Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 5/14/18 Zak Goldstein 5/14/18

Can a Juvenile's Confession Be Used Against Them in Court?

PA Superior Court Finds Juvenile's Waiver of Miranda Rights Involuntary

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of In Re: N.B., finding that the trial court properly suppressed N.B.'s confession due to an involuntary waiver of N.B.'s Miranda rights. The Court's ruling relied heavily on the fact that the juvenile defendant's mother essentially forced him to confess to the police, thereby rendering his decision to waive his Miranda rights and confess involuntary.

In the Interest of N.B.

The facts of In Re: N.B. were relatively straight forward. The defendant’s mother believed that N.B. and his twin brother, D.B., engaged in sexual misconduct involving a 9-year-old girl who lived in a neighboring apartment. On April 29, 2015, the mother confronted both the defendant and his brother about her suspicions. The mother subsequently reported the allegations to the defendant’s school district because she was concerned about his behavior.

A lieutenant with the Bradford Police Department contacted the mother and asked her to bring in the defendant and his brother to the police station for an interview. The mother complied and brought both boys to the police station to be interviewed about the sexual misconduct allegations. The lieutenant then read both the brothers Miranda warnings and explained to the mother that although she could be present for the interviews, he preferred to interview the boys individually and alone. The warnings were read to defendant and his brother “quickly.” The mother agreed to allow the defendant to be interviewed alone. The mother told defendant to “be brave [and] to tell the truth” prior to exiting the room. This interrogation was recorded.

The defendant fully complied with his mother’s instructions and confessed to numerous sex crimes involving the nine-year-old girl and agreed to speak with the lieutenant again if necessary. The defendant’s brother also complied with his mother’s instructions and confessed to numerous sex acts with the same girl. Consequently, on October 16, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a written allegation of delinquency based on the defendant’s confession. On December 1, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the confession. On February 17, 2016, a the family court held a suppression hearing. The mother, the lieutenant, and the defendant testified at this hearing.

The mother testified that the defendant suffered from developmental delays and had difficulty in school. The mother stated that she repeatedly told the lieutenant that she wanted to get her son the help and treatment that he needed, in addition to the consequences for his actions. She also explained that she did not believe the defendant knew that he could refuse to answer the lieutenant’s questions or leave the police station.

The defendant testified that he was in the seventh grade when this occurred. He stated that although he was older than his classmates, he was “behind” in school. He further testified that he had difficulty learning, paying attention, and understanding his teacher’s instructions. Additionally, he testified that he was failing some classes and that he received mental health treatment in school.

In regards to the legal system, the defendant testified that he did not know anything about it. In regards to Miranda warnings, the defendant did not attach any significance to them other than associating them with a television show. Further, he explained that he did not understand that he could refuse to answer the lieutenant’s questions or leave the police station. The defendant testified that he believed had to comply with his mother’s instructions.

The lieutenant testified at the suppression hearing, too. He testified that he did not yell or threaten the defendant. Further, he stated that he was calm during the questioning and the defendant was not restrained in any way. He also testified that the door to the room was closed, but not locked during questioning.

At the conclusion of the evidence and arguments, the suppression court filed an order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. Specifically, the suppression court found that the defendant had not waived his Miranda rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The suppression court also found the defendant to be credible in his testimony. The Commonwealth appealed.

Does the Law treat Juveniles Differently from Adults When Considering Whether a Waiver of Miranda was Knowingly, Voluntarily and Intelligently?

The answer is yes. A popular misconception is that if the police do not read you your Miranda warnings, then the case against you should be thrown out. This is not correct. An officer’s failure to read you your Miranda warnings is only relevant when you are 1) in custody for purposes of Miranda and 2) you are asked questions that are reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response. If those two prongs are not satisfied, then you will not be successful in a motion to suppress. If an officer does read you your Miranda rights, you can still be successful in suppressing your statement if you did not provide a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. Therefore, if you are charged with a crime and provided the police with a statement, you need a skilled attorney who is capable of suppressing the statement.

