Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 12/21/17 Zak Goldstein 12/21/17

PA Supreme Court Reverses Murder Convictions Where Prosecution Hid Key Impeachment Evidence

Zak T. Goldstein, Esq. - Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just announced its decision in Commonwealth v. Johnson, affirming the lower court’s finding that the prosecution committed Brady violations when it withheld several police reports that would have established that its star witness repeatedly engaged in criminal activity and acted on behalf of the police as an informant. This withholding of crucial impeachment evidence by the police and district attorneys in the case violated the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial and led to a reversal of his convictions for homicide.

Commonwealth v. Johnson

In Johnson, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Commonwealth alleged that on December 7, 1996, two cousins robbed a woman because they were looking for drugs and money. They did not find either drugs or money, but they did steal a camcorder and a Sony PlayStation. This woman then told her boyfriend that she had been robbed. The woman told her boyfriend that the robbers were wearing green hoodies during the robbery. The boyfriend knew the cousins and recalled that they were wearing green hoodies earlier on the day of the robbery. The boyfriend spoke with Mr. Johnson, the defendant, and another co-defendant. They also went to a local K-Mart and purchased shotgun shells.

The next day, the boyfriend made contact with the cousins. He lured the cousins into a car under the ruse that they would oversee his drug-dealing business while he was out of town. Later that evening, the cousins were found dead on a gravel driveway. During the incident, the defendant was shot in the torso, and he later went to the hospital.

While at the hospital, the defendant gave a statement to the police. The defendant’s version of events was that his role was limited to driving the minivan. The defendant further stated that when the boyfriend was “showing” where the drugs were stashed, the cousins became suspicious and refused to follow him. Subsequently, the boyfriend began shooting and not only shot the cousins, but also shot the defendant. The defendant then went to a restaurant to get help, and that is where he encountered the police. The defendant did not say that he shot or possessed a gun in his statement, and he presumably denied that he knew that the boyfriend planned to shoot or kill the cousins. This statement was introduced against the defendant at his trial. Without additional evidence, however, the statement may not have been enough to convict the defendant of homicide.

At trial, the Commonwealth alleged that the defendant was actually one of the individuals who shot the cousins. Specifically, they alleged that one of the bullets found in one of the victims came from a .38 caliber handgun. The Commonwealth then called a cooperating witness, Mr. Robles, who testified that the defendant owned a .38 caliber handgun and that the defendant confessed to him to taking the gun from the murder scene, wiping it off with his shirt, and then throwing it on the side of the road about a quarter mile from the scene of the crime. Robles’s testimony was crucial because it linked the murder weapon to the defendant

On cross-examination, defense counsel tried to attack Robles’s credibility by suggesting that he was engaged in criminal activities and was an informant for the Reading Police Department. The Assistant District Attorney objected to this line of questioning, but the court allowed defense counsel to inquire into areas of possible bias. Unfortunately, this cross-examination was limited because, as discussed later, the Commonwealth did not provide the defense attorney with existing police reports linking Robles to drug trafficking and other crimes. After both sides rested, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.

The Defendant's Appeals and PCRAs

What followed after the trial was a very long and complicated factual and procedural history that spanned for almost two decades. Initially, after the sentencing, the defendant’s attorney obtained a letter that Robles sent to the Reading Police while he was incarcerated as a material witness. In that letter, Robles stated that he would “do anything” to get out of jail. The defendant filed an appeal, arguing that the failure to disclose this letter was a violation of Brady v. Maryland. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument because the Commonwealth gave the defense lawyer a police report that referenced this letter prior to trial, so the defense already knew about the letter at the time of the trial and was able to cross-examine Robles on the general subject of the letter. Thus, the defendant’s first Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition was denied.

Eventually, the defendant's luck began to change. In a different homicide case in which he was also convicted based on Robles’ testimony, the defendant filed a federal habeas petition. In that case, Robles was again a key witness against the defendant. Again, Robles testified that Johnson had confessed to him. In the federal habeas litigation, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered the Commonwealth to disclose to the defense team any evidence of a relationship between Robles and the Reading Police Department and/or the Berks County District Attorney’s Office.

