Philadelphia Criminal Defense Blog

Zak Goldstein 6/18/25 Zak Goldstein 6/18/25

PA Superior Court: Trial Court Erred in Quashing Charges From Online Sting Operation Run by Private Citizen Based on Factual Impossibility

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak Goldstein — Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In Commonwealth v. Aguilar, 2025 PA Super 118, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the order of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas dismissing criminal charges against a defendant who had been caught in an online sex sting operation run by a private citizen. The Superior Court held that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to suppress because a motion to suppress was not even the correct type of motion for a defendant to bring. The Court also ruled that even if the trial court properly construe the motion as a motion to quash, the trial court erred in granting it based on factual impossibility as factual impossibility is not a defense in Pennsylvania.

Background

The defendant was targeted by a group called LC Predator Catchers. Posing as a 15-year-old boy on dating apps, a private citizen allegedly engaged in explicit conversations with the defendant. According to the affidavit of probable cause, the defendant sent sexual messages and photos, offered to be “fuck friends,” and invited the fake minor to his home. The private citizen allegedly showed up at the defendant’s house, confronted him, and then notified the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department. Police later conducted a Mirandized interview, during which the defendant allegedly acknowledged the sexual intent of his messages.

Prosecutors charged the defendant with:

Criminal Attempt – Corruption of Minors (both as a misdemeanor and felony under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)),
Criminal Use of a Communication Facility (18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a)).

Suppression and Trial Court Proceedings

The defendant filed a pretrial “motion to suppress,” arguing that all charges should be dismissed because his communications were with an adult civilian rather than an actual minor or police officer. He relied on the text of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (the Unlawful Contact with a Minor statute), which explicitly requires the involvement of a real or undercover minor. Although the defendant was not actually charged under that statute for that reason, the trial court accepted his argument and reasoned that it was factually impossible for the defendant to have committed the charged offenses.

The trial court then sua sponte treated the suppression motion as a motion to quash and dismissed the criminal information in its entirety based on this impossibility argument. In its opinion, the trial court also concluded on its own that the Commonwealth failed to present a prima case at the preliminary hearing that the defendant committed a crime. The Commonwealth appealed.

The Superior Court’s Ruling

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed after concluding that the trial court made a number of mistakes.

Suppression Inapplicable: Because the communications were with a private citizen, not law enforcement, there was no Fourth Amendment or Pennsylvania constitutional violation. Thus, suppression was not a proper remedy.
Improper Sua Sponte Quashal: The defendant never filed a motion to quash. Under Pennsylvania law, quashal must be specifically requested in an omnibus pretrial motion, and sua sponte dismissal is generally improper. The Court emphasized that a suppression motion cannot be repurposed into a dispositive ruling on legal guilt.
Factual Impossibility Is Not a Defense: The Superior Court reaffirmed that under Pennsylvania law, factual impossibility is not a defense to an attempt charge. So long as the defendant believed he was communicating with a minor and took a substantial step toward completing the offense, he could be charged with attempt—even if the "minor" turned out to be an adult vigilante.
No Minor Required Under Charged Statutes: The Superior Court rejected the defendant’s argument that a minor or police officer was required to establish a violation of the statutes at issue. The Corruption of Minors statute, unlike § 6318, does not require the involvement of a real or fictitious minor. Likewise, the offense of Criminal Use of a Communication Facility requires only that the facility be used to facilitate a felony or attempted felony.
Prima Facie Case Was Established: The court found that the Commonwealth had produced sufficient evidence to support each element of the offenses charged. Chat logs, photographs, the defendant’s confession, and the arrangement to meet in person all constituted a prima facie case. Because no preliminary hearing had yet been held, the trial court’s ruling on evidentiary sufficiency was premature. Therefore, the Court reversed.

Conclusion

The Superior Court reinstated all charges and remanded the case for further proceedings. It emphasized that the charges did not require the involvement of an actual or undercover minor and that the trial court overstepped its role by misapplying both suppression doctrine and the law of attempt. Accordingly, the Court effectively held that private-citizen stings—though controversial—can lead to viable prosecutions in Pennsylvania.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

If you are facing criminal charges or under investigation by the police, we can help. We have successfully defended thousands of clients against criminal charges in courts throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey. We have successfully obtained full acquittals and dismissals in cases involving charges such as Conspiracy, Aggravated Assault, Rape, Violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and First-Degree Murder. We have also won criminal appeals and PCRAs in state and federal court, including the successful direct appeal of a first-degree murder conviction and the exoneration of a client who spent 33 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Our award-winning Philadelphia criminal defense lawyers offer a free criminal defense strategy session to any potential client. Call 267-225-2545 to speak with an experienced and understanding defense attorney today.