Juvenile adolescent development has been a hot topic issue in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Most of the jurisprudence focused on punishment (i.e. whether a juvenile could get the death penalty or whether a juvenile could serve the rest of his/her life in prison). However, not all cases focused on punishment. For example, in 2011, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina. This decision focused on juveniles and Miranda. In this case, the Court held that the age of a child is relevant when determining whether a juvenile is in custody for purposes of Miranda. As such, a child does not necessarily have to be in a police station to be in custody for purposes of Miranda. A teacher’s classroom could satisfy this element based on the facts of the particular case.

What Factors Apply to Whether a Juvenile's Mirandized Statement Will Be Admissible?

In Pennsylvania, courts will look at several factors in determining whether or not a juvenile has waived his Miranda rights. Specifically, the court will look at: the juvenile’s age, experience with the criminal justice system, comprehension, whether an interested adult is present, the duration and means of the interrogation, the defendant’s physical and psychological state, the conditions attendant to the detention, the attitude of the interrogator, and any other factors that could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coercion. As one can see, this is a very fact intensive inquiry. Courts do not go through the same level of intensiveness when determining whether an adult made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her Miranda rights.

PA Superior Court Upholds the Suppression Court’s Order Suppressing Defendant’s Statement Because His Waiver Was Not Knowing, Intelligent and Voluntary.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the Suppression Court’s order suppressing the defendant’s statement. In its opinion, the Superior Court focused on several points. First, and arguably most importantly, the court found that the defendant did not have an interested adult present with him when making his waiver. The Superior Court found that because the defendant’s mother instructed him to “be brave [and] tell the truth” she was not considered an “interested person.” Instead, defendant believed he was forced to be there by his mother and that he had to confess.

Additionally, the Superior Court considered the fact that the defendant was intellectually limited, which supported his position that he did not understand his rights, specifically that he was not allowed to leave. Because the trial court found him to be credible, the Superior Court had to adopt that conclusion as well. The Superior Court therefore found that the defendant has basically been coerced into waiving his rights by the circumstances and the orders from his mother. It held that the defendant did not make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights.

Motions to Suppress Statements

Successfully moving to suppress a statement is a very fact intensive exercise that requires a skilled attorney. If you are charged with a crime and you gave a statement to the police, you need an attorney with the knowledge and expertise to fight your case. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully litigated countless suppression motions. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/7/18 Zak Goldstein 5/7/18

PA Superior Court: Trial Court Must Bifurcate Felon in Possession of Firearm Charges from Other Criminal Charges

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has announced its decision in Commonwealth v. Brown, holding that when the Commonwealth prosecutes 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105 (Persons Not to Possess a Firearms) (hereinafter § 6105), along with other charges, the trial court must sever the § 6105 charge from the other offenses and hear those other offenses first when the defendant’s prior conviction is only relevant for purposes of § 6105. This is a significant decision because it prohibits the Commonwealth from circumventing PA Rule of Evidence 404. Rule 404 prohibits the Commonwealth from telling the jury that the defendant has a criminal record, barring certain exceptions which do not apply in the typical gun case.

The Facts of Commonwealth v. Brown

On March 26, 2015, a paratransit driver in Westmoreland County was at work. He was in the process of picking up patients and transporting them to various medical facilities. While working, he had a leather jacket with him, and in one of the pockets, he had a loaded gun. The jacket was draped over the driver’s seat in a way that made it accessible to the backseat passengers. The driver picked up the defendant and transported him to Latrobe Hospital. There were other occupants in the vehicle with the defendant. While driving, he felt a tug on his jacket. Although he was concerned about the gun, the paratransit driver decided he would not check on his gun until he transported the other occupants to their destinations. When the driver dropped the defendant off, he noticed that his gun was missing. He then called the police. Police went to the defendant’s house, frisked him, and searched the house, but they did not find the gun. The defendant told the police that he did not have it.

