Attorney Goldstein Wins New Trial in Philadelphia Arson Case — Client Released After More Than a Decade in Prison

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire, of Goldstein Mehta LLC, recently won a new trial and a new sentencing hearing for a client, R.H., who had been serving a 15-to-30-year state sentence for arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and recklessly endangering another person. After an evidentiary hearing on Attorney Goldstein’s amended Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted relief on three separate grounds: the failure to call a known defense witness who had previously testified that someone else committed the crime, the failure to impeach the Commonwealth’s only two civilian witnesses with their crimen falsi convictions, and the ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The Court granted both a new trial and, in the alternative, a new sentencing hearing.

After the ruling, the Commonwealth offered R.H. a deal for time served. He accepted, and he is now home with his family after more than a decade in state prison.

The Evidence at Trial

The case involved a January 13, 2007, explosion and fire at a rowhome in North Philadelphia. The fire marshal determined that the fire was intentionally set, and the decedent’s body was found on the first floor of the property. The medical examiner concluded that the decedent had been stabbed and was already dead when the fire occurred.

The Commonwealth’s evidence tying R.H. to the arson was entirely circumstantial. No one identified him as having set the fire. No forensic or physical evidence connected him to the property. He did not make any incriminating statements. The case rested on four pieces of evidence: (1) a prior out-of-court statement from a neighbor that he had seen the co-defendant running from the scene with a man the neighbor identified only as his girlfriend’s boyfriend — presumably R.H.; (2) testimony from a second Commonwealth witness, R.H’s girlfriend, who lived across the street that R.H. had been in her home earlier that morning and that she later saw burns on his hand and face; (3) medical records showing that R.H. was treated at a local hospital for second-degree burns to his hand the following day; and (4) testimony from a then-Philadelphia police officer that, several months later, he had seen R.H. and the co-defendant smoke a marijuana cigar together in a public park.

R.H. was tried three times. The first trial ended in a mistrial due to a confrontation clause violation. At the second trial, the jury acquitted him of first- and second-degree murder but hung on the remaining charges. At the third trial, the jury convicted him of arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and recklessly endangering another person. The trial court then imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration followed by 10 years of probation. The sentence was well above the applicable sentencing guideline range.

The PCRA Petition

After his direct appeal was denied and a prior PCRA petition was litigated solely on an issue involving the police officer’s later perjury arrest, R.H. retained Attorney Goldstein. Attorney Goldstein ordered the complete trial transcripts, reviewed the homicide file, and investigated the case. He then filed an objection to the Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss and a supplemental PCRA petition raising several new ineffective assistance of counsel claims that had never been litigated.

Following an evidentiary hearing and post-hearing briefing, the PCRA Court granted relief.

Failure to Call a Witness Who Had Previously Testified for the Defense

The first ground on which the Court granted relief was trial counsel’s failure to call a defense eyewitness at the third trial. This eyewitness had given a statement to police and testified under oath at the second trial that the man she saw running from the burning property with the co-defendant was not R.H. Instead, it was the co-defendant’s brother. After she testified at the second trial, the jury acquitted R.H. of first- and second-degree murder and hung on the remaining counts.

At the third trial, however, trial counsel did not call this witness. The jury, which never heard her exculpatory testimony, convicted. Under Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427 (Pa. 2014), a PCRA petitioner can prevail on a failure-to-call-a-witness claim by showing that the witness existed, was available, was known to counsel, was willing to cooperate, and that the absence of the testimony prejudiced the defense. All of those elements were satisfied here. Trial counsel had tried the prior trials, the witness had given a statement and testified under oath, and her testimony directly pointed to someone else as the person seen running from the fire. She was also still willing to testify and appeared for an evidentiary hearing.

Failure to Impeach the Commonwealth’s Civilian Witnesses with Crimen Falsi Convictions

The second ground was trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s civilian witness — the girlfriend — with her crimen falsi convictions, pending charges, and dismissed cases. Under Pa.R.E. 609(a), evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement “must be admitted” for impeachment purposes. And under Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986), and Commonwealth v. Nolen, 634 A.2d 192 (Pa. 1993), a witness’s pending or recently dismissed charges are generally admissible to show potential bias in favor of the prosecution.

By the time of trial, the girlfriend who lived across the street had a 2011 conviction for tampering with evidence, a 2010 conviction for multiple counts of forgery and theft by deception, and a retail theft arrest from 2013 that had been dismissed while R.H.’s case was pending. None of this was introduced at trial.

As Attorney Goldstein argued, this was not a close case on the impeachment issue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted new trials in circumstantial cases where trial counsel failed to impeach the only witnesses who directly linked the defendant to the crime with available crimen falsi. See Commonwealth v. Baxter, 640 A.2d 1271 (Pa. 1994). The civilian witness was the one of the most important witnesses and ne of the key people who put R.H. anywhere near the scene of the fire. She had serious convictions for dishonesty, and the jury never heard about them.

Sentencing Error

The third ground was trial counsel’s failure to object to the sentencing court’s use of an impermissible sentencing factor and failure to file a post-sentence motion challenging the sentencing court’s undisclosed departure from the guidelines.

With a prior record score of 1 and offense gravity scores of 10 for arson and 9 for conspiracy, the standard range guideline sentences would have led to a minimum aggregate of approximately 7.5 years’ incarceration. Even in the aggravated range, the guidelines would have called for roughly 9.5 years as the minimum. The sentencing court imposed 15 to 30 years.

At sentencing, the record reflected that the court repeatedly focused on the number of children R.H. had. When R.H.’s mitigation witness , the director of a prison rehabilitative program R.H. had completed, attempted to describe the program, the court cut him off to ask how many children R.H. had, to question how R.H. could be described as a caring father when he had children by multiple women, and to share its own personal views about absent fathers. Trial counsel did not object to the court’s reliance on the number of R.H.’s children as an aggravating factor, and he did not file a post-sentence motion challenging the departure from the guidelines.

The governing case law is clear that a sentence is not valid “if the record discloses that the sentencing court may have relied in whole or in part upon an impermissible consideration.” Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 793 (Pa. Super. 2010). The number of children a defendant has and a sentencing judge’s personal views about that is not a proper sentencing factor. And under Commonwealth v. Beatty, 227 A.3d 1277 (Pa. Super. 2020), a sentencing court that departs from the guidelines without acknowledging the departure or placing contemporaneous reasons for the deviation on the record commits reversible error. The record here reflected that the sentencing court never acknowledged the departure at all.

Result

After the PCRA hearing and post-hearing briefing, the Court granted R.H. a new trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase and, in the alternative, granted a new sentencing hearing. Rather than relitigate the case, the Commonwealth offered R.H. a negotiated resolution for a sentence of time served. R.H. accepted and was swiftly released.

Facing a criminal appeal or PCRA petition in Pennsylvania?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense

If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges, serving a state sentence in Pennsylvania, or exploring a direct appeal or PCRA petition, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and we have won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court — including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.