In response to this order, the Commonwealth produced five police reports that could have been used to impeach Robles at both trials because they showed that Robles had repeatedly been investigated for serious criminal activity and not arrested or prosecuted. Specifically, these police reports included accusations that Robles robbed individuals, and in exchange for providing testimony about an unsolved murder, he would not be prosecuted. The reports also suggested that Robles engaged in drug trafficking, lied to police about his own crimes, and possessed and fired guns. Despite repeatedly being investigated for these crimes, Robles was never charged criminally.

After obtaining these police reports, the defendant amended his second PCRA petition to allege that the Commonwealth violated Brady by withholding these police reports. The PCRA court found that these documents were relevant and that there was a reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different had these reports been disclosed to the defense. The Commonwealth then filed this appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

What is Brady Material?

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors must hand over all material that may potentially exonerate a defendant. Where the prosecution fails to do so, the defendant could be entitled to a new trial. Brady violations are typically challenged either on appeal or in Post-Conviction Relief Act proceedings.

In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove three elements: 1) the evidence was suppressed by the state either willfully or inadvertently; 2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, either because it was exculpatory or because it could have been used for impeachment; and 3) the evidence was material in that its omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. The ultimate issue for a Brady claim is whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome at trial or sentencing would have been different if the Government had turned over the Brady material. A reasonable probability does not mean that it would be more likely than not that a different verdict would be reached, but only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.

Police Reports Which Could Be Used To Impeach A Key Witness Are Brady Material

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, unsurprisingly, found that the withheld police reports were Brady material. In its opinion, the Court found that the police reports “are textbook impeachment evidence” and that “[t]hey suggest that Robles sought to curry favor with the police in the face of ongoing criminal investigations and mounting evidence of his own criminal conduct.” Further, the reports showed that Robles had a financial interest in testifying against Johnson because he himself was involved in drug trafficking and would have gained from eliminating a competitor.

The Court further emphasized how crucial Robles was to the case against the defendant. Robles’s testimony was what connected Mr. Johnson to the murder weapon. Without Robles’s testimony, the Commonwealth may not have been able to prove the necessary intent for a first-degree murder conviction. As such, this material could have been very damaging to the Commonwealth’s case in that it may have convinced a jury that Robles was lying to benefit himself, and thus the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court and granted Mr. Johnson a new trial.

PCRA Petitions

Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act provides a number of different ways to challenge a wrongful conviction. If you were previously convicted and believe that this occurred either through wrongdoing by the government or that your trial attorney was ineffective, you need an attorney who has the keen attention to details that will make or break your case. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully litigated countless PCRA petitions. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 12/10/17 Zak Goldstein 12/10/17

PA Superior Court Reverses Murder Conviction in Roosevelt Boulevard Drag Racing Case

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, finding that the Commonwealth failed to prove the charge of third degree murder where the defendant crashed into and killed pedestrians during a drag racing incident on Philadelphia’s Roosevelt Boulevard. The Court’s opinion details the type of evidence necessary for the prosecution to prove a third degree murder charge in a case involving reckless driving, drag racing, or a car accident.

Commonwealth v. Ahkmedov

In Ahkmedov, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of third degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, homicide by vehicle, and recklessly endangering another person. The charges arose out of an incident which occurred on Roosevelt Boulevard. The defendant was driving southbound on the Boulevard, which has a speed limit of 40 miles per hour. At some point, the defendant began racing another driver. At each traffic light, the cars would rev their engines and race to the next light.

Police estimated that the cars traveled at around 70 miles per hour during the race. As the vehicles approached the intersection of the Boulevard and 2nd Street, the defendant began to travel at a minimum speed of 79 miles per hour. Although 79 miles per hour was nearly double the speed limit on that portion of the Boulevard, the evidence also showed that the intersection was not meant for pedestrian crossings. It did not have a crosswalk or signs warning drivers that pedestrians might be present. Unfortunately, Samara Banks and her three children were crossing the Boulevard as the defendant approached. The defendant attempted to swerve around them but was unable to do so. Instead, he struck Ms. Banks and her children, ultimately killing all four of them. The defendant remained at the scene and tried to render aid.