Zak Goldstein 6/17/25 Zak Goldstein 6/17/25

PA Supreme Court Finds Statute Allowing Police to Tell Hospital Staff to Draw Blood Without Warrant in Potential DUI Cases Unconstitutional

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strikes Down Section 3755 as Facially Unconstitutional in DUI Blood Draw Case

Criminal Defense Attorney Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

In Commonwealth v. Hunte, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a trial court ruling finding that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755, the “emergency room blood draw” statute, violates both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court found the statute facially unconstitutional because it authorizes warrantless blood draws from DUI suspects in the absence of a valid exception to the warrant requirement.

The Facts of Hunte

Police officers responded to a single-vehicle crash in Cumberland County in which the defendant and a passenger were ejected from the vehicle. The passenger died, and the defendant was unconscious when the police arrived. The scene contained alcohol containers and fentanyl patches, and first responders reported that the defendant admitted to drinking. At the hospital, without obtaining a warrant or consent, a Pennsylvania State Trooper invoked Section 3755 and directed medical personnel to draw the defendant’s blood.

Although a separate blood sample had already been taken for medical purposes, the blood tested by the Commonwealth was drawn specifically at the trooper’s request under Section 3755. The hospital even used a special form tailored to that statute. Of course, the police had not obtained a warrant authorizing them to order that blood draw. Accordingly, the defendant later moved to suppress the blood results, challenging the constitutionality of the statute.

Section 3755

The statute allows the police to direct medical personnel to conduct a warrantless blood draw in certain circumstances. It provides:

§ 3755.  Reports by emergency room personnel.
(a)  General rule.--If, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the person who drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the movement of any involved motor vehicle requires medical treatment in an emergency room of a hospital and if probable cause exists to believe a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) was involved, the emergency room physician or his designee shall promptly take blood samples from those persons and transmit them within 24 hours for testing to the Department of Health or a clinical laboratory licensed and approved by the Department of Health and specifically designated for this purpose. This section shall be applicable to all injured occupants who were capable of motor vehicle operation if the operator or person in actual physical control of the movement of the motor vehicle cannot be determined. Test results shall be released upon request of the person tested, his attorney, his physician or governmental officials or agencies.
(b)  Immunity from civil or criminal liability.--No physician, nurse or technician or hospital employing such physician, nurse or technician and no other employer of such physician, nurse or technician shall be civilly or criminally liable for withdrawing blood or obtaining a urine sample and reporting test results to the police pursuant to this section or for performing any other duty imposed by this section. No physician, nurse or technician or hospital employing such physician, nurse or technician may administratively refuse to perform such tests and provide the results to the police officer except as may be reasonably expected from unusual circumstances that pertain at the time of admission.

The Statute Is Unconstitutional

Writing for the majority, Justice Wecht held that Section 3755 violates the Fourth Amendment and Pennsylvania’s analogous constitutional provision because it authorizes warrantless blood draws without fitting into any recognized exception to the warrant requirement such as consent or exigency.

The Court reasoned that:

Implied consent statutes cannot serve as an independent exception to the warrant requirement. The Court rejected the notion that drivers implicitly consent to blood draws simply by operating a vehicle in Pennsylvania.
Blood draws are searches under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8. Because they are invasive and reveal sensitive personal information, they require a warrant or a valid exception.
No categorical exigency exists in DUI cases. The Court followed United States Supreme Court precedent (Missouri v. McNeely) in which the US Supreme Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not create per se exigency.
Section 3755 is unconstitutional on its face because it authorizes searches in situations where the Constitution requires individualized inquiry and a warrant, and probable cause alone is not enough.

The Commonwealth’s Arguments

The Commonwealth argued that exigent circumstances justified the blood draw and that a subsequent search warrant for testing the blood cured any defect. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed these arguments, emphasizing that the initial draw—i.e., the search—occurred without a warrant or recognized exception.

The Court also rejected the Commonwealth's attempt to salvage the statute by arguing that it merely facilitates lawful conduct or does not prohibit obtaining a warrant. The Court noted that Section 3755 affirmatively requires blood draws without a warrant or consent.