Police eventually determined that the defendant’s nephew had the gun. When they questioned the nephew, he led the police to the gun and explained that the defendant gave it to him along with $50 for storing it. Police arrested the defendant and charged him with Theft, Receiving Stolen Property, § 6105, and Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License (VUFA 6106). Appellant had previous convictions for aggravated assault and robbery. These prior convictions made it illegal for him to possess a firearm.

Pre-Trial Motions

Prior to trial, the defense attorney filed a Motion for a Bifurcated Trial for the § 6105 charge. The defense attorney argued that it would be prejudicial for the jury to hear that his client had the prior convictions. The trial judge agreed to bifurcate, however, seeking to aid the Commonwealth in its prosecution, the judge allowed the prosecution to proceed with the case as it saw fit. In other words, the trial court did not require that the Commonwealth present evidence of the § 6105 offense and relevant, unfairly prejudicial convictions after it presented evidence of the other alleged crimes like theft and receiving stolen property. Unsurprisingly, the Commonwealth chose to proceed with the § 6105 case first, and then that same jury heard evidence relating to the other charges. Consequently, the jury knew of the defendant’s prior criminal history before it heard the evidence for the other charges. The jury convicted the defendant and found him guilty of all four charges. The trial court sentenced him to three and a half to eight years of incarceration. Appellant appealed, and on appeal, he raised several issues. First, he attacked the sufficiency of the evidence. However, the main issue for purposes of the appeal was whether he was unfairly prejudiced when the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to proceed with the § 6105 charge before the other charges.

Can the Prosecution Introduce Evidence of a Prior Criminal Record in a Criminal Trial?

Generally, no. The rules of evidence often prohibit this because of the fact that juries are extremely likely to convict when they hear that a defendant has a prior criminal record. Rule 404 (a)(1) prohibits the use of evidence of a person’s character to show that on a particular occasion that this person acted in accordance with that character or trait. 404(b)(1) prevents the introduction of a crime in order to show that individual committed this particular crime. What these two subsections seek to prevent is the Commonwealth introducing evidence that a defendant, at some point in his or her life, did something morally wrong or committed some crime to show that he or she committed the crime that they are currently charged with. Obviously, this is a significant rule. If a jury were to hear that the person on trial had previously been convicted of a crime, then the jury is much more likely to convict. There are certain exceptions to this rule. For example, the Commonwealth can file what is referred to as a “Prior Acts Motion” to introduce prior crimes committed by a defendant to show a common scheme, motive, knowledge, lack of mistake, or intent. For example, if the defendant has been charged with burglary in which he or she wore a unique mask, the Commonwealth could probably introduce evidence of prior Burglary cases in which the defendant wore the same mask to show the identity of the defendant. These 404(b) exceptions typically do not apply in a routine gun case, and the Commonwealth did not file the required motion to admit prior bad acts evidence in advance.

However, the Commonwealth may also introduce evidence of a prior crime when it is an element of the crime charged (i.e. § 6105). However, courts have consistently held that the introduction of the underlying conviction that makes the defendant ineligible to possess a firearm should be severed from the other parts of the case. The reason is obvious: as stated above, hearing that the defendant has a prior conviction will unfairly prejudice the jury.

In Philadelphia, the common practice is that the Commonwealth and the defendant agree to have the judge decide whether the defendant has an underlying conviction that makes him or her ineligible to possess a firearm. Typically, there will be a stipulation because it is usually very clear whether or not the person is eligible to possess a firearm. Thus, the jury will not be privy to this information when deciding whether the Commonwealth met its burden for the other elements of § 6105 and the other, if applicable, charges against the defendant. Alternatively, the parties may agree to stipulate to an acquittal or conviction on the 6105 charge that matches the jury’s decision on the other charges. However, each jurisdiction has its own quirks, so you need an attorney who is familiar with the particular jurisdiction and its customs and practices to represent you if you are charged with § 6105.