Murder Charges for Drag Racing

Police arrested the defendant and charged him with homicide and the related charges. The defendant proceeded by way of bench trial, and the trial judge convicted the defendant of third degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, homicide by vehicle, and recklessly endangering another person. On appeal, the defendant challenged a number of evidentiary issues as well as whether the evidence was sufficient for a conviction on the third degree murder charges. Specifically, the defendant argued that the evidence failed to show that he acted with the necessary malice required to sustain a conviction for third degree murder because he did not operate his vehicle under circumstances which almost assured that injury or death would ensue.

The Defendant's Appeal

The Superior Court agreed and reversed the conviction for third degree murder. The Court noted that third degree murder occurs when a person commits a killing which is neither intentional nor committed during the perpetration of a felony, but contains the requisite malice. The definition of malice is well established in Pennsylvania, and courts have defined malice as follows:

Malice exists where there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be injured. Where malice is based on a reckless disregard of consequences, it is not sufficient to show mere recklessness; rather, it must be shown the defendant consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily injury. A defendant must display a conscious disregard for almost certain death or injury such that it is tantamount to an actual desire to injure or kill; at the very least, the conduct must be such that one could reasonably anticipate death or serious bodily injury would likely and logically result.

Obviously, there was no real dispute as to whether or not the defendant acted recklessly. Driving twice the speed limit through an intersection as part of a drag race was clearly reckless. However, in order for recklessness to qualify as malice, Pennsylvania courts have required the prosecution to prove “sustained, purposeful recklessness” such that the defendant must have known of and consciously disregarded the risk that death or serious bodily injury was reasonably certain to occur.

Generally, this level of sustained, purposeful recklessness requires factors like a “near miss,” a warning from a bystander or passenger to slow down and a decision to ignore the warning, and evidence that the defendant clearly saw and recognized the dangers. Finally, in almost every case in which the defendant was properly convicted of third degree murder as a result of a car accident, the prosecution was able to show that the defendant was intoxicated.

Insufficient Evidence of Malice

In this case, the Court found that the prosecution did not establish the requisite level of recklessness. The defendant was reckless in driving at excessive speeds, but he did not have a near miss, he was not warned to slow down, and he was not intoxicated. He attempted to avoid hitting the victims but was unable to do so. Further, the pedestrians were crossing the road at an intersection where they should not have been crossing, and they were wearing dark clothes at night. Finally, the defendant stopped and attempted to assist them after he struck them.

Although the defendant had been pulled over for speeding as part of a road rage incident a week before, the prior traffic stop was not close enough in time to satisfy the “near miss” requirement or show that the defendant was aware of the likelihood of injuring a pedestrian at that particular location where the accident occurred. The Court concluded that the defendant’s recklessness satisfied the mens rea elements for the lesser included charges like manslaughter and recklessly endangering another person, but it did not satisfy the heightened mens rea requirement for murder.

Because the third degree murder charge was the most serious charge, the court remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on the remaining charges. The court did not find that the Commonwealth failed to prove all of the charges; just that they failed to prove the third degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, it is clear that murder requires something more than recklessness. Instead, it requires the prosecution to prove malice.

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers for Homicide Charges

Our Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers have the expertise necessary to challenge the government each step of the way. We have experience working with expert witnesses, challenging identifications, fighting forensic evidence, and thoroughly investigating cases in order to find exculpatory evidence that the police might have missed. We know the defenses, and we know how to challenge each part of the Commonwealth’s case at the preliminary hearing, through pre-trial motions, and at trial with a judge or a jury. We also have extensive experience in negotiating for better outcomes for our clients, and we have obtained great results even in cases in which the Commonwealth has a great deal of evidence. If you or a loved one are under investigation or facing homicide charges, you need an experienced criminal defense attorney in your corner. Call 267-225-2545 for a free strategy session with one of our top-rated defense lawyers today.

Demetra Mehta 12/5/17 Demetra Mehta 12/5/17

PA Supreme Court: Police May Not Search Car Parked in Driveway Without Warrant

Can The Police Search My Car Without A Warrant If It's In My Driveway?

Criminal Defense Attorney Demetra Mehta, Esq.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Loughnane, holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to a car parked in a residential driveway. This decision provides a commonsense limitation on the ability of the police to search private property in Pennsylvania and follows a recent trend of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seeking to increase privacy protections for the Commonwealth's citizens.

