Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 4/22/26 Zak Goldstein 4/22/26

Attorney Goldstein Wins New Trial in Philadelphia Arson Case — Client Released After More Than a Decade in Prison

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, of Goldstein Mehta LLC, recently won a new trial and a new sentencing hearing for a client, R.H., who had been serving a 15-to-30-year state sentence for arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and recklessly endangering another person. After an evidentiary hearing on Attorney Goldstein’s amended Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted relief on three separate grounds: the failure to call a known defense witness who had previously testified that someone else committed the crime, the failure to impeach the Commonwealth’s only two civilian witnesses with their crimen falsi convictions, and the ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The Court granted both a new trial and, in the alternative, a new sentencing hearing.

After the ruling, the Commonwealth offered R.H. a deal for time served. He accepted, and he is now home with his family after more than a decade in state prison.

The Evidence at Trial

The case involved a January 13, 2007, explosion and fire at a rowhome in North Philadelphia. The fire marshal determined that the fire was intentionally set, and the decedent’s body was found on the first floor of the property. The medical examiner concluded that the decedent had been stabbed and was already dead when the fire occurred.

The Commonwealth’s evidence tying R.H. to the arson was entirely circumstantial. No one identified him as having set the fire. No forensic or physical evidence connected him to the property. He did not make any incriminating statements. The case rested on four pieces of evidence: (1) a prior out-of-court statement from a neighbor that he had seen the co-defendant running from the scene with a man the neighbor identified only as his girlfriend’s boyfriend — presumably R.H.; (2) testimony from a second Commonwealth witness, R.H’s girlfriend, who lived across the street that R.H. had been in her home earlier that morning and that she later saw burns on his hand and face; (3) medical records showing that R.H. was treated at a local hospital for second-degree burns to his hand the following day; and (4) testimony from a then-Philadelphia police officer that, several months later, he had seen R.H. and the co-defendant smoke a marijuana cigar together in a public park.

R.H. was tried three times. The first trial ended in a mistrial due to a confrontation clause violation. At the second trial, the jury acquitted him of first- and second-degree murder but hung on the remaining charges. At the third trial, the jury convicted him of arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and recklessly endangering another person. The trial court then imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration followed by 10 years of probation. The sentence was well above the applicable sentencing guideline range.

The PCRA Petition

After his direct appeal was denied and a prior PCRA petition was litigated solely on an issue involving the police officer’s later perjury arrest, R.H. retained Attorney Goldstein. Attorney Goldstein ordered the complete trial transcripts, reviewed the homicide file, and investigated the case. He then filed an objection to the Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss and a supplemental PCRA petition raising several new ineffective assistance of counsel claims that had never been litigated.

Following an evidentiary hearing and post-hearing briefing, the PCRA Court granted relief.

Failure to Call a Witness Who Had Previously Testified for the Defense

The first ground on which the Court granted relief was trial counsel’s failure to call a defense eyewitness at the third trial. This eyewitness had given a statement to police and testified under oath at the second trial that the man she saw running from the burning property with the co-defendant was not R.H. Instead, it was the co-defendant’s brother. After she testified at the second trial, the jury acquitted R.H. of first- and second-degree murder and hung on the remaining counts.

At the third trial, however, trial counsel did not call this witness. The jury, which never heard her exculpatory testimony, convicted. Under Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427 (Pa. 2014), a PCRA petitioner can prevail on a failure-to-call-a-witness claim by showing that the witness existed, was available, was known to counsel, was willing to cooperate, and that the absence of the testimony prejudiced the defense. All of those elements were satisfied here. Trial counsel had tried the prior trials, the witness had given a statement and testified under oath, and her testimony directly pointed to someone else as the person seen running from the fire. She was also still willing to testify and appeared for an evidentiary hearing.

Failure to Impeach the Commonwealth’s Civilian Witnesses with Crimen Falsi Convictions

The second ground was trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s civilian witness — the girlfriend — with her crimen falsi convictions, pending charges, and dismissed cases. Under Pa.R.E. 609(a), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement “must be admitted” for impeachment purposes. And under Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986), and Commonwealth v. Nolen, 634 A.2d 192 (Pa. 1993), a witness’s pending or recently dismissed charges are generally admissible to show potential bias in favor of the prosecution.