Superior Court Finds Commonwealth Must Bifurcate at Trial and Introduce Evidence for § 6105 After it Proves Other Charges

Although the Superior Court held that the trial court was correct in severing the § 6105 charge from the other charges, it stated that allowing the Commonwealth to choose the order in which to introduce evidence was “an exercise in futility.” The reason is obvious: allowing the Commonwealth to proceed with the § 6105 charge first clearly prejudiced the jury because the jurors became aware of the defendant’s prior convictions for robbery and aggravated assault. This, in essence, allowed the Commonwealth to circumvent the prohibitions outlined in Rule 404(b). The Superior Court saw through this and found that the defendant was clearly prejudiced and ordered that he receive a new trial.

Call the Award Winning Law Office of Goldstein Mehta LLC if You Are Charged With Illegally Possessing a Firearm

Gun crimes are very serious, and you need a skilled defense attorney if you are charged with illegally possessing a firearm. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/3/18 Zak Goldstein 5/3/18

PA Superior Court: Four or More Years Older Means a Full Four Years under Statutory Sexual Assault Statute

The Superior Court has held that four or more years older means exactly that for purposes of Statutory Sexual Assault in Pennsylvania. This article explains how the age difference must be calculated under Pennsylvania law before prosecutors can charge a defendant with statutory rape.

What does four or more years older mean in a statututory sexual assault case?

The Superior Court has just decided the cases of Commonwealth v. Price. In Price, the court held that the defendants had not been properly convicted of Statutory Sexual Assault because they were less than four years older than the 16-year-old complainant in the case. The court held that the term “four or more years older” as used in the Statutory Sexual Assault (Statutory Rape) statute requires just that; that a defendant be four years or more older than the complainant. Here, because both defendants were actually a few hours less than four years older than the complainant, the trial court erred in finding them guilty of Statutory Rape.

The facts of Commonwealth v. Price

The facts of Price are relatively straightforward. The defendants were twin brothers who were charged with Statutory Sexual Assault for having sexual intercourse with the complainant. The complainant was born on a certain date in May 1998, at 8:16 am. The brothers were identical twins who were born on the same day and month in 1994 at 7 pm. This means that they were just a few hours less than four years older than the complainant. Both brothers admitted to having sex with the complainant when she was 14 and they were 18. Accordingly, they were charged with Statutory Sexual Assault.

Statutory Sexual Assault in Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania’s Statutory Sexual Assault statute creates a number of different offenses. For purposes of this appeal, the defendants were charged with the Felony of the second degree section of the statute. That section makes it illegal for a person to have sexual intercourse with a complainant to whom the person is not married if the complainant is under the age of 16 years AND the defendant is four years older but less than eight years older than the complainant. This means that the case depended on whether the defendants were four years older or less than four years older than the complainant. If they were four or more years older than the complainant, then they would be guilty of Statutory Sexual Assault even if the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse. If they were less than four years older, then they could not be convicted of Statutory Rape.

The trial court found that because they were born on the same day, they were four years older than the complainant. The court reasoned that for purposes of defining a year, the measurements should not be reduced below days to hours. The court found that a person becomes a certain age on their birthday, so the defendants became four years or more older than the complainant when the day began. Accordingly, the trial court convicted both brothers of Statutory Sexual Assault. The defendants appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court Appeal

The Superior Court recognized that the issue in the case was how to define a year for purposes of the statute. It was not disputed that the defendants were three years, 364 days, and approximately ten hours older than the complainant. The Superior Court reversed. It noted that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and that any ambiguity in a statute must be construed in favor of a criminal defendant pursuant to the Rule of Lenity.