Commonwealth v. Loughnane

In Loughnane, the defendant was charged with accidents involving death or serious injury. On July 24, 2012, a large dark-colored truck struck and killed the victim while she was outside of her apartment that she shared with her boyfriend in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Her boyfriend witnessed the accident. When the boyfriend reported the accident to the police, he told them that the truck which hit the decedent was a large, dark-colored truck that had a distinctive sound.

A few weeks later, the boyfriend's father drove through a residential neighborhood and saw a truck that matched the description provided by his son parked in a residential driveway. He called his son, and his son came to this residence and identified the truck as the one he saw on July 24. The boyfriend then called the police. Later that day, police detectives went to the house, ran the truck's license plate, and determined that the truck belonged to the defendant. Detectives then unsuccessfully attempted to contact the defendant.

After failing to reach the defendant, police sought guidance from the local prosecutors. Apparently, at some point during the investigation, the lead detective learned that the keys to the truck were inside the automobile. Believing that it was about to rain and potential forensic evidence could be lost, the police decided to take action without obtaining a search warrant. They towed the truck to the Wilkes-Barre police garage. Four days later, they obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. The search did not result in the discovery of any evidence. However, they brought the boyfriend back to the police station to make a second identification of the truck. They also turned the truck on and revved the engine, and the boyfriend confirmed that the engine sounded the same as the engine on the truck that hit the decedent.

The defendant was arrested and charged with Accidents involving death or serious bodily injury (hit and run). The defense filed pre-trial Motions to Suppress. At the Motion to Suppress hearing, the defendant's defense lawyer successfully moved to suppress the boyfriend's police station identification of the vehicle. The suppression court granted the motion because the truck was taken from the defendant's private property and there were no exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless taking of the truck. The Commonwealth then filed an interlocutory appeal. The Superior Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered that the Commonwealth be allowed to use the results of the warrantless seizure. In its opinion, the Superior Court inexplicably ruled that a private driveway does not provide any reasonable expectation of privacy becasue it is not part of the curtilage of a home. This ruling was contradicted by dozens of cases in Pennsylvania, the federal courts, and other states. Therefore, the defendant then asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review the Superior Court's decision, and the Supreme Court agreed.

Limits to the Automobile Exception

On appeal, the defendant asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to decide whether the automobile exception applies to automobiles parked in driveways of private residences. The defendant argued that the automobile exception does not apply to vehicles in private residential driveways. As a preliminary matter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court corrected the Superior Court and held that a driveway is constitutionally protected curtilage. This was crucial because in order to have a valid constitutional claim, one must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the person, place, or thing that the government searched or seized.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then addressed whether the automobile exception applies to cars parked in a residential driveway. In making its determination, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed federal and other state cases that addressed the automobile exception.

In its analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court highlighted the fact that in cases that upheld the automobile exception, a deciding factor was that the automobile was in a public space. This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s justification for the automobile exception (the inherent mobility of motor vehicles and that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle as compared to an individual’s home or office).

However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not end its analysis there. It also reviewed federal circuit court and other states’ decisions that found the automobile exception inapplicable. In those cases, the courts consistently held that the automobile exception did not apply when the car was parked in a residential driveway. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to say that “[because] none of the justifications for the automobile exception apply to vehicles parked in a residential driveway, there is no reason for the exception to apply.” Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the rationale of these courts and held that the automobile exception does not apply to automobiles that are parked in residential driveways. If the Commonwealth searches or seizes an individual’s car without a warrant, the limited automobile exception applies and there must be both probable cause and exigent circumstances.

Motions to Suppress

Trials can be won and lost with a motion to suppress. If you are facing criminal charges, you need a defense attorney who has the knowledge and expertise to defend your case. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully fought countless cases at trial and on appeal. We offer a 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to discuss your case with an experienced and understanding criminal defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 12/2/17 Zak Goldstein 12/2/17

Foregone Conclusion Doctrine Allows Government to Make Criminal Defendant Disclose Computer Password

Can The Police Make You Turn Over Your Computer Password?