By the time of trial, the girlfriend who lived across the street had a 2011 conviction for tampering with evidence, a 2010 conviction for multiple counts of forgery and theft by deception, and a retail theft arrest from 2013 that had been dismissed while R.H.’s case was pending. None of this was introduced at trial.

As Attorney Goldstein argued, this was not a close case on the impeachment issue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted new trials in circumstantial cases where trial counsel failed to impeach the only witnesses who directly linked the defendant to the crime with available crimen falsi. See Commonwealth v. Baxter, 640 A.2d 1271 (Pa. 1994). The civilian witness was the one of the most important witnesses and ne of the key people who put R.H. anywhere near the scene of the fire. She had serious convictions for dishonesty, and the jury never heard about them.

Sentencing Error

The third ground was trial counsel’s failure to object to the sentencing court’s use of an impermissible sentencing factor and failure to file a post-sentence motion challenging the sentencing court’s undisclosed departure from the guidelines.

With a prior record score of 1 and offense gravity scores of 10 for arson and 9 for conspiracy, the standard range guideline sentences would have led to a minimum aggregate of approximately 7.5 years’ incarceration. Even in the aggravated range, the guidelines would have called for roughly 9.5 years as the minimum. The sentencing court imposed 15 to 30 years.

At sentencing, the record reflected that the court repeatedly focused on the number of children R.H. had. When R.H.’s mitigation witness , the director of a prison rehabilitative program R.H. had completed, attempted to describe the program, the court cut him off to ask how many children R.H. had, to question how R.H. could be described as a caring father when he had children by multiple women, and to share its own personal views about absent fathers. Trial counsel did not object to the court’s reliance on the number of R.H.’s children as an aggravating factor, and he did not file a post-sentence motion challenging the departure from the guidelines.

The governing case law is clear that a sentence is not valid “if the record discloses that the sentencing court may have relied in whole or in part upon an impermissible consideration.” Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. Super. 2010). The number of children a defendant has and a sentencing judge’s personal views about that is not a proper sentencing factor. And under Commonwealth v. Beatty, 227 A.3d 1277 (Pa. Super. 2020), a sentencing court that departs from the guidelines without acknowledging the departure or placing contemporaneous reasons for the deviation on the record commits reversible error. The record here reflected that the sentencing court never acknowledged the departure at all.

Result

After the PCRA hearing and post-hearing briefing, the Court granted R.H. a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase and, in the alternative, granted a new sentencing hearing. Rather than relitigate the case, the Commonwealth offered R.H. a negotiated resolution for a sentence of time served. R.H. accepted and was swiftly released.

Facing a criminal appeal or PCRA petition in Pennsylvania?

If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, serving a state sentence in Pennsylvania, or exploring a direct appeal or PCRA petition, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and we have won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court — including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 4/11/26 Zak Goldstein 4/11/26

Attorney Goldstein Wins IDSI Appeal: PA Superior Court Dismisses Conviction on Due Process Grounds

Case Result: Conviction Reversed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Attorney Zak Goldstein recently won an important appeal before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, obtaining a full reversal of his client D.M.’s convictions for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) and corruption of minors. In Commonwealth v. D.M., the Superior Court held that the Commonwealth violated D.M.’s due process rights by failing to establish the date of the alleged offense with sufficient particularity under Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1975). The court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating D.M.’s case with his co-defendants’ cases for trial, though it did not need to reach that issue given the Devlin reversal.

The Facts of the Case

D.M. was one of three brothers tried together in Lackawanna County on charges stemming from allegations made by a single complainant, B.P. The complainant alleged that D.M. had assaulted her on a single occasion when she was sixteen years old. She did not report the allegations until October 2019, which was nearly two decades after the events supposedly occurred.

