “public records presumption” with respect to Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) litigation. The public-records presumption often allowed courts to dismiss PCRA Petitions based on newly-discovered evidence on the theory that a petitioner should have found out about potential evidence contained in records which were theoretically publicly available at an earlier date, thereby rendering petitions untimely. PCRA Petitions based on newly-discovered evidence generally must be filed within one year of the date on which the Petitioner learned of the new evidence. Of course, inmates don’t really have access to public records, and even when they have lawyers, their lawyers may not be aware of certain new evidence or facts. Therefore, the presumption unfairly resulted in the dismissal of countless petitions.

Commonwealth v. Small

The defendant and his co-defendant committed an armed robbery of a drug dealer in the co-defendant’s home in 1981. During the incident, the defendant stabbed the drug dealer and the decedent. The decedent died from his wounds. The defendant and his co-defendant were tried together in 1983. At their trial, the drug dealer testified and identified the defendant and his co-defendant as the assailants. The drug dealer also testified that the defendant stabbed him during the robbery, while the co-defendant was armed with a shotgun. During the struggle, the drug dealer was able to escape through a kitchen window.

The co-defendant testified in his own defense and provided a different account of the events. He admitted that he and the defendant intended to rob the drug dealer and the decedent. However, he denied wielding a shotgun. He testified that he and the defendant entered the apartment and ordered the decedent and the drug dealer on the floor. While tying up the drug dealer, he jumped up and struck the co-defendant. The defendant then came to the co-defendant’s aid and hit the drug dealer three times “with what sounded like punches.” The defendant then “punched” the decedent who cried out that he had been stabbed. The co-defendant stated that he left the apartment in a panic, but then they realized he had left his hat behind. The two men then went back to the apartment. They entered the apartment by breaking a kitchen window whereupon the co-defendant retrieved his hat and the defendant carried off a television set.

The defendant also testified in his own defense. He denied any participation in the crimes. He even denied making an incriminating statement that he had given to detectives which stated that he served as a lookout outside of the apartment. The defendant stated that the detectives approached him in the interrogation room with a statement already prepared and instructed him to sign it, but he refused to do so. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found both the defendant and the co-defendant guilty of second-degree murder, robbery, aggravated assault, and criminal conspiracy. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. His sentence was later affirmed by the Superior Court.

The PCRA Petition

Over the course of several decades, the defendant made several attempts to obtain relief under the PCRA. His first three PCRA petitions were denied and their dismissals were affirmed on appeal. The instant case has to do with his fourth PCRA petition which was filed in 2014. In this petition, the defendant alleged that the co-defendant testified during his own post-conviction proceedings in a manner that was substantially different than from his trial testimony. The defendant testified that he learned this in 2013 while conducting legal research in the prison library. Due to what the PCRA court characterized as “some administrative and inexplicable error,” the defendant’s petition was neither assigned to nor received by the PCRA court until April 2017.

The PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss this PCRA petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The defendant responded to the notice, contending that his averments satisfied the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time bar. The PCRA court reconsidered its intent to dismiss the defendant’s petition. The PCRA court stated that the defendant obtained this “newly discovered” evidence based on his reading of a 1998 Superior Court decision that affirmed the denial of the co-defendant’s PCRA petition. In that opinion, the court cites the co-defendant’s testimony from his evidentiary hearing. It stated that the co-defendant testified that the defendant killed the decedent for personal reasons, specifically because his wife had an affair with him.

This was obviously different than what the co-defendant testified to at their trial. Based on this representation, the PCRA court appointed the defendant an attorney to represent him. His attorney was then able to obtain transcripts from evidentiary hearings conducted from the co-defendant’s PCRA proceedings. Consequently, the defendant then filed an amended petition citing these transcripts and alleging that he was entitled to a new trial in light of the after-discovered evidence prong of the PCRA statute. It should be noted that both the Commonwealth and the defendant stipulated that these transcripts constituted “public records.”

In making its decision, the PCRA court gave significant weight to the evidence revealed in the 1993 transcripts. The court found the transcripts relevant because the co-defendant gave another version of events that was different than what he said at their trial. Based on these discrepancies, the PCRA court concluded that this amounted to newly discovered evidence and he was entitled to a new trial. The Commonwealth then filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior reversed the PCRA court. Specifically, the Superior Court found that because these transcripts from the 1993 hearing were a matter of public record and therefore could not be considered “unknown” to the defendant. Further, the Superior Court found that the co-defendant’s testimony from the 1993 hearing was not significantly different than his trial testimony. Consequently, the defendant was not entitled to PCRA relief. The defendant then filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to hear the case.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court eliminated the public record presumption of the PCRA. The Court analyzed the plain language of the newly discovered evidence prong of the PCRA and found that it only has two elements: “that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner,” and that those facts “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Further, the Court stated that “[t]his language plainly calls for a circumstance-dependent analysis of the petitioner’s knowledge, not that of the public at large.” In other words, the language of the newly discovered evidence prong of the PCRA has no requirement that the evidence be of public record and that this presumption was a judicially crafted presumption that was inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.

Unfortunately for the defendant, the elimination of the public records presumption did not mean that he would get a new trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Superior Court’s finding that the co-defendant’s testimony from his 1993 hearing was not significantly different than what he testified to at their trial. The Court acknowledged that there were inconsistencies and omissions between what he testified to in 1993 and what he testified to at trial. Nonetheless, the co-defendant’s testimonies were consistent enough and therefore held that the defendant is not entitled to a new trial. As such, he will be forced to serve the remainder of his sentence. However, this opinion will help many petitioners going forward as they will be able to get into court by filing a PCRA even if the new evidence appeared in public records to which they do not have access outside of the one year window for filing a newly-discovered evidence petition.

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