Accordingly, the statute is unconstitutional. Police must obtain a search warrant prior to directing a blood draw or be able to establish exigent circumstances which make getting a warrant impractical. They may not convert medical personnel into state actors in order to get around the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Zak Goldstein 6/7/25 Zak Goldstein 6/7/25

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Prior ARD Cannot Be Used to Enhance DUI Sentences

Commonwealth v. Shifflett

Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire - Criminal Defense Attorney

In a significant decision for Pennsylvania DUI law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled on May 30, 2025, that using a defendant's prior acceptance of the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program to enhance sentences for subsequent DUI offenses violates constitutional protections under United States Supreme Court precedent such as Alleyne v. United States.

The Facts of Shifflet

The defendant was charged with DUI in 2022. The Commonwealth sought to treat this as a second offense based on his 2012 participation in the ARD for a prior DUI charge. Under Pennsylvania law, a second DUI offense carries mandatory minimum penalties including at least five days imprisonment, compared to six months probation for a first offense. The penalty is often more severe than that depending on the defendant’s BAC or whether the defendant had drugs in their system.

The defendant challenged the use of his prior ARD as a sentencing enhancement, arguing it violated his constitutional rights because it was not an actual conviction. The trial court agreed and sentenced him as a first time offender. The Commonwealth appealed, and the Superior Court reversed. The Superior Court ordered that the defendant be resentenced as a second time offender. The defendant sought review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted allocatur.

The Issue on Appeal

The case centered on the application of Alleyne v. United States. In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact which increases or triggers a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The only exception is for prior convictions, which the Supreme Court has recognized need not be re-proven to a jury.

The critical question was therefore whether ARD acceptance falls within this "prior conviction exception."

The Court's Analysis

Chief Justice Todd, writing for the majority, held that ARD does not qualify as a prior conviction for several reasons:

ARD is Not a Conviction: The Court emphasized that ARD is explicitly a pre-trial diversion program where formal criminal proceedings are suspended. No conviction results from ARD acceptance.
No Constitutional Safeguards: Unlike criminal convictions, ARD proceedings lack fundamental protections:
- No requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
- No admission of guilt required from the defendant at all
- No jury trial
- No formal evidentiary proceedings
- Limited confrontation rights
Not Equivalent to a Guilty Plea: The Court rejected arguments that ARD acceptance is similar to pleading guilty. Key differences include:
- No guilty plea colloquy ensuring knowing and voluntary waiver of rights
- No admission to the facts of the offense
- No requirement that defendants be informed their ARD could enhance future sentences
- Successful completion results in dismissal and expungement, not conviction

The Court's Holding

The Supreme Court therefore held that:

Using prior ARD acceptance to enhance DUI sentences without jury determination violates Alleyne
Section 3806 of the Motor Vehicle Code is facially unconstitutional insofar as it includes ARD in the definition of "prior offense"
The unconstitutional ARD provision is severable from the rest of Section 3806
The defendant was properly sentenced as a first offender

Implications for Pennsylvania DUI Defense

This decision has significant implications for DUI cases in Pennsylvania:

For Current Cases:

Defendants facing DUI charges who have prior ARD resolutions cannot be sentenced as repeat offenders, so they will typically be facing lower mandatory minimums and maximum sentences.
The Commonwealth must now prove any prior DUI convictions (not ARD) to enhance sentences
Defense attorneys should challenge any attempt to use ARD as a sentencing enhancement both for future DUI cases and for any other types of cases

For Past Cases:

Defendants sentenced as repeat offenders based solely on prior ARD may have grounds for an appeal or post-conviction relief if the case was recent
Those currently serving enhanced sentences should consult counsel about potential remedies

For Future ARD Decisions:

The decision removes a significant consequence of accepting ARD
Defendants can accept ARD without fear it will automatically enhance future sentences
This may make ARD a more attractive option for first-time offenders

What This Means for You

If you're facing DUI charges and have a prior ARD, this decision provides crucial protection against mandatory minimum sentences. The Commonwealth can no longer use your ARD acceptance as an easy path to enhanced penalties.

However, the Court left open the possibility that if the Commonwealth can prove the underlying facts of your prior DUI offense to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, enhancement might still be possible. This would require a much more complex and difficult process for prosecutors.

The Dissenting View

Three justices dissented, arguing that ARD acceptance involves a knowing waiver of rights and that the statute could be applied constitutionally in some circumstances. However, the majority's view prevails, providing strong protection for DUI defendants.