The Commonwealth originally charged D.M. with offenses occurring over a five-year window between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2007. After D.M. filed pretrial motions challenging the vague timeframe, the Commonwealth filed amended informations narrowing the period first to one year (August 25, 2005 to August 24, 2006), and ultimately proceeding to trial on two charges, IDSI and corruption of minors, within that same one-year window.

Trial counsel argued from the pretrial stage that even a one-year window was far too broad to satisfy due process. D.M.’s pretrial motions objected that the vague timeframe made it impossible to present an alibi defense or call witnesses in support of one. The trial court denied those motions, finding D.M.’s reliance on Devlin to be “misplaced.” D.M. also moved to sever his trial from his co-defendants’ cases. The trial court denied that motion as well.

Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted D.M. of IDSI and corruption of minors. The court sentenced him to 5-10 years’ imprisonment.

The Due Process Claim: Failure to Fix the Date of the Offense

On appeal, the Superior Court found D.M.’s Devlin argument meritorious and dispositive. In Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1975), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the only proof at trial was that the crime occurred sometime within a fourteen-month period, holding that this failed to meet the “sufficient particularity” standard and violated fundamental fairness.

The Superior Court then carefully distinguished D.M.’s case from a series of post-Devlin decisions in which courts had afforded the Commonwealth greater latitude, including Commonwealth v. Groff, 548 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. 1988), Commonwealth v. G.D.M., Sr., 926 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2007), Commonwealth v. Niemetz, 422 A.2d 1369 (Pa. Super. 1980), Commonwealth v. Renninger, 269 A.3d 548 (Pa. Super. 2022), and Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915 (Pa. Super. 2016). In each of those cases, courts had found the broader timeframe acceptable because the victims were very young children who could not be expected to recall specific dates, the allegations involved a continuing course of conduct with multiple assaults, or the Commonwealth presented additional evidence from other witnesses that helped narrow the timeframe.

D.M.’s case was critically different. B.P. was sixteen at the time of the alleged offense — well past childhood — and therefore had the capacity to recall temporal details. The allegation involved only a single, isolated incident, not an ongoing course of abuse. And the Commonwealth made no conscientious effort to help B.P. narrow the timeline at trial. B.P. provided detailed testimony about the location, what was said, the features of D.M.’s car, and what she did afterward, yet she could not tie the incident to any identifiable temporal marker — a season, a holiday, a school year, or her birthday — that would have narrowed the one-year window. She testified only that it happened on a “normal” day. Even the Commonwealth’s own affidavit of probable cause had originally placed the incident during “the fall months” after B.P.’s sixteenth birthday, but B.P. did not testify to that at trial.

The court also rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that testimony from another witness narrowed the timeframe. The witness had testified that D.M. made a statement to him about B.P. in late 2005 or early 2006, but the court found this still left a period spanning too many months to fix the date with the constitutionally required level of certainty. The court further noted that the witness’s statement actually related to vaginal intercourse, which was a different act entirely from the IDSI charged in the criminal information.

The over-thirteen-year delay in reporting further compounded the due process problem. The court noted that this delay prejudiced D.M.’s ability to find witnesses or other evidence that could corroborate a defense, making the case arguably harder to defend than in Devlin itself, where there was essentially no delay between the alleged offense and the report to police. The Court therefore reversed the trial court’s decision not to dismiss the case and dismissed the conviction.

The Improper Joinder Issue

Although the Devlin ruling was dispositive of D.M.’s appeal, the opinion also addressed the joinder issue in the context of a co-defendant’s appeal — and the court’s analysis makes clear that consolidating D.M.’s trial with his brothers’ cases was an abuse of discretion. D.M. had raised this same issue on appeal, and the court noted in a footnote that it did not need to reach D.M.’s severance argument given its decision to reverse on Devlin grounds.

Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 582, defendants charged in separate informations may be tried together only if they are alleged to have participated in the same act, transaction, or series of acts or transactions constituting an offense. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 583, severance is required if a party may be prejudiced by the joinder.

The court found that while it was permissible to try D.M.’s two brothers together because the allegations against them arose from a single chain of events on the same day, D.M.’s case was entirely different. The allegations against D.M. involved a separate incident that took place in a different location, involved different conduct, and occurred approximately two years after the allegations against his brothers. There was no conspiracy or corrupt organization charge tying them together, and D.M. had nothing to do with the conduct alleged against his brothers.