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code does not define the meaning of the term “four years older.” However, the court noted that the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals and a previous panel of the Superior Court had interpreted four years to mean 1,461 days and that the defendants had been born 1,461 days before the complainant. Thus, if the period of time is counted in days, the defendants would be guilty. If it were counted in smaller increments like hours, minutes, or seconds, then the defendants would be innocent. Because the crimes code does not provide a method by which to measure years, the court accepted the defendants’ argument that they had to be a full 1,461 days older than the complainant. Because a day is 24 hours, they were not a full 1,461 days older than the complainant. They were 14 hours short of a full day from the age of the complainant.

The court concluded that the statute could reasonably be interpreted either way. Given the ambiguity in the statute, the court was required to give the benefit of the doubt to the defendants. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions.

Facing Criminal Chargs? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of cases in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client who is facing criminal charges or who may be under investigation by law enforcement. We can also provide advice to anyone who is considering the merits of filing an appeal or Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition. Call or text 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 5/2/18 Zak Goldstein 5/2/18

PA Superior Court: Drug Overdose Response Act Defense Cannot Be Waived

An en banc panel of the Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Markun. In Markun, the Court reversed the prior decision of a three-panel judge and found that the immunity to minor drug possession charges provided to an overdose victim by the Drug Overdose Response Act cannot be waived by an attorney’s failure to raise the defense in pre-trial motions or at trial.

The Facts of the Case

The facts of Markun are straight-forward. First responders found the defendant unconscious in a Delaware County Motel 6. Housekeeping personnel had called 911 and reported the medical emergency. She was treated by EMTs and transported to a nearby hospital. Police later arrested her and charged her with misdemeanor knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance. In this case, the controlled substance was heroin.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress statements that she had made to the investigating police officer. After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, the defendant went to trial in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. She appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

The Criminal Appeal

Although the defendant never argued that she should have been immune to prosecution under the Drug Overdose Response Act either in pre-trial motions or at trial, her appellate attorneys raised this issue on appeal. Initially, the Superior Court denied the appeal. Her attorneys, however, filed an Application for Re-Argument En Banc, meaning they asked the entire court to hear the appeal and overrule the decision of the initial three-judge panel. The court agreed to hear the appeal en banc and overturned the defendant’s conviction.

The Court's Reasoning

On appeal, the court ruled that the defenses provided by the Drug Overdose Response Act cannot be waived and can be raised for the first time in an appeal. The Act provides that a person may not be charged and shall be immune from prosecution for many misdemeanor drug possession and paraphernalia offenses if the person can show that they reported an overdose by calling 911, provided their name, and remained with the person who needed immediate medical attention until emergency services personnel arrived. In a recent opinion, the Superior Court found that the Act applies not only to the person who calls 911, but also the victim of an overdose where that victim calls 911 on their own behalf.

The Commonwealth argued that the defendant waived the immunity from prosecution for the misdemeanor drug charge provided by the Act by not raising it in the trial court. The Superior Court, however, rejected this argument. The court found that the immunity provided by the act is similar to subject matter jurisdiction or soverign immunity, and those types of immunity defenses cannot be waived and can be raised for the first time in an appeal. Because the trial court never had jurisdiction to hear the case, the defendant could not waive the defense by failing to raise it previously. The court reasoned that the purpose of the act is to prevent people who discover an overdose victim, who may also be drug users and afraid of incurring criminal liability themselves, from hesitating when deciding whether to call the police out of fear of criminal charges. In order to avoid that possibility, the court found that the Act’s defenses should not be waivable. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the conviction.

Limitations to the Drug Overdose Response Act

The Superior Court’s decision properly encourages drug users to get help for themselves or their friends if someone experiences an overdose. At the same time, there are still major limitations to the Act’s immunity provisions. The Act does not provide immunity to serious offenses. For example, the statute does not provide immunity to Possession with the Intent to Deliver charges or the extremely serious and increasingly-prosecuted homicide charges of Drug Delivery Resulting in Death. Accordingly, someone who gave or sold the drugs to the person who overdosed can still be prosecuted for PWID or homicide.

Facing Criminal Charges? We Can Help.

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of cases in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client who is facing criminal charges or who may be under investigation by law enforcement. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.