Note: this article refers to a Superior Court case which has been overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Click here to learn more

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has just decided the case of Commonwealth v. Davis, holding that the trial court properly ordered the defendant in a child pornography possession case to provide police with his computer password. Although the Third Circuit previously allowed prosecutors to obtain a similar order in a federal prosecution, Pennsylvania courts had not yet addressed the issue. Under this decision, prosecutors may now compel a defendant to produce the password to a computer or cell phone if the prosecution can satisfy the “foregone conclusion doctrine.”

In Davis, the defendant was charged with possession of child pornography and related offenses. Officers testified that they were able to download child pornography from the defendant using the eMule peer-to-peer file sharing network. As the officers were downloading the materials, they were able to determine the IP address of the computer that was uploading it. The officers then traced the IP address to the defendant’s internet account and house. They obtained a search warrant and executed the warrant at the defendant’s home. During the search, they seized a desktop computer which was protected by a special encryption software. The officers were unable to access the computer due to the encryption, and the defendant refused to provide them with the password.

The defendant did, however, make a number of inculpatory statements. He confirmed that he lived alone and that the computer was his. He told police he had prior arrests for child pornography, and he told them that he did not understand why it was illegal. He also stated that he liked 10, 11, 12, and 13 year olds, and he told police that the password was sixty-four characters and that he would not turn it over because “We both know what’s on there. It’s only going to hurt me.” The defendant then told the agents that he could not remember the password and that although the drive was encrypted, the agents already knew what was on the hard drive.

After the defendant was charged with two counts of distribution of child pornography and the criminal use of a communication facility, the Commonwealth filed a motion to compel the defendant to produce the password to the computer. The trial court granted the motion, and the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the Superior Court. Although a defendant may not ordinarily appeal a ruling on a pre-trial motion, the Superior Court permitted the defendant to appeal in this case under a limited exception to that general rule.

The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine

The Superior Court reached the merits of the appeal and concluded that the trial court properly ordered the defendant to produce the password under the foregone conclusion doctrine. The foregone conclusion doctrine is a limited exception to the general Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Ordinarily, a court may not compel a defendant to testify or say something that could incriminate him or her. For the Fifth Amendment to apply, however, the communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. Under the foregone conclusion doctrine, however, the courts have ruled that requiring a defendant to produce a password under certain circumstances is not testimonial because the government already knows that the defendant has the password. Thus, if the prosecution can show that the following three factors are present, a defendant may be compelled to produce a passcode to a phone or computer. The factors are:

The Government has knowledge of the existence of the evidence demanded,
The defendant possessed or controlled the evidence, and
The evidence is authentic.

The Government also must be able to describe with reasonable particularity the documents or evidence it seeks to compel.

Here, the Superior Court found that the foregone conclusion doctrine applied because it would not be testimonial for the defendant to give up the password. The Court found the police testimony showed that based on the investigation and the statements of the defendant, the Commonwealth knew the passcode existed, that it was within the control of the defendant, and that it was authentic. Further, based on the defendant’s incriminating statements, it was very likely that the computer would contain illegal child pornography. Therefore, the Court ruled that the trial court properly ordered the defendant to produce the password.

Fifth Amendment Implications of the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine

Clearly, the foregone conclusion doctrine drastically reduces the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment. By making a relatively limited showing that the defendant probably knows the password and the computer probably has illegal contraband on it, the Commonwealth may now essentially force a defendant to confess in that the act of providing the password further establishes that the defendant owns the computer and its contents.

This case also shows the importance of exercising your Fifth Amendment rights immediately when the police first show up and start asking questions. If the defendant had not admitted ownership of the computer, told police that he knew the password, and implied that police were correct in their assumption that the computer contained child pornography, the government may not have been able to satisfy the requirements of the foregone conclusion doctrine. It is absolutely critical that any suspect in a crime speak with an experienced criminal defense attorney before talking to the police as it is often very difficult for prosecutors to prove these types of cases without a confession.

Award-Winning Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyers

If you are facing criminal charges, we can help. Our Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers have successfully defended thousands of clients at the trial level on appeal. We offer a complimentary 15-minute criminal defense strategy session to anyone who is under investigation or facing criminal charges. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.