The court found that joining D.M.’s trial with his brothers’ trial allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence against D.M. that tainted his brothers’ cases and vice versa. The above witness’s testimony, for example, was relevant only to D.M. but was heard by the jury deciding the brothers’ cases as well. The court noted that the trial court itself appeared to concede that the witness testimony was only relevant against D.M. and not his co-defendants.

Perhaps most critically, the court found that the prosecutor’s closing argument compounded the prejudice by repeatedly lumping all three brothers together. The prosecutor referred to the brothers as “three aggressors,” likened them to institutions known for protecting sexual abusers, and argued that B.P. had to come forward because “they” still had power over people who came to the store. These remarks encouraged the jury to find the defendants guilty by association rather than based on the evidence specific to each individual case. The court cited Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 303 A.3d 823 (Pa. Super. 2023), for the principle that even where there is some overlapping evidence between co-defendants, severance is required when the evidence of one defendant’s crimes is irrelevant and prejudicial to another defendant’s case.

Why This Case Matters

This published decision is a significant victory for due process rights in Pennsylvania. It reaffirms that even in cases involving serious allegations and delayed reporting, the Commonwealth cannot charge a defendant with committing a crime at some unknown point during a year-long span ~15 years ago and expect a conviction to stand. The government bears the burden of narrowing the timeframe with reasonable certainty so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to prepare a defense. When the complainant was old enough to recall temporal details, the alleged conduct was a single isolated incident, and the Commonwealth made no effort to narrow the timeframe through its own investigation, due process requires reversal.

The opinion’s joinder analysis is equally important for criminal defense practitioners. It establishes that simply sharing a last name and a complainant is not enough to justify consolidation. When the alleged offenses are separated in time by years, involve different conduct, and occur in different locations, the trial court abuses its discretion by forcing defendants to trial together. This is particularly true where the prosecutor exploits the joinder to encourage guilt by association.

The opinion also provides a comprehensive survey and analysis of the entire Devlin line of cases, making it a valuable roadmap for defense attorneys evaluating due process challenges in cases involving vague or broad charging timeframes.

Facing Criminal Charges or a Wrongful Conviction?

If you or a loved one has been wrongfully convicted or believes that the prosecution withheld evidence in your case, we can help. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our experienced criminal defense lawyers are typically available for same-day phone consultations and in-person meetings so that we can begin investigating your case, obtaining exculpatory evidence, and planning your defense. Call 267-225-2545 for a free criminal defense strategy session.

Zak Goldstein 3/17/26 Zak Goldstein 3/17/26

PA Superior Court Vacates Life Sentence and Orders New Trial in Franklin County Murder Case After Attorney Goldstein Wins PCRA Appeal

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Attorney Goldstein recently won a major victory in the Pennsylvania Superior Court as the Court reversed the denial of his client’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, vacated the judgment of sentence, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Attorney Goldstein’s client had been convicted following a ten-day jury trial in Franklin County of second-degree murder, burglary, robbery, and three counts of conspiracy. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and a consecutive aggregate sentence of 28 to 56 years’ imprisonment on the remaining charges. Attorney Goldstein entered his appearance as PCRA counsel, filed an amended PCRA petition, and represented the client through the PCRA evidentiary hearing and subsequent appeal to the Superior Court.

The central issue on appeal involved trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress evidence obtained from a cell phone that police had searched without a warrant. After the client’s arrest, law enforcement directed Maryland State Police to power on the client’s iPhone and call a suspected phone number to confirm the phone’s connection to that number — all before obtaining a search warrant. The evidence obtained from the phone, including text messages, photographs, rap lyrics, and data linking the client to a co-defendant, formed the backbone of the Commonwealth’s case.