Bottom Line

Commonwealth v. Shifflett represents a major victory for constitutional protections in DUI cases. It ensures that the severe consequences of repeat offender status cannot be imposed based solely on prior participation in a diversionary program designed to help first-time offenders avoid criminal convictions.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Attorney Goldstein Mehta LLC — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys

Zak Goldstein 4/26/25 Zak Goldstein 4/26/25

PA Superior Court: Trial Court May Deny Expungement Petition During Statute of Limitations

Philadelphia Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has decided the case of Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 2025 PA Super 93, affirming the denial of the defendant’s petitions to expunge two sets of charges stemming from alleged domestic violence incidents against his former girlfriend. The defendant sought expungement after the cases were dismissed for lack of prosecution when the complainant failed to appear for multiple preliminary hearing listings.

Procedural History

The Commonwealth charged the defendant at two docket numbers with Aggravated Assault and related offenses. The charges were dismissed a few months later after the complainant failed to appear on three separate occasions. Although the court granted the defendant limited access relief under 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122.2 in November 2022, the defendant filed expungement petitions about six months after the dismissal of the charges. The Commonwealth objected to the expungement of the charges. The Commonwealth cited an alleged pattern of domestic violence-related charges even though all of the charges had been dismissed. After a hearing, the motions judge in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas denied the petitions, and the defendant appealed.

Legal Standard

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reviews the denial of an expungement petition for an abuse of discretion. Where charges are terminated without a conviction or acquittal, courts must balance the petitioner’s right to be free from the reputational harm of maintaining arrest records against the Commonwealth’s interest in retaining them. A court must apply the five-factor test outlined in Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1981). Those factors are:

Strength of the Commonwealth’s case;
Reasons for retaining the records;
The petitioner’s age, criminal record, and employment history;
Time elapsed since the arrest; and
Specific adverse consequences suffered.

The Commonwealth bears the burden of justifying the retention of the records when the prosecution admits it cannot meet its burden at trial. However, per Commonwealth v. Drummond, 694 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. 1997), records may still be maintained until the statute of limitations expires if the evidence is not wholly insufficient.

Arguments on Appeal

The defendant argued that:

The Commonwealth failed to meet its burden because it presented only affidavits of probable cause, which constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The Commonwealth’s reasons for opposing expungement (potential Rule 404(b) use and pending statute of limitations) were too general.
His criminal record was dated, and he faced adverse employment consequences.
The short time since dismissal (six months) should not weigh against expungement.

The Commonwealth and the trial judge countered that:

The affidavits, describing serious physical injuries and identifying defendant, showed a non-frivolous case even though the complainant refused to testify.
The charges were part of a pattern of domestic violence.
The statute of limitations had not expired, allowing potential refiling.
The defendant had not proven specific adverse consequences.

Superior Court Holding

The Superior Court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. In making its ruling, the Court emphasized the following:

Only six months had passed between dismissal and the expungement petitions.
The statute of limitations would not expire until 2027, supporting retention in case the complainant later cooperated. This is probably not true - it would be very difficult for the Commonwealth to reinstate charges given that the speedy trial rule likely continues to run even though the charges have been dismissed.
The defendant remained employed part-time and had not clearly demonstrated that the existence of the dismissed charges prevented full-time employment or caused other specific harm.

The Court concluded that the Commonwealth had provided sufficient justification to retain the arrest records and that the defendant had not shown a compelling right to expungement under the Wexler factors.

Practical Takeaway

Commonwealth v. Lloyd reinforces that even when charges are dismissed without a preliminary hearing, expungement is not automatic. Where the Commonwealth can show a plausible reason to retain records—such as the statute of limitations still running, evidence of serious injuries, and potential future cooperation by a complainant—courts may deny expungement even absent a conviction. Defense attorneys should develop a detailed record of specific adverse consequences when seeking expungement and be prepared to argue why retention of a dismissed case would be fundamentally unfair under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, the defense probably should have argued that even if the statute of limitations had not expired, the speedy trial rule (Rule 600) likely would prevent the Commonwealth from reinstating the charges even if the Commonwealth decided to try to pursue the case again.

Facing criminal charges or appealing a criminal case in Pennsylvania?

Criminal Defense Lawyer Zak T. Goldstein, Esquire — Goldstein Mehta LLC Criminal Defense Attorneys