Attorney Goldstein argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the cell phone evidence under Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), which categorically requires police to obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone. The Superior Court agreed on all three prongs of the ineffectiveness test. First, the Court found the underlying suppression claim had arguable merit, holding that the police’s actions of powering on the iPhone and calling the suspected number constituted a warrantless search under the law as it existed at the time of trial without relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s later decision in Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2018). The Court further found that the warrant subsequently obtained for the phone was tainted because probable cause to search the phone depended entirely on the information unlawfully obtained through the initial warrantless search.

Second, the Court found trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to file the suppression motion. At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified he had no recollection of even considering the suppression issue and was unaware of Riley or any other relevant caselaw.

Third, the Court found prejudice, concluding the cell phone evidence was a critical factor in the Commonwealth’s case. The Court noted that of the six testifying eyewitnesses, only one cooperator unequivocally identified the client at trial, the lead investigator acknowledged that no forensic evidence linked the client to the crime scene, and the investigator described the iPhone as the only physical evidence connecting the client to the robbery and murder. Without the cell phone evidence, the Commonwealth’s case was, in the Court’s words, only weakly supported by the record.

This is an important decision addressing warrantless cell phone searches under Riley and the scope of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in PCRA proceedings, and the Court issued a published opinion in this case.

Facing Criminal Charges or a Wrongful Conviction?

Zak Goldstein 2/11/26 Zak Goldstein 2/11/26

Attorney Goldstein Obtains $1.75 Million Settlement for Wrongfully Convicted Man Who Spent More Than a Decade in Prison

Philadelphia criminal defense and civil rights attorney Zak Goldstein recently obtained a $1.75 million settlement against the City of Philadelphia on behalf of a man who was wrongfully convicted and spent more than ten years in prison due to the prosecution's failure to disclose critical evidence. The settlement resolves a federal civil rights lawsuit that was filed after Attorney Goldstein first won the client's freedom by successfully litigating a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) Petition based on a Brady violation.

The Wrongful Conviction

Our client was convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term based on evidence that was fundamentally undermined by materials the prosecution never turned over to the defense. For more than a decade, he sat in prison for a crime while the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence that could have changed the outcome of his case. As is far too common in wrongful conviction cases, the prosecution's failure to disclose this evidence deprived both the defense and the jury of information that was essential to a fair trial.

The PCRA Victory: Proving the Brady Violation

After being retained to investigate the case, Attorney Goldstein uncovered evidence that the prosecution had violated its obligations under *Brady v. Maryland* by withholding material, exculpatory evidence from the defense. Under Brady, the government is required to turn over any evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the outcome of the case. The suppression of such evidence violates the defendant's constitutional right to due process.

Attorney Goldstein filed a PCRA Petition arguing that the withheld evidence would have significantly impacted the outcome of the trial and that the conviction should be vacated. The PCRA court agreed, and the conviction was overturned. After more than ten years of wrongful imprisonment, our client was finally freed.

The Civil Rights Lawsuit and $1.75 Million Settlement

Following the successful PCRA litigation, Attorney Goldstein filed a civil rights lawsuit against the City of Philadelphia on behalf of his client. The lawsuit alleged that the City, through its police officers and prosecutors, violated our client's constitutional rights by suppressing exculpatory evidence, leading to a wrongful conviction and more than a decade of lost freedom.

The case ultimately settled for $1.75 million. While no amount of money can truly compensate someone for the loss of more than ten years of their life, the settlement provides a measure of accountability and recognition of the harm caused by the government's misconduct.

Wrongful Convictions and Brady Violations

This case is a reminder of the devastating consequences that can result when the government fails to meet its constitutional obligations. Brady v. Maryland requires prosecutors to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense, and the failure to do so can lead to wrongful convictions, destroyed lives, and years of unjust imprisonment. Unfortunately, these violations are not as rare as they should be, and many wrongful convictions go undetected because the suppressed evidence is never uncovered.

Attorney Goldstein and the attorneys at Goldstein Mehta LLC have extensive experience handling PCRA Petitions, criminal appeals, and civil rights claims arising from wrongful convictions and government misconduct. We have successfully obtained relief for clients who have been wrongfully convicted, including winning exonerations, new trials, and significant civil rights settlements.